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  1. Maria Magoula Adamos (2007). The Unity of Emotion: An Unlikely Aristotelian Solution. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114.
    Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...)
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  2. Maria Magoula Adamos (2002). How Are the Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Aspects of Emotion Related? Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):183-195.
    Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity (...)
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  3. Maria Magoula Adamos (2000). Emotions: An Aristotelian Solution. Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
    The main purpose of the dissertation is to give a critical analysis of current theories of emotion, and articulate their main presuppositions. I argue that most theories of emotion fail to give an adequate account of emotions. Emotions do not necessarily involve evaluative beliefs---as the current cognitivist theories claim---nor are they just physiological sensations---as the affect theorists hold. Instead, emotions are multi-faceted phenomena which typically involve beliefs, thoughts, pictures or imaginings, as well as desires, behavioral changes and bodily feelings. What (...)
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  4. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  5. Raja Bahlul (2015). Emotion as Patheception. Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):104-122.
    Emotion as patheception. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/13869795.2013.874494.
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  6. John F. Bannan (2004). Emotions and Biology. Review of Metaphysics 58 (2):279 - 304.
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  7. J. M. Barbalet (1999). William James' Theory of Emotions: Filling in the Picture. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):251–266.
    The theory of emotion developed by William James has been subject to four criticisms. First, it is held that Jamesian emotion is without function, that it plays no role in cognition and behavior. Second, that James ignores the role of experience in emotion. Third, that James overstated the role of physical processes in emotion. Fourth, that James’ theory of emotion has been experimentally demonstrated to be false. A fifth point, less an explicit criticism than an assumption, holds that James has (...)
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  8. Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen (2014). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...)
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  9. Lisa Feldman Barrett & Kristen A. Lindquist (2008). The Embodiment of Emotion. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press
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  10. Bruce Baugh (1990). Sartre and James on the Role of the Body in Emotion. Dialogue 29 (03):357-.
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  11. Debra A. Bekerian & Susan J. Goodrich (1999). Forensic Applications of Theories of Cognition and Emotion. In Tim Dalgleish & M. J. Powers (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion. Wiley 783--798.
  12. A. Ben-Ze'ev (2000). What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. By Paul E. Griffiths. The European Legacy 5 (2):267-268.
  13. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  14. A. Ben-Ze?ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  15. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1987). The Nature of Emotions. Philosophical Studies 52 (3):393 - 409.
  16. Robyn Bluhm (2007). Beyond the Basics: The Evolution and Development of Human Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S):73-94.
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  17. T. Bosse, C. Jonker & J. Treur (2008). Formalisation of Damasio's Theory of Emotion, Feeling and Core Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):94-113.
    This paper contributes an analysis and formalisation of Damasio’s theory on core consciousness. Three important concepts in this theory are ‘emotion’, ‘feeling’ and ‘feeling a feeling’ . In particular, a simulation model is described of the dynamics of basic mechanisms leading via emotion and feeling to core consciousness, and dynamic properties are formally specified that hold for these dynamics at a more global level. These properties have been automatically checked for the simulation model. Moreover, a formal analysis is made of (...)
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  18. Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher (2013). Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception. Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  19. Berit Brogaard (2012). What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (11).
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
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  20. Jeremy Carrette (2005). Pt. 2. James, Psychology and Religion. Listening to James a Century Later : The Varieties as a Resource for Renewing the Psychology of Religion / David M. Wulff ; the Varieties, the Principles and Psychology of Religion : Unremitting Inspiration From a Different Source / Jacob A. Belzen ; Passionate Belief : William James, Emotion and Religious Experience. [REVIEW] In Jeremy R. Carrette (ed.), William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration. Routledge
  21. Louis C. Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
    Philosophical discussions regarding the status of emotion as a scientific domain usually get framed in terms of the question whether emotion is a natural kind. That approach to the issues is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, it has led to an intractable philosophical impasse that ultimately misconstrues the character of the relevant debate in emotion science. Second, and most important, it entirely ignores valence, a central feature of emotion experience, and probably the most promising criterion for demarcating emotion from cognition (...)
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  22. Louis C. Charland (2002). Review of 'What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories', by Paul E. Griffiths. [REVIEW] Mind and Language 17 (3):318-324.
  23. Marc A. Cohen (2008). The Two-Stage Model of Emotion and the Interpretive Structure of the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):291-320.
    Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of bodily responses is inadequate. I offer an alternative model, (...)
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  24. Giovanna Colombetti (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press
    The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. (...)
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  25. Giovanna Colombetti (2008). The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does Not Show. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):51-71.
    Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also argues (...)
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  26. Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (forthcoming). The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  27. Amy Coplan (2010). Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons From the Ancients on Emotion and Virtue-Acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.
    By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive (...)
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  28. Justin D'Arms (2008). Prinz's Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  29. Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 99--108.
  30. Antonio R. Damasio (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Putnam.
  31. R. De Sousa (1999). PAUL E. GRIFFITHS, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Dialogue 38:908-910.
  32. Craig DeLancey (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  33. Daniel C. Dennett, Review of Damasio, Descartes' Error. [REVIEW]
    The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we (...)
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  34. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions as Attitudes. Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  35. Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions: Philosophical Issues About. WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  36. Andreas Dorschel (1999). Emotion und Leib. Philosophia Naturalis 36 (1):35-52.
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  37. Paul Ekamn & Daniel Cordaro (2011). What is Meant by Calling Emotions Basic. Emotion Review 3 (4): Emotion Review October 2364-370.
    Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events. The emotion terms, such as anger, fear, etcetera, denote a family of related states sharing at least 12 characteristics, which distinguish one emotion family from another, as well as from other affective states. These affective responses are preprogrammed and involuntary, but are also shaped by life experiences.
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  38. Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
    The article develops a theoretical framework that is capable of integrating the biological foundations of emotions with their cultural and semantic formation.
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  39. Eva-Maria Engelen & Verena Mayer (2008). Gefuhle. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 115 (2):471.
    Nach Erläuterung der wesentlichen Begriffe wie „Emotion“ und „Gefühl“ stellt Eva-Maria Engelen die wichtigsten theoretischen Ansätze vor. Dabei spielen sowohl Theorien aus der Philosophie, der Psychologie als auch aus den Neurowissenschaften eine wichtige Rolle. Geklärt wird in weiteren Kapiteln das Verhältnis von Gefühlen und Emotionen zum Verstand, zum Bewusstsein und zu Werten.
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  40. J. Förster & R. S. Friedman (2008). The Embodied Emotional Mind. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press
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  41. Rick Anthony Furtak (2010). Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  42. Lukasz Andrzej Glinka (2013). Theorizing Emotions: A Brief Study of Psychological, Philosophical, and Cultural Aspects of Human Emotions. Cambridge International Science Publishing.
    This book presents the concise review of the psychological, philosophical, and cultural foundations for consistent theorizing emotions. The various aspects of the thing, based on the research literature, are compared and conclusions are presented. -/- Contents Foreword 1. Introduction 2. Psychological Basis - 1. Freud Psychoanalysis - 2. James-Lange Theory - 3. Schechter-Singer Theory - 4. Arnold-Frijda Approach - 5. Other Schools on Emotions 3. Individual Differences in Emotions 4. Philosophical Approach - 1. Husserl-Heidegger Phenomenology - 2. Sartre Phenomenology - (...)
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  43. Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
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  44. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  45. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  46. Cornelius L. Golightly (1953). The James-Lange Theory: A Logical Post-Mortem. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):286-299.
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  47. Edmund Gurney (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (35):421-426.
  48. Gary Hatfield (2007). Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Rene Descartes and William James had "body first" theories of the passions or emotions, according to which sensory stimulation causes a bodily response that then causes an emotion. Both held that this bodily response also causes an initial behavioral response (such as flight from a bear) without any cognitive intervention such as an "appraisal" of the object or situation. From here they differ. Descartes proposed that the initial processes that produce fear and running are entirely mechanical. Even human beings initially (...)
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  49. David Irons (1895). The Physical Basis of Emotion: A Reply. Mind 4 (13):92-99.
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  50. David Irons (1894). Prof. James' Theory of Emotion. Mind 3 (9):77-97.
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