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  1. A. R. A. (1960). The Notion of Analytic Truth. Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):703-703.
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  2. R. A. A. (1960). The Notion of Analytic Truth. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 13 (4):703-703.
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  3. Barbara Abbott, Analyticity and Nondescriptionality[*] Michigan State University Abbottb@Msu.Edu.
    One of the widely accepted and quite influential conclusions of modern Anglo-American philosophy is that there is no sharp distinction between analytic truths and statements that are true only [by] virtue of the facts; what had been called analytic truths in earlier work, it is alleged, are simply expressions of deeply held belief. This conclusion seems quite erroneous. There is no fact about the world that I could discover that would convince me that you persuaded John to go to college (...)
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  4. R. Lanier Anderson (2005). The Wolffian Paradigm and its Discontent: Kant's Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (1):22-74.
    I defend Kant’s definition of analyticity in terms of concept “containment”, which has engendered widespread scepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify the extent to (...)
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  5. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  6. Sylvain Auroux (1985). The Analytic and the Synthetic as Linguistic Topics. Topoi 4 (2):193-199.
    The Analytic/Synthetic distinction did not originate in Kant, but in Port-Royal's logical theory. The key for the doctrine is the explicite recognition of two different kinds of relative clauses, e.g. explicative and determinative. In the middle eighteenth century the distinction becomes a topic within the grammars. Although we can find by grammarians different criteria for the distinction, these criteria (for which we can find medieval sources) are for the main predictable from the original theory of ideas, which was presented in (...)
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  7. A. J. Ayer (1987). The a Priori. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  8. A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
  9. G. H. B. (1973). The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):149-149.
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  10. G. H. B. (1973). Empiricism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):151-152.
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  11. L. K. B. (1959). Experience and the Analytic. Review of Metaphysics 13 (1):190-190.
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  12. Shaun Baker (2004). On Quine's Arguments Concerning Analyticity. Sorites 15:56-66.
    In a detailed examination of Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, I argue that Quine fails to make the case that there are no analytical truths in ordinary language. Drawing on admissions he makes with regard to definitions and languages' relationship to pragmatic considerations, and an examination of his arguments concerning the interdefinability of the terms `synonymous', and `analytic', I argue that analytic truths exist as deducible consequences of the various uses to which language or sub-languages are put.
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  13. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch (...)
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  14. Thomas Baldwin (2013). C.I. Lewis and the Analyticity Debate. In Erich H. Reck (ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  15. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1971). Degrees of Analyticity. Philosophia 1 (1-2):1-20.
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  16. George Bealer, Analyticity.
    1. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced the term ‘analytic’ for judgments whose truth is guaranteed by a certain relation of ‘containment’ between the constituent concepts, and ‘synthetic’ for judgments which are not like this. Closely related terms were found in earlier writings of Locke, Hume and Leibniz. In Kant’s definition, an analytic judgment is one in which ‘the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A’ ([1781/1787] 1965: 48). Kant (...)
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  17. Robert W. Beard (1967). Analyticity, Informativeness, and the Incompatibility of Colors. Logique Et Analyse 38:211-217.
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  18. Edward F. Becker (2012). The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth; 2. Analyticity and synonymy; 3. The indeterminacy of translation; 4. Ontological relativity; 5. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index.
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  19. K. Becker (2001). Understanding Quine's Famous `Statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84.
    I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and (...)
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  20. Ermanno Bencivenga (1986). Analyticity and Analytical Truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):14-19.
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  21. Jonathan Bennett (1958). Analytic-Synthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:163 - 188.
    The aim of this paper1 is to attack Quine’s views on the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD), but more than half of it will be devoted to arguing that an attack is still required. This preliminary thesis is based on the claim that what Quine presents as (1) an attack on the ASD, followed by (2) some remarks about confirmation and disconfirmation, offers a more formidable obstacle to the adherent of the traditional ASD if (2) is built into (1) as a positive (...)
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  22. J. F. A. K. Benthem (1974). Hintikka on Analyticity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):419 - 431.
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  23. Gustav Bergman (1958). Analyticity. Theoria 24 (2):71-93.
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  24. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Professor Quine on Analyticity. Mind 64 (254):254-258.
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  25. Karel Berka (1998). Bolzanova Anticipace Analytické Filosofie. Organon F: Filozoficky Casopis 5 (3):217-228.
    Under the influence of Leibnitz in oposition to Kant, especially against his philosophy of mathematics, Bolzano analyses several topics discussed in analytic philosophy of today. His starting point is a distinction of concepts and intuitions, being two basic kinds of ideas-in-themselves, based on the postulates of nonemptiness, singularity and simplicity. This dichotomy is utilized in the analysis of conceptual and empirical sentences , the analytic/synthetic distinction and the a priori and a posteriori differentiation. His classification of analytic sentences, based on (...)
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  26. P. A. Boghossian (1997). Analyticity. In B. Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell. 331-368.
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  27. Paul Boghossian (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):488-497.
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  28. Paul Boghossian (2010). Truth in Virtue of Meaning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):370 - 374.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 370-374, June 2011.
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  29. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  30. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Analyticity and Conceptual Truth. Philosophical Issues 5:117-131.
  31. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Inferential-Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):109-122.
    This is a critical discussion of Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore's "Holism". The paper questions the existence of a slippery slope from some inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning' to all inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning'. "Interalia", it defends the existence of an analytic/synthetic distinction.
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  32. Paul A. Boghossian (1993). Cognitive Science and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Comments on Horwich. Philosophical Issues 3:135-142.
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  33. Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  34. Gérard Bornet (1982). Modes of Analyticity ‐ A Note to A. Stroll's “Primordial Knowledge and Rationality”. Dialectica 36 (2‐3):203-205.
    SummaryThis is an attempt to show a relationship between the notion of primordiality and that of analyticity be defining them in a similar way.RésuméTentative de montrer une relation entre la notion de primordialitéet celle ?on;analyticité en les définissant de manière semblable.ZusammenfassungEs wird versucht, eine Beziehung zwischen Strolls Begriff der Vorgangigkeit und demjenigen der Analytizitat herzustellen, indem man sie in ähnlicher Weise definiert.
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  35. Deborah Brown (1997). Analyticity: An Ockhamist Approach. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):441 - 455.
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  36. Mario Bunge (1961). Analyticity Redefined. Mind 70 (278):239-245.
  37. John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  38. Richard Butrick (1970). Carnap on Meaning and Analyticity. The Hague,Mouton.
  39. H. G. Callaway (2003). The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures. In , W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog.
    This is the Introduction to my translation of Quine's Kant Lectures. Part of my interpretation is that an "esoteric doctrine" in involved in Quine's distinctive semantic claims: his skepticism of the credulity of non-expert evaluation of discourse and theory.
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  40. H. G. Callaway (1996). Synonymy and Analyticity. In Gerhardus D. Et al (ed.), Sprachphilosophie, Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung. De Gruyter.
    This article is an invited overview of contemporary issues connected with meaning and the analytic-synthetic distinction.
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  41. H. G. Callaway (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  42. H. G. Callaway (1991). Review of W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). [REVIEW] Dialectica, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1991, Pp. 317-22 45 (No. 4):317-322.
    Quine's aim in this slim book is to "update, sum up and clarify variously intersecting views on cognitive meaning, objective referencce, and the grounds of knowledge." Only nine pages had previously appeared as the book came to print. It is based largely on unpublished lectures and informal discussions of the past ten years back to the Immanuel Kant Lectures given at Stanford in 1980. It does not, then duplicate Leonelli's Italian translation of the Kant lectures, La Scienza E I Datti (...)
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  43. H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  44. Manuel Campos (1998). Analyticity Revisited. Dissertation, Stanford University
    This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the (...)
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  45. Hector Neri Castañeda (1960). "7 + 5 = 12" as a Synthetic Proposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (2):141-158.
  46. Charles Castonguay (1976). Church's Theorem and the Analytic-Synthetic Distincion in Mathematics. Philosophica 18.
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  47. Albert Casullo (2012). Analyticity, Apriority, Modality. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub.. 228.
  48. Albert Casullo (1992). Analyticity and the A Priori. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (sup1):113-150.
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  49. David J. Chalmers (2011). Verbal Disputes. Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
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  50. David J. Chalmers (2011). Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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