Related categories
Siblings:
35 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Yuri Balashov (2007). About Stage Universalism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):21–39.
    Most four-dimensionalists, including both worm and stage theorists, endorse mereological universalism, the thesis that any class of objects has a fusion. But the marriage of fourdimensionalism and universalism is unfortunate and unprofitable: it creates a recalcitrant problem for stage theory’s account of lingering properties, such as writing ‘War and Piece’ and traveling across the tennis court, which take time to be instantiated. This makes it necessary to impose a natural restriction on diachronic composition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Yuri Balashov (2007). Defining ‚Exdurance'. Philosophical Studies 133 (1):143 - 149.
    On stage theory, ordinary continuants are instantaneous stages which persist by exduring—by bearing temporal counterpart relations to other such stages. Exduring objects lack temporal extension and there is a sense in which they are wholly present at multiple instants. How then is exdurance different from endurance? I offer a definition of ‚exdurance’ that clearly sets it apart from other modes of persistence.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Yuri Balashov (2005). Times of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience. American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4):295 - 309.
    On the B-theory of time, the experiences we have throughout our conscious lives have the same ontological status: they all tenselessly occur at their respective dates. But we do not seem to experience all of them on the same footing. In fact, we tend to believe that only our present experiences are real, to the exclusion of the past and future ones. The B-theorist has to maintain that this belief is an illusion and explain the origin of the illusion. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Yuri Balashov (2002). On Stages, Worms, and Relativity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50:223-.
    Four-dimensionalism, or perdurantism, the view that temporally extended objects persist through time by having (spatio-)temporal parts or stages, includes two varieties, the worm theory and the stage theory. According to the worm theory, perduring objects are four-dimensional wholes occupying determinate regions of spacetime and having temporal parts, or stages, each of them confined to a particular time. The stage theorist, however, claims, not that perduring objects have stages, but that the fundamental entities of the perdurantist ontology are stages. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jiri Benovsky (2009). Eternalist Theories of Persistence Through Time: Where the Differences Really Lie. Axiomathes 19 (1):51-71.
    The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view , and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism . Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view and the endurantist theories—are more (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Jiri Benovsky (2006). Persistence Through Time and Across Possible Worlds. Ontos Verlag.
    How do ordinary objects persist through time and across possible worlds ? How do they manage to have their temporal and modal properties ? These are the questions adressed in this book which is a "guided tour of theories of persistence". The book is divided in two parts. In the first, the two traditional accounts of persistence through time (endurantism and perdurantism) are combined with presentism and eternalism to yield four different views, and their variants. The resulting views are then (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Montse Bordes (1997). Four-Dimensional Remarks: A Defence of Temporal Parts. Theoria (29):343-377.
  8. Heather Dyke (2006). Review of Jiri Benovsky, Persistence Through Time, and Across Possible Worlds. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (9).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Heather Dyke (2003). Review of Katherine Hawley, How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Crawford L. Elder (2011). Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. Cambridge University Press.
    Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to 'explain (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Cody Gilmore (2012). Keep in Touch. Philosophia Naturalis 49 (1):85-111.
    I introduce a puzzle about contact and de re temporal predication in relativistic spacetime. In particular, I describe an apparent counterexample to the following principle, roughly stated: if B is never in a position to say ‘I was touching A, I am touching A, and I will be touching A’, then (time travel aside) A is never in a position to say ‘I was touching B, I am touching B, and I will be touching B’. In the case I present, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Alessandro Giordani & Damiano Costa (2013). From Times to Worlds and Back Again: A Transcendentist Theory of Persistence. Thought 2 (1):210-220.
    Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Mariusz Grygianiec (2005). Genidentyczność a metafizyka persystencji: endurantyzm, perdurantyzm i eksdurantyzm. Filozofia Nauki 2.
    The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scien-tific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (stage view and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theo-ries, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Sally Haslanger, Comments on Sider.
    I’ll start by giving a very brief summary of Sider’s position and will identify some points on which my own position differs from his. I’ll then raise four issues, viz., how to articulate the 3-dimensionalist view, the trade-offs between Ted’s stage view of persistence and endurance with respect to intrinsic properties, the endurantist’s response to the argument from vagueness, and finally more general questions about what’s at stake in the debate. I don’t believe that anything I say raises insurmountable problems (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Katherine Hawley (2001). How Things Persist. Oxford University Press.
    Katherine Hawley explores and compares three theories of persistence -- endurance, perdurance, and stage theories - investigating the ways in which they attempt to account for the world around us. Having provided valuable clarification of its two main rivals, she concludes by advocating stage theory.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ingvar Johansson (2010). Review: Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Objects in Time. Studies of Persistence in B-Time (2009). [REVIEW] Metaphysica 11 (1):93-94.
  18. S. Langford (2010). Reply to Roache. Analysis 70 (4):676-681.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Simon Langford (2007). How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
    David Lewis's cohabitation theory suffered damaging criticism from Derek Parfit. Though many have defended versions of Lewis's theory Parfit's criticism has not been answered. This paper shows how to defend the cohabitation theory against Parfit's criticism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Trenton Merricks (2003). Review: How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):146-148.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Pablo Rychter (2012). Stage Theory and Proper Names. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):367-379.
    In the contemporary debate about the nature of persistence, stage theory is the view that ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are instantaneous and persist by being suitably related to other instantaneous objects. In this paper I focus on the issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like ‘Socrates’ or ‘London’. I consider the remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Theodore Sider (2000). The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 60 (1):84 - 88.
    Four-dimensionalism, as I’ll use the term, is the doctrine that reality is spread out in time as well as space.1 Just as objects that are located at multiple regions of space contain parts confined to those regions of space, so objects that are located at multiple regions of time contain parts — temporal parts — that are confined to those regions of time. (Or better: an object that occupies an extended spatiotemporal region R has parts confined to the various subregions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Theodore Sider (1997). Four-Dimensionalism. Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Theodore Sider (1996). All the World's a Stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
    Some philosophers believe that everyday objects are 4-dimensional spacetime worms, that a person (for example) persists through time by having temporal parts, or stages, at each moment of her existence. None of these stages is identical to the person herself; rather, she is the aggregate of all her temporal parts.1 Others accept “three dimensionalism”, rejecting stages in favor of the notion that persons “endure”, or are “wholly present” throughout their lives.2 I aim to defend an apparently radical third view: not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Joshua M. Stuchlik (2003). Not All Worlds Are Stages. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):309-321.
    The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivatedby the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in thecases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claimsthat there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory,it argues that these spacetime worms are not familiar particulars liketables and chairs. Rather, familiar particulars are the instantaneoustemporal slices of worms. In order to explain our intuitions that particulars persist for more than an instant, the stage theory drawson (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Paul Tappenden, Sider's Stage Theory and Expectancy Prior to Personal Fission.
    According to Sider’s stage theory a subject about to undergo personal fission should expect to experience each outcome simultaneously as distinct persons. How is the subject to make sense of this ? I argue that their most paradigmatically self-interested future-directed behaviour, betting for personal gain, ought to be exactly the same as in equivalent games of chance where the possible outcomes correspond to the fission output branches. So this novel form of expectancy, albeit strange, can be a reliable guide to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Helen Tattam (2010). Words and the Stage. Theory, Theatre, and Polyphony : Dramatising Existentialist Ethical Thought. In Pierre-Alexis Mevel & Helen Tattam (eds.), Language and its Contexts: Transposition and Transformation of Meaning? = le Langage Et Ses Contexts: Transposition Et Transformation du Sens? Peter Lang.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Achille C. Varzi (2003). Naming the Stages. Dialectica 57 (4):387–412.
    Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Achille C. Varzi (2003). Riferimento, predicazione, e cambiamento. In Claudia Bianchi & Andrea Bottani (eds.), Significato e ontologia. Franco Angeli. 221–249.
    This paper focuses on the semantics of statements of the form ‘x is P at t’ vis-à-vis its metaphysical underpinnings. I begin by considering four main readings, corresponding to the four basic parsings of the temporal modifier ‘at t’: (1) at-t x is P, (2) x-at-t is P, (3) x is-at-t P, and (4) x is P-at-t. Each of these readings—which correspond to different metaphysical conceptions of the nature of temporal change—is found inadequate or otherwise problematic. In the second part (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Emanuel Viebahn (2013). Counting Stages. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):311-324.
    This paper defends stage theory against the argument from diachronic counting. It argues that stage theorists can appeal to quantifier domain restriction in order to accommodate intuitions about diachronic counting sentences. Two approaches involving domain restriction are discussed. According to the first, domains of counting are usually restricted to stages at the time of utterance. This approach explains intuitions in many cases, but is theoretically costly and delivers wrong counts if diachronic counting is combined with fission or fusion. On the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2010). The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication. Erkenntnis 72 (2):267 - 280.
    In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “ a is F at t ”, where “ a ” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “ F ” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “ t ” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2008). Can I Be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time? Metaphysica 9 (2):235-239.
    An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Brian Weatherson, Growing Individuals and Temporary Intrinsics.
    I argue that ordinary objects are fusions of past and present, but not future, temporal parts. This theory provides the neatest solution to some puzzles concerning intrinsic properties, and is supported by some surprising linguistic data. (This paper is probably inconsistent with some other papers I've written, but the line it runs is at least amusing and original.).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Brian Weatherson, Growing Individuals and Intrinsic Properties.
    Most people who believe in temporal parts believe that the referents of our ordinary referring terms, like Bill Clinton, or that table, are fusions of temporal parts from past, present and future times. Call these fusions worms, and the theory that the referents of ordinary referring terms (ordinary objects) the worm theory. Buying the metaphysical theory of temporal parts does not immediately imply that we must buy the worm theory. Theodore Sider (1996, 2000), for example, has suggested that these ordinary (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Stephen Wright (2010). The Leibniz's Law Problem (For Stage Theory). Metaphysica 11 (2):137-151.
    Stage theorists invoke the idea of counterpart relations to make sense of how objects are able to persist despite their claim that an object is identical with a single instantaneous stage. According to stage theorists, an object persists if and only if it has a later counterpart that bears the appropriate counterpart relation of identity to it. Whilst objects can and do persist, stages cannot and do not. This seems to amount to a refutation of Leibniz’s law. Stage theorists think (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation