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  1. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
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  2. John F. Bannan (2004). Emotions and Biology. Review of Metaphysics 58 (2):279 - 304.
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  3. J. M. Barbalet (1999). William James' Theory of Emotions: Filling in the Picture. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 29 (3):251–266.
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  4. Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen (2013). The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural (...)
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  5. Bruce Baugh (1990). Sartre and James on the Role of the Body in Emotion. Dialogue 29 (03):357-.
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  6. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings: Comment. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  7. A. Ben-Ze?ev (2002). Emotions Are Not Feelings. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):81-89.
  8. Robyn Bluhm (2007). Beyond the Basics: The Evolution and Development of Human Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S):73-94.
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  9. T. Bosse, C. Jonker & J. Treur (2008). Formalisation of Damasio's Theory of Emotion, Feeling and Core Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):94-113.
  10. Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher (2013). Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception. Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  11. Berit Brogaard (2012). What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel? Philosophers' Imprint 12 (11).
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
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  12. Jeremy Carrette (2005). Pt. 2. James, Psychology and Religion. Listening to James a Century Later : The Varieties as a Resource for Renewing the Psychology of Religion / David M. Wulff ; the Varieties, the Principles and Psychology of Religion : Unremitting Inspiration From a Different Source / Jacob A. Belzen ; Passionate Belief : William James, Emotion and Religious Experience. [REVIEW] In Jeremy R. Carrette (ed.), William James and the Varieties of Religious Experience: A Centenary Celebration. Routledge.
  13. Louis C. Charland (2005). The Heat of Emotion: Valence and the Demarcation Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):82-102.
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  14. Marc A. Cohen (2008). The Two-Stage Model of Emotion and the Interpretive Structure of the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior 29 (4):291-320.
    Empirical evidence shows that non-conscious appraisal processes generate bodily responses to the environment. This finding is consistent with William James’s account of emotion, and it suggests that a general theory of emotion should follow James: a general theory should begin with the observation that physiological and behavioral responses precede our emotional experience. But I advance three arguments (empirical and conceptual arguments) showing that James’s further account of emotion as the experience of bodily responses is inadequate. I offer an alternative model, (...)
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  15. Giovanna Colombetti (web). Enaction, Sense-Making and Emotion. In S. J. Gapenne & E. Di Paolo (eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
    The theory of autopoiesis is central to the enactive approach. Recent works emphasize that the theory of autopoiesis is a theory of sense-making in living systems, i.e. of how living systems produce and consume meaning. In this chapter I first illustrate (some aspects of) these recent works, and interpret their notion of sense-making as a bodily cognitive- emotional form of understanding. Then I turn to modern emotion science, and I illustrate its tendency to over-intellectualize our capacity to evaluate and understand. (...)
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  16. Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (forthcoming). The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
    For many years emotion theory has been characterized by a dichotomy between the head and the body. In the golden years of cognitivism, during the nineteen-sixties and seventies, emotion theory focused on the cognitive antecedents of emotion, the so-called “appraisal processes.” Bodily events were seen largely as byproducts of cognition, and as too unspecific to contribute to the variety of emotion experience. Cognition was conceptualized as an abstract, intellectual, “heady” process separate from bodily events. Although current emotion theory has moved (...)
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  17. Amy Coplan (2010). Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons From the Ancients on Emotion and Virtue-Acquisition. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):132-151.
    By briefly sketching some important ancient accounts of the connections between psychology and moral education, I hope to illuminate the significance of the contemporary debate on the nature of emotion and to reveal its stakes. I begin the essay with a brief discussion of intellectualism in Socrates and the Stoics, and Plato's and Posidonius's respective attacks against it. Next, I examine the two current leading philosophical accounts of emotion: the cognitive theory and the noncognitive theory. I maintain that the noncognitive (...)
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  18. Justin D'Arms (2008). Prinz's Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):712-719.
  19. Antonio R. Damasio (2001). Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 99--108.
  20. Antonio R. Damasio (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Putnam.
  21. Craig DeLancey (2005). Review of Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  22. Daniel C. Dennett, Review of Damasio, Descartes' Error. [REVIEW]
    The legacy of René Descartes' notorious dualism of mind and body extends far beyond academia into everyday thinking: "These athletes are prepared both mentally and physically," and "There's nothing wrong with your body--it's all in your mind." Even among those of us who have battled Descartes' vision, there has been a powerful tendency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) as the body's boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in with this standard way of thinking, we (...)
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  23. Eva-Maria Engelen, Hans J. Markowitsch, Christian Scheve, Birgitt Roettger-Roessler, Achim Stephan, Manfred Holodynski & Marie Vandekerckhove (2009). Emotions as Bio-Cultural Processes: Discipinary Debates and an Interdisciplinary Outlook. In Birgitt Röttger-Rössler & Hans Markowitsch (eds.), Emotions as Bio-cultural Processes.
    The article develops a theoretical framework that is capable of integrating the biological foundations of emotions with their cultural and semantic formation.
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  24. J. Förster & R. S. Friedman (2008). The Embodied Emotional Mind. In G. R. Semin & Eliot R. Smith (eds.), Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches. Cambridge University Press.
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  25. Rick Anthony Furtak (2010). Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
    In both psychology and philosophy, cognitive theories of emotion have met with increasing opposition in recent years. However, this apparent controversy is not so much a gridlock between antithetical stances as a critical debate in which each side is being forced to qualify its position in order to accommodate the other side of the story. Here, I attempt to sort out some of the disagreements between cognitivism and its rivals, adjudicating some disputes while showing that others are merely superficial. Looking (...)
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  26. Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
    Emotions, I will argue, involve two kinds of feeling: bodily feeling and feeling towards. Both are intentional, in the sense of being directed towards an object. Bodily feelings are directed towards the condition of one's body, although they can reveal truths about the world beyond the bounds of one's body – that, for example, there is something dangerous nearby. Feelings towards are directed towards the object of the emotion – a thing or a person, a state of affairs, an action (...)
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  27. Irwin Goldstein (2002). Are Emotions Feelings? A Further Look at Hedonic Theories of Emotions. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
    Many philosophers sharply distinguish emotions from feelings. Emotions are not feelings, and having an emotion does not necessitate having some feeling, they think. In this paper I reply to a set of arguments people use sharply to distinguish emotions from feelings. In response to these people, I endorse and defend a hedonic theory of emotion that avoids various anti-feeling objections. Proponents of this hedonic theory analyze an emotion by reference to forms of cognition (e.g., thought, belief, judgment) and a pleasant (...)
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  28. Irwin Goldstein (1981). Cognitive Pleasure and Distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.
    Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
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  29. Cornelius L. Golightly (1953). The James-Lange Theory: A Logical Post-Mortem. Philosophy of Science 20 (October):286-299.
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  30. Edmund Gurney (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (35):421-426.
  31. Gary Hatfield (2007). Did Descartes Have a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions? Philosophical Psychology 20 (4):413-440.
    Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007), 413–40. Key words: Cognitive theories of emotion, Rene Descartes, embodiment, emotions, evolution, historical methodology, instinct, mechanistic theories of behavior, mind–brain relations, passions, William James.
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  32. David Irons (1895). The Physical Basis of Emotion: A Reply. Mind 4 (13):92-99.
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  33. David Irons (1894). Prof. James' Theory of Emotion. Mind 3 (9):77-97.
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  34. William James (1884). What is an Emotion? Mind 9 (34):188-205.
  35. Uriah Kriegel (2012). Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion. European Journal of Philosophy (3):420-442.
    According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer from two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this (...)
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  36. Michael Lacewing (2000). Book Review of Pugmire, D., "Rediscovering Emotions&Quot;. [REVIEW] Ratio (3):287-292.
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  37. Robert W. Levenson (2011). Basic Emotion Questions. Emotion Review 3 (4):379-386.
    Among discrete emotions, basic emotions are the most elemental; most distinct; most continuous across species, time, and place; and most intimately related to survival-critical functions. For an emotion to be afforded basic emotion status it must meet criteria of: (a) distinctness (primarily in behavioral and physiological characteristics), (b) hard-wiredness (circuitry built into the nervous system), and (c) functionality (provides a generalized solution to a particular survival-relevant challenge or opportunity). A set of six emotions that most clearly meet these criteria (enjoyment, (...)
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  38. Michelle Maiese (2011). Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Machine generated contents note: -- Series Editors' Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- The Essential Embodiment Thesis -- Essentially Embodied, Desire-Based Emotions -- Sense of Self,_Embodiment, and Desire-Based Emotions -- The Role of Emotion in Decision and Moral Evaluation -- Essentially Embodied, Emotive, Enactive Social Cognition -- Breakdowns in Embodied Emotive Cognition -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index.
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  39. Olivier Massin (2013). The Intentionality of Pleasures. In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. Rodopi.
    This paper defends hedonic intentionalism, the view that all pleasures, including bodily pleasures, are directed towards objects distinct from themselves. Brentano is the leading proponent of this view. My goal here is to disentangle his significant proposals from the more disputable ones so as to arrive at a hopefully promising version of hedonic intentionalism. I mainly focus on bodily pleasures, which constitute the main troublemakers for hedonic intentionalism. Section 1 introduces the problem raised by bodily pleasures for hedonic intentionalism and (...)
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  40. Olivier Massin (2011). Joies Amères Et Douces Peines [Bitter Joys and Sweet Sorrows]. In Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Les ombres de l'âme, Penser les émotions négatives. Markus Haller.
    This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily location, (...)
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  41. Olivier Massin (2011). On Pleasures. Dissertation, Geneva
    This thesis introduces and defends the Axiological Theory of Pleasure (ATP), according to which all pleasures are mental episodes which exemplify an hedonic value. According to the version of the ATP defended, hedonic goodness is not a primitive kind of value, but amounts to the final and personal value of mental episodes. Beside, it is argued that all mental episodes –and then all pleasures– are intentional. The definition of pleasures I arrived at is the following : -/- x is a (...)
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  42. Charles S. Myers (1901). Experimentation on Emotion. Mind 10 (37):114-115.
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  43. Gerald E. Myers (1969). William James's Theory of Emotion. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 5 (2):67-89.
  44. W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.) (forthcoming). Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
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  45. Joseph T. Palencik (2007). William James and the Psychology of Emotions: From 1884 to the Present. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 43 (4):769 - 786.
    : This paper addresses the significance of William James's theory of emotion in contemporary emotion theory. While many of James's detractors have pointed to the problems with his definition of emotion, the bearing his theory of emotion generation would have on modern approaches in psychology suggests a different point of view.
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  46. Jaak Panksepp (2005). On the Embodied Neural Nature of Core Emotional Affects. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):158-184.
  47. Joel M. Potter (2012). Arguments From the Priority of Feeling From Contemporary Emotion Theory and Max Scheler's Phenomenology. Quaestiones Disputatae 3 (1):215-225.
    Many so-called “cognitivist” theories of the emotions account for the meaningfulness of emotions in terms of beliefs or judgments that are associated or identified with these emotions. In recent years, a number of analytic philosophers have argued against these theories by pointing out that the objects of emotions are sometimes meaningfully experienced before one can take a reflective stance toward them. Peter Goldie defends this point of view in his book The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Goldie argues that emotions are (...)
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  48. Jesse Prinz (2008). Précis of Gut Reactions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):707–711.
  49. Jesse Prinz (2004). Emotions Embodied. In R. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press.
    In one of the most frequently quoted passages in the history of emotion research, William James (1884: 189f) announces that emotions occur when the perception of an exciting fact causes a collection of bodily changes, and “our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion.” The same idea occurred to Carl Lange (1984) around the same time. These authors were not the first to draw a link between the emotions and the body. Indeed, this had been a (...)
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  50. Jesse J. Prinz (2005). Are Emotions Feelings? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (8-10):9-25.
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