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  1. A. Arato (1974). The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity. Telos 1974 (21):108-161.
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  2. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely (...)
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  3. Celso Martins Azar Filho (2012). Método e estilo, subjetividade e conhecimento nos ensaios de Montaigne. Kriterion 53 (126):559-578.
    A característica mais notável da filosofia renascentista foi também o que tornou sua assimilação pela história da filosofia tão difícil: a interação entre forma e conteúdo, entre ideia e sua expressão. Tal resulta da tentativa de realizar outra inter-relação que lhe é ainda mais essencial: aquela entre teoria e prática, pensamento e ação. Nos Ensaios de Montaigne, o método constitui antes de tudo um estilo de vida: a linguagem é aí o meio pelo qual a implicação entre mundos externos e (...)
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  4. Alain Badiou (2009). Theory of the Subject. Continuum.
    The place of the subjective -- Everything that is of a whole constitutes an obstacle to it insofar as it is included in it -- Action, manor of the subject -- The real is the impasse of formalization : formalization is the locus of the passing-into-force of the real -- Hegel : "the activity of force is essentially activity reacting against itself" -- Subjective and objective -- The subject under the signifiers of the exception -- Of force as disappearance, whose (...)
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  6. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by functionalist models. For (...)
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  7. John Bickle (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  8. T. Birchal (1993). A marca do vazio: reflexões sobre a subjetividade em Blaise Pascal. Kriterion 88:50-69.
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  9. John I. Biro (2006). A Point of View on Points of View. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
    A number of writers have deployed the notion of a point of view as a key to the allegedly theory-resistant subjective aspect of experience. I examine that notion more closely than is usually done and find that it cannot support the anti-objectivist's case. Experience may indeed have an irreducibly subjective aspect, but the notion of a point of view cannot be used to show that it does.
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  10. John I. Biro (1993). Consciousness and Objectivity. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
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  11. John I. Biro (1991). Consciousness and Subjectivity. Philosophical Issues 1:113-133.
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  12. Jørn Bjerre (2015). A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle's Misreading of Durkheim. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1):53-82.
    The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality (...)
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  13. Jesse Butler (2011). Introspective Knowledge of Experience and its Role in Consciousness Studies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2):128-145.
    In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous epistemic relationship. (...)
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  14. Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
    It is by now commonly agreed that the proper study of consciousness requires a multidisciplinary approach which focuses on the varieties and dimensions of conscious experience from different angles. This book, which is based on a workshop held at the University of Skövde, Sweden, provides a microcosm of the emerging discipline of consciousness studies and focuses on some important but neglected aspects of consciousness. The book brings together philosophy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, linguistics, cognitive and computer science, biology, physics, art and (...)
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  15. Andrea Christofidou (1999). Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4):1-27.
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  16. Jason Costanzo (2014). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  17. Kevin S. Decker (2008). The Evolution of the Psychical Element: George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago: Lecture Notes by H. Heath Bawden 1899–1900: Introduction. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (3):pp. 469-479.
    George Herbert Mead's early lectures at the University of Chicago are more important to understanding the genesis of his views in social psychology than some commentators, such as Hans Joas, have emphasized. Mead's lecture series "The Evolution of the Psychical Element," preserved through the notes of student H. Heath Bawden, demonstrate his devotion to Hegelianism as a method of thinking and how this influenced his non-reductionistic approach to functional psychology. In addition, Mead's breadth of historical knowledge as well as his (...)
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  18. Christophe Dejours (2006). Subjectivity, Work, and Action. Critical Horizons 7 (1):45-62.
    This essay is intended to explore relations between work and subjectivity (that is, what concerns the individual subject: his or her suffering, pleasure, personal development, and so on). To this end, we shall draw on a body of theory and clinical practice that has been developing in France for some twenty years under the name of the `psychodynamics of work' and ask the three following questions. What is work? This question might seem trivial, but the clinical analysis of the relationship (...)
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  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 85:384-389.
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  20. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  21. Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Jean Durup (2012). Does Consciousness Exist Independently of Present Time and Present Time Independently of Consciousness. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):45-49.
    While some are currently debating whether time may or may not be an illusion, others keep devoting their time to the science of consciousness. Time as such may be seen as a physical or a subjective variable, and the limitations in our capacity of perceiving and analyzing temporal order and change in physical events definitely constrain our understanding of consciousness which, in return, constrains our conceptual under-standing of time. Temporal codes generated in the brain have been considered as the key (...)
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  22. Jaana Eigi (2013). Knowing Things in Common. Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 1 (2):26-37.
    In her analysis of the politics of biotechnology, Sheila Jasanoff argued that modern democracy cannot be understood without an analysis of the ways knowledge is created and used in society. s he suggested calling these ways to “know things in common” civic epistemologies. Jasanoff thus approached knowledge as fundamentally social. t he focus on the social nature of knowledge allows drawing parallels with some developments in philosophy of science. In the first part of the paper, I juxtapose Jasanoff’s account with (...)
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  23. Naomi M. Eilan (1997). Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
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  24. R. Elliott (1980). NAGEL, T., "Mortal Questions". [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:415.
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  25. Andreas Elpidorou, Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Phenomenal concepts are the concepts that we deploy when – but arguably not only when – we introspectively examine, focus on, or take notice of the phenomenal character of our experiences. They refer to phenomenal properties (or qualities) and they do so in a subjective (first-personal) and direct (non-relational) manner. It is through the use of such concepts that the phenomenal character of our experiences is made salient to us. Discourse about the nature of phenomenal concepts plays an important role (...)
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  26. Jeffrey E. Foss (1993). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Nagel on Consciousness. Dialogue 32 (4):725-36.
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  27. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  28. Marilyn Friedman (1990). Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity: Discussion. Philosophy 65 (254):501-509.
    In The View from Nowhere , Thomas Nagel develops a theory of practical reasoning which attempts to give the personal, or subjective, point of view its due2 while still insisting on the objectivity of ethics. On the objective side, Nagel affirms that there are truths about values and reasons for action which are independent of the ways in which reasons and values appear to us, independent of our own particular beliefs and inclinations . The objective foundation for these truths consists (...)
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  29. H. Ganthaler, A. Gehlen, E. Gellner, L. Goldstein, D. Gottlieb, E. Hanslick, G. Harman, N. Hartmann, K. Havlicek & O. Hazay (2006). Nagel, T. 3445 Neumaier, O. 18, 246. In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 324.
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  30. J. Glover (1981). NAGEL, T. "Mortal Questions". [REVIEW] Mind 90:292.
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  31. Patrick Grüneberg (2013). Projektives Bewusstsein. Th. Metzingers Selbstmodelltheorie und J.G. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. Mentis.
    Bewusstsein ist nicht ohne Grund eines der grundlegenden Themen philosophischer Forschung: Es bildet den Kristallisationspunkt, in dem sich die intime Sphäre unserer Persönlichkeit im Schnittfeld mit radikal Anderem artikuliert. Dabei kommt dem subjektiven Bezug auf eine objektive Wirklichkeit, sprich auf uns selbst wie auf unsere natürliche und soziale Umgebung, eine zentrale Funktion zu. Aufgrund seiner Selbstverständlichkeit wird dieser Ausgriff auf die Wirklichkeit jedoch in repräsentationalistischen Ansätzen, die einen Großteil aktueller Bewusstseinstheorie ausmachen, häufig unhinterfragt vorausgesetzt. Dieses Buch entwickelt demgegenüber einen relationalen (...)
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  32. Keith Gunderson (1970). Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309.
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  33. John Haglund (forthcoming). The View From Somewhere - Investigations Pertaining to the Implications of the Impurity of the Third- and the First-Person-Perspective. Continental Philosophy Review.
    The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails (...)
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  34. V. Haksar (1981). Nagel on Subjective and Objective. Inquiry 24 (March):105-21.
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  35. Justin L. Harmon (2009). What Is It Like to Be Mysterious, Alienated, and Wildly Rich Through Less Than Savory Means? Phenomenal Consciousness and Aesthetic Experience. Consciousness, Literature, and the Arts 10 (2).
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  36. Rom Harre (1999). Nagel's Challenge and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 74 (288):247-270.
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  37. D. Henrich (2003). Subjectivity as Philosophical Principle. Critical Horizons 4 (1):7-27.
    This paper wishes to establish some connections with the intentions that have informed the project of the philosophy of the subject. This project has especially been represented by the work of Fichte, although today it is important to make it relevant to contemporary philosophical problems and issues. A renewed philosophy of the subject must not risk being exposed to the fundamental critique, so eloquently formulated by Heidegger, that, like Fichte's work, it can begin once again from the conviction that we (...)
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  38. D. Henrich (1989). The Dimensions and Shortcomings of Nagel Theory of Subjectivity. Philosophische Rundschau 36 (1-2):1-24.
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  39. David R. Hiley (1978). Materialism and the Inner Life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):61-70.
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  40. William Hirstein (2012). Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. Oup Oxford.
    In this important and controversial new book, William Hirstein argues that it is possible for one person to directly experience the conscious states of another, by way of what he calls mindmelding. Drawing on a range of research from neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy, he presents a highly original new account of consciousness.
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  41. David Hunter (2008). Belief and Self-Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
    This paper is about what is distinctive about first-person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first-person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed (...)
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  42. Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  43. Claus Janew (2014). Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness: From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 5 (4):351-391.
    Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its (...)
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  44. Greg Janzen (2007). Review of Dan Zahavi's Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW] Psyche 13 (1).
    In Subjectivity and Selfhood Dan Zahavi presents the fruits of his thinking on a nexus of issues regarding the experiential structure of consciousness and its relation to selfhood. The central theme of the book is that the “notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness, and consequently it is indispensable to a variety of disciplines such as philosophy of mind, social philosophy, psychiatry, developmental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience” . Proceeding, as in his previously published work , on (...)
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  45. Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
  46. Philip C. Jones (1949). Subjectivity in Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 16 (January):49-57.
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  47. J. Jonkisz (2012). Consciousness: A Four-Fold Taxonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...)
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  48. Pedro Karczmarczyk (2011). La relevancia de Wittgenstein para una teoría materialista del discurso. In Actas de las VIII Jornadas de Investigación en Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación.
    En el presente trabajo intentaremos mostrar la relevancia del planteo filosófico wittgensteiniano para la fundamentación y el desarrollo de una teoría materialista del discurso. Tomaremos como punto de partida para examinar esta tesis la propuesta de una teoría materialista del discurso desarrollada por Michel Pêcheux (1938-1983). Pêcheux fue un pensador marxista, discípulo de Louis Althusser, a quien habitualmente se ubica en los orígenes de lo que se conoce como “Escuela francesa de Análisis del discurso”2. En nuestro trabajo nos concentraremos en (...)
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  49. John Kekes (1977). Physicalism and Subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.
    This note is a reply to nagel's "what is it like to be a bat?" I argue that nagel is right in claiming that members of each species have a unique point of view due to physiological differences; no member of another species can have the same experiences. Nagel is wrong, However, In concluding from this truism that no objective account of experiences is possible. Such an account can give everything physicalism needs. What it cannot give, And what it was (...)
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  50. Stan Klein (forthcoming). The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. I (...)
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