It is widely accepted by the scientific community and beyond that human beings are primarily responsible for climate change and that climate change has brought with it a number of real problems. These problems include, but are not limited to, greater threats to coastal communities, greater risk of famine, and greater risk that tropical diseases may spread to new territory. In keeping with J. S. Mill's 'Harm Principle', green political theorists often respond that if we are contributing a harm to (...) others in contributing to climate change and its negative effects, we then have a negative duty to assist those we have harmed and to reduce our carbon emissions. In this paper, I will take seriously negative duties stemming from a contribution to climate change and demonstrate that our negative duties do not demand that we necessarily end our contribution to climate change if we were able to compensate those who may be affected by climate change. Thus, the conclusion of many green political theorists - that we must reduce our carbon emissions - does not necessarily follow from the view that humans are primarily responsible for climate change and its attended ill effects. (shrink)

Reflection on personal choices and climate change can lead to the thought that nothing an individual does can possibly make a difference to the planet’s future. So why bother going green? This is a version of the problem of causal inefficacy, and it is a particular problem for those with consequentialist leanings. Voters and vegetarians are consulted for help, and a suggestive thought about consistency is pursued. Consequentialist arguments for governmental action are shored up with reflection on consistency, and, hopefully, (...) the result is a solution to the problem: a nearly-consequentialist argument for individual action on climate change. (shrink)

A "moral hazard" is a market failure most commonly associated with insurance, but also associated by extension with a wide variety of public policy scenarios, from environmental disaster relief, to corporate bailouts, to natural resource policy, to health insurance. Specifically, the term "moral hazard" describes the danger that, in the face of insurance, an agent will increase her exposure to risk. If not immediately clear, such terminology invokes a moral notion, suggesting that changing one's exposure to risk after becoming insured (...) is morally problematic. This paper challenges that position. It argues that there is nothing inherently moral about the moral hazard. It does so by arguing against three proposed claims regarding the wrongness of the moral hazard: first, the view that conceives of it as deception; then, the view that conceives of it as cheating; and finally, the view that conceives of it as stealing. (shrink)

By 2050, global livestock production is expected to double—growing faster than any other agricultural sub-sector—with most of this increase taking place in the developing world. As the United Nation’s four-hundred-page report, Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options , documents, livestock production is now one of three most significant contributors to environmental problems, leading to increased greenhouse gas emissions, land degradation, water pollution, and increased health problems. The paper draws on the UN report as well as a flurry of other (...) recently published studies in order to demonstrate the effect of intensive livestock production on global warming and on people’s health. The paper’s goal is to outline the problems caused by intensive livestock farming and analyze a number of possible solutions, including legislative changes and stricter regulations, community mobilizing, and consumers choosing to decrease their demand for animal products. (shrink)

Current conceptualizations of environmental responsibility follow a human-centered approach wherein the natural environment is seen as instrumental to human ends. Environmental responsibility, in this context, emerges primarily as the preservation and sustenance of nature in a manner that would limit waste, enhance the aesthetic and spiritual value of nature, and confer psychological and economic rewards upon individuals and businesses that follow a sustainable course of interaction with nature. In contrast, this paper advances an ecocentric approach to sustainable living that ensures (...) the dialectic between human systems and natural and technical systems by explicitly recognizing nature as central to survival and progress. Environmental responsibility within this approach is viewed to be multilateral and institutional rather than merely as moral responsibility of business or of governments. (shrink)

Ethics, Policy & Environment, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 241-243, June 2012.

The proponents of competing views about the safety and usefulness of GM crops often talk past each other. One major reason for this is the lack of a shared framework in which to evaluate their competing claims. In this paper I shall make use of Philip Kitcher's idea of a well-ordered science to see if it may offer us any guidance here. In doing so I shall first lay out the idea of a well-ordered science, as developed by Kitcher. Next (...) I will see how it might deal with at least some of the controversies surrounding GM crops. In doing so I have two main goals. First, to show that work on the development and application of GM crops is distinctly un-well ordered at this time. Secondly, I seek to show that only by applying the ideals of something like a well-ordered science can we properly asses the potential harms and benefits of GM crops. Once I have done this, I tentatively suggest that the role of GM crops in solving the problems noted above is likely to be much smaller than their proponents might have thought. (shrink)

I claim that differences in the importance attached to economic liberty are more important in debates over the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture than disagreements about the precautionary principle. I will argue this point by considering a case study: the decision by the U.S. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to grant nonregulated status to Roundup Ready soy. I will show that the unregulated release of this herbicide-resistant crop would not be acceptable morally unless one places (...) a very high premium on economic liberty. This is true even if one takes a sound science attitude to unknown risks, rather than a precautionary attitude. I concede that it may not have been within APHIS’s legislative mandate to regulate Roundup Ready soy further, but for those of us who do not put a high premium on economic liberty, this only calls for extending regulatory oversight of GMOs. (shrink)

: The current difference in attitude toward germ-line enhancement in humans and nonhumans is unjustified. Society should be more cautious in modifying the genes of nonhumans and more bold in thinking about modifying our own genome. I identify four classes of arguments pertaining to germ-line enhancement: safety arguments, justice arguments, trust arguments, and naturalness arguments. The first three types are compelling, but do not distinguish between human and nonhuman cases. The final class of argument would justify a distinction between human (...) and nonhuman germ-line enhancement; however, this type of argument fails and, therefore, the discrepancy in attitude toward human and nonhuman germ-line enhancement is unjustified. (shrink)

The earth cannot support humanity's increasing population and consumption. Concerned scientists and citizens are therefore wondering how we might work toward a sustainable, survivable human future. Sustainability involves increased technological efficiency and agricultural productivity, but also incentives and attitudes that moderate consumption. Social psychology contributes to changing attitudes and behavior with evidence that a) materialism exacts psychic as well as environmental costs, and b) economic growth has failed to improve human morale. Two principles-the adaptation level phenomenon and social comparison-help explain (...) why materialism and increasing affluence fail to satisfy. (shrink)

There are a lot of expressions of pessimism these days about whether we can save the environment — and thereby ourselves. Some of this pessimism is self-serving, but most of it is quite genuine. People look at the trends, and they despair — or else go into denial. And those who despair will almost invariably point to one factor above all others — the threat of overpopulation. No matter whether we recycle all our waste, switch entirely to non-polluting energy sources, (...) sponge the skies of CFCs and greenhouse emissions, turn the deserts into gardens, and save the rainforests and the poor whales, all these gains will be washed away, these people say, by a surging tide of hungry hominids. My topic today, therefore, is the population boom. I want to consider the following question: is it inevitable that humanity must overwhelm itself in hungry babies? And I shall argue that the answer is a firm no — that while it is possible, and maybe even probable, that this catastrophe will happen, it is not inevitable. First, let’s take a clear-eyed look at some worrisome numbers, so that no one can say we are ignoring the facts. The world population clock has recently clicked over the six billion mark. I myself remember when it passed three billion. That was back around the time when the Beatles were driving teenie-boppers into hysterics; not all that long ago, really. We are currently adding nearly 90 million new hungry mouths every year, roughly three Canadas. Try to imagine the consequences if 90 million immigrants showed up at our borders in one year. In fact, the rate of increase has slowed down a little bit since the sixties and early seventies. Demographic experts are desperately trying to project on the basis of current trends, but the best they can do is to guess that world population will level out around ten billions or so, roughly around 2050. Will we all breathe a sigh of relief at that point, convinced that we have dodged the bullet? The problem is, of course, that it is not clear that we can continue, much longer, to provide even for the present world population, let alone a few billions more, given our current, highly wasteful methods of land use and resource extraction.. (shrink)

Analysing the demands of global justice for the distribution of resources is a complex task and requires consideration of a broad range of issues. Of particular relevance is the effect that different distributions will have on global population growth and individual welfare. Since changes in the consumption and distribution of resources can have major effects on the welfare of the global population, and the rate at which it increases, it is important to establish meaningful principles to ensure a just distribution (...) of resources. In order to establish such principles we must consider the scope of any reproductive rights, and rights to other goods, such as food and health care, as well as examine the extent of duties correlating to those rights. In addition to the impact that distributions of global goods have on the welfare of current generations, it is also important to consider what duties we have, if any, to future generations. (shrink)