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  1. R. T. Allen (1981). Supererogation Revised. Sophia 20 (2):5-11.
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  2. John P. Anderson (1997). Sophie's Choice. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):439-450.
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  3. Alfred Archer (2014). Forcing Cohen To Abandon Forced Supererogation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
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  4. Alfred Archer (2013). Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent. Philosophia 41 (2):447-462.
    It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two (...)
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  5. Alfred Archer & Michael Ridge (forthcoming). The Heroism Paradox: Another Paradox of Supererogation. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Philosophers are by now familiar with “the” paradox of supererogation. This paradox arises out of the idea that it can never be permissible to do something morally inferior to another available option, yet acts of supererogation seem to presuppose this. This paradox is not our topic in this paper. We mention it only to set it to one side and explain our subtitle. In this paper we introduce and explore another paradox of supererogation, one which also deserves serious philosophical attention. (...)
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  6. Antonio Argandona (2001). Management and Acting 'Beyond the Call of Duty'. Business Ethics 10 (4):320-330.
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  7. Robin Attfield (1979). Supererogation and Double Standards. Mind 88 (352):481-499.
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  8. Neera Kapur Badhwar (1985). Friendship, Justice and Supererogation. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (2):123 - 131.
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  9. Deborah R. Barnbaum (2008). Supererogation in Clinical Research. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 11 (3):343-349.
    ‘Supererogation’ is the notion of going beyond the call of duty. The concept of supererogation has received scrutiny in ethical theory, as well as clinical bioethics. Yet, there has been little attention paid to supererogation in research ethics. Supererogation is examined in this paper from three perspectives: (1) a summary of two analyses of ‘supererogation’ in moral theory, as well as an examination as to whether acts of supererogation exist; (2) a discussion of supererogation in clinical practice, including arguments that (...)
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  10. Marcia Baron (1987). Kantian Ethics and Supererogation. Journal of Philosophy 84 (5):237-262.
    ...believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of...
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  11. Claire Benn (2014). What is Wrong with Promising to Supererogate. Philosophia 42 (1):55-61.
    There has been some debate as to whether or not it is possible to keep a promise, and thus fulfil a duty, to supererogate. In this paper, I argue, in agreement with Jason Kawall, that such promises cannot be kept. However, I disagree with Kawall’s diagnosis of the problem and provide an alternative account. In the first section, I examine the debate between Kawall and David Heyd, who rejects Kawall’s claim that promises to supererogate cannot be kept. I disagree with (...)
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  12. Yotam Benziman (2014). The Ethics of Common Decency. Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (1):87-94.
    Let’s begin with a few examples. The queue at the supermarket is long. My shopping cart is full of groceries. You are standing behind me, and your cart has only two or three items in it. I let you go ahead of me so that you can finish your shopping quickly.A stranger in the street approaches you and asks you if you can light his cigarette. As a matter of course, you do.David Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. (...)
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  13. Johan Brännmark (2006). From Virtue to Decency. Metaphilosophy 37 (5):589-604.
    In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one (...)
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  14. Lorenne M. Burchill (1965). In Defence of Saints and Heroes. Philosophy 40 (152):152 - 157.
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  15. Vanessa Carbonell (2013). What We Know and What We Owe. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 3.
    Knowledge is necessary for certain moral obligations. In learning something new, one sometimes triggers a moral obligation. This paper argues that the existence of these knowledge-based obligations poses a problem for the view that we are not only free to choose the course of our own lives, including our careers and personal projects, but also free to change our minds and quit at any time to pursue something else. For if our choice of life path has generated knowledge-based moral obligations (...)
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  16. Vanessa Carbonell (2012). The Ratcheting-Up Effect. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):228-254.
    I argue for the existence of a ‘ratcheting-up effect’: the behavior of moral saints serves to increase the level of moral obligation the rest of us face. What we are morally obligated to do is constrained by what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are morally obligated to do. Moral saints provide us with a special kind of evidence that bears on what we can reasonably believe about our obligations. They do this by modeling the level of (...)
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  17. Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa (1966). Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of Supererogation. Synthese 16 (3-4):321 - 331.
    We first summarize and comment upon a 'calculus of intrinsic preferability' which we have presented in detail elsewhere. 1 Then we set forth 'the problem of supererogation' - a problem which, according to some, has presented difficulties for deontic logic. And, finally, we propose a moral or deontic interpretation of the calculus of intrinsic preferability which, we believe, enables us to solve the problem of supererogation.
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  18. Yogendra Chopra (1963). Professor Urmson on 'Saints and Heroes'. Philosophy 38 (144):160 - 166.
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  19. Michael Clark (1978). The Meritorious And The Mandatory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:23-33.
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  20. Shlomo Cohen (2013). Forced Supererogation. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):n/a-n/a.
    There is a disturbing kind of situation that presents agents with only two possibilities of moral action—one especially praiseworthy, the other condemnable. I describe such scenarios and argue that moral action in them exhibits a unique set of parameters: performing the commendable action is especially praiseworthy; not performing is not blameworthy; not performing is wrong. This set of parameters is distinct from those which characterize either moral obligation or supererogation. It is accordingly claimed that it defines a distinct, yet unrecognized, (...)
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  21. Tim Connolly (2013). Sagehood and Supererogation in the Analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40 (2):269-286.
    The Confucian ethical tradition emphasizes unceasing progress toward the goal of sagehood, and so it is generally opposed to the idea of supererogation, as this implies that we may be satisfied with attaining some sub-sagely level of morality. The one possible exception to this anti-supererogationist stance, however, turns out to be Confucius himself, who in the Analects appears to downplay sagehood and instead focus on the goal of junzi. Yet given that Confucius stresses ceaseless cultivation as much as anyone else (...)
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  22. Barry Curtis (1981). The Supererogatory, the Foolish and the Morally Required. Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (4):311-318.
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  23. Jonathan Dancy (1993). Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and Offence. Philosophical Books 34 (1):48-49.
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  24. N. J. H. Dent (1983). Supererogation. Philosophical Books 24 (2):65-70.
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  25. Dimitrios Dentsoras (forthcoming). The Birth of Supererogation in Advance. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy.
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  26. Dale Dorsey (2013). The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It. Utilitas 25 (3):355-382.
    Many find it plausible to posit a category of supererogatory actions. But the supererogatory resists easy analysis. Traditionally, supererogatory actions are characterized as actions that are morally good, but not morally required; actions that go the call of our moral obligations. As I shall argue in this article, however, the traditional analysis can be accepted only by a view with troubling consequences concerning the structure of the moral point of view. I propose a different analysis that is extensionally correct, avoids (...)
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  27. R. S. Downie (2002). Supererogation and Altruism: A Comment. Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2):75-76.
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  28. Elizabeth Drummond Young (2013). God's Moral Goodness and Supererogation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (2):83-95.
    What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, (...)
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  29. Paul D. Eisenberg (1966). From the Forbidden to the Supererogatory: The Basic Ethical Categories in Kant's "Tugendlehre&Quot;. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (4):255 - 269.
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  30. Joel Feinberg (1961). Supererogation and Rules. Ethics 71 (4):276-288.
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  31. Michael Ferry (2013). Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):573-589.
    It is widely accepted that morality does not demand that we do our very best, but our most significant moral traditions do not easily accommodate this intuition. I will argue that the underlying problem is not specific to any particular tradition. Rather, it will be difficult for any moral theory to account for binary moral concepts like permissible/impermissible while also accounting for scalar moral concepts like better/worse. If only the best is considered permissible, morality will seem either unreasonably demanding or (...)
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  32. Stephen Finlay (2007). Too Much Morality. In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford University Press.
    This paper addresses the nature and relationship of morality and self-interest, arguing that what we morally ought to do almost always conflicts with what we self-interestedly ought to do. The concept of morality is analyzed as being essentially and radically other-regarding, and the category of the supererogatory is explained as consisting in what we morally ought to do but are not socially expected to do. I express skepticism about whether there is a coherent question, ‘Which ought I all things considered (...)
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  33. Mary Forrester (1975). Some Remarks on Obligation, Permission, and Supererogation. Ethics 85 (3):219-226.
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  34. Espen Gamlund (2011). The Duty to Forgive Repentant Wrongdoers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (5):651-671.
    The purpose of this paper is to consider the question of whether we have a duty to forgive those who repent and apologize for the wrong they have done. I shall argue that we have a pro tanto duty to forgive repentant wrongdoers, and I shall propose and consider the norm of forgiveness. This norm states that if a wrongdoer repents and apologizes to a victim, then the victim has a duty to forgive the wrongdoer, other things being equal. That (...)
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  35. Espen Gamlund (2010). Supererogatory Forgiveness. Inquiry 53 (6):540-564.
    While forgiveness is widely recognised as an example of a supererogatory action, it remains to be explained precisely what makes forgiveness supererogatory, or the circumstances under which it is supererogatory to forgive. Philosophers often claim that forgiveness is supererogatory, but most of the time they do so without offering an adequate explanation for why it is supererogatory to forgive. Accordingly, the literature on forgiveness lacks a sufficiently nuanced account of the supererogatory status of forgiveness. In this paper, I seek to (...)
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  36. J. Gert (2012). Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction. Philosophical Review 121 (4):611-618.
    Julia Markovits has recently argued for what she calls the ‘Coincident Reasons Thesis’: the thesis that one’s action is morally worthy if and only if one’s motivating reasons for acting mirror, in content and strength, the reasons that explain why the action ought, morally, to be performed. This thesis assumes that the structure of motivating reasons is sufficiently similar to the structure of normative reasons that the required coincidence in content and strength is a genuine possibility. But because motivating reasons (...)
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  37. Shawn Graves (forthcoming). God and Moral Perfection. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    One will be hard-pressed to find a morally perfect agent in this world. It’s not that there aren’t any morally good people. It just takes a lot to be morally perfect. However, theists claim that God is morally perfect. (Atheists claim that if God exists, God is morally perfect.) Perhaps they are mistaken. This chapter presents an argument for the conclusion that God is not morally perfect. The argument depends upon two things: (1) the nature of the concept of moral (...)
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  38. Daniel Guevara (1999). The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant's Moral Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):593-624.
    It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J. O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that therefore none could account for "all the facts of morality," as he put it. But his arguments were (...)
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  39. Daniel Guevara (1999). The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant's Moral Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):593 - 624.
    It is common to think that certain acts are supererogatory, especially certain heroic or saintly self-sacrifices for the good. The idea seems to have an ordinary and clear application. Nothing shows this better than the well-known cases which J. O. Urmson adduced. Urmson argued that no major moral theory could give a proper account of the supererogatory character of such acts, and that therefore none could account for "all the facts of morality," as he put it. But his arguments were (...)
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  40. Susan C. Hale (1991). Against Supererogation. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):273 - 285.
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  41. Bashshar Haydar (2002). Forced Supererogation and Deontological Restrictions. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):445-454.
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  42. Trevor Hedberg (2014). Epistemic Supererogation and its Implications. Synthese 191 (15):3621-3637.
    Supererogatory acts, those which are praiseworthy but not obligatory, have become a significant topic in contemporary moral philosophy, primarily because morally supererogatory acts have proven difficult to reconcile with other important aspects of normative ethics. However, despite the similarities between ethics and epistemology, epistemic supererogation has received very little attention. In this paper, I aim to further the discussion of supererogation by arguing for the existence of epistemically supererogatory acts and considering the potential implications of their existence. First, I offer (...)
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  43. D. Heyd (1980). Beyond the Call of Duty in Kant's Ethics. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):308-324.
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  44. David Heyd, Supererogation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  45. David Heyd (2005). Supererogatory Promises a Comment on Kawal's “Promising and Supererogation”. Philosophia 32 (1-4):399-403.
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  46. David Heyd (1994). Supererogation and Ethical Methodology: A Reply to Mellema. Philosophia 24 (1-2):183-189.
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  47. David Heyd (1982). Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    David Heyd's study will stimulate philosophers to recognise the importance of the rather neglected topic of the distinctiveness of supererogation and the ...
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  48. Thomas E. Hill Jr (1971). Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation. Kant-Studien 62 (1-4):55-76.
  49. Benjamin Hippen (2010). Professional Obligation and Supererogation With Reference to the Transplant Tourist. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (2):14-16.
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  50. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2010). Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation. Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):29-63.
    In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...)
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