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  1. Emily A. Austin (2012). Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death. Apeiron 45 (2):109-129.
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  2. John Baum (2003). When Death Enters Life. Floris.
  3. Ernest Becker (1973). The Denial of Death. New York,Free Press.
    Drawing from religion and the human sciences, particularly psychology after Freud, the author attempts to demonstrate that the fear of death is man's central ...
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  4. Kathy Behrendt (2011). Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die. Think 10 (28):67-76.
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by (...)
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  5. Kathy Behrendt (2010). A Special Way of Being Afraid. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):669-682.
    I am interested in fear of non-existence, which is often discussed in terms of fear one’s own death, or as it is sometimes called, fear of death as such. This form of fear has been denied by some philosophers. Cognitive theories of the emotions have particular trouble in dealing with it, granting it a status that is simultaneously paradigmatic yet anomalous with respect to fear in general. My paper documents these matters, and considers a number of responses. I provide examples (...)
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  6. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  7. John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter (1990). Death and Well-Being. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
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  8. Stephan Blatti (2014). Mortal Harm and the Antemortem Experience of Death. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):640-42.
    In his recent book, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics (Routeledge 2012), James Stacey Taylor challenges two ideas whose provenance may be traced all the way back to Aristotle. The first of these is the thought that death (typically) harms the one who dies (mortal harm thesis). The second is the idea that one can be harmed (and wronged) by events that occur after one’s death (posthumous harm thesis). Taylor devotes two-thirds of the book to arguing against both theses and the (...)
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  9. Stephan Blatti (2012). Death's Distinctive Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.
    Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...)
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  10. Lisa Bortolotti & Yujin Nagasawa (2009). Immortality Without Boredom. Ratio 22 (3):261-277.
    In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1.
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  11. Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
  12. Ben Bradley (2008). The Worst Time to Die. Ethics 118 (2):291-314.
    At what stage of life is death worst for its victim? I hold that, typically, death is worse the earlier it occurs. Others, including Jeff McMahan and Christopher Belshaw, have argued that it is worst to die in early adulthood. In this paper I show that McMahan and Belshaw are wrong; I show that views that entail that Student’s death is worse face fatal objections. I focus in particular on McMahan’s time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the badness of death. Manuscript (...)
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  13. Ben Bradley (2007). How Bad is Death? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
    A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues that a deprivation account should discount the evil of (...)
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  14. Ben Bradley (2004). When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
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  15. Ben Bramble (2014). Whole-Life Welfarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
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  16. Samantha Brennan (2001). The Badness of Death, the Wrongness of Killing, and the Moral Importance of Autonomy. Dialogue 40 (04):723-.
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  17. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1986). Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  18. Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1998). Being Born Earlier. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):110 – 114.
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  19. Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth. Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
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  20. Mikel Burley (2008). Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.
    In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I (...)
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  21. Mikel Burley (2007). Lucretius' Symmetry Argument and the Determinacy of Death. Philosophical Forum 38 (4):327–341.
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  22. Mikel Burley (2006). Anticipating Annihilation. Inquiry 49 (2):170 – 185.
    According to Epicureans, anticipating one's own annihilation ought not to be a frightening experience. Non-existence precludes the possibility of sensation, and hence annihilation can be neither pleasant nor unpleasant. And that which cannot be felt is unworthy of fear. Certain objectors to this claim have asserted that one's own annihilation really is a terrifying prospect. Against this assertion, I argue that those who make it are guilty of precisely the kind of confusion that Epicurus and his disciples alert us to, (...)
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  23. Jacques Choron (1963). Death and Western Thought. New York, Collier Books.
  24. Thomas W. Clark (1995). Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing. 15-20.
    The words quoted above distill the common secular conception of death. If we decline the traditional religious reassurances of an afterlife, or their fuzzy new age equivalents, and instead take the hard-boiled and thoroughly modern materialist view of death, then we likely end up with Gonzalez-Cruzzi. Rejecting visions of reunions with loved ones or of crossing over into the light, we anticipate the opposite: darkness, silence, an engulfing emptiness. But we would be wrong.
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  25. Françoise Dastur (2012). How Are We to Confront Death?: An Introduction to Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
    Overcoming death -- Neutralizing death -- Accepting death.
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  26. John Donnelly (ed.) (1994). Language, Metaphysics, and Death. Fordham University Press.
    This standard work in thanatology is updated with ten essays new to the second edition, and features a new introduction by Donnelly. The collection addresses certain basic issues inherent in a philosophy of death.
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  27. Kai Draper (2006). Review: Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1182-1185.
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  28. Kai Draper (2004). Epicurean Equanimity Towards Death. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):92–114.
    This paper assesses two reformulations of Epicurus' argument that "death ... is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present; and whenever death is present, we do not exist." The first resembles many contemporary reformulations in that it attempts to reach the conclusion that death is not to the disadvantage of its subject. I argue that this rather anachronistic sort of reformulation cannot succeed. The second reformulation stays closer to the spirit of Epicurus' actual position on death (...)
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  29. Kai Draper (1999). Disappointment, Sadness, and Death. Philosophical Review 108 (3):387-414.
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  30. Norbert Elias (1985/2001). The Loneliness of the Dying. Continuum.
    Originally published in 1985, this is a short meditation by a great old man on people relating to other people who are dying, and the need for all of us to open ...
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  31. Fred Feldman, “Death”.
    Reflection on death gives rise to a variety of philosophical questions. One of the deepest of these is a question about the nature of death. Typically, philosophers interpret this question as a call for an analysis, or definition, of the concept of death. Plato proposed to define death as the separation of soul from body. This definition is not acceptable to materialists, who think that there are no souls. It is also unacceptable to anyone who thinks that plants and lower (...)
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  32. Fred Feldman (2013). Brueckner and Fischer on the Evil of Death. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):309-317.
    Abstract According to the Deprivation Approach, the evil of death is to be explained by the fact that death deprives us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had lived longer. But the Deprivation Approach confronts a problem first discussed by Lucretius. Late birth seems to deprive us of the goods we would have enjoyed if we had been born earlier. Yet no one is troubled by late birth. So it’s hard to see why we should be troubled (...)
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  33. Fred Feldman (2000). The Termination Thesis. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 24 (1):98–115.
    The Termination Thesis (or “TT”) is the view that people go out of existence when they die. Lots of philosophers seem to believe it. Epicurus, for example, apparently makes use of TT in his efforts to show that it is irrational to fear death. He says, “as long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”1 Lucretius says pretty much the same thing, but in many more words and more poetically: “Death (...)
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  34. Fred Feldman (1991). Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death. Philosophical Review 100 (2):205-227.
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  35. John Martin Fischer (2009). Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction: "meaning in life and death : our stories" -- John Martin Fischer and Anthony B rueckner, "Why is death bad?", Philosophical studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (September 1986) -- "Death, badness, and the impossibility of experience," Journal of ethics -- John Martin Fischer and Daniel Speak, "Death and the psychological conception of personal identity," Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 24 -- "Earlier birth and later death : symmetry through thick and thin," Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniel, Jason R. Raibley, eds., (...)
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  36. John Martin Fischer (2006). Epicureanism About Death and Immortality. Journal of Ethics 10 (4):355 - 381.
    In this paper I discuss some of Martha Nussbaum’s defenses of Epicurean views about death and immortality. Here I seek to defend the commonsense view that death can be a bad thing for an individual against the Epicurean; I also defend the claim that immortality might conceivably be a good thing. In the development of my analysis, I make certain connections between the literatures on free will and death. The intersection of these two literatures can be illuminated by reference to (...)
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  37. John Martin Fischer (1997). Death, Badness, and the Impossibility of Experience. Journal of Ethics 1 (4):341-353.
    Some have argued (following Epicurus) that death cannot be a bad thing for an individual who dies. They contend that nothing can be a bad for an individual unless the individual is able to experience it as bad. I argue against this Epicurean view, offering examples of things that an individual cannot experience as bad but are nevertheless bad for the individual. Further, I argue that death is relevantly similar.
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  38. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (1993). The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford University Press.
    This collection of seventeen essays deals with the metaphysical, as opposed to the moral, issues pertaining to death. For example, the authors investigate (among other things) the issue of what makes death a bad thing for an individual, if indeed death is a bad thing. This issue is more basic and abstract than such moral questions as the particular conditions under which euthanasia is justified, if it is ever justified. Though there are important connections between the more abstract questions addressed (...)
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  39. Antony Flew (1964). Body, Mind, and Death. New York, Macmillan.
  40. W. J. Gavin (1995). Cuttin' the Body Loose: Historical, Biological, and Personal Approaches to Death and Dying. Temple University Press.
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  41. Holly Smith Goldman (1980). Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia. Analysis 40 (4):224 -.
    Death is not always an evil for the person who dies. The implication for euthanasia is clear-cut. When death counts as a good for someone, directly killing the person would be no worse, and might be better, than merely allowing her to die.
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  42. William Grey (1999). Epicurus and the Harm of Death. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):358 – 364.
    Epicurus notoriously argued that death at no time is a harm because before death there is no harm and after death there is no victim. The denial that death can be a harm to the one who dies has been challenged by various claims including (1) death is eternally bad for the victim (Feldman), (2) it is before death that it is bad for the victim (Feinberg and Pitcher), (3) death is bad for the victim but at no particular time (...)
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  43. Dorothy Grover (1989). Posthumous Harm. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):334-353.
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  44. Matthew Hanser (2005). Where's the Harm in Dying? Philosophical Books 46 (1):4-10.
  45. Philip Hardie (1992). Lucretius on the Fear of Death Charles Segal: Lucretius on Death and Anxiety: Poetry and Philosophy in De Rerum Natura. Pp. Xii + 279. Princeton University Press, 1990. $29.95. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 42 (02):299-300.
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  46. Stephen Hetherington (2013). Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean Answer. Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):79-97.
    Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It (...)
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  47. J. Johansson (2012). The Time of Death's Badness. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):464-479.
    Those who endorse the view that death is in some cases bad for the deceased—a view that, as I shall explain, has considerable bearing on many bioethical issues—need to address the following, Epicurean question: When is death bad for the one who dies? The two most popular answers are "before death" (priorism) and "after death" (subsequentism). Part of the support for these two views consists in the idea that a third answer, "at no time" (atemporalism), makes death unsatisfyingly different from (...)
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  48. Jens Johansson (2008). Kaufman's Response to Lucretius. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):470-485.
    Abstract: The symmetry argument is an objection to the 'deprivation approach'– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of his theory, (...)
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  49. Lawrence Jost (2005). Review of James Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (11).
  50. Frederik Kaufman (1996). Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius' Symmetry Argument Fails. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):305 – 312.
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