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  1. Barbara Abbott, Analyticity and Nondescriptionality[*] Michigan State University Abbottb@Msu.Edu.
    One of the widely accepted and quite influential conclusions of modern Anglo-American philosophy is that there is no sharp distinction between analytic truths and statements that are true only [by] virtue of the facts; what had been called analytic truths in earlier work, it is alleged, are simply expressions of deeply held belief. This conclusion seems quite erroneous. There is no fact about the world that I could discover that would convince me that you persuaded John to go to college (...)
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  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2005). The Wolffian Paradigm and its Discontent: Kant's Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (1):22-74.
    I defend Kant’s definition of analyticity in terms of concept “containment”, which has engendered widespread scepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify the extent to (...)
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  3. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  4. Sylvain Auroux (1985). The Analytic and the Synthetic as Linguistic Topics. Topoi 4 (2):193-199.
    The Analytic/Synthetic distinction did not originate in Kant, but in Port-Royal's logical theory. The key for the doctrine is the explicite recognition of two different kinds of relative clauses, e.g. explicative and determinative. In the middle eighteenth century the distinction becomes a topic within the grammars. Although we can find by grammarians different criteria for the distinction, these criteria (for which we can find medieval sources) are for the main predictable from the original theory of ideas, which was presented in (...)
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  5. A. J. Ayer (1987). The a Priori. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  6. A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
  7. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch (...)
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  8. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1971). Degrees of Analyticity. Philosophia 1 (1-2):1-20.
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  9. George Bealer, Analyticity.
    1. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced the term ‘analytic’ for judgments whose truth is guaranteed by a certain relation of ‘containment’ between the constituent concepts, and ‘synthetic’ for judgments which are not like this. Closely related terms were found in earlier writings of Locke, Hume and Leibniz. In Kant’s definition, an analytic judgment is one in which ‘the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A’ ([1781/1787] 1965: 48). Kant (...)
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  10. Edward F. Becker (2012). The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth; 2. Analyticity and synonymy; 3. The indeterminacy of translation; 4. Ontological relativity; 5. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index.
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  11. K. Becker (2001). Understanding Quine's Famous `Statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84.
    I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and (...)
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  12. Ermanno Bencivenga (1986). Analyticity and Analytical Truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):14-19.
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  13. Jonathan Bennett (1958). Analytic-Synthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:163 - 188.
    The aim of this paper1 is to attack Quine’s views on the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD), but more than half of it will be devoted to arguing that an attack is still required. This preliminary thesis is based on the claim that what Quine presents as (1) an attack on the ASD, followed by (2) some remarks about confirmation and disconfirmation, offers a more formidable obstacle to the adherent of the traditional ASD if (2) is built into (1) as a positive (...)
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  14. J. F. A. K. Benthem (1974). Hintikka on Analyticity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):419 - 431.
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  15. Gustav Bergman (1958). Analyticity. Theoria 24 (2):71-93.
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  16. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Professor Quine on Analyticity. Mind 64 (254):254-258.
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  17. Paul Boghossian (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):488-497.
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  18. Paul Boghossian (2010). Truth in Virtue of Meaning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):370 - 374.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 370-374, June 2011.
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  19. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  20. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Analyticity and Conceptual Truth. Philosophical Issues 5:117-131.
  21. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Inferential-Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):109-122.
    This is a critical discussion of Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore's "Holism". The paper questions the existence of a slippery slope from some inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning' to all inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning'. "Interalia", it defends the existence of an analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  22. Paul A. Boghossian (1993). Cognitive Science and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Comments on Horwich. Philosophical Issues 3:135-142.
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  23. Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  24. Mario Bunge (1961). Analyticity Redefined. Mind 70 (278):239-245.
  25. John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  26. Richard Butrick (1970). Carnap on Meaning and Analyticity. The Hague,Mouton.
  27. H. G. Callaway (2003). The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures. In , W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog.
    This is the Introduction to my translation of Quine's Kant Lectures. Part of my interpretation is that an "esoteric doctrine" in involved in Quine's distinctive semantic claims: his skepticism of the credulity of non-expert evaluation of discourse and theory.
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  28. H. G. Callaway (1996). Synonymy and Analyticity. In Gerhardus D. Et al (ed.), Sprachphilosophie, Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung. De Gruyter.
    This article is an invited overview of contemporary issues connected with meaning and the analytic-synthetic distinction.
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  29. H. G. Callaway (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  30. H. G. Callaway (1991). Review of W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). [REVIEW] Dialectica, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1991, Pp. 317-22 45 (No. 4):317-322.
    Quine's aim in this slim book is to "update, sum up and clarify variously intersecting views on cognitive meaning, objective referencce, and the grounds of knowledge." Only nine pages had previously appeared as the book came to print. It is based largely on unpublished lectures and informal discussions of the past ten years back to the Immanuel Kant Lectures given at Stanford in 1980. It does not, then duplicate Leonelli's Italian translation of the Kant lectures, La Scienza E I Datti (...)
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  31. H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  32. Hector Neri Castañeda (1960). "7 + 5 = 12" as a Synthetic Proposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (2):141-158.
  33. Albert Casullo (2012). Analyticity, Apriority, Modality. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub.. 228.
  34. David J. Chalmers (2011). Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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  35. David J. Chalmers (2011). Verbal Disputes. Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
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  36. Jonathan Cohen (2000). Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense From Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):115-135.
    In the new metalanguage of semantics, it is possible to make statements about the relation of designation and about truth.... To me the usefulness of semantics for philosophy was so obvious that I believed no further arguments were required and it was sucient to list a great number of customary concepts of a semantical nature ([Carnap, 1963], 60--62).
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  37. David Cole, Note on Analyticity and the Definability of "Bachelor".
    Those who have a brief against the analytic-synthetic distinction raise problems for what seem to supporters of the distinction to be some of the clearest cases. That bachelors are unmarried seems to many to be analytically true. But to hold this seems to imply that there is a definition of "bachelor" that includes being unmarried. But critics of the analytic-synthetic distinction, such as Jerry Fodor, deny that there are true definitions (reportive, not stipulative). So there can be no definition of (...)
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  38. Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he (Quine) has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is (...)
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  39. Richard Creath (1987). The Initial Reception of Carnap's Doctrine of Analyticity. Noûs 21 (4):477-499.
  40. Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
    Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, (...)
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  41. W. R. de Jong (1997). Kant's Theory of Geometrical Reasoning and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. On Hintikka's Interpretation of Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (1):141-166.
    Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic method is connected to the so-called Aristotelian model of science and has to be interpreted in a (broad) directional sense. With the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments the critical Kant did introduced a new way of using the terms 'analytic'-'synthetic', but one that still lies in line with their directional sense. A careful comparison of the conceptions of the critical Kant with ideas of the precritical Kant as expressed in _Ãœber die Deutlichkeit, leads (...)
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  42. Willem R. de Jong (2010). The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege. Synthese 174 (2):237-261.
    This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...)
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  43. Willem R. de Jong (2001). Bernard Bolzano, Analyticity and the Aristotelian Model of Science. Kant-Studien 92 (3):328-349.
    Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.
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  44. Lieven Decock (2010). Review of Callaway, Meaning Without Analyticity. [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 251 (1):127-130.
    The volume assembles thirteen essays on logic, language and meaning, and is preceded by an introduction by Paul Gochet. Most of the papers were published between 1981 and 2000 in European journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, and Erkenntnis. The papers stand alone, yet throughout the book an overarching view of the relationship between pragmatics and semantics transpires clearly. Callaway defends a midway position between American analytic philosophy and American pragmatism. The result is a blend of Quine's scientific philosophy (...)
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  45. Lieven Decock, Carnap and Quine on Some Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions.
    I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...)
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  46. J. K. Derden Jr (1976). Carnap's Definition of 'Analytic Truth' for Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 43 (4):506-522.
    In this paper Rudolf Carnap's definition of 'analytic truth' based upon a meaning postulate At, for theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory is subjected to critique. It is argued that this definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Assuming that the preceding is correct, At is subjected to further scrutiny to determine how to interpret it and whether, and under what conditions, it need even be true. It is argued that a given At need not be true as (...)
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  47. Jesús A. Díaz (1988). Cartesian Analyticity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):47-55.
    The syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot account for an ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation and related texts. Descartes' notion of god relies on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which Descartes had identified before Leibniz and Kant did. I describe how the syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot explain Descartes' ontological argument; then I apply the analytic-synthetic distinction to Descartes’ idea of god.
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  48. Dennis Earl (2009). Analyticity and the Analysis Relation. Acta Analytica 24 (2):139-148.
    Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms (...)
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  49. Frank B. Ebersole (1956). On Certain Confusions in the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Journal of Philosophy 53 (16):485-494.
    Interessanter Artikel. Ebersole fordert ein extensionales Kriterium für die Unterscheidung, erklärt die Suche aber für aussichtslos. Er betont, dass nur Aussagen analytisch sind, nicht Sätze. Er betont, dass empirische Allsätze weder prinzipiell analytisch noch synthetisch sind, ihr Wahrheitswert ist unbestimmt. Erst, wenn wir alle Gegenstände kennen, die unter den allquantifizierten Begriff fallen, können wir dies sagen. (Hier habe ich Probleme, da ich Allquantifikation über undefinierten Begriffen unzulässig finde.).
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  50. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.
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