This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
19 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Gunnar Björnsson (2007). How Effects Depend on Their Causes, Why Causal Transitivity Fails, and Why We Care About Causation. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):349 - 390.
    Despite recent efforts to improve on counterfactual theories of causation, failures to explain how effects depend on their causes are still manifest in a variety of cases. In particular, theories that do a decent job explaining cases of causal preemption have problems accounting for cases of causal intransitivity. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the counterfactual accounts makes it difficult to see why the concept of causation would be such a central part of our cognition. In this paper, I propose an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Dorothy Edgington (1997). Mellor on Chance and Causation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):411-433.
    Mellor's subject is singular causation between facts, expressed ‘E because C’. His central requirement for causation is that the chance that E if C be greater than the chance that E if C: chc(E)>chc(E). The book is as much about chance as it is about causation. I show that his way of distinguishing chc (E) from the traditional notion of conditional chance leaves than him with a problem about the existence of chQ(P) when Q is false (Section 3); and also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ellery Eells (1991). Probabilistic Causality. CUP.
    In this important first book in the series Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory, Ellery Eells explores and refines current ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ellery Eells (1987). Probabilistic Causality: Reply to John Dupré. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):105-114.
    John Dupré (1984) has recently criticized the theory of probabilistic causality developed by, among others, Good (1961-62), Suppes (1970), Cartwright (1979), and Skyrms (1980). He argues that there is a tension or incompatibility between one of its central requirements for the presence of a causal connection, on the one hand, and a feature of the theory pointed out by Elliott Sober and me (1983), on the other. He also argues that the requirement just alluded to should be given up. I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Bruce Glymour (2003). On the Metaphysics of Probabilistic Causation: Lessons From Social Epidemiology. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1413-1423.
    I argue that the orthodox account of probabilistic causation, on which probabilistic causes determine the probability of their effects, is inconsistent with certain ontological assumptions implicit in scientific practice. In particular, scientists recognize the possibility that properties of populations can cause the behavior of members of the populations. Such emergent population‐level causation is metaphysically impossible on the orthodoxy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Luke Glynn (2011). A Probabilistic Analysis of Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):343-392.
    The starting point in the development of probabilistic analyses of token causation has usually been the naïve intuition that, in some relevant sense, a cause raises the probability of its effect. But there are well-known examples both of non-probability-raising causation and of probability-raising non-causation. Sophisticated extant probabilistic analyses treat many such cases correctly, but only at the cost of excluding the possibilities of direct non-probability-raising causation, failures of causal transitivity, action-at-a-distance, prevention, and causation by absence and omission. I show that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Christopher Hitchcock (1996). A Probabilistic Theory of Second Order Causation. Erkenntnis 44 (3):369 - 377.
    Larry Wright and others have advanced causal accounts of functional explanation, designed to alleviate fears about the legitimacy of such explanations. These analyses take functional explanations to describe second order causal relations. These second order relations are conceptually puzzling. I present an account of second order causation from within the framework of Eells' probabilistic theory of causation; the account makes use of the population-relativity of causation that is built into this theory.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1995). The Mishap at Reichenbach Fall: Singular Vs. General Causation. Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Christopher Read Hitchcock (1993). A Generalized Probabilistic Theory of Causal Relevance. Synthese 97 (3):335 - 364.
    I advance a new theory of causal relevance, according to which causal claims convey information about conditional probability functions. This theory is motivated by the problem of disjunctive factors, which haunts existing probabilistic theories of causation. After some introductory remarks, I present in Section 3 a sketch of Eells's (1991) probabilistic theory of causation, which provides the framework for much of the discussion. Section 4 explains how the problem of disjunctive factors arises within this framework. After rejecting three proposed solutions, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Adam Morton (1980). Would Cause. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:139 - 151.
    I discuss 'cause' embedded in the consequent of a counterfactual: if e1 then e2 would cause e3. I argue that surprising as it may seem this idea is in some respects easier to understand than simple 'e1 caused e2'.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Wesley Salmon (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Review of Dowe and Noordhof: Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):869-874.
    This is an excellent anthology. The contributors are first-rate, the contributions are state-of-the-art, and the content is highly unified. The introduction further connects the essays and succinctly articulates the main themes. What results will be of interest to anyone interested in the contemporary discussion of causation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jonathan Schaffer (2000). Overlappings: Probability-Raising Without Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):40 – 46.
    The leading regularity, counterfactual, and agential accounts of causation converge on the idea that causation is probability-raising. While the necessity of probability-raising for causation remains in dispute, the sufficiency of probability-raising for causation is generally assumed, at least in the direct (no intermediaries involved) and precisely described case. I offer a class of counterexamples: overlappings.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Patrick Suppes (1970). A Probabilistic Theory of Causality. Amsterdam,North-Holland Pub. Co..
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. László E. Szabó, The Einstein--Podolsky--Rosen Argument and the Bell Inequalities. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) published an important paper in which they claimed that the whole formalism of quantum mechanics together with what they called a “Reality Criterion” imply that quantum mechanics cannot be complete. That is, there must exist some elements of reality that are not described by quantum mechanics. They concluded that there must be a more complete description of physical reality involving some hidden variables that can characterize the state of affairs in the world in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Michael Tooley (2004). Probability and Causation. In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Charles R. Twardy & Kevin B. Korb (2011). Actual Causation by Probabilistic Active Paths. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):900-913.
    We present a probabilistic extension to active path analyses of token causation (Halpern & Pearl 2001, forthcoming; Hitchcock 2001). The extension uses the generalized notion of intervention presented in (Korb et al. 2004): we allow an intervention to set any probability distribution over the intervention variables, not just a single value. The resulting account can handle a wide range of examples. We do not claim the account is complete --- only that it fills an obvious gap in previous active-path approaches. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Brad Weslake (2006). Common Causes and the Direction of Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):239-257.
    Is the common cause principle merely one of a set of useful heuristics for discovering causal relations, or is it rather a piece of heavy duty metaphysics, capable of grounding the direction of causation itself? Since the principle was introduced in Reichenbach’s groundbreaking work The Direction of Time (1956), there have been a series of attempts to pursue the latter program—to take the probabilistic relationships constitutive of the principle of the common cause and use them to ground the direction of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
    Woodward's long awaited book is an attempt to construct a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a wide variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. The book engages some of the relevant literature from other disciplines, as Woodward weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defenses, objections, and replies into a convincing defense of the core of his theory, which is that we can analyze causation by appeal to the notion of manipulation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation