Related categories
Siblings:
80 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 80
  1. K. Akiba (1999). On Super- and Subvaluationism: A Classicist's Reply to Hyde. Mind 108 (432):727-732.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas (2009). Supervaluations Debugged. Mind 118 (472):901-933.
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. JC Beall (ed.) (2004). Liars and Heaps: New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nuel Belnap (2009). Truth Values, Neither-True-nor-False, and Supervaluations. Studia Logica 91 (3):305 - 334.
    The first section (§1) of this essay defends reliance on truth values against those who, on nominalistic grounds, would uniformly substitute a truth predicate. I rehearse some practical, Carnapian advantages of working with truth values in logic. In the second section (§2), after introducing the key idea of auxiliary parameters (§2.1), I look at several cases in which logics involve, as part of their semantics, an extra auxiliary parameter to which truth is relativized, a parameter that caters to special kinds (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Jiri Benovsky (2014). Vague Objects with Sharp Boundaries. Ratio 27 (1).
    In this article I shall consider two seemingly contradictory claims: first, the claim that everybody who thinks that there are ordinary objects has to accept that they are vague, and second, the claim that everybody has to accept the existence of sharp boundaries to ordinary objects. The purpose of this article is of course not to defend a contradiction. Indeed, there is no contradiction because the two claims do not concern the same ‘everybody’. The first claim, that all ordinary objects (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Andrea Borghini & Achille C. Varzi (2006). Event Location and Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):313-336.
    Most event-referring expressions are vague; it is utterly difficult, if not impossible, to specify the exact spatiotemporal location of an event from the words that we use to refer to it. We argue that in spite of certain prima facie obstacles, such vagueness can be given a purely semantic (broadly supervaluational) account.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Andrea Cantini (1990). A Theory of Formal Truth Arithmetically Equivalent to ID. Journal of Symbolic Logic 55 (1):244 - 259.
    We present a theory VF of partial truth over Peano arithmetic and we prove that VF and ID 1 have the same arithmetical content. The semantics of VF is inspired by van Fraassen's notion of supervaluation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Pablo Cobreros (2013). Vagueness: Subvaluationism. Philosophy Compass 8 (5):472-485.
    Supervaluationism is a well known theory of vagueness. Subvaluationism is a less well known theory of vagueness. But these theories cannot be taken apart, for they are in a relation of duality that can be made precise. This paper provides an introduction to the subvaluationist theory of vagueness in connection to its dual, supervaluationism. A survey on the supervaluationist theory can be found in the Compass paper of Keefe (2008); our presentation of the theory in this paper will be short (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Fara's Argument Concerning Higher-Order Vagueness. In Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This paper discusses Fara's so-called 'Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness' concerning supervaluationism. In the paper I argue that supervaluationism is not committed to global validity, as it is largely assumed in the literature, but to a weaker notion of logical consequence I call 'regional validity'. Then I show that the supervaluationist might solve Fara's paradox making use of this weaker notion of logical consequence. The paper is discussed by Delia Fara in the same volume.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Varzi on Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence. Mind 120 (479):833-43.
    Though it is standardly assumed that supervaluationism applied to vagueness is committed to global validity, Achille Varzi (2007) argues that the supervaluationist should take seriously the idea of adopting local validity instead. Varzi’s motivation for the adoption of local validity is largely based on two objections against the global notion: that it brings some counterexamples to classically valid rules of inference and that it is inconsistent with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. In this discussion I review these objections and point out ways (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Classical Logic. In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Hans-Christian Schmitz & Uli Sauerland (eds.), Vagueness in Communication, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 6517. Springer.
    This paper is concerned with the claim that supervaluationist consequence is not classical for a language including an operator for definiteness. Although there is some sense in which this claim is uncontroversial, there is a sense in which the claim must be qualified. In particular I defend Keefe's position according to which supervaluationism is classical except when the inference from phi to Dphi is involved. The paper provides a precise content to this claim showing that we might provide complete (and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Pablo Cobreros (2008). Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence: A Third Way. Studia Logica 90 (3):291 - 312.
    It is often assumed that the supervaluationist theory of vagueness is committed to a global notion of logical consequence, in contrast with the local notion characteristic of modal logics. There are, at least, two problems related to the global notion of consequence. First, it brings some counterexamples to classically valid patterns of inference. Second, it is subject to an objection related to higher-order vagueness . This paper explores a third notion of logical consequence, and discusses its adequacy for the supervaluationist (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Pablo Cobreros (2008). Supervaluationism and Necessarily Borderline Sentences. Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy 3 (25):41-49.
    The supervaluationist theory of vagueness is committed to a particular notion of logical consequence known as global validity. According to a recent objection, this notion of consequence is more problematic than is usually thought since i) it bears a commitment to some sort of bizarre inferences, ii) this commitment threatens the internal coherence of the theory and iii) we might find counterexamples to classically valid pat- terns of inference even in the absence of a definitely-operator (or similar device). As a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert Rooij (2012). Tolerance and Mixed Consequence in the S'valuationist Setting. Studia Logica 100 (4):855-877.
    In a previous paper (see ‘Tolerant, Classical, Strict’, henceforth TCS) we investigated a semantic framework to deal with the idea that vague predicates are tolerant, namely that small changes do not affect the applicability of a vague predicate even if large changes do. Our approach there rests on two main ideas. First, given a classical extension of a predicate, we can define a strict and a tolerant extension depending on an indifference relation associated to that predicate. Second, we can use (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John Collins (2000). Unsharpenable Vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves a form of semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. And where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy—an indeterminacy between various ways that the specification of the predicate might be completed or, as some like to say, sharpened (or precisified). We shall argue that this idea is defective insofar as there are vague predicates (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. John D. Collins & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Unsharpenable Vagueness. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):1-10.
    A plausible thought about vagueness is that it involves semantic incompleteness. To say that a predicate is vague is to say (at the very least) that its extension is incompletely specified. Where there is incomplete specification of extension there is indeterminacy, an indeterminacy between various ways in which the specification of the predicate might be completed or sharpened. In this paper we show that this idea is bound to founder by presenting an argument to the effect that there are vague (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mark Colyvan (2010). A Topological Sorites. Journal of Philosophy 107 (6):311-325.
    This paper considers a generalisation of the sorites paradox, in which only topological notions are employed. We argue that by increasing the level of abstraction in this way, we see the sorites paradox in a new, more revealing light—a light that forces attention on cut-off points of vague predicates. The generalised sorites paradox presented here also gives rise to a new, more tractable definition of vagueness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Timothy J. Day (1992). Excluded Middle and Bivalence. Erkenntnis 37 (1):93 - 97.
    I consider two related objections to the claim that the law of excluded middle does not imply bivalence. One objection claims that the truth predicate captured by supervaluation semantics is not properly motivated. The second objection says that even if it is, LEM still implies bivalence. I show that LEM does not imply bivalence in a supervaluational language. I also argue that considering supertruth as truth can be reasonably motivated.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.) (2010). (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- Ism’, in Eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Michael Dummett (1975). Wang's Paradox. Synthese 30 (3-4):201--32.
  21. Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.) (2010). Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This volume brings together twelve papers by linguists and philosophers contributing novel empirical and formal considerations to theorizing about vagueness. Three main issues are addressed: gradable expressions and comparison, the semantics of degree adverbs and intensifiers (such as 'clearly'), and ways of evading the sorites paradox.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Matti Eklund (2001). Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic Overdetermination. Dialectica 55 (4):363–378.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Delia Graff Fara (2011). Truth in a Region. In Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use. Palgrave Macmillan.
    In this paper I criticize a version of supervaluation semantics. This version is called "Region-Valuation" semantics. It's developed by Pablo Cobreros. I argue that all supervaluationists, regionalists in particular, and truth-value gap theorists of vagueness more generally, are commited to the validity of D-intro, the principle that every sentence entails its definitization (the truth of "Paul is tall" guarantees the truth of "Paul is definitely tall"). The principle embroils one in a paradox that's distinct from, but related to, the sorites (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Delia Graff Fara (2010). Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), (2010) ‘Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluation- ism’, in eds., Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, Its Nature, and Its Logic,. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Kit Fine (1975). Vagueness, Truth and Logic. Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1996). What Cannot Be Evaluated Cannot Be Evaluated and It Cannot Be Supervalued Either. Journal of Philosophy 93 (10):516-535.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. John Gardner, Supervaluationism and its Logics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. John Hawthorne (2005). Vagueness and the Mind of God. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):1 - 25.
    This paper examines the mind and language of an omniscient being from a supervaluationist perspective. Two questions hall receive special attention. How ought the supervaluationist explicate the concept of omniscience? And what ought the supervaluationist expect an omniscient speaker to say about a Sorites series?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Richard Heck (2003). Semantic Accounts of Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps. OUP.
    Read as a comment on Crispin Wright's \"Vagueness: A Fifth Column Approach\", this paper defends a form of supervaluationism against Wright's criticisms. Along the way, however, it takes up the question what is really wrong with Epistemicism, how the appeal of the Sorities ought properly to be understood, and why Contextualist accounts of vagueness won't do.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Andrea Iacona (2014). Ockhamism Without Thin Red Lines. Synthese 191 (12):2633-2652.
    This paper investigates the logic of Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. Several attempts have been made to give rigorous shape to this view by defining a suitable formal semantics, but arguably none of them is fully satisfactory. The paper draws attention to some problems that beset such attempts, and suggests that these problems are different symptoms of the same initial confusion, in that they stem from the unjustified assumption that the actual course (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Andrea Iacona (2010). Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
    In a paper called 'Definiteness and Knowability', Tim Williamson addresses the question whether one must accept that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon if one adopts classical logic and a disquotational principle for truth. Some have suggested that one must not, hence that classical logic and the disquotational principle may be preserved without endorsing epistemicism. Williamson’s paper, however, finds ‘no plausible way of substantiating that possibility’. Its moral is that ‘either classical logic fails, or the disquotational principle does, or vagueness is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Nicholas K. Jones (2011). Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism. Journal of Philosophy 108 (11):633-641.
    Central to discussion of supervaluationist accounts of vagueness is the extent to which they require revisions of classical logic and if so, whether those revisions are objectionable. In an important recent Journal of Philosophy article, J.R.G. Williams presents a powerful challenge to the orthodox view that supervaluationism is objectionably revisionary. Williams argues both that supervaluationism is non-revisionary and that even if it were, those revisions would be unobjectionable. This note shows that his arguments for both claims fail.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Rosanna Keefe (2010). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):213-215.
    Vagueness is an extremely widespread feature of language, famously associated with the sorites paradox. One instance of this paradox concludes that a single grain of sand is a heap of sand, by starting with a large heap of sand and invoking the plausible premise that if you take one grain of sand away from a heap of sand, then you still have a heap. The supervaluationist theory of vagueness states that a sentence is true if and only if it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Rosanna Keefe (2008). Vagueness: Supervaluationism. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):315–324.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Rosanna Keefe (2000). Supervaluationism and Validity. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):93-105.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Rosanna Keefe (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press.
    Most expressions in natural language are vague. But what is the best semantic treatment of terms like 'heap', 'red' and 'child'? And what is the logic of arguments involving this kind of vague expression? These questions are receiving increasing philosophical attention, and in this timely book Rosanna Keefe explores the questions of what we should want from an account of vagueness and how we should assess rival theories. Her discussion ranges widely and comprehensively over the main theories of vagueness and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Philip Kremer (2008). Supervaluation Fixed-Point Logics of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407 - 440.
    Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. We also (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Dan López de Sa (2009). Can One Get Bivalence From (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282.
    Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Dan López de Sa (2007). On the Semantic Indecision of Vague Singular Terms. Sorites 19:88-91.
    Donald Smith (2006) argues that if ‘I’ is indeed vague, and the view of vagueness as semantic indecision correct after all, then ‘I’ cannot refer to a composite material object. But his considerations would, if sound, also establish that ‘Tibbles,’ ‘Everest,’ or ‘Toronto,’ do not refer to composite material objects either—nor hence, presumably, to cats, mountains, or cities. And they can be resisted, anyway. Or so I argue.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Neil McKinnon, Persistence and a New Problem of the Many.
    One winter’s Saturday Clarence wakes up. He realises he has left his umbrella at work. The office is locked, and he can’t get in. Being one of those people who punish themselves for their mistakes, he can’t bring himself to buy a replacement. He has an engagement six kilometres down the road and starts wondering whether it will rain. Normally, this would not be a problem, but his motor vehicle has broken down because he forgot to have it serviced. And (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Neil McKinnon (2002). Supervaluations and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (208):320-339.
    Supervaluational treatments of vagueness are currently quite popular among those who regard vagueness as a thoroughly semantic phenomenon. Peter Unger's 'problem of the many' may be regarded as arising from the vagueness of our ordinary physical-object terms, so it is not surprising that supervaluational solutions to Unger's problem have been offered. I argue that supervaluations do not afford an adequate solution to the problem of the many. Moreover, the considerations I raise against the supervaluational solution tell also against the solution (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Brian P. McLaughlin (1997). Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):209-30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Henry Mehlberg (1958). The Reach of Science. [Toronto]University of Toronto Press.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Martin Montminy (2008). Supervaluationism, Validity and Necessarily Borderline Sentences. Analysis 68 (297):61–67.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148 - 156.
  47. Gary Ostertag (2002). Review of Keefe, Theories of Vagueness. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):291-2.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Elisa Paganini (2012). God's Silence. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):287-298.
    Vagueness manifests itself (among other things) in our inability to find boundaries to the extension of vague predicates. A semantic theory of vagueness plans to justify this inability in terms of the vague semantic rules governing language and thought. According to a supporter of semantic theory, the inability to find such a boundary is not dependent on epistemic limits and an omniscient being like God would be equally unable. Williamson (Vagueness, 1994 ) argued that cooperative omniscient beings adequately instructed would (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. F. J. Pelletier & R. J. Stainton (2003). On 'the Denial of Bivalence is Absurd'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):369 – 382.
    Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd. This paper is an examination of the logical force of this argument, which is found wanting.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1990). Supervaluational Anti-Realism and Logic. Synthese 84 (1):97 - 138.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 80