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  1. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely (...)
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  2. Celso Martins Azar Filho (2012). Método e estilo, subjetividade e conhecimento nos ensaios de Montaigne. Kriterion 53 (126):559-578.
    A característica mais notável da filosofia renascentista foi também o que tornou sua assimilação pela história da filosofia tão difícil: a interação entre forma e conteúdo, entre ideia e sua expressão. Tal resulta da tentativa de realizar outra inter-relação que lhe é ainda mais essencial: aquela entre teoria e prática, pensamento e ação. Nos Ensaios de Montaigne, o método constitui antes de tudo um estilo de vida: a linguagem é aí o meio pelo qual a implicação entre mundos externos e (...)
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  3. Alain Badiou (2009). Theory of the Subject. Continuum.
    The place of the subjective -- Everything that is of a whole constitutes an obstacle to it insofar as it is included in it -- Action, manor of the subject -- The real is the impasse of formalization : formalization is the locus of the passing-into-force of the real -- Hegel : "the activity of force is essentially activity reacting against itself" -- Subjective and objective -- The subject under the signifiers of the exception -- Of force as disappearance, whose (...)
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective. In Georg Gasser (ed.), How Successful is Naturalism? Publications of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. Ontos Verlag.
    The first-person perspective is a challenge to naturalism. Naturalistic theories are relentlessly third-personal. The first-person perspective is, well, first-personal; it is the perspective from which one thinks of oneself as oneself* without the aid of any third-person name, description, demonstrative or other referential device. The exercise of the capacity to think of oneself in this first-personal way is the necessary condition of all our self-knowledge, indeed of all our self-consciousness. As important as the first-person perspective is, many philosophers have not (...)
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  5. Lynne Rudder Baker (1998). The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (4):327-348.
    Self-consciousness, many philosophers agree, is essential to being a person. There is not so much agreement, however, about how to understand what self-consciousness is. Philosophers in the field of cognitive science tend to write off self-consciousness as unproblematic. According to such philosophers, the real difficulty for the cognitive scientist is phenomenal consciousness--the fact that we (and other organisms) have states that feel a certain way. If we had a grip on phenomenal consciousness, they think, self-consciousness could be easily handled by (...)
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  6. John Bickle (ed.) (2009). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience is a state-of-the-art collection of interdisciplinary research spanning philosophy (of science, mind, and ...
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  7. T. Birchal (1993). A marca do vazio: reflexões sobre a subjetividade em Blaise Pascal. Kriterion 88:50-69.
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  8. John I. Biro (2006). A Point of View on Points of View. Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):3-12.
    A number of writers have deployed the notion of a point of view as a key to the allegedly theory-resistant subjective aspect of experience. I examine that notion more closely than is usually done and find that it cannot support the anti-objectivist's case. Experience may indeed have an irreducibly subjective aspect, but the notion of a point of view cannot be used to show that it does.
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  9. John I. Biro (1993). Consciousness and Objectivity. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.
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  10. John I. Biro (1991). Consciousness and Subjectivity. Philosophical Issues 1:113-133.
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  11. Jørn Bjerre (forthcoming). A New Foundation for the Social Sciences? Searle's Misreading of Durkheim. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393114525860.
    The aim of John Searle’s philosophy of society is to provide a foundation for the social sciences. Arguing that the study of social reality needs to be based on a philosophy of language, Searle claims that sociology has little to offer since no sociologist ever took language seriously. Attacking Durkheim head-on, Searle not only claims that Durkheim’s project differs from his own but also that Durkheim’s sociology has serious shortcomings. Opposing Searle, this paper argues that Durkheim’s account of social reality (...)
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  12. Ronald L. Chrisley (2001). A View From Anywhere: Prospects for an Objective Understanding of Consciousness. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins.
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  13. Andrea Christofidou (1999). Subjectivity and the First Person: Some Reflections. Philosophical Inquiry 21 (3-4):1-27.
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  14. Jason Costanzo (2014). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content (...)
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  15. Kevin S. Decker (2008). The Evolution of the Psychical Element: George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago: Lecture Notes by H. Heath Bawden 1899–1900: Introduction. [REVIEW] Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44 (3):pp. 469-479.
    George Herbert Mead's early lectures at the University of Chicago are more important to understanding the genesis of his views in social psychology than some commentators, such as Hans Joas, have emphasized. Mead's lecture series "The Evolution of the Psychical Element," preserved through the notes of student H. Heath Bawden, demonstrate his devotion to Hegelianism as a method of thinking and how this influenced his non-reductionistic approach to functional psychology. In addition, Mead's breadth of historical knowledge as well as his (...)
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  16. Christophe Dejours (2006). Subjectivity, Work, and Action. Critical Horizons 7 (1):45-62.
    This essay is intended to explore relations between work and subjectivity (that is, what concerns the individual subject: his or her suffering, pleasure, personal development, and so on). To this end, we shall draw on a body of theory and clinical practice that has been developing in France for some twenty years under the name of the `psychodynamics of work' and ask the three following questions. What is work? This question might seem trivial, but the clinical analysis of the relationship (...)
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  17. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Explorations 85:384-389.
    In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer (...)
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  18. Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
    What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very (...)
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  19. Birgitta Dresp-Langley & Jean Durup (2012). Does Consciousness Exist Independently of Present Time and Present Time Independently of Consciousness. Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):45-49.
    While some are currently debating whether time may or may not be an illusion, others keep devoting their time to the science of consciousness. Time as such may be seen as a physical or a subjective variable, and the limitations in our capacity of perceiving and analyzing temporal order and change in physical events definitely constrain our understanding of consciousness which, in return, constrains our conceptual under-standing of time. Temporal codes generated in the brain have been considered as the key (...)
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  20. Naomi M. Eilan (1997). Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
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  21. Andreas Elpidorou (forthcoming). Phenomenal Concepts. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  22. Jeffrey E. Foss (1993). Subjectivity, Objectivity, and Nagel on Consciousness. Dialogue 32 (4):725-36.
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  23. Robert Francescotti (1993). Subjective Experience and Points of View. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:25-36.
    Thomas Nagel contends that facts regarding the qualitative character of conscious experience can be grasped from only a single point of view. This feature, he claims, is what renders conscious experience subjective in character, and it is what makes facts about the qualitative experience subjective facts. While much has been written regarding the ontological implications of the ‘point of view account’ relatively Iittle has been said on whether the account itself successfully defines the subjectivity of the mental. In this paper, (...)
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  24. Patrick Grüneberg (2013). Projektives Bewusstsein. Th. Metzingers Selbstmodelltheorie und J.G. Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre. Mentis.
    Bewusstsein ist nicht ohne Grund eines der grundlegenden Themen philosophischer Forschung: Es bildet den Kristallisationspunkt, in dem sich die intime Sphäre unserer Persönlichkeit im Schnittfeld mit radikal Anderem artikuliert. Dabei kommt dem subjektiven Bezug auf eine objektive Wirklichkeit, sprich auf uns selbst wie auf unsere natürliche und soziale Umgebung, eine zentrale Funktion zu. Aufgrund seiner Selbstverständlichkeit wird dieser Ausgriff auf die Wirklichkeit jedoch in repräsentationalistischen Ansätzen, die einen Großteil aktueller Bewusstseinstheorie ausmachen, häufig unhinterfragt vorausgesetzt. Dieses Buch entwickelt demgegenüber einen relationalen (...)
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  25. Keith Gunderson (1970). Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:273-309.
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  26. John Haglund (forthcoming). The View From Somewhere - Investigations Pertaining to the Implications of the Impurity of the Third- and the First-Person-Perspective. Continental Philosophy Review.
    The old duality that eventually came to produce the mind/body-problem indicates the problem of transcendental subjectivity. The enduring significance of this problem shows itself in a provocation of any paradigm that has become too objectivistic, too naturalistic – even too idealistic in a certain sense – and too forgetful of its own departure from a perspective always presumed. Analytic philosophy bears a tendency towards such a ‘view from nowhere’ which denies a fundamental subjective connection. The rebuttal of this position entails (...)
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  27. V. Haksar (1981). Nagel on Subjective and Objective. Inquiry 24 (March):105-21.
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  28. Rom Harre (1999). Nagel's Challenge and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 74 (288):247-270.
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  29. D. Henrich (2003). Subjectivity as Philosophical Principle. Critical Horizons 4 (1):7-27.
    This paper wishes to establish some connections with the intentions that have informed the project of the philosophy of the subject. This project has especially been represented by the work of Fichte, although today it is important to make it relevant to contemporary philosophical problems and issues. A renewed philosophy of the subject must not risk being exposed to the fundamental critique, so eloquently formulated by Heidegger, that, like Fichte's work, it can begin once again from the conviction that we (...)
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  30. David R. Hiley (1978). Materialism and the Inner Life. Southern Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):61-70.
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  31. William Hirstein (2012). Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy. OUP Oxford.
    Can consciousness and the human mind be understood and explained in sheerly physical terms? Materialism is a philosophical/scientific theory, according to which the mind is completely physical. This theory has been around for literally thousands of years, but it was always stymied by its inability to explain how exactly mere matter could do the amazing things the mind can do. Beginning in the 1980s, however, a revolution began quietly boiling away in the neurosciences, yielding increasingly detailed theories about how the (...)
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  32. David Hunter (2008). Belief and Self-Consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
    This paper is about what is distinctive about first-person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first-person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that I am disposed (...)
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  33. Elizabeth Irvine (2012). Old Problems with New Measures in the Science of Consciousness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):627-648.
    Introspective and phenomenological methods are once again being used to support the use of subjective reports, rather than objective behavioural measures, to investigate and measure consciousness. Objective measures are often seen as useful ways of investigating the range of capacities subjects have in responding to phenomena, but are fraught with the interpretive problems of how to link behavioural capacities with consciousness. Instead, gathering subjective reports is seen as a more direct way of assessing the contents of consciousness. This article explores (...)
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  34. Greg Janzen (2007). Subjectivity and Selfhood. [REVIEW] Psyche 13 (1).
  35. Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
  36. Philip C. Jones (1949). Subjectivity in Philosophy. Philosophy of Science 16 (January):49-57.
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  37. J. Jonkisz (2012). Consciousness: A Four-Fold Taxonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...)
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  38. John Kekes (1977). Physicalism and Subjectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (June):533-6.
    This note is a reply to nagel's "what is it like to be a bat?" I argue that nagel is right in claiming that members of each species have a unique point of view due to physiological differences; no member of another species can have the same experiences. Nagel is wrong, However, In concluding from this truism that no objective account of experiences is possible. Such an account can give everything physicalism needs. What it cannot give, And what it was (...)
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  39. Byoung Ick Lee (2008). A Classification of the Concepts of Subjectivity. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:269-276.
    This paper aims at proposing a criterion to analyze the concept of subjectivity by surveying and classifying the theories of some major figures in the history of the western philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, and Hegel. As proceeding in this work, I reveal two approaches which confront each other, self-centered viewpoint and system-centered viewpoint, and arrange Descartes, Hobbes, and Bentham into the former, and Aristotle and Kant into the latter. Also, I assign Plato and Hegel to an alternative, (...)
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  40. M. R. Leet (2002). Recovering the Individual: Subjectivity or Intersubjectivity as a Framework for Critical Theory? Contemporary Political Theory 1 (1):19-38.
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  41. William G. Lycan (1990). What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental? Philosophical Perspectives 11 (2):229-238.
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  42. William G. Lycan (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ...
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  43. William G. Lycan (1987). Subjectivity. In Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  44. Norman Malcolm (1988). Subjectivity. Philosophy 63 (April):147-60.
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  45. Pete Mandik (2009). The Neurophilosophy of Subjectivity. In John Bickle (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    The so-called subjectivity of conscious experience is central to much recent work in the philosophy of mind. Subjectivity is the alleged property of consciousness whereby one can know what it is like to have certain conscious states only if one has undergone such states oneself. I review neurophilosophical work on consciousness and concepts pertinent to this claim and argue that subjectivity eliminativism is at least as well supported, if not more supported, than subjectivity reductionism.
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  46. Pete Mandik (2008). The Neural Accomplishment of Objectivity. In Pierre Poirier & Luc Faucher (eds.), Des Neurones a La Philosophie: Neurophilosophie Et Philosophie Des Neurosciences. Éditions Syllepse.
    Philosophical tradition contains two major lines of thought concerning the relative difficulty of the notions of objectivity and subjectivity. One tradition, which we might characterize as.
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  47. Pete Mandik (2001). Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations exhibit (...)
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  48. Pete Mandik (2000). Objective Subjectivity: Allocentric and Egocentric Representations in Thought and Experience. Dissertation, Washington University
    Many philosophical issues concern questions of objectivity and subjectivity. Of these questions, there are two kinds. The first considers whether something is objective or subjective; the second what it _means_ for something to be objective or subjective.
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  49. Olivier Massin (2011). Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence]. Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  50. Olivier Massin (2011). Le Mutisme des Sens [The Deep Silence of the Senses]. In S. Laugier & C. Al-Saleh (eds.), J.L. Austin et la philosophie du langage ordinaire. Olms.
    The thesis defended is that ordinary perception does not present us with the existential independence of its objects from itself. The phenomenology of ordinary perception is mute with respect to the subject-object distinction. I call this view "phenomenal neutral monism" : though neutral monists are wrong about the metaphysics of perception (in every perceptual episode, there is a distinction between the perceptual act and its perceptual objet), they are right about its phenomenology. I first argue that this view is not (...)
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