Bookmark and Share

Spatial Experience

Edited by Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)
Assistant editor: Farid Masrour (Harvard University)
About this topic
Summary What is the relationship between our representation of spatial properties (such as distance, direction, size, shape, location) and objectivity? When we think of objects as existing independently of us, does this entail that we think of them as occupying space? Do we represent the objects we perceive as all occupying the same continuous space? Where does our concept of space come from? Is our representation of bodily space continuous with our representation of space outside the body?  Does the experience of space differ across sensory modalities? When we experience space, do we always experience ourselves in it? Could we hold constant our experience of left and right, while varying which direction those experiences represented?
Key works Kant 2007 discussed our representation of space and held that we represent a single continuous space, and that we represent objects as existing in it. His idea that we have a special means of representing space (an 'intuition') distinct from our means of representing objects in space has influenced many subsequent discussions of the relationship between space and objectivity. The relationship is also the topic of Evans 1980 and Strawson 1959Strawson 1959 introduced a case of a sound-world in which the inhabitant (Hero) only has auditory perception, and questions whether anyone could reidentification criteria for sounds that don't use any spatial cues.  Evans 1980 uses the case to probe the nature of our representation of mind-independence.
Introductions Eilan et al 1993; Evans 1980; Strawson 1959.
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
142 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 142
  1. Liliana Albertazzi (ed.) (2002). Unfolding Perceptual Continua. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.
    The book analyses the differences between the mathematical interpretation and the phenomenological intuition of the continuum.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. S. E. Asch & H. A. Witkin (1948). Studies in Space Orientation. II. Perception of the Upright with Displaced Visual Fields and with Body Tilted. Journal of Experimental Psychology 38 (4):455.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ignacio Ávila (2014). Evans on Bodily Awareness and Perceptual Self‐Location. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):269-287.
    In Chapter 7 of The Varieties of Reference Evans implicitly outlines a view to the effect that bodily awareness plays no role in perceptual self-location or in the specification of our perceptual perspective of the world. In this paper I discuss this story and offer an alternative proposal. Then I explore some consequences of this account for our understanding of the elusiveness of the self in perceptual experience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Antonio M. Battro (1977). Visual Riemannian Space Versus Cognitive Euclidean Space. Synthese 35 (4):423 - 429.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. David J. Bennett (2011). How the World Is Measured Up in Size Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):345-365.
    I develop a Russellian representationalist account of size experience that draws importantly from contemporary vision science research on size perception. The core view is that size is experienced in ‘body-scaled’ units. So, an object might, say, be experienced as two eye-level units high. The view is sharpened in response to Thompson’s (forthcoming) Doubled Earth example. This example is presented by Thompson as part of an argument for a Fregean view of size experience. But I argue that the Russellian view I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith (2003). A Theory of Granular Partitions. In Foundations of Geographic Information Science. Taylor & Francis
    We have a variety of different ways of dividing up, classifying, mapping, sorting and listing the objects in reality. The theory of granular partitions presented here seeks to provide a general and unified basis for understanding such phenomena in formal terms that is more realistic than existing alternatives. Our theory has two orthogonal parts: the first is a theory of classification; it provides an account of partitions as cells and subcells; the second is a theory of reference or intentionality; it (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Bill Brewer (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Bill Brewer (1993). The Integration of Spatial Vision and Action. In Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Bill Brewer (1992). Unilateral Neglect and the Objectivity of Spatial Representation. Mind and Language 7 (3):222-39.
    Patients may show a more-or-less complete deviation of the head and eyes towards the right (ipsilesional) side [that is, to the same side of egocentric space as the brain lesion responsible for their disorder]. If addressed by the examiner from the left (contralesional) side [the opposite side to their lesion], patients with severe extrapersonal neglect may fail to respond or may look for the speaker in the right side of the room, turning head and eyes more and more to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Robert Briscoe, Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science.
    Pictures are 2D surfaces designed to elicit 3D-scene-representing experiences from their viewers. In this essay, I argue that philosophers have tended to underestimate the relevance of research in vision science to understanding the nature of pictorial experience or ‘seeing-in’, to use Richard Wollheim’s familiar expression. Both the deeply entrenched methodology of virtual psychophysics as well as empirical studies of pictorial space perception provide compelling support for the view that seeing-in and seeing face-to-face are experiences of the same psychological, explanatory kind. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert Briscoe (2015). Multisensory Processing and Perceptual Consciousness: Part I. Philosophy Compass:1-13.
    Multisensory processing encompasses all of the various ways in which the presence of information in one sensory modality can adaptively influence the processing of information in a different modality. In Part I of this survey article, I begin by presenting a cartography of some of the more extensively investigated forms of multisensory processing, with a special focus on two distinct types of multisensory integration. I briefly discuss the conditions under which these different forms of multisensory processing occur as well as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Robert Briscoe (2014). Do Intentions for Action Penetrate Visual Experience? Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-2.
  14. Robert Briscoe (2014). Spatial Content and Motoric Significance. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):199-216.
    According to “actionism” (Noë 2010), perception constitutively depends on implicit knowledge of the way sensory stimulations vary as a consequence of the perceiver’s self-movement. My aim in this contribution is to develop an alternative conception of the role of action in perception present in the work of Gareth Evans using resources provided by Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of mental representation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay suggests, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Robert Briscoe (2010). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
    Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the "two visual systems" hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in conscious visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver's bodily actions. In this paper, I review and assess three main sources (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Robert Briscoe & Rick Grush (2015). Action-Based Theories of Perception. In The Stanford Encylcopedia of Philosophy. 1-66.
    Action is a means of acquiring perceptual information about the environment. Turning around, for example, alters your spatial relations to surrounding objects and, hence, which of their properties you visually perceive. Moving your hand over an object’s surface enables you to feel its shape, temperature, and texture. Sniffing and walking around a room enables you to track down the source of an unpleasant smell. Active or passive movements of the body can also generate useful sources of perceptual information (Gibson 1966, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Lorin Browning (1973). On Seeing 'Everything' Upside Down. Analysis 34 (December):48-49.
  21. David J. Bryant (1997). Representing Space in Language and Perception. Mind and Language 12 (3-4):239-264.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David J. Bryant & Barbara Tversky (1992). Assessing Spatial Frameworks with Object and Direction Probes. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (1):29-32.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Rebecca Bull, Alexandra A. Cleland & Thomas Mitchell (2013). Sex Differences in the Spatial Representation of Number. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):181.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. John Campbell (2007). What's the Role of Spatial Awareness in Visual Perception of Objects? Mind and Language 22 (5):548–562.
    I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. John Campbell (2006). What is the Role of Location in the Sense of a Visual Demonstrative? Reply to Matthen. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):239-254.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. John Campbell (1997). Attention and Frames of Reference in Spatial Reasoning: A Reply to Bryant. Mind and Language 12 (3&4):265–277.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. John Campbell (1996). Shape Properties, Experience of Shape and Shape Concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:351-363.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Quassim Cassam (2005). Space and Objective Experience. In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Albert Casullo (1989). Perceptual Space is Monadic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):131-134.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Albert Casullo (1986). The Spatial Structure of Perceptual Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):665-671.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Austen Clark, Location, Location, Location.
    Forthcoming in Lana Trick & Don Dedrick , Cognition, Computation, and Pylyshyn. MIT Press. Presented at the Zenon Pylyshyn Conference , University of Guelph, 1 May 2005.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Clare Mac Cumhaill (2015). Perceiving Immaterial Paths. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):687-715.
    In what sense does empty space feature in visual experience? In the first part of this essay I sketch a view advanced by Soteriou and Richardson on which one's visual awareness of empty space is explained by appeal to ‘structural’ features of the phenomenology of visual experience, in particular the phenomenology of experiencing one's visual field as bounded. I suggest that although this ‘structuralist’ view is silent on whether empty space has a phenomenal appearance, the very appeal to structural features (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. James E. Cutting (2003). Reconceiving Perceptual Space. In Heiko Hecht, Robert Schwartz & Margaret Atherton (eds.), Looking Into Pictures. The MIT Press
  34. John J. Drummond (1983). Objects' Optimal Appearances and the Immediate Awareness of Space in Vision. Man and World 16 (3):177-206.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John J. Drummond (1979). On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinaesthesis in Visual Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):19-32.
  36. Naomi M. Eilan (ed.) (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen A. McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.) (1993). Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Blackwell.
    Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Lorne Falkenstein (1989). Is Perceptual Space Monadic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):709-713.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Ilya Farber, Will Peterman & Patricia Smith Churchland (2001). 4 The View From Here: The Nonsymbolic Structure of Spatial. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. E. Ford (1893). The Original Datum of Space-Consciousness. Mind 2 (6):217-218.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Robert French (1987). The Geometry of Visual Space. Noûs 21 (June):115-133.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Robert E. French (1987). The Geometry Of Vision And The Mind Body Problem. Lang.
    In this thesis, I both analyze the phenomenology of vision from a geometrical point of view, and also develop certain connections between that geometrical analysis and the mind body problem. In order to motivate the need for such an analysis, I first show, by means of a refutation of direct realism, that visual space is never identical with any of the physical objects being indirectly "seen" by constituting color arrangements in it. It thus follows that the geometry of visual space (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Matthew Fulkerson (2012). Touch Without Touching. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (5).
    In this paper, I argue that in touch, as in vision and audition, we can and often do perceive objects and properties even when we are not in direct or even apparent bodily contact with them. Unlike those senses, however, touch experiences require a special kind of mutually interactive connection between our sensory surfaces and the objects of our experience. I call this constraint the Connection Principle. This view has implications for the proper understanding of touch, and perceptual reference generally. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.) (2010). Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the relationship between perception and action, with a focus on the debate about the dual visual systems hypothesis, against action oriented theories of perception.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Brian Glenney, Molyneux's Question. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Molyneux’s Question, also known as Molyneux’s Problem, soon became a fulcrum for early research in the epistemology of concepts, challenging common intuitions about how our concepts originate, whether sensory features differentiate concepts, and how concepts are utilized in novel contexts. It was reprinted and discussed by a wide range of early modern philosophers, including Gottfried Leibniz, George Berkeley, and Adam Smith, and was perhaps the most important problem in the burgeoning discipline of psychology of the 18th Century. The question has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. V. W. Grant (1942). Accommodation and Convergence in Visual Space Perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology 31 (2):89.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Pierre Grenon & Barry Smith (2004). SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial Ontology. Spatial Cognition and Computation 4 (1):69–103.
    We propose a modular ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snapshot views of the world at successive instants of time and, on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology must combine these two distinct types of inventory of the entities and relationships in reality, and we provide characterizations of spatiotemporal reasoning in the light of the interconnections (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Rick Grush (2000). Self, World and Space: The Meaning and Mechanisms of Ego- and Allocentric Spatial Representation. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (1):59-92.
    b>: The problem of how physical systems, such as brains, come to represent themselves as subjects in an objective world is addressed. I develop an account of the requirements for this ability that draws on and refines work in a philosophical tradition that runs from Kant through Peter Strawson to Gareth Evans. The basic idea is that the ability to represent oneself as a subject in a world whose existence is independent of oneself involves the ability to represent space, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Rick Grush (1998). Skill and Spatial Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (6).
    [1] It is well-known that Evans laid the groundwork for a truly radical and fruitful theory of _content_ -- a theory according to which content is a genus with at least conceptual and nonconceptual varieties as species, and in which nonconceptual content plays a very significant role. It is less well-recognized that Evans was also in the process of working out the details of a truly radical and groundbreaking theory of _representation_, a task he was unfortunately unable to bring to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Jonathan Harrison (1961). The Third Dimension. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:151-168.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 142