Bookmark and Share

Testimony

Edited by Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside)
About this topic
Summary

Beliefs are often based on assertions by others: that is, on testimony.  This phenomenon raises many questions.  How wide is the range of testimony-based beliefs? Do all assertions play the same epistemic role, or do some assertive speech acts play special roles?  Can mathematical, moral, religious, or aesthetic knowledge be transferred?  A major issue in the epistemology of testimony concerns the rational role of testimony.  How does comprehending an assertion rationally support a belief? According to reductionism, it provides no support; comprehension is rationally inert. The recipient must have independent rational grounds to believe the assertion. Anti-reductionism disagrees: comprehension provides prima facie, defeasible rational support. Reductionism is accused of being too demanding, anti-reductionism of being too permissive.  Another issue concerns the transmission of knowledge.   Is knowledge transferred from sender to receiver? Is knowledge in the chain of sources essential for the uptake of knowledge, or can assertive communication sometimes generate knowledge?

Key works Coady 1992 is a classic book-length treatment of nearly all the major issues. Burge 1993 is a rewarding and influential anti-reductionist account. Graham 2010 is an empirically informed, proper functioning anti-reductionist account. Fricker 1994 levels the charge of excessive permissiveness against anti-reductionism. Goldberg & Henderson 2006 articulates the standard, anti-reductionist response. Moran 2005 emphasizes the interpersonal role of telling in favor of anti-reductionism. Lackey 1999 and Graham 2006 argue that testimony sometimes generates knowledge. In recent books, Lackey 2008 and Faulkner 2011 both argue, in very different ways, for a middle path between reductionism and anti-reductionism.
Introductions Adler 2008 is Jonathan Adler's revised and comprehensive Stanford Encyclopedia entry. Lackey 2010 is a concise and informative survey.
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:History/traditions: Testimony
748 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 748
Material to categorize
  1. Patrick Bondy, When Reasons Don’T Work.
    The aim of this paper is to extend Miranda Fricker’s conception of testimonial injustice to what I call “argumentative injustice”: those cases where an arguer’s social identity brings listeners to place too little or too much credibility in an argument. My recommendation is to put in place a type of indirect “affirmative action” plan for argument evaluation. I also situate my proposal in Johnson ’s framework of argumentation as an exercise in manifest rationality.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Edward Craig (1986). The Practical Explication of Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:211 - 226.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  3. Tal Golan (1999). The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in the English Courtroom. Science in Context 12 (1):7.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Jennifer Lackey (2006). 1. Reductionism. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press 160.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Kay Mathiesen (2005). Epistemic Risk and Community Policing. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (Supplement):139-150.
    In his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Benjamin W. McCraw (2015). The Nature of Epistemic Trust. Social Epistemology 29 (4):413-430.
    This paper offers an analysis of the nature of epistemic trust. With increased philosophical attention to social epistemology in general and testimony in particular, the role for an epistemic or intellectual version of trust has loomed large in recent debates. But, too often, epistemologists talk about trust without really providing a sustained examination of the concept. After some introductory comments, I begin by addressing various components key to trust simpliciter. In particular, I examine what we might think of when we (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Richard McDonough (1999). Bruce Goldberg: August 31, 1937 - April 29, 1999. Idealistic Studies 29 (3):123-124.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. John McDowell (1994). Knowledge by Hearsay. In A. Chakrabarti & B. K. Matilal (eds.), Knowing From Words. Kluwer 195--224.
    Language matters to epistemology for two separate reasons (although they are no doubt connected) -/- My interest in testimony derives from Gareth Evans, as does my conviction that it cannot be accommodated by the sort of account of knowledge which I attack in this paper. I believe I also owe to him my interest in the sorts of case I discuss in §4 below, where knowledge is retained under the risk that what would have been knowledge if the relevant fact (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  9. Aidan McGlynn (2012). Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge. Episteme 9 (4):361-376.
    In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Nancy K. Miller & Jason Tougaw (eds.) (2002). Extremities: Trauma, Testimony, Community. Illinois University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Kitty Judith Millet (1996). To Survive Outside the Law: The Testimonial Communities of Holocaust Survivors. Dissertation, University of Minnesota
    This interdisciplinary dissertation reflects on humanist scholarship's failure to analyze Holocaust survivor testimony. I give the reason for this failure in the introduction: the unique purposiveness of survivor testimony conflicts with the general purposiveness of testimony to serve communal interests. To illustrate how testimony subscribes to communal interests, I explore its use from the pre-Socratics to modernity. Modernity's codification of testimony as an object of knowledge, which conforms to the expectations of rule-based judgments, indicates that testimony is judicially-centered rather than (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. John Moody (1947). A Testimonial to Grace. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):185-186.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Luis Antonio Sánchez Navarro (2002). Carácter testimonial de la Sagrada Escritura. Revista Agustiniana 43 (131):349-370.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Philip James Nickel (2002). Moral Dependence: Reliance on Moral Testimony. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Moral dependence is taking another person's assertion or "testimony" that C as a reason to believe C , such that whatever justificatory force is associated with the person's testimony endures or remains as one's reason for believing C. People are justified in relying on one another's testimony in non-moral matters. The dissertation takes up the question whether the same is true for moral beliefs. ;My method is to divide the topic into three somewhat separate questions. First, there is the epistemological (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Ben C. Ollenburger (forthcoming). Book Review: Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy. [REVIEW] Interpretation 53 (1):71-73.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. Meg Paul (2012). The Testimony [Book Review]. The Australian Humanist 107 (107):21.
    Paul, Meg Review(s) of: The testimony, by Halina Wagowska, Hardie Grant 2012 $24.95.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Heidi Pauwels (2010). ""Who Are the Enemies of the Bhaktas? Testimony About" Śāktas" and" Others" From Kabīr, the Rāmānandīs, Tulsīdās, and Harirām Vyās. Journal of the American Oriental Society 130 (4):509-539.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. Joel S. Perlmutter (2011). Expert Testimony at the Food and Drug Administration: Who Wants the Truth? Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics 1 (2):78-82.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Philip Pettit (2006). No Testimonial Route to Consensus. Episteme 3 (3):156-165.
    The standard image of how consensus can be achieved is by pooling evidence and reducing if not eliminating disagreements. But rather than just pooling substantive evidence on a certain question, why not also take into account the formal, testimonial evidence provided by the fact that a majority of the group adopt a particular answer? Shouldn't we be reinforced by the discovery that we are on that majority side, and undermined by the discovery that we are not? Shouldn't this be so, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20. Philip L. Quinn & Vincent C. Müller (1998). Auf der Suche nach den Fundamenten des Theismus [In Search of the Foundations of Theism]. In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh 331-353.
    Dieser Aufsatz ist eine kritische und erkundende Diskussion von Plantingas Behauptung, daß bestimmte Aussagen, aus denen evidentermaßen folgt, daß Gott existiert, berechtigterweise basal sein könnten. Im kritischen Abschnitt argumentiere ich dafür, daß es Plantinga nicht gelingt zu zeigen, daß das Kriterium des modernen Fundamentalisten für berechtigte Basalität, dem zufolge solche Aussagen nicht berechtigterweise basal sein können, selbstreferentiell inkohärent oder anderweitig mangelhaft ist. Im erkundenden Abschnitt versuche ich, ein Argument für die Auffassung zu entwickeln, daß solche Aussagen, selbst wenn sie berechtigterweise (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Philip L. Quinn & Vincent C. Müller (1998). Auf der Suche nach den Fundamenten des Theismus [In Search of the Foundations of Theism]. In Christoph Jäger (ed.), Analytische Religionsphilosophie. Ferdinand Schöningh 331-353.
    Dieser Aufsatz ist eine kritische und erkundende Diskussion von Plantingas Behauptung, daß bestimmte Aussagen, aus denen evidentermaßen folgt, daß Gott existiert, berechtigterweise basal sein könnten. Im kritischen Abschnitt argumentiere ich dafür, daß es Plantinga nicht gelingt zu zeigen, daß das Kriterium des modernen Fundamentalisten für berechtigte Basalität, dem zufolge solche Aussagen nicht berechtigterweise basal sein können, selbstreferentiell inkohärent oder anderweitig mangelhaft ist. Im erkundenden Abschnitt versuche ich, ein Argument für die Auffassung zu entwickeln, daß solche Aussagen, selbst wenn sie berechtigterweise (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Curtis E. Renoe (1996). Seeing is Believing?: Expert Testimony and the Construction of Interpretive Authority in an American Trial. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 9 (2):115-137.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23. Wayne Riggs (2012). Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic? Social Epistemology 26 (2):149-162.
    This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker?s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  24. Adriane Rini (2012). Modal Notions: Perception and Testimony as Data Providers. Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information:77-79.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Eileen Rizo-Patron (2007). On the Role of the Oneiric in Testimonial Narrative. In Peter Gratton, John Panteleimon Manoussakis & Richard Kearney (eds.), Traversing the Imaginary: Richard Kearney and the Postmodern Challenge. Northwestern University Press
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. John Alan Robinson (1956). Causation, Probability and Testimony. Dissertation, Princeton University
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. William E. W. Robinson (forthcoming). Book Review: Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony. [REVIEW] Interpretation 62 (4):446-446.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. James Macdonald Rogers (1881). The Testimony of the Gods, an Essay on the Evidence That the Greatest Men of All Ages Have Acknowledged Their Belief in a Great First Cause, by Castleton.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Joshua Rollins (2015). Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments. Philosophy Compass 10 (1):78-90.
    Until recently, epistemology was largely caught in the grips of an epistemically unrealistic radical epistemological individualism on which the beliefs and testimony of others were of virtually no epistemic significance. Thankfully, epistemologists have bucked the individualist trend, acknowledging that one person's belief or testimony that P might offer another person prima facie epistemic reasons – or social evidence as I call it – to believe P. In this paper, I discuss the possibility and conditions under which beliefs and testimony act (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. M. Root (2012). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology * By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG. Analysis 72 (1):184-186.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. James Ross (1975). Testimonial Knowledge. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics. Springer
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. James F. Ross (1975). Testimonial Evidence. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics. Springer 35--55.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Marc Rotenberg (1990). Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record on Computer Virus Legislation. Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 20 (1):12-25.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Andrew Rotondo (2014). The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays by Christensen, David and Lackey, Jennifer (Eds.). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):413-414.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Ci Lewis Against Russell (2012). Sanford Shieh. In Lila Haaparanta & Heikki Koskinen (eds.), Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic. Oxford University Press, Usa
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Dafina Amit Selbst (1998). The Condition for Transmission Holocaust - (Not Holo) Caust Which is Heard by the Testimony of the One. Analysis 8:127.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Judith M. Siegel & Elizabeth F. Loftus (1978). Impact of Anxiety and Life Stress Upon Eyewitness Testimony. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 12 (6):479-480.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Epistemically Fundamental Or Simply (2008). Is the Principle of Testimony Simply Epistemically Fundamental or Simply Not? In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne. Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. Ontos 61.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Fiona E. Somerset (1996). Vernacular Argumentation in The Testimony of William Thorpe. Mediaeval Studies 58 (1):207-241.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Ernest Sosa (2010). Chapter Seven. Knowledge: Instrumental and Testimonial. In Knowing Full Well. Princeton University Press 128-139.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Bethany J. Spielman (forthcoming). Reliability of Bioethics Testimony. Bioethics in Law.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. David Joshua Strauss (2004). Understanding and Evaluating Expert Testimony in the Law. Dissertation, University of California, Riverside
    Judges and jurors in the American legal system are not presumed to possess any expertise; they are typically laypersons with respect to the scientific and technical subjects about which experts testify in legal trials. Yet judges and jurors are given the legal authority to resolve cases involving battles of experts, and their decisions can have far reaching consequences both for present litigants as well as the legal system in general. ;It is therefore imperative that judges and jurors, despite their lack (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. J. Sumic-Riha (2003). Silence and the Real. Testimony Between the Impossibility and Obligation. Filozofski Vestnik 24 (1):35-51.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. józef Szajna (2002). Memories Old and New: A Testimony. Dialogue and Universalism 12 (6-7):69-70.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. F. Talmage (1985). Trauma at Tortosa-the Testimony of Rimoch, Abraham. Mediaeval Studies 47:379-415.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. Frank Talmage (1985). Trauma at Tortosa: The Testimony of Abraham Rimoch. Mediaeval Studies 47 (1):379-415.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. I. Plato’S. Testimony (2003). A Testimony of Anaximenes in Plato. Classical Quarterly 53:327-337.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Laurence H. Tribe (1990). House Testimony. Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 2 (1):103-111.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. A. L. Tsing (2014). Strathern Beyond the Human: Testimony of a Spore. Theory, Culture and Society 31 (2-3):221-241.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Chris Tucker (2012). The dangers of using safety to explain transmission failure: A reply to Martin Smith. Episteme 9 (4):393-406.
    Many epistemologists hold that the Zebra Deduction fails to transmit knowledge to its conclusion, but there is little agreement concerning why it has this defect. A natural idea is, roughly, that it fails to transmit because it fails to improve the safety of its conclusion. In his, Martin Smith defends a transmission principle which is supposed to underwrite this natural idea. There are two problems with Smith's account. First, Smith's argument for his transmission principle relies on a dubious premise. I (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 748