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  1. Elisa Aaltola (2012). Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Animal Suffering: Philosophy and Culture explores the multifaceted moral meanings allocated to non-human suffering in contemporary Western culture.
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  2. Fred Adams (ed.) (2007). Ethics and the Life Sciences. Philosophy Document Center.
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  3. Susan J. Armstrong & Richard George Botzler (eds.) (2008). The Animal Ethics Reader. Routledge.
    The Animal Ethics Reader is the first comprehensive, state-of-the-art anthology of readings on this substantial area of study and interest. A subject that regularly captures the headlines, the book is designed to appeal to anyone interested in tracing the history of the subject, as well as providing a powerful insight into the debate as it has developed. The recent wealth of material published in this area has not, until now, been collected in one volume. Readings are arranged thematically, carefully presenting (...)
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  4. Robin Attfield (2011). Schmidtz on Species Egalitarianism. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (2):139 - 141.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 139-141, June 2011.
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  5. Christiane Bailey & Chloë Taylor (2013). Editor's Introduction. Phaenex. Journal of Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture 8 (2):i-xv.
    Christiane Bailey and Chloë Taylor (Editorial Introduction) Sue Donaldson (Stirring the Pot - A short play in six scenes) Ralph Acampora (La diversification de la recherche en éthique animale et en études animales) Eva Giraud (Veganism as Affirmative Biopolitics: Moving Towards a Posthumanist Ethics?) Leonard Lawlor (The Flipside of Violence, or Beyond the Thought of Good Enough) Kelly Struthers Montford (The “Present Referent”: Nonhuman Animal Sacrifice and the Constitution of Dominant Albertan Identity) James Stanescu (Beyond Biopolitics: Animal Studies, Factory Farms, (...)
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  6. Marc Bekoff (1997). Deep Ethology, Animal Rights, and the Great Ape/Animal Project: Resisting Speciesism and Expanding the Community of Equals. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 10 (3):269-296.
    In this essay I argue that the evolutionary and comparative study of nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) cognition in a wide range of taxa by cognitive ethologists can readily inform discussions about animal protection and animal rights. However, while it is clear that there is a link between animal cognitive abilities and animal pain and suffering, I agree with Jeremy Bentham who claimed long ago the real question does not deal with whether individuals can think or reason but rather with whether (...)
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  7. Marc Bekoff & Lofe Gruen (1993). Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics: A Conversation Against Speciesism. Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):163 – 175.
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  8. Mark Bernstein (2004). Neo-Speciesism. Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (3):380–390.
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  9. T. M. Caro (1989). Making a Dent in Speciesism. Biology and Philosophy 4 (3):353-357.
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  10. Bob Corbett, Bob Corbett's Comments On Peter Singer's Analysis That Leads to Speciesism.
    As we begin our exploration of our relationship with animals, we come face to face with Peter Singer and his insistence that speciesism is a vice. It is important to come to know what he means by speciesism, why he regards it as a moral mistake.
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  11. Bob Corbett, Bonnie Steinbock Comments and on and Criticisms of Peter Singer's "Speciesism" Argument.
    Bonnie Steinbock argues that Peter Singer has made an important contribution to remind us that animals deserve very special consideration, but that he fails to make a compelling case against "speciesism.".
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  12. Roger Crisp (1985). A Comment on 'On Behalf of a Moderate Speciesism' by Alan Holland. Journal of Applied Philosophy 2 (2):279-280.
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  13. Simon Cushing (2003). Against "Humanism&Quot;: Speciesism, Personhood, and Preference. Journal of Social Philosophy 34 (4):556–571.
    Article responds to the criticism of speciesism that it is somehow less immoral than other -isms by showing that this is a mistake resting on an inadequate taxonomy of the various -isms. Criticizes argument by Bonnie Steinbock that preference to your own species is not immoral by comparison with racism of comparable level.
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  14. Joan Dunayer (2004). Speciesism. Ryce Pub..
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  15. Rainer Ebert & Tibor R. Machan (2012). Innocent Threats and the Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (2):146-159.
    The existence of predatory animals is a problem in animal ethics that is often not taken as seriously as it should be. We show that it reveals a weakness in Tom Regan's theory of animal rights that also becomes apparent in his treatment of innocent human threats. We show that there are cases in which Regan's justice-prevails-approach to morality implies a duty not to assist the jeopardized, contrary to his own moral beliefs. While a modified account of animal rights that (...)
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  16. William C. French (1995). Against Biospherical Egalitarianism. Environmental Ethics 17 (1):39-57.
    Arne Naess and Paul Taylor are two of the most forceful proponents of the principle of species equality. Problematically, both, when adjudicating conflict of interest cases, resort to employing explicit or implicit species-ranking arguments. I examine how Lawrence Johnson’s critical, species-ranking approach helpfully avoids the normative inconsistencies of “biospherical egalitarianism.” Many assume species-ranking schemes are rooted in arrogant, ontological claims about human, primate, or mammalian superiority. Species-ranking, I believe, is best viewed as a justified articulation of moral priorities in response (...)
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  17. Michael Goldman (2001). A Transcendental Defense of Speciesism. Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (1):59-69.
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  18. Donald Graft (1997). Against Strong Speciesism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (2):107–118.
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  19. Christopher Grau, A Sensible Speciesism?
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  20. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of moral (...)
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  21. John Hacker-Wright (2007). Moral Status in Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 82 (3):449-473.
    My contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of moral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I argue that the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtues like justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by that conception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of (...)
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  22. Alan J. Holland (1984). On Behalf of Moderate Speciesism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 1 (2):281-291.
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  23. Oscar Horta (2014). The Scope of the Argument From Species Overlap. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (1):142-154.
    The argument from species overlap has been widely used in the literature on animal ethics and speciesism. However, there has been much confusion regarding what the argument proves and what it does not prove, and regarding the views it challenges. This article intends to clarify these confusions, and to show that the name most often used for this argument (‘the argument from marginal cases’) reflects and reinforces these misunderstandings. The article claims that the argument questions not only those defences of (...)
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  24. Oscar Horta (2013). Animals, Moral Status Of. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
  25. Oscar Horta (2010). What is Speciesism? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (3):243-266.
    In spite of the considerable literature nowadays existing on the issue of the moral exclusion of nonhuman animals, there is still work to be done concerning the characterization of the conceptual framework with which this question can be appraised. This paper intends to tackle this task. It starts by defining speciesism as the unjustified disadvantageous consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. It then clarifies some common misunderstandings concerning what this means. Next, (...)
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  26. Oscar Horta (2010). The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear Against the Nonspeciesist Paradigm: A Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature. Between the Species 13 (10):163-187.
    Humans often intervene in the wild for anthropocentric or environmental reasons. An example of such interventions is the reintroduction of wolves in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called an “ecology of fear”, which is being currently discussed in places such as Scotland. In the first part of this paper I discuss the reasons for this measure and argue that they are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, I claim that if we (...)
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  27. Patrick Kain (2010). Duties Regarding Animals. In Lara Denis (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press. 210--233.
    A better appreciation of Kant’s commitments in a variety of disciplines reveals Kant had a deeper understanding of human and non-human animals than generally recognized, and this sheds new light on Kant’s claims about the nature and scope of moral status and helps to address, at least from Kant’s perspective, many of the familiar objections to his notorious account of “duties regarding animals.” Kant’s core principles about the nature of moral obligation structure his thoughts about the moral status of human (...)
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  28. Frederik Kaufman (1998). Speciesism and the Argument From Misfortune. Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):155–163.
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  29. Christopher Knapp (2009). Species Inegalitarianism as a Matter of Principle. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):174-189.
    Most critics of species egalitarianism point to its counter-intuitive implications in particular cases. But this argumentative strategy is vulnerable to the response that our intuitions should give way in the face of arguments showing that species egalitarianism is required by our deepest, most fundamental moral principles. In this article, I develop an argument against deontological versions of species egalitarianism on its own terms. Appealing to the fundamental moral ideal of proportionality, I show that deontological species egalitarianism is morally objectionable as (...)
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  30. Rahul Kumar (2008). Permissible Killing and the Irrelevance of Being Human. Journal of Ethics 12 (1):57 - 80.
    This is a review essay of Jeff McMahan's recent book The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP: 2002). In the first part, I lay out the central features of McMahan's account of the wrongness of killing and its implications for when it is permissible to kill. In the second part of the essay, I argue that we ought not to accept McMahan's rejection of species membership as having any bearing on whether it is permissible to kill (...)
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  31. Hugh LaFollette & Niall Shanks (1996). The Origin of Speciesism. Philosophy 71 (275):41-.
    Anti-vivisectionists charge that animal experimenters are speciesists people who unjustly discriminate against members of other species. Until recently most defenders of experimentation denied the charge. After the publication of `The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research' in the New England Journal of Medicine , experimenters had a more aggressive reply: `I am a speciesist. Speciesism is not merely plausible, it is essential for right conduct...'1. Most researchers now embrace Cohen's response as part of their defense of animal (...)
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  32. Hugh LaFollette & Niall Shanks (1995). Two Models of Models in Biomedical Research. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):141-160.
    Biomedical researchers claim there is significant biomedical information about humans which can be discovered only through experiments on intact animal systems (AMA p. 2). Although epidemiological studies, computer simulations, clinical investigation, and cell and tissue cultures have become important weapons in the biomedical scientists' arsenal, these are primarily "adjuncts to the use of animals in research" (Sigma Xi p. 76). Controlled laboratory experiments are the core of the scientific enterprise. Biomedical researchers claim these should be conducted on intact biological systems, (...)
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  33. Michael Meyer (2001). The Simple Dignity of Sentient Life: Speciesism and Human Dignity. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (2):115–126.
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  34. Albert Mosley, Expanding the Moral Circle: From Racism to Speciesism.
    This paper reviews the argument by Peter Singer that speciesism, the exploitation of other species without regard for their interests, is as morally objectionable as racism and sexism. Objections to this argument by philosophers such as Peter Carruthers, Mary Midgley, and Cora Diamond as well as conventional wisdom about notions of species differences are presented and critically examined. I conclude that Alaine Locke would have supported Singer's expansion of the moral circle.
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  35. Roger Paden (1992). Deconstructing Speciesism. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 (1):55-64.
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  36. R. L. Perkins (ed.) (1974). Abortion: Pro and Con. Schenkman.
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  37. Constance K. Perry (2001). A Compassionate Autonomy Alternative to Speciesism. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (3):237-246.
    Many people in the animal welfare communityhave argued that the use of nonhuman animals inmedical research is necessarily based onspeciesism, an unjustified prejudice based onspecies membership. As such it is morally akinto racism and sexism. This is misguided. Thecombined capacities for autonomy and sentiencewith the obligations derived from relationssupport a morally justifiable rationale forusing some nonhuman animals in order to limitthe risk of harm to humans. There may be a fewcases where it is morally better to use a neversentient human (...)
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  38. E. Gavin Reeve (1978). Speciesism and Equality. Philosophy 53 (206):562 - 563.
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  39. Colette Sciberras (2008). Buddhism and Speciesism: On the Misapplication of Western Concepts to Buddhist Beliefs. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 15:215-240.
    In this article, I defend Buddhism from Paul Waldau’s charge of speciesism. I argue that Waldau attributes to Buddhism various notions that it does not necessarily have, such as the ideas that beings are morally considerable if they possess certain traits, and that humans, as morally considerable beings, ought never to be treated as means. These ideas may not belong in Buddhism, and for Waldau’s argument to work, he needs to show that they do. Moreover, a closer look at his (...)
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  40. Dan C. Shahar (2011). Conflict and Comparison Between Species. Ethics, Policy and Environment 14 (2):163 - 166.
    Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 14, Issue 2, Page 163-166, June 2011.
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  41. Peter Singer, Taking Humanism Beyond Speciesism.
    During nearly two millennia of European history in which Christian dogmas could not be questioned, many prejudices put down deep roots. Humanists are, rightly, critical of Christians who have not freed themselves of these prejudices-for example, against the equality of women or against nonreproductive sex. It is curious, therefore, that, despite many individual exceptions, humanists have on the whole been unable to free themselves from one of the most central of these Christian dogmas: the prejudice of speciesism.
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  42. Peter Singer (2009). Speciesism and Moral Status. Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):567-581.
    Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for (...)
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  43. Peter Singer (1979). Killing Humans and Killing Animals. Inquiry 22 (1-4):145 – 156.
    It is one thing to say that the suffering of non-human animals ought to be considered equally with the like suffering of humans; quite another to decide how the wrongness of killing non-human animals compares with the wrongness of killing human beings. It is argued that while species makes no difference to the wrongness of killing, the possession of certain capacities, in particular the capacity to see oneself as a distinct entity with a future, does. It is claimed, however, that (...)
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  44. Bonnie Steinbock (1978). Speciesism and the Idea of Equality. Philosophy 53 (204):247 - 256.
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  45. Julia Tanner (2012). Anthropocentrism. In Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Environmental Issues.
    Definition: considering human beings to be of central importance; the source of value.
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  46. Julia Tanner (2011). The Argument From Marginal Cases: Is Species a Relevant Difference. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (32):225-235.
    Marginal humans are not rational yet we still think they are morally considerable. This is inconsistent with denying animals moral status on the basis of their irrationality. Therefore, either marginal humans and animals are both morally considerable or neither are. In this paper I consider a major objection to this argument: that species is a relevant difference between humans animals.
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  47. Julia Tanner (2011). Moral Status of Animals From Marginal Cases. In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  48. Julia Tanner (2009). The Argument From Marginal Cases and the Slippery Slope Objection. Environmental Values 18 (1):51-66.
    Rationality (or something similar) is usually given as the relevant difference between all humans and animals; the reason humans do but animals do not deserve moral consideration. But according to the Argument from Marginal Cases not all humans are rational, yet if such (marginal) humans are morally considerable despite lacking rationality it would be arbitrary to deny animals with similar capacities a similar level of moral consideration. The slippery slope objection has it that although marginal humans are not strictly speaking (...)
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  49. Julia Tanner (2008). Species as a Relationship. Acta Analytica 23 (4):337-347.
    The fact that humans have a special relationship to each other insofar as they belong in the same species is often taken to be a morally relevant difference between humans and other animals, one which justifies a greater moral status for all humans, regardless of their individual capacities. I give some reasons why this kind of relationship is not an appropriate ground for differential treatment of humans and nonhumans. I then argue that even if relationships do matter morally species membership (...)
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  50. Julia Tanner (2006). Marginal Humans, The Argument From Kinds, And The Similarity Argument. Facta Universitatis 5 (1):47-63.
    In this paper I will examine two responses to the argument from marginal cases; the argument from kinds and the similarity argument. I will argue that these arguments are insufficient to show that all humans have moral status but no animals do. This does not prove that animals have moral status but it does shift the burden of proof onto those who want to maintain that all humans are morally considerable, but no animals are.
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