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  1. Horacio Arlo-Costa (2010). Review of Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri (Eds.), Degrees of Belief. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (1).
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  2. Brad Armendt (2008). Stake-Invariant Belief. Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.
    What can rational deliberation indicate about belief? Belief clearly influences deliberation. The principle that rational belief is stake-invariant rules out at least one way that deliberation might influence belief. The principle is widely, if implicitly, held in work on the epistemology of categorical belief, and it is built into the model of choice-guiding degrees of belief that comes to us from Ramsey and de Finetti. Criticisms of subjective probabilism include challenges to the assumption of additive values (the package principle) employed (...)
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  3. Arthur Thomas Barnett (1897). Why Are Betting and Gambling Wrong?
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  4. Will Barrett (2001). Betting on Belief. Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 3 (1):40.
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  5. Peter Baumann (1998). Can Reliabilitists Believe in Subjective Probability? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):199-200.
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  6. Darlene Bay & Alexey Nikitkov (2011). Subjective Probability Assessments of the Incidence of Unethical Behavior: The Importance of Scenario–Respondent Fit. Business Ethics 20 (1):1-11.
    Largely due to the difficulty of observing behavior, empirical business ethics research relies heavily on the scenario methodology. While not disputing the usefulness of the technique, this paper highlights the importance of a careful assessment of the fit between the context of the situation described in the scenario and the knowledge and experience of the respondents. Based on a study of online auctions, we provide evidence that even respondents who have direct knowledge of the situation portrayed in the scenario may (...)
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  7. Richard J. Blackwell (1978). "Belief and Probability," by John M. Vickers. Modern Schoolman 55 (3):327-327.
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  8. Ethan D. Bolker (1967). A Simultaneous Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability. Philosophy of Science 34 (4):333-340.
    This paper contributes to the mathematical foundations of the model for utility theory developed by Richard Jeffrey in The Logic of Decision [5]. In it I discuss the relationship of Jeffrey's to classical models, state and interpret an existence theorem for numerical utilities and subjective probabilities and restate a theorem on their uniqueness.
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  9. Nick Bostrom, Everything.
    For me, belief is not an all-or-nothing thing—believe or disbelieve, accept or reject. Instead, I have degrees of belief, a subjective probability distribution over different possible ways the world could be. This means I am constantly changing my mind about all sorts of things, as I reflect or gain more evidence. While I don’t always think explicitly in terms of probabilities, I often do so when I give careful consideration to some matter. And when I reflect on my own cognitive (...)
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  10. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz, A Dutch Book for Group Decision-Making?
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  11. Darren Bradley (2010). Conditionalization and Belief De Se. Dialectica 64 (2):247-250.
    Colin Howson (1995 ) offers a counter-example to the rule of conditionalization. I will argue that the counter-example doesn't hit its target. The problem is that Howson mis-describes the total evidence the agent has. In particular, Howson overlooks how the restriction that the agent learn 'E and nothing else' interacts with the de se evidence 'I have learnt E'.
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  12. R. Bradley (2012). Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the (...)
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  13. Michael Caie (2013). Rational Probabilistic Incoherence. Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
    Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain (...)
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  14. B. Carr (1980). VICKERS, J. M. "Belief and Probability". [REVIEW] Mind 89:452.
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  15. Carlton M. Caves, Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack (2007). Subjective Probability and Quantum Certainty. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):255-274.
  16. Jean P. Chapman (1961). The Spacing of Sequentially Dependent Trials in Probability Learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (6):545.
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  17. Giulianella Coletti, Angelo Gilio & Romano Scozzafava (1993). Comparative Probability for Conditional Events: A New Look Through Coherence. Theory and Decision 35 (3):237-258.
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  18. Mark Colyvan, Is Probability the Only Coherent Approach to Uncertainty?
    In this article, I discuss an argument that purports to prove that probability theory is the only sensible means of dealing with uncertainty. I show that this argument can succeed only if some rather controversial assumptions about the nature of uncertainty are accepted. I discuss these assumptions and provide reasons for rejecting them. I also present examples of what I take to..
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  19. Roger M. Cooke (1991). Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science. Oxford University Press.
    This book is an extensive survey and critical examination of the literature on the use of expert opinion in scientific inquiry and policy making. The elicitation, representation, and use of expert opinion is increasingly important for two reasons: advancing technology leads to more and more complex decision problems, and technologists are turning in greater numbers to "expert systems" and other similar artifacts of artificial intelligence. Cooke here considers how expert opinion is being used today, how an expert's uncertainty is or (...)
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  20. Roger M. Cooke (1986). Conceptual Fallacies in Subjective Probability. Topoi 5 (1):21-27.
    Subjective probability considered as a logic of partial belief succumbs to three fundamental fallacies. These concern the representation of preference via expectation, the measurability of partial belief, and the normalization of belief.
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  21. Francesco Corielli (1995). A Note on the Decidability of de Finetti's Coherence. Theory and Decision 38 (1):121-129.
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  22. Justin M. Dallmann (2014). A Normatively Adequate Credal Reductivism. Synthese 191 (10):2301-2313.
    It is a prevalent, if not popular, thesis in the metaphysics of belief that facts about an agent’s beliefs depend entirely upon facts about that agent’s underlying credal state. Call this thesis ‘credal reductivism’ and any view that endorses this thesis a ‘credal reductivist view’. An adequate credal reductivist view will accurately predict both when belief occurs and which beliefs are held appropriately, on the basis of credal facts alone. Several well-known—and some lesser known—objections to credal reductivism turn on the (...)
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  23. Anne A. Davenport (2008). Probabilism and Scotism at the Stuart Court. Quaestio 8 (1):303-321.
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  24. J. P. Day & John M. Vickers (1978). Belief and Probability. Philosophical Quarterly 28 (111):171.
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  25. Marieke van Delft & Marco de Niet (2004). Bibliopolis: A Platform for the Dutch History of the Book. Logos: Journal of the World Book Community 15 (1):25-29.
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  26. Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell (1982). Updating Subjective Probability. Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.
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  27. Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley, A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
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  28. Simone Duca (2009). Rationality and the Wason Selection Task: A Logical Account. Psyche 15 (1):109-131.
    The main goal of the paper is to investigate the relation between indicative conditionals and rationality. We wil l do this by consider- ing several interpretations of a very wel l-known example of reasoning involving conditionals, that is the Wason selection task, and showing how those interpretations have different bearings on the notion of ra- tionality. In particular, in the first part of the paper, after having briefly presented the selection task, we wil l take a look at two prag- (...)
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  29. Antony Eagle (ed.) (2010). Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective chances. The book (...)
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  30. Kenny Easwaran (2013). Why Countable Additivity? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):53-61.
    It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity.
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  31. Brian Ellis (1973). The Logic of Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):125-152.
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  32. James R. Erickson & Karen K. Block (1970). Conditional Response Distributions in a Multiple-Choice Probability-Learning Situtation. Journal of Experimental Psychology 86 (2):328.
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  33. Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2013). The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief. Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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  34. Sergio Fajardo (1985). Probability Logic with Conditional Expectation. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 28 (2):137-161.
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  35. Arthur Falk (1984). Theaetetus Invents Dutch Books. Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society 9.
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  36. J. Gregor Fetterman & Stanley S. Pliskoff (1981). Choice and the Conditional Probability of Alternation: Some New Data. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 18 (2):95-98.
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  37. Branden Fitelson (2005). Review of Richard Jeffrey, Subjective Probability: The Real Thing. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
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  38. Tommaso Flaminio (2007). NP-Containment for the Coherence Test of Assessments of Conditional Probability: A Fuzzy Logical Approach. [REVIEW] Archive for Mathematical Logic 46 (3-4):301-319.
    In this paper we investigate the problem of testing the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability following a purely logical setting. In particular we will prove that the coherence of an assessment of conditional probability χ can be characterized by means of the logical consistency of a suitable theory T χ defined on the modal-fuzzy logic FP k (RŁΔ) built up over the many-valued logic RŁΔ. Such modal-fuzzy logic was previously introduced in Flaminio (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. (...)
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  39. Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni, Coherence in the Aggregate: A Betting Method for Belief Functions on Many-Valued Events.
    Betting methods, of which de Finetti's Dutch Book is by far the most well-known, are uncertainty modelling devices which accomplish a twofold aim. Whilst providing an interpretation of the relevant measure of uncertainty, they also provide a formal definition of coherence. The main purpose of this paper is to put forward a betting method for belief functions on MV-algebras of many-valued events which allows us to isolate the corresponding coherence criterion, which we term coherence in the aggregate. Our framework generalises (...)
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  40. Tommaso Flaminio, Lluis Godo & Hykel Hosni, On the Logical Structure of de Finetti's Notion of Event.
    This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values (...)
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  41. Tommaso Flaminio & Franco Montagna (2005). A Logical and Algebraic Treatment of Conditional Probability. Archive for Mathematical Logic 44 (2):245-262.
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  42. Peter G. Found (2001). Never Judge a Dutch Book by its Cover. Dissertation, Bowling Green State University
    The purpose of this dissertation was to expose the Dutch Book Argument as a thoroughly flawed justification for applying the probability calculus to subjective degrees of belief. ;Through close and careful scrutiny of the internal logical and conceptual structure of the argument, it was concluded that the DBA relies on a number of questionable assumptions and misguided interpretations, to the point of virtually begging the question. In particular, it was shown that the key concept of fairness was distorted and misapplied. (...)
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  43. Maria Carla Galavotti (1996). Probabilism and Beyond. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):253 - 265.
    Richard Jeffrey has labelled his philosophy of probability radical probabilism and qualified this position as Bayesian, nonfoundational and anti-rationalist. This paper explores the roots of radical probabilism, to be traced back to the work of Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.
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  44. Maria Carla Galavotti (1995). Operationism, Probability and Quantum Mechanics. Foundations of Science 1 (1):99-118.
    This paper investigates the kind of empiricism combined with an operationalist perspective that, in the first decades of our Century, gave rise to a turning point in theoretical physics and in probability theory. While quantum mechanics was taking shape, the classical (Laplacian) interpretation of probability gave way to two divergent perspectives: frequentism and subjectivism. Frequentism gained wide acceptance among theoretical physicists. Subjectivism, on the other hand, was never held to be a serious candidate for application to physical theories, despite the (...)
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  45. Maria Carla Galavotti (1991). The Notion of Subjective Probability in the Work of Ramsey and de Finetti. Theoria 57 (3):239-259.
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  46. Robin Giles (1992). A Generalization of the Theory of Subjective Probability and Expected Utility. Synthese 90 (2):301 - 343.
    A generalization of the usual approach to the expected utility theory is given, with the aim of representing the state of belief of an agent who may decline on grounds of ignorance to express a preference between a given pair of acts and would, therefore, be considered irrational from a Bayesian point of view. Taking state, act, and outcome as primitive concepts, a utility function on the outcomes is constructed in the usual way. Each act is represented by a utility-valued (...)
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  47. Geoffrey Grimmett & David Stirzaker (2001). Probability and Random Processes. Oxford University Press.
    A Markov chain is a random process with the property that, conditional on its present value, the future is independent of the past. The Chapman- Kolmogorov equations are derived, and used to explore the persistence and transience of states.
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  48. Ian Hacking (1966). Subjective Probability. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (64):334-339.
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  49. Robert F. Hadley (1991). The Many Uses of 'Belief' in AI. Minds and Machines 1 (1):55-74.
    Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of belief. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called belief. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which belief is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing concerns with special (...)
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  50. Alan Roy Hajek (1993). The Conditional Construal of Conditional Probability. Dissertation, Princeton University
    Very roughly, the conditional construal of conditional probability is the hypothesis that the conditional probability P equals the probability of the conditional 'if A, then B'. My main purposes are to hone this rough statement down to various precise versions of the Hypothesis, as I call it, and to argue that virtually none of them is tenable. ;In S 1, I distinguish four versions of the Hypothesis. The subsequent four sections are largely an opinionated historical survey, tracing the motivations for (...)
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