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  1. Linda Martin Alcoff (2000). On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant? In Naomi Zack (ed.), On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant? Wiley-Blackwell. 235-262.
  2. Ronald J. Allen (2008). Explanationism All the Way Down. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 320-328.
    The probabilistic account of juridical proof meets insurmountable problems. A better explanation of juridical proof is that it is a form of inference to the best explanation that involves the comparative plausibility of the parties’ stories. In addition, discrete evidentiary matters such as relevance and probative value are also best understood as involving inference to the best explanation rather than being probabilistic.
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  3. Fritz Allhoff & David Monroe (eds.) (2007). Food & Philosophy. Blackwell.
    Provides a critical reflection on what and how we eat can contribute to a robust enjoyment of gastronomic pleasures A thoughtful, yet playful collection which ...
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  4. Ben Almassi (2009). Trust in Expert Testimony: Eddington's 1919 Eclipse Expedition and the British Response to General Relativity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 40 (1):57-67.
  5. Endre Begby (2013). The Epistemology of Prejudice. Thought 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
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  6. V. Boland (2006). Truth, Knowledge and Communication: Thomas Aquinas on the Mystery of Teaching. Studies in Christian Ethics 19 (3):287-304.
    The context in which Thomas Aquinas reflects on teaching is discussed, as are the texts in which he does so. We learn how he understands teaching from two other considerations, how he went about the task, and the pedagogical concerns that persist through his writing career. The most important source for his convictions about pedagogy is the Bible, and Jesus is ‘the most excellent of teachers’. His account of teaching is ultimately theological, then, in line with his concerns in Summa (...)
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  7. Joseph A. Bracken (1987). Testimony and Intersubjectivity. Philosophy and Theology 2 (1):35-43.
    Following a brief examination of some remarks by Paul Ricoeur on the notion of testimony. I provide the outline or an analysis of revelation based upon certain key concepts of process philosophy. This is followed by a more specific interpretation within the context of Whitehead’s philosophy of process.
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  8. Ian A. Burney (2002). Testing Testimony: Toxicology and the Law of Evidence in Early Nineteenth-Century England. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):289-314.
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  9. Kenneth Campbell, Stephen Banning, Hilary Fussell Sisco, Susanna Priest & Karen Taylor (2011). Reading Hurricane Katrina: Information Sources and Decision-Making in Response to a Natural Disaster. Social Epistemology 23 (3):361-380.
    In this paper we analyze results from 114 face-to-face qualitative interviews of people who had evacuated from the New Orleans area in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, interviews that were completed within weeks of the 2005 storm in most cases. Our goal was to understand the role information and knowledge played in people's decisions to leave the area. Contrary to the conventional wisdom underlying many disaster communication studies, we found that our interviewees almost always had extensive storm-related information from a (...)
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  10. J. Adam Carter & Philip J. Nickel (2014). On Testimony and Transmission. Episteme 11 (02):145-155.
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...)
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  11. Annamaria Carusi (2009). Implicit Trust in the Space of Reasons and Implications for Technology Design: A Response to Justine Pila. Social Epistemology 23 (1):25-43.
    In this issue, Pila (2009) has criticised the recommendations made by requirements engineers involved in the design of a grid technology for the support of distributed readings of mammograms made by Jirotka et al. (2005). The disagreement between them turns on the notion of “biographical familiarity” and whether it can be a sound basis for trust for the performances of professionals such as radiologists. In the first two sections, this paper gives an interpretation of the position of each side in (...)
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  12. Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane (2011). The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
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  13. C. A. J. Coady (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...)
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  14. David Coady (2007). Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational? Episteme 4 (2):193-204.
    Abstract It is widely believed that to be a conspiracy theorist is to suffer from a form of irrationality. After considering the merits and defects of a variety of accounts of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, I draw three conclusions. One, on the best definitions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. Two, there may be occasions on which we should settle for an inferior definition which (...)
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  15. David Coady (2007). Introduction: Conspiracy Theories. Episteme 4 (2):131-134.
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  16. Sinan Dogramaci (2012). Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.
    This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.
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  17. Charles M. Ess (2010). Trust and New Communication Technologies: Vicious Circles, Virtuous Circles, Possible Futures. [REVIEW] Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (3-4):287-305.
    I approach the philosophical analyses of the phenomenon of trust vis-à-vis online communication beginning with an overview from within the framework of computer-mediated communication (CMC) of concerns and paradigmatic failures of trust in the history of online communication. I turn to the more directly philosophical analyses of trust online by first offering an introductory taxonomy of diverse accounts of trust that have emerged over the past decade or so. In the face of important objections to the possibility of establishing and (...)
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  18. Anna Estany & David Casacuberta (2012). Contributions of Socially Distributed Cognition to Social Epistemology: The Case of Testimony. Eidos 16 (16):40-68.
    El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y revisar las normas que filosóficamente asociamos al proceso de testimonio, inquiriendo hasta qué puntoson0 consistentes con los conocimientos empíricos de las ciencias cognitivas.Tradicionalmente, el problema del testimonio surgía cuando, desde una epistemología de corte individualista, se suponía, siguiendo el dictum ya marcado en la Modernidad tanto por racionalistas como por empiristas, de que el conocimiento debía ser testado personalmente. Sin embargo, disciplinas y enfoques recientes, como la Cognición Socialmente Distribuida y la Epistemología (...)
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  19. María G. Navarro (2014). Agencia y paciencia de la utopía. [REVIEW] Isegoría 54:408-414.
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  20. Christopher Gauker (2003). Social Externalism and Linguistic Communication. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. CSLI.
    According to the expressive theory of communication, the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey the content of their thoughts to hearers. According to Tyler Burge's social externalism, the content of a person's thought is relative to the way words are used in his or her surrounding linguistic community. This paper argues that Burge's social externalism refutes the expressive theory of communication.
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  21. Axel Gelfert (2011). Expertise, Argumentation, and the End of Inquiry. Argumentation 25 (3):297-312.
    This paper argues that the problem of expertise calls for a rapprochement between social epistemology and argumentation theory. Social epistemology has tended to emphasise the role of expert testimony, neglecting the argumentative function of appeals to expert opinion by non-experts. The first half of the paper discusses parallels and contrasts between the two cases of direct expert testimony and appeals to expert opinion by our epistemic peers, respectively. Importantly, appeals to expert opinion need to be advertised as such, if they (...)
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  22. Axel Gelfert (2010). Kant and the Enlightenment's Contribution to Social Epistemology. Episteme 7 (1):79-99.
    The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a (...)
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  23. David M. Godden & Douglas Walton (2006). Argument From Expert Opinion as Legal Evidence: Critical Questions and Admissibility Criteria of Expert Testimony in the American Legal System. Ratio Juris 19 (3):261-286.
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  24. John Greco (2009). Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting Testimony. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83:61-76.
    An adequate account of testimonial knowledge in general explains how religious knowledge can be grounded in testimony, and even in the context of conflicting testimonial traditions. Three emerging trends in epistemology help to make that case. The first is to make a distinction between two projects of epistemology: “the project of explanation” and “the project of vindication.” The second is to emphasize a distinction between knowledge and understanding. The third is to ask what role the concept of knowledge plays in (...)
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  25. John Greco (2007). Discrimination and Testimonial Knowledge. Episteme 4 (3):335-351.
    Sanford Goldberg has called our attention to an interesting problem: How is it that young children can learn from the testimony of their caregivers (their parents, teachers, and nannies, for example) even when the children themselves are undiscriminating consumers of testimony? Part One describes the importance and scope of the problem, showing that it generalizes beyond tots and their caregivers. Part Two considers and rejects several strategies for solving the problem, including Goldberg's own. Part Three defends a solution, positing a (...)
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  26. William P. Gunnar (2008). Laws of Men and Laws of Nature: The History of Scientific Expert Testimony in England and America (Review). Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 51 (4):650-655.
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  27. Patricia A. Halliday (2005). Book Review: Tales of Trauma: A Review of Leigh Gilmore's the Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony (Cornell University Press, 2001) and Janice Doane and Devon Hodges's Telling Incest: Narratives of Dangerous Remembering From Stein to Sapphire (University of Michigan Press, 2001). [REVIEW] Hypatia 20 (2):210-213.
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  28. Robert Hambourger (1980). Belief in Miracles and Hume's Essay. Noûs 14 (4):587-604.
    IN HIS ESSAY "OF MIRACLES" HUME DERIVES THE CONCLUSION THAT TESTIMONY CANNOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE REASON TO BELIEVE IN A MIRACLE FROM TWO PRINCIPLES; A GENERAL ONE CONCERNING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH TESTIMONY SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, AND THE PRINCIPLES THAT TO BE BELIEVED PROPERLY TO BE A MIRACLE, AN EVENT WOULD HAVE TO VIOLATE PRINCIPLES AS WELL ESTABLISHED AS ANY CAN BE BY INFERENCES FROM EXPERIENCE. HERE IT IS ARGUED THAT BOTH OF HUME’S PRINCIPLES ARE FALSE, AFTER WHICH A POSITIVE ACCOUNT (...)
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  29. Jörg Hardy (2010). Seeking the Truth and Taking Care for Common Goods – Plato on Expertise and Recognizing Experts. Episteme 7 (1):7-22.
    In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...)
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  30. Paul L. Harris & Melissa A. Koenig (2007). The Basis of Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources? Episteme 4 (3):264-284.
    What is the nature of children's trust in testimony? Is it based primarily on evidential correlations between statements and facts, as stated by Hume, or does it derive from an interest in the trustworthiness of particular speakers? In this essay, we explore these questions in an effort to understand the developmental course and cognitive bases of children's extensive reliance on testimony. Recent work shows that, from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular informants, differentiate between those who make (...)
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  31. A. Hazlett, R. McKenna & J. Pollock (2012). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, Edited by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (483):784-788.
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  32. Allan Hazlett, Preferring Non-Testimonial Belief is a Social Virtue.
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  33. Allan Hazlett, Truthfulness Without Truth.
    What is the relationship between the value of sincerity and the value of truth? You might assume that the value of sincerity and the value of truth (more exactly: true belief) are part of an evaluative package, such that they stand or fall together. In this spirit, Bernard Williams (2002) offers an account of the “virtues of truth,” which include sincerity and accuracy. My goal in this paper is to undermine the assumption that the value of sincerity is tied to (...)
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  34. Allan Hazlett, Robin McKenna & Joey Pollock (forthcoming). Review of Brown and Cappelen, Assertion (Oxford University Press). Mind.
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  35. Edward Hinchman (2014). Assurance and Warrant. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (17).
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  36. Edward Hinchman (2005). Telling as Inviting to Trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.
    How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling (...)
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  37. Christopher Hookway (2010). Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker. Episteme 2010 (7):151-163.
    Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating (...)
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  38. Robert Hopkins (2000). Beauty and Testimony. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:209-236.
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  39. Joachim Horvath (2008). Testimony, Transmission, and Safety. Abstracta 4 (1):27-43.
    Most philosophers believe that testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge, but merely a way to transmit already existing knowledge. However, Jennifer Lackey has presented some counterexamples which show that one can actually come to know something through testimony that no one ever knew before. Yet, the intuitive idea can be preserved by the weaker claim that someone in a knowledge-constituting testimonial chain has to have access to some non-testimonial source of knowledge with regard to what is testified. But (...)
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  40. Stephen John (2011). Expert Testimony and Epistemological Free-Riding: The Mmr Controversy. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):496-517.
    Using the controversy over the MMR vaccine, I consider the reasons why non-experts should defer to experts, and I sketch a model for understanding cases where they fail to defer. I first suggest that an intuitively plausible model of the expert/non-expert relationship is complicated by shifting epistemic standards. One possible moderate response to this challenge, based on a more complex notion of non-experts' relationship with experts, seems unappealing as an account of the MMR controversy. A more radical suggestion is that (...)
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  41. Jason Kawall (2002). Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues. Ratio 15 (3):257–275.
    Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as an expert), patience, and creativity. We can (...)
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  42. Tim Kenyon (2013). Noninferentialism and Testimonial Belief Fixation. Episteme 10 (1):73-85.
    An influential view in the epistemology of testimony is that typical or paradigmatic beliefs formed through testimonial uptake are noninferential. Some epistemologists in particular defend a causal version of this view: that beliefs formed from testimony (BFT) are generated by noninferential processes. This view is implausible, however. It tends to be elaborated in terms that do not really bear it out – e.g. that BFT is fixed directly, immediately, unconsciously or automatically. Nor is causal noninferentialism regarding BFT plausibly expressed in (...)
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  43. Hidetoshi Kihara (1999). In Defense of Expertise; on its Location in Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology 13 (3 & 4):269 – 272.
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  44. J. F. Kindstrand (1985). A Supposed Testimony to Bion of Borysthens. Classical Quarterly 35 (02):527-.
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  45. Peter King & Nathan Ballantyne (2009). Augustine on Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 195-214.
  46. Rolfe King (2013). Divine Self-Testimony and the Knowledge of God. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (3):279-295.
    A proof is offered that aims to show that there can be no knowledge of God, excluding knowledge based on natural theology, without divine self-testimony. Both special and general revelation, if they occur, would be forms of divine self-testimony. It is argued that this indicates that the best way to model such knowledge of God is on the basis of an analogy with knowledge gained through testimony, rather than perceptual models of knowledge, such as the prominent model defended by Plantinga. (...)
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  47. Amir Konigsberg (2012). The Acquaintance Principle, Aesthetic Autonomy, and Aesthetic Appreciation. British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (2):153-168.
    The acquaintance principle (AP) and the view it expresses have recently been tied to a debate surrounding the possibility of aesthetic testimony, which, plainly put, deals with the question whether aesthetic knowledge can be acquired through testimony—typically aesthetic and non-aesthetic descriptions communicated from person to person. In this context a number of suggestions have been put forward opting for a restricted acceptance of AP. This paper is an attempt to restrict AP even more.
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  48. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Introduction: Perspectives on Testimony. Episteme 4 (3):233-237.
    Almost everything we know depends in some way on testimony. Without the ability to learn from others, it would be virtually impossible for any individual person to know much beyond what has come within the scope of her immediate perceptual environment. The fruits of science, history, geography – all of these would be beyond our grasp, as would much of what we know about ourselves. We do not, after all, perceive that we belong to one family rather than to another (...)
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  49. Michael Levine (1988). Belief in Miracles: Tillotson's Argument Against Transubstantiation as a Model for Hume. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 23 (3):125 - 160.
    HUME THOUGHT THAT WE CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING AN EVENT E TO HAVE OCCURRED GIVEN E’S CHARACTERIZATION OF A VIOLATION OF A LAW OF NATURE. HE CLAIMS THAT HE IS USING AN ARGUMENT SIMILAR TO JOHN TILLOTSON’S AGAINST TRANSUBSTANTIATION. A COMPARISON OF HUME’S ARGUMENT WITH TILLOTSON’S CAN HELP IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ONE CAN BE JUSTIFIED IN BELIEVING IN A MIRACLE. THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF BOTH TESTIMONY FOR, AND FIRSTHAND EXPERIENCE OF, AN ALLEGED MIRACLE IS CONSIDERED. I (...)
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  50. Christian List, When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. Here I identify the conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and those under which it does not. I also introduce the new concept of ‘consistency of degree k’, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only ‘blatant’ (...)
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