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- Maria Alvarez (2010). Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. OUP Oxford.
- Maria Alvarez (2009). How Many Kinds of Reasons? Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
- Steven Arkonovich (2011). Advisors and Deliberation. Journal of Ethics 15 (4):405-424.
- Carla Bagnoli (2007). The Authority of Reflection. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 22 (1):43-52.
- Simon Blackburn, A Short Note on Reasons.
- Richard A. Blanke (1986). Objective Reasons and Practical Reasons. Metaphilosophy 17 (1):26–41.
- Paul Boghossian (2001). How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible? Philosophical Studies 106 (1-2):1 - 40.
- Anthony Robert Booth (2006). Can There Be Epistemic Reasons for Action? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):133-144.
- John Broome (2008). Reply to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity. Ethics 119 (1):96-108.
- John Broome (2007). Does Rationality Consist in Responding Correctly to Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):349-374.
- John Broome (2005). Does Rationality Give Us Reasons? Philosophical Issues 15 (1):321–337.
- John Brunero (2007). Are Intentions Reasons? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444.
- Randolph Clarke (2008). Autonomous Reasons for Intending. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.
- Roger Crisp (2009). Goodness and Reasons: A Response to Stratton-Lake. Mind 118 (472):1095-1099.
- Jonathan Dancy (2003). Précis of Practical Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):423–428.
- Jonathan Dancy (2003). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):468–490.
- Stephen Darwall (2003). Desires, Reasons, and Causes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
- John K. Davis (2009). Subjectivity, Judgment, and the Basing Relationship. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):21-40.
- Fabian Dorsch, Our Subjective Perspective on Objective Reasons.
- Fred Dretske (1971). Conclusive Reasons. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1 – 22.
- Pascal Engel (2005). Logical Reasons. Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
- Daan Evers (forthcoming). In Defence of Proportionalism. European Journal of Philosophy.
- W. D. Falk (1986). Ought, Reasons, and Morality: The Collected Papers of W.D. Falk. Cornell University Press.
- Stephen Finlay (2006). The Reasons That Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
- Gerald Gaus, What is Deontology?, Part Two: Reasons to Act Gerald F. Gaus.
- Joshua Gert (2008). Putting Particularism in its Place. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
- John Gibbons (2010). Things That Make Things Reasonable. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.
- Alan H. Goldman (2008). The Case Against Objective Values. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):507 - 524.
- Alex Gregory (2009). Slaves of the Passions? On Schroeder's New Humeanism. Ratio 22 (2):250-257.
- Allan Hazlett, Wishful Thinking as Responding to Non-Epistemic Theoretical Reasons.
- Brian Hedden (2012). Options and the Subjective Ought. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
- Tim Henning (2012). Normative Reasons Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2).
- Kelly Heuer, Hypotheticalism and the Objectivity of Morality.
- Thomas E. Hill Jr (1986). Review: Darwall on Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Ethics 96 (3):604-619.
- Brad Hooker (2003). Comments: Dancy on How Reasons Are Related to Oughts. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41:114-120.
- Christopher Hookway (2006). Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtues. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.
- John Horty (2007). Reasons as Defaults. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (3):1-28.
- Vaughn E. Huckfeldt (2007). Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality. Philosophia 35 (1):23-41.
- Laurence Kaufmann (2005). Self-in-a-Vat: On John Searle's Ontology of Reasons for Acting. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):447-479.
- Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
- Benjamin Kiesewetter (2012). A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Normativity. Analysis 72 (3):466-474.
- Benjamin Kiesewetter (2011). 'Ought' and the Perspective of the Agent. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.
- James Lenman (1998). Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
- Hallvard Lillehammer (2010). Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons. Journal of Ethics 14 (1).
- Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). The Russellian Retreat. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
- Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3).
- Duncan Macintosh (2007). Reasons and Purposes: Human Rationality and the Teleological Explanation of Action - By G.F. Schueler. Philosophical Books 48 (1):86-88.
- Julia Markovits (2010). Acting for the Right Reasons. Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
- Alfred Mele (2007). Reasonology and False Beliefs. Philosophical Papers 36 (1):91-118.
- Christian Miller (2008). Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):551 - 561.
- James Morauta (2010). In Defence of State-Based Reasons to Intend. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228.
- Paul K. Moser (1990). Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions. Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
- Thomas Nagel (1997). The Last Word. OUP USA.
- Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
- Christian Piller (2003). Two Accounts of Objective Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444–451.
- Ted Poston (2012). Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
- James Pryor (2007). Reasons and That-Clauses. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244.
- Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2012). Reasons From The Humean Perspective. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (249):777-796.
- Joseph Raz, On the Guise of the Good.
- Joseph Raz (2009). Reasons : Practical and Adaptive. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
- Instrumental Reasons, Instrumental Reasons.
- Andrew Reisner (2009). The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):257 - 272.
- Andrew Reisner (2008). Does Friendship Give Us Non-Derivative Partial Reasons. Les Ateliers De L'Éthique 3 (1):70-78.
- Andrew Reisner (2008). Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.
- Jacob Ross, Acceptance and Practical Reason.
- Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). An Alternative Account of Epistemic Reasons for Action: In Response to Booth. Grazer Philosophische Studien 76 (1):191-198.
- Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2009). Normative Reasons and the Agent-Neutral/Relative Dichotomy. Philosophia 37 (2):227-243.
- Benjamin Sachs (2008). Reasons and Requirements. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (1):73 - 83.
- Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Mark Schroeder, Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.
- Mark Schroeder (2012). The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons. Ethics 122 (3):457-488.
- Mark Schroeder (2011). What Does It Take to "Have" a Reason? In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
- Mark Schroeder (2009). Means-End Coherence, Stringency, and Subjective Reasons. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.
- Mark Schroeder (2008). Having Reasons. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57--71.
- Mark Schroeder (2007). Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons. Noûs 41 (1):110–132.
- Mark Schroeder (2007). The Humean Theory of Reasons. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
- Mark Schroeder (2004). The Scope of Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.
- Mark Andrew Schroeder (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford University Press.
- Andrew Sepielli, Normative Uncertainty and Intertheoretic Comparisons.
- Kieran Setiya (2009). Reply to Bratman and Smith. Analysis 69 (3):531-540.
- Kieran Setiya (2009). Summary of 'Reasons Without Rationalism'. Analysis 69 (3):509-510.
- Russ Shafer-Landau (2009). A Defence of Categorical Reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):189-206.
- Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) (2007). Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press.
- Kenneth Shockley (2008). The Agent Relativity of Directed Reasons. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:391-400.
- Sydney Shoemaker (1986). Book Review. The Subjective View. Colin McGinn. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 83 (7):407-13.
- Sydney Shoemaker (1986). Book Review. The Subjective View. Colin McGinn. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 83 (7):407-13.
- Neil Sinclair (2011). Review: Kinds of Reasons – Maria Alvarez. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):873-875.
- Marcus G. Singer (1989). Review Essay: Impartial Reason. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (3):507-515.
- John Skorupski (2009). The Unity and Diversity of Reasons. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason. Oxford University Press.
- Michael Smith (2012). Agents and Patients, Or: What We Learn About Reasons for Action by Reflecting on Our Choices in Process‐of‐Thought Cases. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):309-331.
- Michael Smith (2009). Reasons with Rationalism After All. Analysis 69 (3):521-530.
- Michael Smith (1994/1995). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
- David Sobel (2009). Review of Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (4).
- David Sobel (2005). Pain for Objectivists: The Case of Matters of Mere Taste. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):437 - 457.
- David Sobel (2001). Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action. Ethics 111 (3):461-492.
- Herman E. Stark (2004). Reasons Without Principles. Inquiry 47 (2):143 – 167.
- Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.) (forthcoming). Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
- Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2011). How to Be a Teleologist About Epistemic Reasons. In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.
- Jussi Suikkanen (2012). Reason-Statements As Non-Extensional Contexts. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (248):592-613.
- Attila Tanyi (2011). Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
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