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  1. Barbara Abbott, Analyticity and Nondescriptionality[*] Michigan State University Abbottb@Msu.Edu.
    One of the widely accepted and quite influential conclusions of modern Anglo-American philosophy is that there is no sharp distinction between analytic truths and statements that are true only [by] virtue of the facts; what had been called analytic truths in earlier work, it is alleged, are simply expressions of deeply held belief. This conclusion seems quite erroneous. There is no fact about the world that I could discover that would convince me that you persuaded John to go to college (...)
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  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2005). The Wolffian Paradigm and its Discontent: Kant's Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (1):22-74.
    I defend Kant’s definition of analyticity in terms of concept “containment”, which has engendered widespread scepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify the extent to (...)
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  3. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  4. Sylvain Auroux (1985). The Analytic and the Synthetic as Linguistic Topics. Topoi 4 (2):193-199.
    The Analytic/Synthetic distinction did not originate in Kant, but in Port-Royal's logical theory. The key for the doctrine is the explicite recognition of two different kinds of relative clauses, e.g. explicative and determinative. In the middle eighteenth century the distinction becomes a topic within the grammars. Although we can find by grammarians different criteria for the distinction, these criteria (for which we can find medieval sources) are for the main predictable from the original theory of ideas, which was presented in (...)
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  5. A. J. Ayer (1987). The a Priori. In Paul K. Moser (ed.), A Priori Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
  6. A. J. Ayer (1936). Language, Truth and Logic. London, V. Gollancz, Ltd..
  7. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch (...)
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  8. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1971). Degrees of Analyticity. Philosophia 1 (1-2):1-20.
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  9. George Bealer, Analyticity.
    1. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant introduced the term ‘analytic’ for judgments whose truth is guaranteed by a certain relation of ‘containment’ between the constituent concepts, and ‘synthetic’ for judgments which are not like this. Closely related terms were found in earlier writings of Locke, Hume and Leibniz. In Kant’s definition, an analytic judgment is one in which ‘the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A’ ([1781/1787] 1965: 48). Kant (...)
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  10. Edward F. Becker (2012). The Themes of Quine's Philosophy: Meaning, Reference, and Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface; Acknowledgements; 1. Conventionalism and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth; 2. Analyticity and synonymy; 3. The indeterminacy of translation; 4. Ontological relativity; 5. Criticisms and extensions; Concluding remarks: conventionalism and implications; Bibliography; Index.
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  11. K. Becker (2001). Understanding Quine's Famous `Statement'. Erkenntnis 55 (1):73-84.
    I argue that Quine''s famous claim, any statement can be held true come what may, demands an interpretation that implies that the meanings of the expressions in the held-true statement change. The intended interpretation of this claim is not clear from its context, and so it is often misunderstood by philosophers (and is misleadingly taught to their students). I explain Fodor and Lepore''s (1992) view that the above interpretation would render Quine''s assertion entirely trivial and reply, on both textual and (...)
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  12. Ermanno Bencivenga (1986). Analyticity and Analytical Truth. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (1):14-19.
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  13. Jonathan Bennett (1958). Analytic-Synthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:163 - 188.
    The aim of this paper1 is to attack Quine’s views on the analytic-synthetic distinction (ASD), but more than half of it will be devoted to arguing that an attack is still required. This preliminary thesis is based on the claim that what Quine presents as (1) an attack on the ASD, followed by (2) some remarks about confirmation and disconfirmation, offers a more formidable obstacle to the adherent of the traditional ASD if (2) is built into (1) as a positive (...)
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  14. J. F. A. K. Benthem (1974). Hintikka on Analyticity. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):419 - 431.
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  15. Gustav Bergman (1958). Analyticity. Theoria 24 (2):71-93.
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  16. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Professor Quine on Analyticity. Mind 64 (254):254-258.
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  17. Paul Boghossian (2011). Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):488-497.
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  18. Paul Boghossian (2010). Truth in Virtue of Meaning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):370 - 374.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 370-374, June 2011.
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  19. Paul A. Boghossian (2003). Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):15-35.
    The paper is a defense of the project of explaining the a priori via the notion of meaning or concept possession. It responds to certain objections that have been made to this project—in particular, that there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement. The paper goes on to distinguish between two different ways in which facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement—inferential and (...)
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  20. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Analyticity and Conceptual Truth. Philosophical Issues 5:117-131.
  21. Paul A. Boghossian (1994). Inferential-Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):109-122.
  22. Paul A. Boghossian (1993). Cognitive Science and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Comments on Horwich. Philosophical Issues 3:135-142.
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  23. Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This is what many philosophers believe today about the analytic/synthetic distinction: In his classic early writings on analyticity -- in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth" -- Quine showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devastated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity -- specifically, the linguistic theory of necessary (...)
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  24. Mario Bunge (1961). Analyticity Redefined. Mind 70 (278):239-245.
  25. John P. Burgess (2004). Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  26. Richard Butrick (1970). Carnap on Meaning and Analyticity. The Hague,Mouton.
  27. H. G. Callaway (2003). The Esoteric Quine? Belief Attribution and the Significance of the Indeterminacy Thesis in Quine’s Kant Lectures. In H. G. Callaway (ed.), W.V. Quine, Wissenschaft und Empfindung. Frommann-Holzboog.
  28. H. G. Callaway (1996). Synonymy and Analyticity. In Dascal (ed.), Sprachphilosophie, Ein internationales Handbuch zeitgenössischer Forschung.
    This article is an invited overview of contemporary issues connected with meaning and the analytic-synthetic distinction.
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  29. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  30. H. G. Callaway (1991). Review of W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). [REVIEW] Dialectica, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1991, Pp. 317-22 45 (No. 4):317-322.
    Quine's aim in this slim book is to "update, sum up and clarify variously intersecting views on cognitive meaning, objective referencce, and the grounds of knowledge." Only nine pages had previously appeared as the book came to print. It is based largely on unpublished lectures and informal discussions of the past ten years back to the Immanuel Kant Lectures given at Stanford in 1980. It does not, then duplicate Leonelli's Italian translation of the Kant lectures, La Scienza E I Datti (...)
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  31. H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  32. Hector Neri Castañeda (1960). "7 + 5 = 12" as a Synthetic Proposition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (2):141-158.
  33. Albert Casullo (2012). Analyticity, Apriority, Modality. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub..
  34. David J. Chalmers (2011). Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". Journal of Philosophy 108 (8):387-415.
    W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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  35. David J. Chalmers (2011). Verbal Disputes. Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
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  36. Jonathan Cohen (2000). Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, If You Sever Sense From Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):115-135.
    In the new metalanguage of semantics, it is possible to make statements about the relation of designation and about truth.... To me the usefulness of semantics for philosophy was so obvious that I believed no further arguments were required and it was sufficient to list a great number of customary concepts of a semantical nature ([Carnap, 1963], 60–62).
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  37. David Cole, Note on Analyticity and the Definability of "Bachelor".
    Those who have a brief against the analytic-synthetic distinction raise problems for what seem to supporters of the distinction to be some of the clearest cases. That bachelors are unmarried seems to many to be analytically true. But to hold this seems to imply that there is a definition of "bachelor" that includes being unmarried. But critics of the analytic-synthetic distinction, such as Jerry Fodor, deny that there are true definitions (reportive, not stipulative). So there can be no definition of (...)
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  38. Richard Creath (1991). Every Dogma has its Day. Erkenntnis 35 (1-3):347 - 389.
    This paper is a reexamination of Two Dogmas in the light of Quine's ongoing debate with Carnap over analyticity. It shows, first, that analytic is a technical term within Carnap's epistemology. As such it is intelligible, and Carnap's position can meet Quine's objections. Second, it shows that the core of Quine's objection is that he (Quine) has an alternative epistemology to advance, one which appears to make no room for analyticity. Finally, the paper shows that Quine's alternative epistemology is (...)
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  39. Richard Creath (1987). The Initial Reception of Carnap's Doctrine of Analyticity. Noûs 21 (4):477-499.
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  40. Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
    Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, (...)
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  41. W. R. de Jong (1997). Kant's Theory of Geometrical Reasoning and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. On Hintikka's Interpretation of Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (1):141-166.
  42. Willem R. de Jong (2010). The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and the Classical Model of Science: Kant, Bolzano and Frege. Synthese 174 (2).
    This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, (...)
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  43. Willem R. de Jong (2001). Bernard Bolzano, Analyticity and the Aristotelian Model of Science. Kant-Studien 92 (3):328-349.
    Quine's well-known ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (1951) plays a key role in the debate about the analytic-synthetic distinction. Taking to task the ideas of Carnap in particular, Quine shows that logical positivism works with a concept of scientific rationality that is based dogmatically on, among other things, the opposition analytic-synthetic.
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  44. Lieven Decock (2010). Review of Callaway, Meaning Without Analyticity. [REVIEW] Revue Internationale de Philosophie 251 (1):127-130.
    The volume assembles thirteen essays on logic, language and meaning, and is preceded by an introduction by Paul Gochet. Most of the papers were published between 1981 and 2000 in European journals such as Dialectica, Logique et Analyse, and Erkenntnis. The papers stand alone, yet throughout the book an overarching view of the relationship between pragmatics and semantics transpires clearly. Callaway defends a midway position between American analytic philosophy and American pragmatism. The result is a blend of Quine's scientific philosophy (...)
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  45. Lieven Decock, Carnap and Quine on Some Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions.
    I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...)
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  46. J. K. Derden Jr (1976). Carnap's Definition of 'Analytic Truth' for Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science 43 (4):506-522.
    In this paper Rudolf Carnap's definition of 'analytic truth' based upon a meaning postulate At, for theoretical predicates of a given scientific theory is subjected to critique. It is argued that this definition is both too exclusive and too inclusive. Assuming that the preceding is correct, At is subjected to further scrutiny to determine how to interpret it and whether, and under what conditions, it need even be true. It is argued that a given At need not be true as (...)
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  47. Jesús A. Díaz (1988). Cartesian Analyticity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):47-55.
    The syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot account for an ontological argument in Descartes' Fifth Meditation and related texts. Descartes' notion of god relies on the analytic-synthetic distinction, which Descartes had identified before Leibniz and Kant did. I describe how the syllogism and the predicate calculus cannot explain Descartes' ontological argument; then I apply the analytic-synthetic distinction to Descartes’ idea of god.
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  48. Dennis Earl (2009). Analyticity and the Analysis Relation. Acta Analytica 24 (2):139-148.
    Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms (...)
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  49. Frank B. Ebersole (1956). On Certain Confusions in the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Journal of Philosophy 53 (16):485-494.
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  50. Catherine Z. Elgin (2004). Denying a Dualism: Goodman's Repudiation of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):226–238.
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  51. Milton Fisk (1966). Analyticity and Conceptual Revision. Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):627-637.
    The view that analytic propositions are those which are true in virtue of rules of use is basically correct. But there are many kinds of rules of use, and rules of some of these kinds do not generate truth. There is nothing like a grammatical analytic, though grammatical rules are rules of use. So, this rules-of-use view falls short of being an explanatory account. My problem is to find what it is that is special about those rules of use which (...)
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  52. Jerry Fodor & Ernie Lepore, Analyticity Again.
    It would be ever so nice if there were a viable analytic/synthetic distinction. Though nobody knows for sure, there would seem to be several major philosophical projects that having one would advance. For example: analytic sentences2 are supposed to have their truth values solely in virtue of the meanings (together with the syntactic arrangement) of their constituents; i.e., their truth values are supposed to supervene on their linguistic properties alone.3 So they are true in every possible world where they mean (...)
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  53. Robert E. Gahringer (1954). Some Observations on the Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 51 (15):425-436.
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  54. Alexander George (2000). On Washing the Fur Without Wetting It: Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity. Mind 109 (433):1-24.
    Despite its centrality and its familiarity, W. V. Quine's dispute with Rudolf Carnap over the analytic/synthetic distinction has lacked a satisfactory analysis. The impasse is usually explained either by judging that Quine's arguments are in reality quite weak, or by concluding instead that Carnap was incapable of appreciating their strength. This is unsatisfactory, as is the fact that on these readings it is usually unclear why Quine's own position is not subject to some of the very same arguments. A satisfying (...)
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  55. Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Necessity, a Priority and Analyticity: A Wittgensteinian Perspective. In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave Macmillan.
  56. John D. Greenwood (1990). Analyticity, Indeterminacy and Semantic Theory: Some Comments on “the Domino Theory”. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):41 - 49.
    In "The Domino Theory" Professor Katz's general thesis is that the arguments against intensionalism advanced in the last four decades are arranged like so many dominos, since they all rest upon Quine's arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". If this is the case, then they are all vitiated if Quine's original arguments are unsatisfactory, and fall like so many dominos. I propose to accept, if only for the sake of argument, that all the other critiques of (...)
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  57. Paul Gregory (2010). Putting the Bite Back Into "Two Dogmas". Principia 7 (1-2):115-129.
    Recent Carnap scholarship suggests that the received view of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debate is importantly mistaken. It has been suggested that Carnap’s analyticity distinction is immune from Quine’s criticisms. This is either because Quine did not understand Carnap’s use of analytic-ity, or because Quine did not appreciate that, rather than dispelling dog-mas, he was merely offering an alternate framework for philosophy. It has also been suggested that ultimately nothing of substance turns on this dis-pute. I am sympathetic to these reassessments (...)
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  58. Paul Gregory (2003). Two Dogmas'?All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633-648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  59. Paul A. Gregory (2003). Two Dogmas'–All Bark and No Bite? Carnap and Quine on Analyticity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):633–648.
    Recently O’Grady argued that Quine’s “Two Dogmas” misses its mark when Carnap’s use of the analyticity distinction is understood in the light of his deflationism. While in substantial agreement with the stress on Carnap’s deflationism, I argue that O’Grady is not sufficiently sensitive to the difference between using the analyticity distinction to support deflationism, and taking a deflationary attitude towards the distinction itself; the latter being much more controversial. Being sensitive to this difference, and viewing Quine as having reason to (...)
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  60. H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson (1956). In Defense of a Dogma. Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
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  61. B. G. H. (1973). The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. The Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):149-149.
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  62. Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (2008). Husserl on Analyticity and Beyond. Husserl Studies 24 (2).
    Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.
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  63. Lucas P. Halpin (2012). Analyticity and Substantive Inquiry. Self-Published.
    In this book, a Grice/Strawson account of analyticity is explained and formalized, and a corresponding account of logic is offered. The implications of these views for science/substantive inquiry are explored and a neo-Carnapian/verificationist meta-theory is presented.
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  64. Gilbert Harman (1996). Analyticity Regained? Noûs 30 (3):392-400.
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  65. James F. Harris (1970). Analyticity. Chicago,Quadrangle Books.
    Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. Quine.--In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson.--The analytic and the synthetic: an untenable dualism, by M. G. White.--Synonymity, by B. Mates.--The meaning of a word, by J. L. Austin.--Meaning and synonymy in natural languages, by R. Carnap.--Analytic-synthetic, by J. Bennett.--On "analytic," by R. M. Martin.--Selected bibliography (p. [188]-196).
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  66. Reese M. Heitner (2006). From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine's Argument Against Analyticity. Synthese 150 (1):15 - 39.
    Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine (1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, 20–46) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural (...)
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  67. Shadworth H. Hodgson (1877). Kant's Analytic and Synthetic Judgments, and His Question, How Synthetic à Priori Judgments Are Possible. Mind 2 (5):118-122.
  68. Frank Hofmann & Joachim Horvath (2008). In Defence of Metaphysical Analyticity. Ratio 21 (3):300-313.
    According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion (...)
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  69. Christopher Hookway (1997). Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:197-.
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  70. Richard Horsey (2001). Psychosemantic Analyticity. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    It is widely agreed that the content of a logical concept such as and is constituted by the inferences it enters into. I argue that it is impossible to draw a principled distinction between logical and non-logical concepts, and hence that the content of non-logical concepts can also be constituted by certain of their inferential relations. The traditional problem with such a view has been that, given Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction, there does not seem to be any way (...)
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  71. Juraj Hvorecký (2006). Appropriating A Priori. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):113-120.
    The paper criticizes the novel approach of Mišcevic to apriority and analyticity. In a nutshell, it aims to show that Mišcevic has failed to appreciate the power and impact of semantic atomism in the theory of concepts. He simply assumes a clean distinction between concept-analyzing propositions and those that do not analyze concepts, misconstrue the way atomists understand concept-analyzing propositions, namely epistemically and not semantically, and fails to provide an answer to atomistic considerations. Finally, I analyze his examples of alleged (...)
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  72. Peter Hylton (2002). Analyticity and Holism in Quine's Thought. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 10 (1):11-26.
  73. Peter Hylton (1982). Analyticity and the Indeterminacy of Translation. Synthese 52 (2):167 - 184.
  74. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2009). Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109:337-343.
    In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider (...)
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  75. Ronald Burke Jager (1969). Analyticity and Necessity in Moore's Early Work. Journal of the History of Philosophy 7 (4):441-458.
  76. C. S. Jenkins (2010). Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell. Mind 119 (473):232-238.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  77. C. S. Jenkins (2008). Boghossian and Epistemic Analyticity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):113-127.
    Boghossian claims that we can acquire a priori knowledge by means of a certain form of argument, our grasp of whose premises relies on the existence of implicit definitions. I discuss an objection to his ‘analytic theory of the a priori’. The worry is that in order to employ this kind of argument we must already know its conclusion. Boghossian has responded to this type of objection in recent work, but I argue that his responses are unconvincing. Along the way, (...)
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  78. Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
    Conceptions of analytic truth -- Hume's fork -- Kant and the analytic/synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori propositions -- Bolzano and analyticity -- Analyticity in frege -- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions -- The Vienna circle -- Carnap and logical empiricism -- Carnap and Quine -- Demise of the aufbau -- Philosophy as logical syntax -- Logical and descriptive languages -- Physical languages -- Analyticity in syntax -- Carnap's move to semantics -- Explications -- Analyticity in a semantic (...)
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  79. Jerrold J. Katz (1997). Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):1-28.
    Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning. This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke concerning natural kind terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the (...)
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  80. Jerrold J. Katz (1974). Where Things Now Stand with the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Synthese 28 (3-4):283 - 319.
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  81. Jerrold J. Katz (1967). Some Remarks on Quine on Analyticity. Journal of Philosophy 64 (2):36-52.
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  82. John G. Kemeny (1963). Analyticity Versus Fuzziness. Synthese 15 (1):57 - 80.
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  83. Wolfgang Künne (2006). Analyticity and Logical Truth : From Bolzano to Quine. In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge.
  84. Gregory Lavers (2012). On the Quinean-Analyticity of Mathematical Propositions. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):299-319.
    This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine’s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not (...)
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  85. Ernest Lepore, Analyticity Again.
    It would be ever so nice if there were a viable analytic/synthetic distinction. Though nobody knows for sure, there would seem to be several major philosophical projects that having one would advance. For example: analytic sentences2 are supposed to have their truth values solely in virtue of the meanings (together with the syntactic arrangement) of their constituents; i.e., their truth values are supposed to supervene on their linguistic properties alone.3 So they are true in every possible world where they mean (...)
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  86. Ernest Lepore & Matthew Stone, Logic and Semantic Analysis.
    When we wish to frame or to communicate a precise and nuanced argument, we should first clarify whatever meaningful distinctions our reasoning exploits. That’s why every good paper begins by defining its terms. A tiger is a large and ferocious predatory cat, yellow with black stripes. A bachelor is an unmarried man. Freedom is the capacity to choose one’s actions for oneself, independent of causal forces in the outside world. Knowledge is justified true belief. Getting clear on our concepts is (...)
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  87. Ernie Lepore (1995). Quine, Analyticity, and Transcendence. Noûs 29 (4):468-480.
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  88. Michael E. Levin (1975). Quine on Analyticity in L. Mind 84 (333):114-118.
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  89. Leonard Linsky (1970). Analytic/Synthetic and Semantic Theory. Synthese 21 (3-4):439 - 448.
    A somewhat simplified version of Jerrold J. Katz's theory of the analytic/synthetic distinction for natural languages is presented. Katz's account is criticized on the following grounds. (1) the antonymy operator is not well defined; it leaves certain sentences without readings. (2) The account of negation is defective; it has the consequence that certain nonsynonymous sentences are marked as synonymous. (3) The account of entailment is defective; it has the consequence that analytic sentences entail synthetic ones. (4) Katz's account of indeterminable (...)
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  90. Eric J. Loomis (2006). Empirical Equivalence in the Quine-Carnap Debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):499–508.
    Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, (...)
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  91. Eric Loomis & Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
    Conceptions of analytic truth -- Hume's fork -- Kant and the analytic/synthetic distinction -- Synthetic a priori propositions -- Bolzano and analyticity -- Analyticity in frege -- Russell's paradox and the theory of descriptions -- The Vienna circle -- Carnap and logical empiricism -- Carnap and Quine -- Demise of the aufbau -- Philosophy as logical syntax -- Logical and descriptive languages -- Physical languages -- Analyticity in syntax -- Carnap's move to semantics -- Explications -- Analyticity in a semantic (...)
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  92. Sebastian Lutz, Choosing the Analytic Component of Theories.
    I provide a compact reformulation of Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for the analytic and the synthetic component of a theory and show that, contrary to arguments by Winnie and Demopoulos, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy need not be supplemented by another condition. This has immediate implications for the analytic component of reduction sentences.
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  93. Jack C. Lyons (2005). Representational Analyticity. Mind and Language 20 (4):392–422.
    The traditional understanding of analyticity in terms of concept containment is revisited, but with a concept explicitly understood as a certain kind of mental representation and containment being read correspondingly literally. The resulting conception of analyticity avoids much of the vagueness associated with attempts to explicate analyticity in terms of synonymy by moving the locus of discussion from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. The account provided here illustrates some interesting features of representations and explains, at least (...)
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  94. Edwin David Mares (2011). A Priori. Acumen.
    Edwin Mares seeks to make the standard topics and current debates within a priori knowledge, including necessity and certainty, rationalism, empiricism and analyticity, Quine's attack on the a priori, Kantianism, Aristotelianism, mathematical knowledge, moral knowledge, logical knowledge, and philosophical knowledge, accessible to students.
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  95. Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2001). Boghossian on Analyticity. Analysis 61 (4):293–302.
    In an important recent discussion of analyticity, Paul Boghossian (1997)1 argues for the following three claims: (i) While Quine’s well-known arguments against analyticity do undermine one type of analyticity (what Boghossian calls metaphysical analyticity), they fail to undermine another type (what he calls epistemic analyticity). (ii) Epistemic analyticity explains the a prioricity of logic and perhaps even the a prioricity of conceptual truths.
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  96. Verena Mayer (2003). Implicit Thoughts: Quine, Frege and Kant on Analytic Propositions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):61-90.
    Quine criticised the semantic notion of analyticity that is often attributed to Frege and Kant for presupposing an essentialist theory of meaning. In what follows I trace back the notion from Quine via Carnap to Frege and Kant, and eventually examine Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements in more detail. It turns out that the so called Frege-Kant-notion of analyticity can not be attributed to Kant. In contrast, Kant had a distinctly pragmatic notion of analytic judgements. According to him (...)
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  97. M. H. McCarthy (1979). Kant's Application of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction to Imperatives. Dialogue 18 (03):373-391.
  98. Mark E. Meaney (1992). The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Revisited. Southwest Philosophy Review 8 (2):55-66.
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  99. Kevin Meeker (2011). Quine on Hume and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophia 39 (2):369-373.
    W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.
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  100. A. W. Moore (1997). The Underdetermination/Indeterminacy Distinction and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Erkenntnis 46 (1):5-32.
    Two of W. V. Quine''s most familiar doctrines are his endorsement of the distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy, and his rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. The author argues that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine, and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, the author draws an exhaustive and exclusive distinction between two kinds of true sentences, and then argues that this corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. In an appendix the author expands (...)
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