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  1. Murat Aydede & Guzeldere Guven (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely (...)
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  2. Alain Badiou (2009). Theory of the Subject. Continuum.
    The place of the subjective -- Everything that is of a whole constitutes an obstacle to it insofar as it is included in it -- Action, manor of the subject -- The real is the impasse of formalization : formalization is the locus of the passing-into-force of the real -- Hegel : "the activity of force is essentially activity reacting against itself" -- Subjective and objective -- The subject under the signifiers of the exception -- Of force as disappearance, whose (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we (and other organisms) have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by (...)
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  5. John Bickle (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  6. John I. Biro (2006). A Point of View on Points of View. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
    A number of writers have deployed the notion of a point of view as a key to the allegedly theory-resistant subjective aspect of experience. I examine that notion more closely than is usually done and find that it cannot support the anti-objectivist's case. Experience may indeed have an irreducibly subjective aspect, but the notion of a point of view cannot be used to show that it does.
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  7. John I. Biro (1993). Consciousness and Objectivity. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
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  8. John I. Biro (1991). Consciousness and Subjectivity. Philosophical Issues 1:113-133.
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  9. Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
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  10. Andrea Christofidou (1999). Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4):1-27.
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  11. Kevin S. Decker (2008). The Evolution of the Psychical Element: George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago: Lecture Notes by H. Heath Bawden 1899–1900: Introduction. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (3):pp. 469-479.
    George Herbert Mead's early lectures at the University of Chicago are more important to understanding the genesis of his views in social psychology than some commentators, such as Hans Joas, have emphasized. Mead's lecture series "The Evolution of the Psychical Element," preserved through the notes of student H. Heath Bawden, demonstrate his devotion to Hegelianism as a method of thinking and how this influenced his non-reductionistic approach to functional psychology. In addition, Mead's breadth of historical knowledge as well as his (...)
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  12. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] 85:384-389.
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  13. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  14. Naomi M. Eilan (1997). Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
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  15. Jeffrey E. Foss (1993). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Nagel on Consciousness. Dialogue 32 (4):725-36.
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  16. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  17. Keith Gunderson (1970). Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309.
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  18. John Haglund (forthcoming). The View From Somewhere - Investigations Pertaining to the Implications of the Impurity of the Third- and the First-Person-Perspective. Continental Philosophy Review.
    The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails (...)
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  19. V. Haksar (1981). Nagel on Subjective and Objective. Inquiry 24 (March):105-21.
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  20. Rom Harre (1999). Nagel's Challenge and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 74 (288):247-270.
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  21. David R. Hiley (1978). Materialism and the Inner Life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):61-70.
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  22. David Hunter (2008). Belief and Self-Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
    This paper is about what is distinctive about first-person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first-person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed (...)
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  23. E. Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  24. Greg Janzen (2007). Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW] Psyche 13 (1).
  25. Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
  26. Philip C. Jones (1949). Subjectivity in Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 16 (January):49-57.
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  27. J. Jonkisz (2012). Consciousness: A Four-Fold Taxonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...)
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  28. John Kekes (1977). Physicalism and Subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.
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  29. Byoung Ick Lee (2008). A Classification of the Concepts of Subjectivity. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:269-276.
    This paper aims at proposing a criterion to analyze the concept of subjectivity by surveying and classifying the theories of some major figures in the history of the western philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, and Hegel. As proceeding in this work, I reveal two approaches which confront each other, self-centered viewpoint and system-centered viewpoint, and arrange Descartes, Hobbes, and Bentham into the former, and Aristotle and Kant into the latter. Also, I assign Plato and Hegel to an alternative, (...)
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  30. William G. Lycan (1990). What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental? Philosophical Perspectives 11 (2):229-238.
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  31. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ...
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  32. William G. Lycan (1987). Subjectivity. In Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  33. Norman Malcolm (1988). Subjectivity. Philosophy 63 (April):147-60.
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  34. Pete Mandik (2009). The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.
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  35. Pete Mandik (2008). The Neural Accomplishment of Objectivity. In Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher (eds.), Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Éditions Syllepse.
    Philosophical tradition contains two major lines of thought concerning the relative difficulty of the notions of objectivity and subjectivity. One tradition, which we might characterize as.
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  36. Pete Mandik (2001). Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit (...)
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  37. Pete Mandik (2000). Objective Subjectivity: Allocentric and Egocentric Representations in Thought and Experience. Dissertation, Washington University
    Many philosophical issues concern questions of objectivity and subjectivity. Of these questions, there are two kinds. The first considers whether something is objective or subjective; the second what it _means_ for something to be objective or subjective.
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  38. Olivier Massin (2011). Le Mutisme des Sens. In S. Laugier & C. Al-Saleh (eds.), J.L. Austin et la philosophie du langage ordinaire. Olms.
    The thesis defended is that ordinary perception does not present us with the existential independence of its objects from itself. The phenomenology of ordinary perception is mute with respect to the subject-object distinction. I call this view "phenomenal neutral monism" : though neutral monists are wrong about the metaphysics of perception (in every perceptual episode, there is a distinction between the perceptual act and its perceptual objet), they are right about its phenomenology. I first argue that this view is not (...)
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  39. Olivier Massin (2011). Résistance Et Existence. Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  40. Olivier Massin (2010). L'objectivité du toucher. Dissertation, Aix-Marseille
    This thesis vindicates the common-sense intuition that touch is more objective than the other senses. The reason why it is so, it is argued, is that touch is the only sense essential of the experience of physical effort, and that this experience constitutes our only acquaintance with the mind-independence of the physical world. The thesis is divided in tree parts. Part I argues that sensory modalities are individuated by they proper objects, realistically construed. Part II argues that the proper objects (...)
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  41. Nicholas Maxwell (2011). Three Philosophical Problems About Consciousness and Their Possible Resolution. Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-10.
    Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, which means all three problems remain unsolved. Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why (...)
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  42. Ron McClamrock (1992). Irreducibility and Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies 67 (2):177-92.
    ...the problem of...how cognition...is possible at all...can never be answered on the basis of a prior knowledge of the transcendent [i.e. the external, spatio-temporal, empirical]...no matter whence the knowledge or the judgments are borrowed, not even if they are taken from the exact sciences.... It will not do to draw conclusions from existences of which one knows but which one cannot "see". "Seeing" does not lend itself to demonstration or deduction. [Husserl 1964a, pp. 2-3].
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  43. Thomas Metzinger (2004). The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective. Networks.
    Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into (...)
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  44. Thomas Metzinger (1994). Analyomen. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  45. Thomas Metzinger (1994). Subjectivity and Mental Representation. In Analyomen. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  46. Bernard Molyneux (2011). On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211-228.
    I show that the recursive structure of Leibniz's Law requires agents to perform infinitely many operations to psychologically identify the referents of phenomenal and physical concepts, even though the referents of ordinary concepts (e.g. Hesperus and Phosphorus) can be identified in a finite number of steps. The resulting problem resembles the hard problem of consciousness in the fact that it appears (and indeed is) unsolvable by anyone for whom it arises, and in the fact that it invites dualist and eliminativist (...)
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  47. H. O. Mounce (1992). On Nagel and Consciousness. Philosophical Investigations 15 (2):178-84.
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  48. Paul G. Muscari (1992). Subjective Experience. Philosophical Inquiry 14 (3-4):12-33.
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  49. Paul G. Muscari (1987). The Status of Humans in Nagel's Phenomenology. Philosophical Forum 19:23-33.
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  50. Paul G. Muscari (1985). The Subjective Character of Experience. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:577-97.
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  51. Thomas Nagel (1994). Consciousness and Objective Reality. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
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  52. Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
    Human beings have the unique ability to view the world in a detached way: We can think about the world in terms that transcend our own experience or interest, and consider the world from a vantage point that is, in Nagel's words, "nowhere in particular". At the same time, each of us is a particular person in a particular place, each with his own "personal" view of the world, a view that we can recognize as just one aspect of the (...)
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  53. Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
    Death.--The absurd.--Moral luck.--Sexual perversion.--War and massacre.--Ruthlessness in public life.--The policy of preference.--Equality.--The fragmentation of value.--Ethics without biology.--Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness.--What is it like to be a bat?--Panpsychism.--Subjective and objective.
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  54. Thomas Nagel (1979). Subjective and Objective. In Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
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  55. Gregory M. Nixon (2010). From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
    When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here (...)
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  56. Ana Pasztor (1998). Subjective Experience Divided and Conquered. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):73-102.
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  57. Christopher Peacocke (2009). Objectivity. Mind 118 (471):739-769.
    Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, concepts are individuated by (...)
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  58. Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher (eds.) (2008). Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Éditions Syllepse.
  59. Wolfgang Prinz (2003). Emerging Selves: Representational Foundations of Subjectivity. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):515-528.
    A hypothetical evolutionary scenario is offered meant to account for the emergence of mental selves. According to the scenario, mental selves are constructed to solve a source-attribution problem. They emerge when internally generated mental contents (e.g., thoughts and goals) are treated like messages arising from external personal sources. As a result, mental contents becomes attributed to the self as an internal personal source. According to this view, subjectivity is construed outward-in, that is, one's own mental self is derived from, and (...)
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  60. Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.) (2001). Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
  61. A. R. (1981). Rancor Against Time. The Review of Metaphysics 35 (1):170-172.
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  62. Matthew Ratcliffe (2002). Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity. Continental Philosophy Review 35 (4):353-377.
    Thomas Nagel argues that the subjective character of mind inevitably eludes philosophical efforts to incorporate the mental into a single, complete, physically objective view of the world. Nagel sees contemporary philosophy as caught on the horns of a dilemma.
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  63. David Roden (2013). NATURE's DARK DOMAIN: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALIZED PHENOMENOLOGY. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (1):169-88.
    Phenomenology is based on a doctrine of evidence that accords a crucial role to the human capacity to conceptualise or ‘intuit’ features of their experience. However, there are grounds for holding that some experiential entities to which phenomenologists are committed must be intuition-transcendent or ‘dark’. Examples of dark phenomenology include the very fine-grained perceptual discriminations which Thomas Metzinger calls ‘Raffman Qualia’ and, crucially, the structure of temporal awareness. It can be argued, on this basis, that phenomenology is in much the (...)
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  64. Richard Rorty (1993). Holism, Intrinsicality, and the Ambition of Transcendence. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  65. Robert Rosen (1993). Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):89-100.
    Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in the (...)
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  66. Steven M. Rosen (2008). The Self-Evolving Cosmos: A Phenomenological Approach to Nature's Unity-in-Diversity. World Scientific Publishing, Series on Knots and Everything.
    He explores what might be called the metaphysics of physics, or maybe just its geometry: as the series title might suggest, topology plays a major role in the ...
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  67. Steven M. Rosen (2008). Quantum Gravity and Phenomenological Philosophy. Foundations of Physics 38 (6):556-582.
    The central thesis of this paper is that contemporary theoretical physics is grounded in philosophical presuppositions that make it difficult to effectively address the problems of subject-object interaction and discontinuity inherent to quantum gravity. The core objectivist assumption implicit in relativity theory and quantum mechanics is uncovered and we see that, in string theory, this assumption leads into contradiction. To address this challenge, a new philosophical foundation is proposed based on the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger. Then, through (...)
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  68. Steven M. Rosen (2006). Topologies of the Flesh: A Multidimensional Exploration of the Lifeworld. Ohio University Press, Series in Continental Thought.
    Topologies of the Flesh is an original blend of continental thought and mathematical imagination.
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  69. Steven M. Rosen (2004). Dimensions of Apeiron: A Topological Phenomenology of Space, Time, and Individuation. Editions Rodopi, Value Inquiry Book Series.
    As we saw in the Preface, pre-Socratic philosophy viewed nature in the raw as apeiron, the Greek word meaning "limitless," "boundless" or "indeterminate. ...
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  70. Steven M. Rosen (2000). Focusing on the Flesh: Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin, and Lived Subjectivity. Lifwynn Correspondence 5 (1):1-14.
  71. Steven M. Rosen (1997). Wholeness as the Body of Paradox. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):391-423.
    This essay is written at the crossroads of intuitive holism, as typified in Eastern thought, and the discursive reflectiveness more characteristic of the West. The point of departure is the age-old human need to overcome fragmentation and realize wholeness. Three basic tasks are set forth: to provide some new insight into the underlying obstacle to wholeness, to show what would be necessary for surmounting this blockage, and to take a concrete step in that direction. At the outset, the question of (...)
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  72. Steven M. Rosen (1994). Science, Paradox, and the Moebius Principle: The Evolution of a "Transcultural" Approach to Wholeness. State University of New York Press; Series in Science, Technology, and Society.
    PART I. The Moebius Principle in Science and Philosophy INTRODUCTION The papers in part span a seventeen year period (-). The section begins and ends with ...
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  73. Steven M. Rosen (1986). On Whiteheadian Dualism: A Reply to Professor Griffin. Journal of Religion and Psychical Research 9 (1):11-17.
    In this article, the author defends his claim that a subtle form of metaphysical dualism can be found in Alfred North Whitehead's central notion of the "actual occasion." Rosen contends that phenomenological philosophers such as Martin Heidegger go further than Whitehead in challenging traditional dualism.
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  74. Murray Shanahan (2010). Embodiment and the Inner Life: Cognition and Consciousness in the Space of Possible Minds. Oxford University Press.
  75. Basil Smith (2012). A Dialogue on Consciousness, by Torin Alter and Robert Howell. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):247-252.
  76. Cara Spencer, Indexical Knowledge and Phenomenal Knowledge.
    A familiar story about phenomenal knowledge likens it to indexical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about oneself typically expressed with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The popularity of this sort of story owes in part to its promise of resolving some longstanding puzzles about phenomenal knowledge. One such puzzle arises from the compelling arguments that we can have full objective knowledge of the world while lacking some phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the widespread optimism about the indexical account on this score is (...)
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  77. Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1982). The Importance of Subjectivity: An Inaugural Lecture. Inquiry 25 (June):143-63.
    The disciplined investigation of consciousness is of three main types: eidetic, anthropological (and historical), and psychophysical. The first concerns the essence of consciousness in general and of its main modes. Its method involves introspection, empathy, and insight into necessities present in what these reveal. As the study of the essence of that which is the locus of all value it is of unique importance, and it is also essential as a foundation of the other inquiries. Such inquiry has been the (...)
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  78. Scott Sturgeon (1994). The Epistemic Basis of Subjectivity. Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-35.
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  79. Pär Sundström (2002). Nagel's Case Against Physicalism. SATS 3 (2):91-108.
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  80. Pär Sundström (1999). Psychological Phenomena and First-Person Perspectives: Critical Discussions of Some Arguments in Philosophy of Mind. Acta University Umensis.
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  81. Justin Sytsma, Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
    It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. In this article I consider one example, focusing on what Dan Dennett says about the “folk theory of consciousness.” I show that he holds that the folk believe that the sensory qualities that we are acquainted with in ordinary perception are phenomenal qualities. Nonetheless, the shape of the folk theory is an empirical matter and in the absence of (...)
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  82. Charles Taliaferro (1997). The Perils of Subjectivity. Inquiry 40 (4):475-480.
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  83. Charles Taliaferro (1988). Nagel's Vista or Taking Subjectivity Seriously. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):393-401.
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  84. Robert van Gulick (1985). Physicalism and the Subjectivity of the Mental. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):51-70.
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  85. Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.) (1994). The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.
  86. Xiangdong Xu (2004). Consciousness, Subjectivity and Physicalism. Philosophical Inquiry 26 (1-2):21-39.
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