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  1. Jody Azzouni (2005). Tarski, Quine, and the Transcendence of the Vernacular “True”. Synthese 142 (3):273 - 288.
    It is argued that the blind ascriptive role for the word true, its use, that is, in conjunction with descriptions of classes of sentences or with proper names of sentences (but not quote-names), is one which applies indiscriminately to sentences regardless of whether these are in languages we speak, can understand, or can translate into sentences that we do speak (and understand). Formal analogues of the ordinary word true as they arise in Tarskis seminal work, and in others, cannot replicate (...)
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  2. Arvid Båve (2013). Formulating Deflationism. Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, ${\langle \text{p}\rangle}$ is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I (...)
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  3. Arvid Båve (2010). Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer. Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  4. Andrea Cantini (1989). Notes on Formal Theories of Truth. Zeitshrift für Mathematische Logik Und Grundlagen der Mathematik 35 (1):97--130.
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  5. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2001). Ist die Wahrheitsdefinition Tarskis philosophisch uninteressant? Die semantische Wahrheitsdefinition, Verifikationismus und Begriffsempirismus. Conceptus 34 (84):33-45.
    Der semantischen Wahrheitsdefinition Tarskis wird of vorgeworfen, dass sie philosophisch uninteressant sei. Sie sei informativ leer, weil sie mit jeder erdenklichen Ansicht bezüglich der Natur der Wahrheit zu vereinbaren sei. Wir wollen zeigen, dass diese Meinung unhaltbar ist. Tarskis semantische Wahrheitsdefinition lässt sich im Besonderen mit den Versuchen der Epistemisierung und Pragmatisierung des Wahrheitsbegriffs nicht vereinbaren. (Vorausgesetzt, dass diese Versuche wirklich den Wahrheitsbegriff und nicht den Realitätsbegriff betreffen.) Darüber hinaus ist die Tatsache, dass Tarskis Definition eine Unterscheidung von Sprach¬ebenen voraus¬setzt, (...)
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  6. Yael Cohen (1994). Semantic Truth Theories. Magnes Press, Hebrew University.
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  7. Marian David (2008). Tarski's Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford Univ. Press.
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  8. Marian David (2004). Theories of Truth. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen & J. Wolenski (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology. Kluwer. 331--414.
  9. Donald Davidson (1967). Truth and Meaning. Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
  10. John Etchemendy (1988). Tarski on Truth and Logical Consequence. Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):51-79.
  11. Solomon Feferman (2008). Tarski's Conceptual Analysis of Semantical Notions. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 72.
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  12. Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.
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  13. Michael Glanzberg, Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.
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  14. Michael Glanzberg (2005). Truth, Reflection, and Hierarchies. Synthese 142 (3):289 - 315.
    A common objection to hierarchical approaches to truth is that they fragment the concept of truth. This paper defends hierarchical approaches in general against the objection of fragmentation. It argues that the fragmentation required is familiar and unprob-lematic, via a comparison with mathematical proof. Furthermore, it offers an explanation of the source and nature of the fragmentation of truth. Fragmentation arises because the concept exhibits a kind of failure of closure under reflection. This paper offers a more precise characterization of (...)
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  15. Mario Gómez-torrente (1998). Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth. Synthese 117 (3):375-408.
    This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...)
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  16. Susan Haack (1976). Is It True What They Say About Tarski? Philosophy 51 (197):323 - 336.
    Popper welcomes Tarski's theory of truth as a vindication of the ‘objective or absolute or correspondence theory of truth’: -/- Tarski's greatest achievement, and the real significance of his theory for the philosophy of the empirical sciences, is that he rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth … He vindicated the free use of the intuitive idea of truth as correspondence to the facts ….
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  17. Volker Halbach, Axiomatic Theories of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Definitional and axiomatic theories of truth -- Objects of truth -- Tarski -- Truth and set theory -- Technical preliminaries -- Comparing axiomatic theories of truth -- Disquotation -- Classical compositional truth -- Hierarchies -- Typed and type-free theories of truth -- Reasons against typing -- Axioms and rules -- Axioms for type-free truth -- Classical symmetric truth -- Kripke-Feferman -- Axiomatizing Kripke's theory in partial logic -- Grounded truth -- Alternative evaluation schemata -- Disquotation -- Classical logic -- Deflationism (...)
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  18. Volker Halbach (1997). Tarskian and Kripkean Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):69-80.
    A theory of the transfinite Tarskian hierarchy of languages is outlined and compared to a notion of partial truth by Kripke. It is shown that the hierarchy can be embedded into Kripke's minimal fixed point model. From this results on the expressive power of both approaches are obtained.
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  19. Volker Halbach (1994). A System of Complete and Consistent Truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35 (1):311--27.
    To the axioms of Peano arithmetic formulated in a language with an additional unary predicate symbol T we add the rules of necessitation and conecessitation T and axioms stating that T commutes with the logical connectives and quantifiers. By a result of McGee this theory is -inconsistent, but it can be approximated by models obtained by a kind of rule-of-revision semantics. Furthermore we prove that FS is equivalent to a system already studied by Friedman and Sheard and give an analysis (...)
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  20. Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (2006). Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth. Journal of Symbolic Logic 71 (2):677 - 712.
    We investigate axiomatizations of Kripke's theory of truth based on the Strong Kleene evaluation scheme for treating sentences lacking a truth value. Feferman's axiomatization KF formulated in classical logic is an indirect approach, because it is not sound with respect to Kripke's semantics in the straightforward sense: only the sentences that can be proved to be true in KF are valid in Kripke's partial models. Reinhardt proposed to focus just on the sentences that can be proved to be true in (...)
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  21. Richard Heck (1997). Tarski, Truth, and Semantics. Philosophical Review 106 (4):533-554.
    John Etchemendy has argued that it is but "a fortuitous accident" that Tarski's work on truth has any signifance at all for semantics. I argue, in response, that Etchemendy and others, such as Scott Soames and Hilary Putnam, have been misled by Tarski's emphasis on definitions of truth rather than theories of truth and that, once we appreciate how Tarski understood the relation between these, we can answer Etchemendy's implicit and explicit criticisms of neo-Davidsonian semantics.
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  22. Jaakko Hintikka (1975). A Counterexample to Tarski-Type Truth-Definitions as Applied to Natural Languages. Philosophia 5 (3):207-212.
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  23. Glen Hoffmann (2007). The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field's Incompleteness Objection. Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints (...)
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  24. Dale Jacquette (2010). Circularity or Lacunae in Tarski's Truth-Schemata. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):315-326.
    Tarski avoids the liar paradox by relativizing truth and falsehood to particular languages and forbidding the predication to sentences in a language of truth or falsehood by any sentences belonging to the same language. The Tarski truth-schemata stratify an object-language and indefinitely ascending hierarchy of meta-languages in which the truth or falsehood of sentences in a language can only be asserted or denied in a higher-order meta-language. However, Tarski’s statement of the truth-schemata themselves involve general truth functions, and in particular (...)
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  25. W. R. Jondeg (1990). Did Hobbes Have a Semantic Theory of Truth? Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1).
  26. Guido Küng (1965). Soviet Philosophy and the Semantic Definition of Truth. Studies in East European Thought 5 (1-2):51-56.
  27. Wolfgang Künne (2003). Conceptions of Truth. Oxford University Press.
    Truth is one of the most debated topics in philosophy; Wolfgang Kunne presents a comprehensive critical examination of all major theories, from Aristotle to the present day. He argues that it is possible to give a satisfactory 'modest' account of truth without invoking problematic notions like correspondence, fact, or meaning. The clarity of exposition and the wealth of examples will make Conceptions of Truth an invaluable and stimulating guide for advanced students and scholars.
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  28. Hannes Leitgeb (2001). Truth as Translation – Part A. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):281-307.
    This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate - (...)
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  29. M. P. Lynch (2001). The Nature of Truth: From the Classic to the Contemporary. The Mit Press.
  30. Robert L. Martin & Peter W. Woodruff (1975). On Representing 'True-in-l' in L. Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
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  31. V. McGee (2005). Maximal Consistent Sets of Tarski'€™s Schema. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1):235--41.
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  32. Vann McGee (1985). How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result. Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
  33. Peter Milne (1999). Tarski on Truth and its Definition. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99:141-167.
    Of his numerous investigations ... Tarski was most proud of two: his work on truth and his design of an algorithm in 1930 to decide the truth or falsity of any sentence of the elementary theory of the high school Euclidean geometry. [...] His mathematical treatment of the semantics of languages and the concept of truth has had revolutionary consequences for mathematics, linguistics, and philosophy, and Tarski is widely thought of as the man who "defined truth". The seeming simplicity of (...)
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  34. Luis Fernández Moreno (2001). Tarskian Truth and the Correspondence Theory. Synthese 126 (1-2):123 - 147.
    Tarski's theory of truth brings out the question of whether he intended his theory to be a correspondence theory of truth and whether, whatever his intentions, his theory is in fact a correspondence theory. The aim of this paper is to answer both questions. The answer to the first question depends on Tarski's relevant assertions on semantics and his conception of truth. In order to answer the second question Popper's and Davidson's interpretations of Tarski's truth theory are examined; to this (...)
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  35. R. J. Nelson (1997). Proxy Functions, Truth and Reference. Synthese 111 (1):73-96.
    Quines ontological relativity is related to Tarskis theory of truth in two ways: Quine repudiates term-by-term-correspondence, as does Tarskis rule of truth; and Quines proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarskis truth definition.Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesnt comply with the rule of truth (Tarskis celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quines express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires.
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  36. Ilkka Niiniluoto (2004). Tarski's Definition and Truth-Makers. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):57-76.
    A hallmark of correspondence theories of truth is the principle that sentences are made true by some truth-makers. A well-known objection to treating Tarski’s definition of truth as a correspondence theory has been put forward by Donald Davidson. He argued that Tarski’s approach does not relate sentences to any entities (like facts) to which true sentences might correspond. From the historical viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that Tarski’s philosophical teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski advocated an ontological doctrine of reism which accepted (...)
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  37. T. Parent, Paradox with Just Self-Reference.
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires something akin to diagonalization on substitution instances of a definition-scheme (*): ‘x is Lagadonian iff, in the g(t)th substitution instance of (*), x = t’. (Given a substitution instance of (*), let t be the term replacing 'x' and let g(t) be the Godel code for t.) Assuming an appropriate enumeration of the instances, (...)
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  38. Douglas Patterson (2008). Truth-Definitions and Definitional Truth. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):313-328.
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  39. Douglas Patterson (ed.) (2008). New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The essays can be seen as addressing Tarski's seminal treatment of four basic questions about logical consequence. (1) How are we to understand truth, one of ...
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  40. Douglas Patterson (2002). Theories of Truth and Convention T. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (5):1-16.
    Partly due to the influence of Tarski's work, it is commonly assumed that any good theory of truth implies biconditionals of the sort mentioned in Convention T: instances of the T-Schema "s is true in L if and only if p" where the sentence substituted for "p" is equivalent in meaning to s. I argue that we must take care to distinguish the claim that implying such instances is sufficient for adequacy in an account of truth from the claim that (...)
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  41. Douglas Eden Patterson (2006). Tarski on the Necessity Reading of Convention T. Synthese 151 (1):1 - 32.
    Tarski’s Convention T is often taken to claim that it is both sufficient and necessary for adequacy in a definition of truth that it imply instances of the T-schema where the embedded sentence translates the mentioned sentence. However, arguments against the necessity claim have recently appeared, and, furthermore, the necessity claim is actually not required for the indefinability results for which Tarski is justly famous; indeed, Tarski’s own presentation of the results in the later Undecidable Theories makes no mention of (...)
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  42. K. Popper (1972). Philosophical Comments on Tarski'€™s Theory of Truth. In , Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Clarendon Press.
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  43. Panu Raatikainen, Truth, Correspondence, Models, and Tarski.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...)
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  44. Panu Raatikainen (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Translation. In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. O.U.P.. 247.
    Philosopher’s judgements on the philosophical value of Tarski’s contributions to the theory of truth have varied. For example Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Donald Davidson have, in their different ways, celebrated Tarski’s achievements and have been enthusiastic about their philosophical relevance. Hilary Putnam, on the other hand, pronounces that “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Putnam has several alleged reasons for his dissatisfaction,1 but one of them, (...)
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  45. Panu Raatikainen (2003). More on Putnam and Tarski. Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  46. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000). El problema metafísico de la verdad. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 26 (2):351-59.
    In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.
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  47. Artur Rojszczak (2002). Philosophical Background and Philosophical Content of the Semantic Definition of Truth. Erkenntnis 56 (1):29 - 62.
    The aim of this paper is to show that it is the explicativecharacter of Tarski's semantic definition of truth given in his study of 1933 that allows forconsideration of a philosophical background of this definition in the proper sense. Given the explicativecharacter of this definition it is argued that the philosophical tradition that should be taken intoaccount with regard to this philosophical background is the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw Schoolin its connections with the School of Brentano. As an example of (...)
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  48. Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.) (2003). Theories of Truth. Blackwell Pub..
  49. Barry Smith (1993). Putting the World Back Into Semantics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:91-109.
    To what in reality do the logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: 'Great Fact' theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made the simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made tme by what are called 'dependence structures', or (...)
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  50. Jeff Speaks (2006). Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
    In "Truth and Meaning", Davidson suggested that a truth theory can do the work of a theory of meaning: it can give the meanings of expressions of a language, and can explain the semantic competence of speakers of the language by stating information knowledge of which would suffice for competence. From the start, this program faced certain fundamental objections. One response to these objections has been to supplement the truth theory with additional rules of inference (e.g. from T-sentences to meaning (...)
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