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  1. Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
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  2. Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...)
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  3. Mark Crimmins (1992). Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
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  4. Davide Fassio (2014). A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief. Acta Analytica 29 (1):71-81.
    Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable (...)
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  5. David Hunter, Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions.
    forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.
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  6. David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  7. J. C. Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.) (1988). Practical Knowledge. Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills. Croom Helm.
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  8. Michael Polanyi (1967). The Tacit Dimension. London, Routledge & K. Paul.
    Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the ...
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  9. Chris Ranalli (2014). Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis. Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002; Turri 2010; Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...)
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