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  1. Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
  2. Edison Barrios (2012). Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration. Critica 44 (130):35-67.
    Según la Propositional Attitude View (PAV), un hablante es competente en su idioma en virtud de poseer actitudes proposicionales cuyo contenido es su gramática interna. En este artículo desarrollo una objeción a PAV, llamada �el reto de la integración�, originalmente propuesto por Stich (1978) y Evans (1981), y que está constituido por dos premisas: (1) las actitudes proposicionales se caracterizan por su integración inferencial, y (2) los estados que contienen información gramatical no están inferencialmente integrados. En este artículo considero y (...)
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  3. Dale Cannon (2002). Construing Polanyi's Tacit Knowing as Knowing by Acquaintance Rather Than Knowing by Representation. Tradition and Discovery 29 (2):26-43.
    This essay proposes that Polanyi’s tacit knowing – specifically his conception of tacit knowing as cognitive contact with reality – should be construed as fundamentally a knowing by acquaintance – a relational knowing of reality, rather than merely the underlying subsidiary component of explicit representational knowledge. Thus construed, Polanyi’s theory that tacit knowing is foundational to all human knowing is more radical than is often supposed, for it challenges the priority status of explicit representational knowledge relative to tacit acquaintance knowledge, (...)
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  4. Harry Collins (2013). Building an Antenna for Tacit Knowledge. Philosophia Scientiae 17 (3):25-39.
    My book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, is introduced. The introduction is also helpful in explaining the book to me, the author.Mon livre, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge, est introduit. L’introduction est également utile pour m’expliquer le livre à moi-même, l’auteur.
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  5. Mark Crimmins (1992). Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
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  6. Julien Dutant (2015). Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton, Tacit Knowledge, Durham: Acumen, 2013, 210 Pp., £18.99 , ISBN 1844655466; £55 , ISBN 1844655458. [REVIEW] Dialectica 69 (4):621-623.
  7. Adam Elga & Agustin Rayo, Fragmentation and Information Access.
    In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses. Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes. Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how .
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  8. Davide Fassio (2014). A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief. Acta Analytica 29 (1):71-81.
    Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable (...)
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  9. Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two leading internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  10. Matthew Frise (forthcoming). No Need to Know. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    I introduce and defend an argument against the popular view that anything falling short of knowledge falls short in value. The nature of belief and cognitive psychological research on memory, I claim, support the argument. I also show that not even the most appealing mode of knowledge is distinctively valuable.
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  11. Jerry H. Gill (1980). Of Split Brains and Tacit Knowing. International Philosophical Quarterly 20 (March):49-58.
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  12. David Hunter, Demonstrative Belief and Dispositions.
    forthcoming in Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper argues against David Armstrong’s view that singular beliefs are not dispositions. It also begins to develop the view that self-conscious belief is a matter of belief revision.
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  13. David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  14. Mudyń Krzysztof (2015). On the False Ontological Consensus. Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
    The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...)
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  15. James A. Macleod (forthcoming). Belief States in Criminal Law. Oklahoma Law Review 68.
    Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...)
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  16. J. C. Nyíri & Barry Smith (eds.) (1988). Practical Knowledge. Outlines of a Theory of Traditions and Skills. Croom Helm.
    A series of papers on different aspects of practical knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, J. C. Nyiri, Eva Picardi, Joachim Schulte Roger Scruton, Barry Smith and Johan Wrede.
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  17. T. Parent, Content Externalism and Equivocal Inference.
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 6 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  18. Trevor Pinch (2013). Tacit Knowledge and Realism and Constructivism in the Writings of Harry Collins. Philosophia Scientiæ 17 (3):41-54.
    In this paper I examine Harry Collins’s influential writing on tacit knowledge. In particular I turn my attention to his recent book, Tacit and Explicit Knowledge [Collins 2010], or TEK, which is arguably the most complete and systematic statement of what he means by the term “tacit knowledge”. As well as examining tacit knowledge as elaborated in this contribution, I draw out an underlying tension in Collins’s major contributions to the sociology of scientific knowledge in general between the realism underlying (...)
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  19. Michael Polanyi (1967). The Tacit Dimension. London, Routledge & K. Paul.
    Back in print for a new generation of students and scholars, this volume challenges the assumption that skepticism, rather than established belief, lies at the ...
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  20. Peter Railton (2013). Reliance, Trust, and Belief. Inquiry 57 (1):122-150.
  21. Chris Ranalli (2014). Luck, Propositional Perception, and the Entailment Thesis. Synthese 191 (6):1223-1247.
    Looking out the window, I see that it's raining outside. Do I know that it’s raining outside? According to proponents of the Entailment Thesis, I do. If I see that p, I know that p. In general, the Entailment Thesis is the thesis that if S perceives that p, S knows that p. But recently, some philosophers (McDowell 2002; Turri 2010; Pritchard 2011, 2012) have argued that the Entailment Thesis is false. On their view, we can see p and not (...)
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  22. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2016). How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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