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  • Marcus P. Adams (2009). Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction. Synthese 170 (1).
    In this article I have two primary goals. First, I present two recent views on the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how (Stanley and Williamson, The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):411–444, 2001; Hetherington, Epistemology futures, 2006). I contend that neither of these provides conclusive arguments against the distinction. Second, I discuss studies from neuroscience and experimental psychology that relate to this distinction. Having examined these studies, I then defend a third view that explains certain relevant data from these studies by positing the (...)
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  • Mark Aronszajn (1996). A Defense of Temporalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1).
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  • Radu Bogdan, What is Epistemic Discourse About?
    In the 1960’s and 70’s Jaakko Hintikka has written extensively about epistemic logic, epistemic concepts and ordinary epistemic discourse. As a (graduate) student of Jaakko’s toward the end of that period, I was somewhat familiar with that body of work and even discussed some fragments of it in my dissertation on the pragmatics of knowledge. Since then my interests developed in different directions, toward philosophy of mind and cognitive science in general and commonsense or naive psychology in particular. This paper (...)
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  • Yuri Cath (2009). The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How. Noûs 43 (1):137-156.
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  • M. J. Cresswell (1978). Prepositions and Points of View. Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (1).
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  • Jack Hoeksema (2008). There is No Number Effect in the Licensing of Negative Polarity Items: A Reply to Guerzoni and Sharvit. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (4).
    Guerzoni and Sharvit (Linguistics and Philosophy 30:361–391, 2007) provide an argument that plural, but not singular, wh-phrases may contain a negative polarity item in their restriction, and connect this with the semantic property of exhaustivity. I will show that this claim is factually incorrect, and that the theory of negative polarity licensing does not need to be complicated by taking number distinctions into account. In addition, I will argue that number distinctions do not appear to be relevant for polarity items (...)
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  • Christopher Kennedy (2001). Polar Opposition and the Ontology of 'Degrees'. Linguistics and Philosophy 24 (1).
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  • E. König (1977). Temporal and Non-Temporal Uses of 'Noch' and 'Schon' in German. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2).
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  • Henry Laycock, Words Without Objects.
    A picture of the world as chiefly one of discrete objects, distributed in space and time, has sometimes seemed compelling. It is however one of two main targets of this work; for it is seriously incomplete. The picture leaves no space for stuff like air and water. With discrete objects, we may always ask "how many?," but with stuff the question has to be "how much?" Within philosophy, stuff of certain basic kinds is central to the ancient pre-Socratic world-view; but (...)
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  • Henry Laycock, Words Without Objects - Book and Chapters Abstracts.
    The 'paper' is itself an abstract, hopefully useful, of the book and its chapters from Clarendon Press (April 2006).
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  • Henry Laycock (1972). Some Questions of Ontology. Philosophical Review 81 (1):3-42.
    The views of Quine and Strawson on the significance of 'mass terms' are rehearsed, and the metaphysical status of substances, in the chemist's sense, is considered. It is urged that the ontological dichotomy of particulars and universals is not adequate to accommodate such substances, which are in a sense to be explicated concrete but non-particular.
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  • Ted Poston (2009). Know How to Be Gettiered? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743-747.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
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  • Agustin Rayo, Beyond Plurals.
    I have two main objectives. The first is to get a better understanding of what is at issue between friends and foes of higher-order quantification, and of what it would mean to extend a Boolos-style treatment of second-order quantification to third- and higherorder quantification. The second objective is to argue that in the presence of absolutely general quantification, proper semantic theorizing is essentially unstable: it is impossible to provide a suitably general semantics for a given language in a language of (...)
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  • William H. Roberts (1941). Experience - Noun or Verb? Journal of Philosophy 38 (September):542-548.
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  • Daniele Sgaravatti & Elia Zardini (2008). Knowing How to Establish Intellectualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):217-261.
    In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge-that. Thirdly, (...)
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  • Peter Simons (2006). The Logic of Location. Synthese 150 (3).
    I consider the idea of a propositional logic of location based on the following semantic framework, derived from ideas of Prior. We have a collection L of locations and a collection S of statements such that a statement may be evaluated for truth at each location. Typically one and the same statement may be true at one location and false at another. Given this semantic framework we may proceed in two ways: introducing names for locations, predicates for the relations among (...)
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  • Bas C. van Fraassen (1995). `World' is Not a Count Noun. Noûs 29 (2):139-157.
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  • Ralph Wedgwood (2001). Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms. Philosophical Review 110 (1):1-30.
    This paper outlines a new approach to the task of giving an account of the meaning of moral statements: a sort of "conceptual role semantics", according to which the meaning of moral terms is given by their role in practical reasoning. This role is sufficient both to distinguish the meaning of any moral term from that of other terms, and to determine the property or relation (if any) that the term stands for. The paper ends by suggesting reasons for regarding (...)
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  • Markus Werning (2003). Ventral Versus Dorsal Pathway: The Source of the Semantic Object/Event and the Syntactic Noun/Verb Distinction? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):299-300.
    Experimental data suggest that the division between the visual ventral and dorsal pathways may indeed indicate that static and dynamical information is processed separately. Contrary to Hurford, it is suggested that the ventral pathway primarily generates representations of objects, whereas the dorsal pathway produces representations of events. The semantic object/event distinction may relate to the morpho-syntactic noun/verb distinction.
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  • John N. Williams (2008). Propositional Knowledge and Know-How. Synthese 165 (1).
    This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes (...)
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  • Eytan Zweig (2009). Number-Neutral Bare Plurals and the Multiplicity Implicature. Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (4).
    Bare plurals ( dogs ) behave in ways that quantified plurals ( some dogs ) do not. For instance, while the sentence John owns dogs implies that John owns more than one dog, its negation John does not own dogs does not mean “John does not own more than one dog”, but rather “John does not own a dog”. A second puzzling behavior is known as the dependent plural reading; when in the scope of another plural, the ‘more than one’ (...)
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