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  1. Peter Baumann (1998). Can Reliabilitists Believe in Subjective Probability? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):199-200.
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  2. Darlene Bay & Alexey Nikitkov (2011). Subjective Probability Assessments of the Incidence of Unethical Behavior: The Importance of Scenario–Respondent Fit. Business Ethics 20 (1):1-11.
    Largely due to the difficulty of observing behavior, empirical business ethics research relies heavily on the scenario methodology. While not disputing the usefulness of the technique, this paper highlights the importance of a careful assessment of the fit between the context of the situation described in the scenario and the knowledge and experience of the respondents. Based on a study of online auctions, we provide evidence that even respondents who have direct knowledge of the situation portrayed in the scenario may (...)
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  3. Ethan D. Bolker (1967). A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability. Philosophy of Science 34 (4):333-340.
    This paper contributes to the mathematical foundations of the model for utility theory developed by Richard Jeffrey in The Logic of Decision [5]. In it I discuss the relationship of Jeffrey's to classical models, state and interpret an existence theorem for numerical utilities and subjective probabilities and restate a theorem on their uniqueness.
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  4. Darren Bradley (2010). Conditionalization and Belief De Se. Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
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  5. Carlton M. Caves, Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack (2007). Subjective Probability and Quantum Certainty. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):255-274.
  6. Mark Colyvan, Is Probability the Only Coherent Approach to Uncertainty?
    In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to..
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  7. Roger M. Cooke (1991). Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an extensive survey and critical examination of the literature on the use of expert opinion in scientific inquiry and policy making. The elicitation, representation, and use of expert opinion is increasingly important for two reasons: advancing technology leads to more and more complex decision problems, and technologists are turning in greater numbers to "expert systems" and other similar artifacts of artificial intelligence. Cooke here considers how expert opinion is being used today, how an expert's uncertainty is or (...)
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  8. Roger M. Cooke (1986). Conceptual Fallacies in Subjective Probability. Topoi 5 (1):21-27.
    Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.
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  9. Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell (1982). Updating Subjective Probability. Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.
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  10. Simone Duca (2009). Rationality and the Wason Selection Task: A Logical Account. Psyche 15 (1):109-131.
    The main goal of the paper is to investigate the relation between indicative conditionals and rationality. We wil l do this by consider- ing several interpretations of a very wel l-known example of reasoning involving conditionals, that is the Wason selection task, and showing how those interpretations have different bearings on the notion of ra- tionality. In particular, in the first part of the paper, after having briefly presented the selection task, we wil l take a look at two prag- (...)
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  11. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  12. Brian Ellis (1973). The Logic of Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):125-152.
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  13. Branden Fitelson (2005). Review of Richard Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  14. Maria Carla Galavotti (1996). Probabilism and Beyond. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):253 - 265.
    Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability radical probabilism and qualified this position as Bayesian, nonfoundational and anti-rationalist. This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.
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  15. Maria Carla Galavotti (1995). Operationism, Probability and Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Science 1 (1):99-118.
    This paper investigates the kind of empiricism combined with an operationalist perspective that, in the first decades of our Century, gave rise to a turning point in theoretical physics and in probability theory. While quantum mechanics was taking shape, the classical (Laplacian) interpretation of probability gave way to two divergent perspectives: frequentism and subjectivism. Frequentism gained wide acceptance among theoretical physicists. Subjectivism, on the other hand, was never held to be a serious candidate for application to physical theories, despite the (...)
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  16. Maria Carla Galavotti (1991). The Notion of Subjective Probability in the Work of Ramsey and de Finetti. Theoria 57 (3):239-259.
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  17. Robin Giles (1992). A Generalization of the Theory of Subjective Probability and Expected Utility. Synthese 90 (2):301 - 343.
    A generalization of the usual approach to the expected utility theory is given, with the aim of representing the state of belief of an agent who may decline on grounds of ignorance to express a preference between a given pair of acts and would, therefore, be considered irrational from a Bayesian point of view. Taking state, act, and outcome as primitive concepts, a utility function on the outcomes is constructed in the usual way. Each act is represented by a utility-valued (...)
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  18. Ian Hacking (1966). Subjective Probability. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (64):334-339.
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  19. Franz Huber (2008). Reply to Crupi Et Al.'S "Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence&Quot;. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213 - 215.
    Crupi et al. ([2008]) propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0(E) at t0 to . . . to Pri(E) at ti to . . . to Prn(E) at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change (...)
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  20. Richard C. Jeffrey (2004). Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. Cambridge University Press.
    This book offers a concise survey of basic probability theory from a thoroughly subjective point of view whereby probability theory is a mode of judgement. Written by one of the greatest figures in the field of probability theory, the book is both a summation and a synthesis of a lifetime of wrestling with such problems and issues.
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  21. Cory F. Juhl (1996). Objectively Reliable Subjective Probabilities. Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.
    Subjective Bayesians typically find the following objection difficult to answer: some joint probability measures lead to intuitively irrational inductive behavior, even in the long run. Yet well-motivated ways to restrict the set of reasonable prior joint measures have not been forthcoming. In this paper I propose a way to restrict the set of prior joint probability measures in particular inductive settings. My proposal is the following: where there exists some successful inductive method for getting to the truth in some situation, (...)
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  22. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2010). Subjective Probability : Criticisms, Reflections and Problems. [REVIEW] In Antony Eagle (ed.), Journal of Philosophical Logic. Routledge. 157 - 180.
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  23. H. Kyburg (1978). Subjective Probability: Criticisms, Reflections, and Problems. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):157 - 180.
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  24. Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.) (1980). Studies in Subjective Probability. Krieger.
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  25. Mark Norris Lance (1995). Subjective Probability and Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 77 (1):147 - 179.
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  26. D. H. Mellor (2005). Probability: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...
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  27. Giovanni B. Moneta (1991). Ambiguity, Inductive Systems, and the Modeling of Subjective Probability Judgements. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):267 – 285.
    Gambles which induce the decision-maker to experience ambiguity about the relative likelihood of events often give rise to ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-avoidance, which imply violation of additivity and Savage's axioms. The inability of the subjective Bayesian theory to account for these empirical regularities has determined a dichotomy between normative and descriptive views of subjective probability. This paper proposes a framework within which the two perspectives can be reconciled. First, a formal definition of ambiguity is given over a continuum ranging from ignorance (...)
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  28. Czeslaw S. Nosal (1991). Neurobiology of Subjective Probability. In Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
  29. Czeslaw S. Nosal (1991). Probability and Rationality. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  30. Richard Otte (1987). Subjective Probability, Objective Probability, and Coherence. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):373-380.
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  31. David Schmeidler (1989). Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity. Econometrica 57:571-589.
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  32. Abner Shimony (1967). Amplifying Personal Probability Theory: Comments on L. J. Savage's "Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability". Philosophy of Science 34 (4):326-332.
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  33. Kristin Shrader-Frechette (1993). Book Review:Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science. Roger M. Cooke. [REVIEW] Ethics 103 (3):599-.
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  34. Eric Swanson (2009). How Not to Theorize About the Language of Subjective Uncertainty. In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    A successful theory of the language of subjective uncertainty would meet several important constraints. First, it would explain how use of the language of subjective uncertainty affects addressees’ states of subjective uncertainty. Second, it would explain how such use affects what possibilities are treated as live for purposes of conversation. Third, it would accommodate 'quantifying in' to the scope of epistemic modals. Fourth, it would explain the norms governing the language of subjective uncertainty, and the differences between them and the (...)
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  35. John M. Vickers (1965). Some Remarks on Coherence and Subjective Probability. Philosophy of Science 32 (1):32-38.
    The interpretation of the calculus of probability as a logic of partial belief has at least two advantages: it makes the assignment of probabilities plausible in cases where classical frequentist interpretations must find such assignments meaningless, and it gives a clear meaning to partial belief and to consistency of partial belief.
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  36. Jan von Plato (1989). De Finetti's Earliest Works on the Foundations of Probability. Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):263 - 282.
    Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.
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  37. Carl G. Wagner (2007). The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation. Studia Logica 86 (2):343 - 350.
    The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.
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  38. J. Williamson (1999). Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    While there are several arguments on either side, it is far from clear as to whether or not countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability. I focus here on de Finetti's central argument against countable additivity and provide a new Dutch book proof of the principle, To argue that if we accept the Dutch book foundations of subjective probability, countable additivity is an unavoidable constraint.
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  39. Jon Williamson (2006). From Bayesianism to the Epistemic View of Mathematics: Review of R. Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 14 (3):365-369.
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Betting Interpretations and Dutch Books
  1. Ernest W. Adams (1964). On Rational Betting Systems. Archiv für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagenforschung 6:7-29.
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  2. Stefano Aguzzoli, Brunella Gerla & Vincenzo Marra (2008). De Finetti's No-Dutch-Book Criterion for Gödel Logic. Studia Logica 90 (1):25 - 41.
    We extend de Finetti’s No-Dutch-Book Criterion to Gödel infinite-valued propositional logic.
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  3. Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.) (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Brad Armendt (2010). Stakes and Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.
    The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant (...)
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  5. Brad Armendt (1993). Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):1-20.
    One guide to an argument's significance is the number and variety of refutations it attracts. By this measure, the Dutch book argument has considerable importance.2 Of course this measure alone is not a sure guide to locating arguments deserving of our attention—if a decisive refutation has really been given, we are better off pursuing other topics. But the presence of many and varied counterarguments at least suggests that either the refutations are controversial, or that their target admits of more than (...)
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  6. Brad Armendt (1980). Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics? Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
    Dutch Book arguments have been presented for static belief systems and for belief change by conditionalization. An argument is given here that a rule for belief change which under certain conditions violates probability kinematics will leave the agent open to a Dutch Book.
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  7. Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & and John Hawthorne (2004). Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding. Mind 113 (450):251-283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as ‘Trumped’ (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), ‘Rouble trouble’ (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), ‘The airtight Dutch book’ (McGee 1999), and ‘The two envelopes puzzle’ (Broome 1999). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
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  8. Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne (2004). Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding. Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as 'Trumped' (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), 'Rouble trouble' (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), 'The airtight Dutch book' (McGee 1999), and 'The two envelopes puzzle' (Broome 1995). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
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  9. Patricia Baillie (1973). Confirmation and the Dutch Book Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):393-397.
  10. Paul Bartha (2004). Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
    De Finetti would claim that we can make sense of a draw in which each positive integer has equal probability of winning. This requires a uniform probability distribution over the natural numbers, violating countable additivity. Countable additivity thus appears not to be a fundamental constraint on subjective probability. It does, however, seem mandated by Dutch Book arguments similar to those that support the other axioms of the probability calculus as compulsory for subjective interpretations. These two lines of reasoning can be (...)
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  11. Luc Bovens, Four Brides for Twelve Brothers - How to Dutch Book a Group of Fully Rational Players.
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