"The problem with you, Dewey, is that you think philosophy is done with the hands rather than with the eyes.""Thank you for the compliment."1A child's curious hand: like the budding of a plant seeking nourishment from sun and soil, the hand expresses into the world so that it may give, receive, and reproduce itself: the newborn grasping for mama's breast or papa's nose, instinctually squeezing a finger that may be placed in its palm; the toddler negotiating the traumatic development of (...) its identity by seizing toys and declaring "Mine!"; the painful learning that fire is hot through the necessary experience of placing fingers in flame despite previous verbal warnings; holding hands with grandpa while crossing the .. (shrink)

The deeper meaning of education, says Dewey in his Human Nature and Conduct (1922), which distinguishes the justly honored profession from that of mere trainer, is that a future new society of changed purposes and desires may be created by a deliberately humane treatment of the impulses of youth (p. 69). For Dewey, a truly humane education consists in an intelligent direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and necessities of the social situation (p. 70). Student impulse (...) and interest are not to be suppressed nor continually vented in unrestrained expression. In view of the plasticity of youth, there is little danger that allowing the role of student interest will lead away from important objectives of the curriculum. Education which respects the integrity of the student is a prerequisite of the kind of educated public suited for fuller participation in the democratic processes which properly direct and reconstruct our social life. The citizen appropriate for a democratic society is neither the dull conformist nor the superficial, gushing, non-conformist or sensualist. Individual impulse and initiative is neither to be damned up nor frivolously expressed. Meaningful participation and fuller social reconstruction require that we respect the social conditions for the possibility of knowledge and its growth, and this is more easily achieved, and more broadly appealing, when we speak of plans for the school environment. Respect for the cognitive and developmental needs of our own children and young people is fundamental to the self-respect of any viable society. Education could be philosophical praxis for a better world. (shrink)

The achievement of intentional learning is a powerful paradigm for the objectives and methods of the teaching of philosophy. This paradigm sees the objectives and methods of such teaching as based not simply on the mastery of content, but as rooted in attempts to shape the various affective and cognitive factors that influence students’ learning efforts. The goal of such pedagogy is to foster an intentional learning orientation, one characterized by self-awareness, active monitoring of the learning process, and a desire (...) for publicly certified expertise. I provide a number of examples of philosophy-specific teaching strategies that follow this paradigm. (shrink)

Children are surrounded by a lot of problems here and there, and they often show any tendency to answer them promptly. In this paper, I argue that helping children understand their problems properly before answering them is one of the good ways of meta-thinking teaching in philosophy for children, and then I suggest how teachers help them do so.

The author presents a novel interpretation of Peirce's ‘speculative rhetoric’ (the third and culminating branch of his general theory of signs), then draws out the most important implications of Peircean rhetoric for understanding our educational practices and, more generally, human learning. Improvisation and the unanticipated emergence of novel purposes are herein stressed.

In his 1973 paper ?The Justification of Education? R.S. Peters aspired to give a non-instrumental justification of education. Ever since, his so-called ?transcendental argument? has been under attack and most critics conclude that it does not work. They have, however, thrown the baby away with the bathwater, when they furthermore concluded that Peters? justificatory project itself is futile. This article takes another look at Peters? justificatory project. As against a Kantian interpretation, it proposes an axiological-perfectionist interpretation to bring out the (...) permanent importance of this project and suggests some possible strategies for its successful execution. (shrink)

This paper utilizes Foucault to offer a preliminary sketch and critique of an instrumentalist mentalite within higher education. Part one tackles some of the socio-historical issues pertaining to American universities. Here, I address questions of liberal learning and offer them as important distinctions from more narrow, curriculum-based focuses on skill-sets and workforce training. Part two provides an ethical foundation for the study of colleges and universities. Both instrumental and ethical perspectives on education are considered. Instmmental approaches appear within the discourse (...) of education as training. Altematively, ethical approaches emerge within the discourse of education as a process of self-cultivation or care of self I tum to Foucault's notion of spirituality and argue that education is a means by which we constitute ourselves and become capable of operating within fields of ethical action. (shrink)

In this essay Sarah Galloway considers emancipation as a purpose for education through examining the theories of Paulo Freire and Jacques Rancière. Both theorists are concerned with the prospect of distinguishing between education that might socialize people into what is taken to be an inherently oppressive society and education with emancipation as its purpose. Galloway reconstructs the theories in parallel, examining the assumptions made, the processes of oppression described, and the movements to emancipation depicted. In so doing, she argues that (...) that the two theorists hold a common model for theorizing oppression and emancipation as educational processes, distinguished by the differing assumptions they each make about humanity, but that their theories ultimately have opposing implications for educational practices. Galloway further maintains that Freire and Rancière raise similar educational problems and concerns, both theorizing that the character of the relations among teachers, students, and educational materials is crucial to an emancipatory education. Galloway's approach allows discussion of some of the criticisms that have been raised historically about Freire's theory and how these might be addressed to some degree by Rancière's work. Taking the two theories together, she argues that the possibility for an emancipatory education cannot be ignored if education is to be considered as more than merely a process of passing down the skills and knowledge necessary in order to socialize people into current society. (shrink)

The paper explores the links between philosophy and learning with a view to highlight some of the today’s most influential philosophical “paradigms” of education. The concepts of “paradigm” and “philosophical paradigm of education” are discussed – and nuanced - based on some explicit references to them in the current philosophical and pedagogical literature. While taking into account all the different ways in which philosophy may be inquired with regard to its influence on education, the paper focuses merely on philosophical contributions (...) to the understanding of specific issues such as the human potential for learning; the concepts of cognition and learning; epistemological and value assumptions in teaching and learning; and psycho-social aspects exploring the relationshipsbetween the self and the “other” via communication and other forms of social interaction. While assuming that the relationships between philosophy and education are not unidirectional (in the sense that not only philosophy impacts on education, but also vice-versa, education issues may trigger philosophical reflection and debates), the paper analyses how different contemporary influential philosophical orientations (i.e. Pragmatism and Neo-pragmatism; The Critical Theory; Post-modern and Relativistic approaches; Constructivism) paved their way into educational thinking, policy making and teaching and learning practices. Whereas acknowledging that philosophy is not the only strong “foundation” for education, the paper stresses nevertheless the benefits of a reflective attitude ineducation with regard to its main (philosophical) assumptions. Choices in education are not always following a reflective pattern and changes are very often introduced because they are fashionable. Recurrent interrogations on important philosophical assumptions of educational theories, policies and practices may yet bring about a better balance between “innovation” and “tradition” and/or between “change” and “stability” while avoiding the many pitfalls of new andattractive, yet ephemeral, education fashions. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, the idea that education should function to promote economic progress has played a major role in shaping educational policy. So far, however, philosophers of education have shown relatively little interest in analysing this notion and its implications. The present article critically examines, from a philosophical perspective, the link between education and the currently prevailing understanding of economic progress, which is grounded in human capital theory. A number of familiar philosophical objections to the idea that economic (...) progress is a worthy educational aim are raised, but it is held that many of these objections stem from a partial understanding of economic theory. The article then moves on to investigate the foundations of human capital theory's conception of economic progress. It is argued that there are inherent tensions between the philosophical foundations of the economist's conception of progress and the very essence of education. The article concludes by suggesting that in order to resolve these tensions we should consider grounding the economic theory that guides educational policy-making in an intersubjective or objective conception of welfare. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, the influence of economic thought on education has been steadily increasing. Taking Jean-Jacques Rousseau's educational thought as a point of departure, Tal Gilead critically inquires into the philosophical foundations of what can be termed the economic approach to education. Gilead's focus in this essay is on happiness and the role that education should play in promoting it. The first two parts of the essay provide an introduction to Rousseau's conception of happiness, followed by an examination of the (...) economic approach to education and the notion of human capital. In the course of this discussion, Gilead shows that increasing happiness is one of the economic approach's major aims. In the third part of the essay, he uses Rousseau's views to interrogate significant aspects of the economic approach to education. He then continues by highlighting some of the educational implications that stem from Rousseau's critique. Gilead maintains that Rousseau's ideas can provide valuable suggestions regarding how education might contribute to the promotion of happiness. The article concludes by proposing that while Rousseau's ideas on the matter should not necessarily be embraced, contemporary policymakers can learn some important lessons from them. (shrink)

This paper deals with an analysis of philosophy as intellectual therapeutics for educational (pedagogical) activity. Two interrelated issues are examined: (1) philosophy's role in the construction of cognitive attitudes to all systems of education; (2) philosophy's role in the formation of a definite value attitude to education. A great deal of attention is devoted to the problem of educational goals. It is argued that the assumed dichotomy of the social and the individual (which still occurs in our teaching practice and (...) in some philosophical doctrines) in defining educational goals, is itself mistaken. It is shown that pedagogical activity must be based on a general concept of man as a whole substance who organically includes qualities in himself. Our pressing concern with education in the twenty-first century promotes a new subject for pedagogical activity. This presupposes a modern philosophical mind capable of creating an individual with a broad worldview and with pragmatic capabilities. (shrink)

The overall question addressed in this article is, ‘What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The article focuses on the following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by philosophers themselves; the meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by policy makers; the difference place and time makes to these meanings; how these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy (of education) influencing policy. The question is addressed using philosophical methods (...) and empirical evidence from conversations and conversational interviews with some philosophers of education and other educational researchers. The argument begins with an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the findings from the conversational evidence. The article is drawn together in the penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the concluding section, some further—thorny—questions are raised by the analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice. (shrink)

Discussion regarding education’s aims, especially its ultimate aims, is a key topic in the philosophy of education. These aims or values play a pivotal role in regulating and structuring moral and other types of normative education. We outline two plausible strategies to identify and justify education’s ultimate aims. The first associates these aims with a normative standpoint, such as the moral, prudential, or aesthetic, which is overriding, in a sense of ‘overriding’ to be explained. The second associates education’s ultimate aims (...) with the intrinsic value of personal well-being. We advance reasons to doubt that these strategies are successful. The shortcomings of these strategies impute yet further urgency to the issue of how we are to ascertain and validate education’s ultimate aims. (shrink)

Teaching in university education programmes, can, at times, involve the uncomfortable situation of discriminatory speech. A situation that has often occurred in our own teaching, and in those of our colleagues, is the citation of homophobic and heterosexist comments. These are comments that are more likely to occur in foundation subjects such as philosophy and sociology of education. The occurrence of such situations has prompted debate regarding ‘silencing words that wound’. This has prompted the question, ‘should we keep students from (...) stating such discriminatory speech?’ Our article takes up this issue, and considers it from the perspective of the importance of critique. Working with Foucault's What is Critique? together with his discussion of subjectivation in the 1981–82 lectures at the Collège de France, we set out to make the case for the significance of the relationship between truth and critique. This leads us to a position where we ask the question, if we silence, what do we risk doing to critique? (shrink)

The dominant model of curriculum design in the last century assumed that school education could be organized around aims, defined primarily in terms of students' behaviour. The credentials of this model were questioned by, among others, Lawrence Stenhouse, who pointed out that education serves purposes that cannot be stated in terms of behavioural objectives. In this article, I offer support for Stenhouse's conclusion and go beyond it, showing that if education aims at critical understanding of its own value, then it (...) is even more radically open-ended than Stenhouse argued.My argument is based on two premises. One of them is that the reason why people disagree about what education involves is that they have less-than-perfect knowledge of what human characteristics are worth cultivating. This premise is supported by a theory of meaning advanced by Hilary Putnam. The other premise is that one of the aims of education is intellectual independence. From these premises, I conclude that a successful course of education serves purposes that cannot be completely stated in advance. (shrink)

Sweeping changes in technology followed by political, social and economic transformation are modifying the expectations from education. There is urgent need for reforms in the aim, content and method of education systems. Evidence is gathered to justify this need and suggest a process that will lead to the desired reform. We argue that character education is a requirement in order to ensure that changes move in the direction envisaged. Empowerment of the parties involved will change the mood of silence and (...) transform the agents into active participants in change. (shrink)

A cosmopolitan education must help us identify with those who are unlike us. In Martha Nussbaum’s words, students must learn “enough to recognize common aims, aspirations, and values, and enough about these common ends to see how variously they are instantiated in the many cultures and their histories.” It is commonly thought that reading serious literature will play a significant role in this process. However, this claim is challenged by theorists we call sentimentalists, who claim that the goals of cosmopolitan (...) education are better served by less sophisticated, overtly sentimental texts which take a certain moral framework as given and encourage straightforward emotional responses within the guidelines of that framework. This paper critiques the sentimentalists’ position, arguing that their conception of a ‘sentimental education’ is inadequate to prepare students for the increasingly diverse, complex, cosmopolitan world their fate it is to inhabit. (shrink)

The aim of this presentation is to show that philosophy of education must seriously engage itself with horizons of education. After a brief explanation of the term “horizon”, the horizon of modern pedagogy, which was inaugurated by Pestalozzi and Herbart, is examined. Modern pedagogy with its special emphasis on method unravels itself as one of the major streams of modern epistemology, for which inspection of inner ideas is crucial. The modern epistemology, on the other hand, presupposes the atomistic self represented (...) by the Lockian dark room. This is the horizon of modern pedagogy. One of the deficiencies of this horizon is that it is not capable of articulating the educational aim on its own terms. Thus, dealing with the aim of education, modern pedagogy was obliged to use terms such as God or Nature, the terms, of which philosophical origin goes back to the Cave metaphor of Plato. This takes us to the second part of the presentation: the examination of the Cave metaphor in order to unravel the horizon of the classical education, paideia. The comparison of the two horizons will show the importance of horizon, about which philosophy of education must be sensitive. (shrink)

I would like to begin by talking about General Education in America. General Education plays a very particular and interesting role in American Higher Education. A typical undergraduate at one of our colleges or universities is expected to satisfy a range of requirements in his or her major area of study (mathematics, economics, philosophy, etc.); and they will also take a range of electives – courses that are not required for graduation but in which the student might want to explore (...) a developing interest. In addition to both of these, however, most undergraduate institutions (though not all) require that students satisfy a range of general education requirements as well. These are the requirements that must be satisfied for the student to count – in the opinion of the institution – as generally educated. They are the requirements, in other words, that every student must fulfill regardless of their areas of interest or specialty in order to be prepared to enter the broader world and to aspire to live a good life in it. (shrink)

At present the basic intellectual aim of academic inquiry is to improve knowledge. Much of the structure, the whole character, of academic inquiry, in universities all over the world, is shaped by the adoption of this as the basic intellectual aim. But, judged from the standpoint of making a contribution to human welfare, academic inquiry of this type is damagingly irrational. Three of four of the most elementary rules of rational problem-solving are violated. A revolution in the aims and methods (...) of academic inquiry is needed so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom, conceived of as the capacity to realize what is of value, for oneself and others, thus including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. This urgently needed revolution would affect every branch and aspect of the academic enterprise. (shrink)

We need a revolution in education, from five year olds onwards, so that exploration of problems is at the heart of the enterprise.

Is Science Neurotic? sets out to show that science suffers from a damaging but rarely noticed methodological disease — “rationalistic neurosis.” Assumptions concerning metaphysics, human value and politics, implicit in the aims of science, are repressed, and the malaise has spread to affect the whole academic enterprise, with the potential for extraordinarily damaging long-term consequences. The book begins with a discussion of the aims and methods of natural science, and moves on to discuss social science, philosophy, education, psychoanalytic theory and (...) academic inquiry as a whole. It makes an original and compelling contribution to the current debate between those for and those against science, arguing that science would be of greater human value if it were more rigorous — we suffer not from too much scientific rationality, but too little. The author discusses the need for a revolution in the aims of science and academic inquiry in general and, in a lively and accessible style, spells out a thesis with profound importance for the long-term future of humanity. (shrink)

Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning about the universe, and learning how to live wisely. The first problem was solved with the creation of modern science, but the second problem has not been solved. This combination puts humanity into a situation of unprecedented danger. In order to solve the second problem we need to learn from our solution to the first problem. This requires that we bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry, (...) so that it takes up its proper task of promoting wisdom. (shrink)

In order to make progress with solving our grave global problems we need to bring about a revolution in academia so that problems of living are given intellectual priority, and the basic intellectual aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, and not just acquire knowledge.

In this article, written for the generally educated reader, I summarize my latest thinking about a dilemma that I believe current theoretical reflection faces about the proper ultimate aims of a public university. Specifically, I make the following three major points: (1) On the one hand, all dominant theories of how properly to spend public resources entail that academics should not pursue knowledge for its own sake and should rather devote their energies toward promoting some concrete public good (such as (...) citizenship, justice, autonomy or the like). (2) On the other hand, that view of the academic enterprise entails patent absurdities. (3) The dilemma is best resolved by articulating a new theory of how public resources ought to be spent, one according to which the point of the state and its public institutions ought to be to _balance_ the realization of final goods. (shrink)

A lengthy annotated bibliography of the most central work from the past 25 years on various aspects of the philosophy of higher education.

The aim of this article is to establish that current thought about the point of a publicly funded university faces a dilemma. On the one hand, influential and attractive ‘macro’-level principles about how state resources ought to be accountably used entail that academic freedom should be utilised solely for the sake of social justice or some other concrete public good. Standard theories of public morality entail that an academic’s responsibility is entirely to be ‘responsive’ or ‘relevant’ to her social context (...) in the way she teaches and researches. On the other hand, ‘micro’-level self-conceptions of teachers and researchers include the idea that it can be proper to use academic freedom in order to discover and impart knowledge that is unlikely to foster social justice, however construed. Probably most academics accept the idea that ‘knowledge for its own sake’ can often merit pursuit and transmission. In this article, I use the most space to defend the second horn of the dilemma, the micro-level perspective, by indicating just how counterintuitive the macro one is. As a foil I critically discuss a recent report by the South African Council on Higher Education, which occasions awareness of the position that the right to academic freedom is exhausted by a duty to benefit society. However, I conclude by noting prima facie defences of the first horn, pointing out that dominant accounts of institutional ethics forbid scholars from seeking knowledge for its own sake, and hence indicating the need to resolve an antinomy about the proper final ends of a state university. (shrink)

I seek to answer the question of whether publicly funded higher education ought to aim intrinsically to promote certain kinds of ‘‘blue-sky’’ knowledge, knowledge that is unlikely to result in ‘‘tangible’’ or ‘‘concrete’’ social benefits such as health, wealth and liberty. I approach this question in light of an African moral theory, which contrasts with dominant Western philosophies and has not yet been applied to pedagogical issues. According to this communitarian theory, grounded on salient sub-Saharan beliefs and practices, actions are (...) right insofar as they respect relationships in which people both share a way of life, or identify with one another, and care for others’ quality of life, or are in solidarity with each other. I argue that while considerations of identity and solidarity each provide some reason for a state university to pursue blue-sky knowledge as a final end, they do not provide conclusive reason for it to do so. I abstain from drawing any further conclusion about whether this provides reason to reject the Afro-communitarian moral theory or the intuition that blue-sky knowledge is a proper final end of public higher education. I do point out, however, that the dominant Western moral theories on the face of it do no better than the African one at accounting for this intuition. (shrink)

From the perspective of an African ethic, analytically interpreted as a philosophical principle of right action, what are the proper final ends of a publicly funded university and how should they be ranked? To answer this question, I first provide a brief but inclusive review of the literature on Africanising higher education from the past 50 years, and contend that the prominent final ends suggested in it can be reduced to five major categories. Then, I spell out an intuitively attractive (...) African moral theory and apply it to these five final ends, arguing that three of them are appropriate but that two of them are not. After that, I maintain that the African moral theory prescribes two additional final ends for a public university that are not salient in the literature. Next, I argue that employing the African moral theory as I do enables one to rebut several criticisms of Africanising higher education that have recently been made from a liberal perspective. I conclude by posing questions suitable for future research. (shrink)

Abstract On the basis of an analysis of moral judgements and choices, this paper discusses moral motivation grounded in the desire to maintain and express one's personal identity as a good, or ?good enough?, person. This identity is perceived as a link between moral knowledge and commitment to moral action. Identity?based motivation encourages a pluralistic and tolerant view of other norms. Since it is based on personal identity, it suggests a new situation in education. The aim of moral education will (...) be the development of an identity with an orientation towards the desirable rather than an instrumentalist orientation. It is suggested that the school should serve as a ?culture preserve?, offering a model of identity. In order to fulfill this mission the school must present, with full awareness of the dangers of this approach, a comprehensive system of values, beyond morality in the narrow sense. (shrink)

Advances in artificial intelligence and neuroscience claim to have begun to undermine the assumptions of the arts and educational theory community by explaining consciousness through either a reduction to mathematical functionalism or an excrescence of brain biology. I suggest that the worldview behind such reductionism is opposed to the worldview assumed by many educational practitioners and theorists. I then go on to outline a few common positions taken in the burgeoning field of consciousness studies that suggest that—though many attributes of (...) consciousness have been identified and explained—individual consciousness itself remains as much of an enigma to scientists as to the rest of us who experience it. However, I do suggest the necessity of intersubjectivity for conscious evolution. (shrink)

Business education is at a critical juncture. How are we to justify the curriculum in undergraduate business awards in Aotearoa New Zealand? This essay suggests a philosophical framework for the analysis the business curriculum in Western countries. This framework helps us to see curriculum in a context of global academic communities and national needs. It situates the business degree in the essential tension which modernity (Western metaphysics) creates and which is expressed in an increasingly globalised economy. The tension is between (...) those who insist that the degree is to serve modernity and those who hope that it may contribute to a new era of justice and harmony with nature. One critical battle ground for the business curriculum is the subject Business Ethics. The business ethics curriculum often indicates the intention of the business ethics degree itself. Kant's distinction between heteronomy (rule following) and autonomy (making your own decisions) provides us with a means to judge the purposes of business ethics courses: there are courses which seek to produce reliable and compliant (heteronomous) employees, and there are those which seek to produce independent creative (autonomous) human beings. The question for this conference is: what do we as business educators see as our task? (shrink)

The present education does riot yield required results mainly because it is divorced from the real social content and social goals. We as the citizens of the republic are constitutionally committed to democracy, social justice, equality of opportunity, secularism and above all to a welfare state. Educational policy and educational programmes should not merely equip an individual to adjust with society to its customs and conventions, but it should enable him to bring desirable changes in the society. Every educational institute (...) from secondary school to University College should be developed to become an agency of change, it is the dream of Dr. B.R .Ambedkar. (shrink)

This paper argues that moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, depends upon a constricted and untenable view of rational judgment as simple syllogistic ratiocination. This I demonstrate by re-examining Nussbaum’s (1986/2002) case for particularism based on Sophocles’ Antigone. The central role of principles in moral judgment and in educational theory is supported by explicating ‘mature judgment’, which highlights key features of Thomas Green’s account of norm acquisition and of Kant’s account of the (...) autonomy of rational judgment. (shrink)