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  1. Roman Altshuler (2015). Teleology, Narrative, and Death. In John Lippitt & Patrick Stokes (eds.), Narrative, Identity and the Kierkegaardian Self. Edinburgh University Press 29-45.
  2. Colin Amery (2003). Is the Fear of Death Irrational? Philosophy Pathways 57.
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  3. Peter Aronoff (1997). Lucretius and the Fears of Death. Dissertation, Cornell University
    The Epicureans argued that death was nothing to us and that we should not fear death, and this thesis takes up these arguments as they appear in our fullest extant source, the De Rerum Natura of Lucretius. After an initial look at the general Epicurean theory of emotions, the thesis narrows in on the fears of death. Lucretius starts from a popular dichotomy concerning death: death is either the utter destruction of the person who dies, or the person survives in (...)
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  4. Emily A. Austin (2012). Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death. Apeiron 45 (2):109-129.
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  5. John Baum (2003). When Death Enters Life. Floris.
  6. Ernest Becker (1973). The Denial of Death. New York,Free Press.
    Drawing from religion and the human sciences, particularly psychology after Freud, the author attempts to demonstrate that the fear of death is man's central ...
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  7. Kathy Behrendt (2016). Learning to Be Dead: The Narrative Problem of Mortality. In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. 157-172.
    The problem of mortality treats death as posing a paradox for the narrative view of the self. This view, on some interpretations, needs death in order to complete a life in a manner analogous to the ending of a story. But death is inaccessible to the subject herself, and so the analogy fails. Our inability to grasp the event of our own death is thought to undermine the possibility of achieving a meaningful, coherent, or complete life on narrativist terms. Narrativist (...)
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  8. Kathy Behrendt (2015). The Senses of and Ending. In Patrick Stokes (ed.), Narrative, Identity, and the Kierkegaardian Self. 186-202.
    Many philosophical discussions of the narrative self touch upon the end of life. End-related terms and concepts that occur in these discussions include finitude, completion, closure, telos, retroactive meaning-conferral, life shape, and a closed beginning-middle-and-end structure. Those who emphasise life’s end in non-philosophical narrative contexts are perhaps clearer on its significance. The end is thought to play a key role in the story of a life, securing or enhancing the life narrative’s meaning or value, and thereby warranting special treatment and (...)
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  9. Kathy Behrendt (2014). Whole Lives and Good Deaths. Metaphilosophy 45 (3):331-347.
    This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...)
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  10. Kathy Behrendt (2011). Reasons to Live Versus Reasons Not to Die. Think 10 (28):67-76.
    ‘Any reason for living is an excellent reason for not dying’ (Steven Luper-Foy, 'Annihilation'). Some claims seem so clearly right that we don’t think to question them. Steven Luper-Foy’s remark is like that. It borders on the ‘trivially true’ (i.e. so obviously true as to be uninteresting). If I have a reason to live, surely I likewise have a reason not to die. It may then be surprising to learn that so many philosophers disagree with this claim—either directly or by (...)
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  11. Kathy Behrendt (2010). A Special Way of Being Afraid. Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):669-682.
    I am interested in fear of non-existence, which is often discussed in terms of fear one’s own death, or as it is sometimes called, fear of death as such. This form of fear has been denied by some philosophers. Cognitive theories of the emotions have particular trouble in dealing with it, granting it a status that is simultaneously paradigmatic yet anomalous with respect to fear in general. My paper documents these matters, and considers a number of responses. I provide examples (...)
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  12. Kathy Behrendt (2007). Reasons to Be Fearful: Strawson, Death and Narrative. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):133-.
    I compare and assess two significant and opposing approaches to the self with respect to what they have to say about death: the anti-narrativist, as articulated by Galen Strawson, and the narrativist, as pieced together from a variety of accounts. Neither party fares particularly well on the matter of death. Both are unable to point towards a view of death that is clearly consistent with their views on the self. In the narrativist’s case this inconsistency is perhaps not as explicit (...)
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  13. C. Belshaw (2012). Harm, Change, and Time. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):425-444.
    What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does bring (...)
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  14. Christopher Belshaw (2013). Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. By James Stacey Taylor. (London: Routledge, 2012. Pp. 228. Price £80.00 Hb. Also Available as an eBook.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):621-624.
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  15. John Bigelow, John Campbell & Robert Pargetter (1990). Death and Well-Being. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):119-40.
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  16. Stephan Blatti (2014). Mortal Harm and the Antemortem Experience of Death. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):640-42.
    In his recent book, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics (Routeledge 2012), James Stacey Taylor challenges two ideas whose provenance may be traced all the way back to Aristotle. The first of these is the thought that death (typically) harms the one who dies (mortal harm thesis). The second is the idea that one can be harmed (and wronged) by events that occur after one’s death (posthumous harm thesis). Taylor devotes two-thirds of the book to arguing against both theses and the (...)
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  17. Stephan Blatti (2012). Death's Distinctive Harm. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):317-30.
    Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...)
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  18. Andreas J. M. Blom (1992). In Defence of Euthanasia: The Epicurean View of Death. Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)
    Epicuras holds that death should not be feared, as it cannot be experienced. This thesis defends that view. ;If all sensation ceases when the body dies, one's own non-existence cannot possibly be experienced. If, as is argued, good and bad cannot be inherent qualities, death cannot be inherently bad. It follows that one need not fear one's own non-existence. ;Acceptance of this view may not affect our fear of death, but it implies that if we encounter a person who has (...)
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  19. Lisa Bortolotti & Yujin Nagasawa (2009). Immortality Without Boredom. Ratio 22 (3):261-277.
    In this paper we address Bernard Williams' argument for the undesirability of immortality. Williams argues that unavoidable and pervasive boredom would characterise the immortal life of an individual with unchanging categorical desires. We resist this conclusion on the basis of the distinction between habitual and situational boredom and a psychologically realistic account of significant factors in the formation of boredom. We conclude that Williams has offered no persuasive argument for the necessity of boredom in the immortal life. 1.
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  20. Ben Bradley (2015). How Should We Feel About Death? Philosophical Papers 44 (1):1-14.
    This paper examines the implications of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals for the correctness of emotions and attitudes towards death. I argue that the correctness of an attitude such as fear must be explained by appeal to its causal relations to certain preferences.
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  21. Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
  22. Ben Bradley (2008). The Worst Time to Die. Ethics 118 (2):291-314.
    At what stage of life is death worst for its victim? I hold that, typically, death is worse the earlier it occurs. Others, including Jeff McMahan and Christopher Belshaw, have argued that it is worst to die in early adulthood. In this paper I show that McMahan and Belshaw are wrong; I show that views that entail that Student’s death is worse face fatal objections. I focus in particular on McMahan’s time-relative interest account (TRIA) of the badness of death. Manuscript (...)
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  23. Ben Bradley (2007). How Bad is Death? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):111-127.
    A popular view about why death is bad for the one who dies is that death deprives its subject of the good things in life. This is the “deprivation account” of the evil of death. There is another view about death that seems incompatible with the deprivation account: the view that a person’s death is less bad if she has lived a good life. In The Ethics of Killing, Jeff McMahan argues that a deprivation account should discount the evil of (...)
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  24. Ben Bradley (2004). When is Death Bad for the One Who Dies? Noûs 38 (1):1–28.
    Epicurus seems to have thought that death is not bad for the one who dies, since its badness cannot be located in time. I show that Epicurus’ argument presupposes Presentism, and I argue that death is bad for its victim at all and only those times when the person would have been living a life worth living had she not died when she did. I argue that my account is superior to competing accounts given by Thomas Nagel, Fred Feldman and (...)
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  25. Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) (2012). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
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  26. Ben Bramble (2014). Whole-Life Welfarism. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74.
    In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.
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  27. Samantha Brennan (2001). The Badness of Death, the Wrongness of Killing, and the Moral Importance of Autonomy. Dialogue 40 (4):723.
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  28. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). Death's Badness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):37-45.
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  29. Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1986). Why is Death Bad? Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
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  30. Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1998). Being Born Earlier. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):110 – 114.
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  31. Anthony Brueckner & John Martin Fischer (1993). The Asymmetry of Early Death and Late Birth. Philosophical Studies 71 (3):327-331.
    In a previous paper, we argued that death's badness consists in the deprivation of pleasurable experiences which one would have had, had one died later rather than at the time of one's actual death. Thus, we argued that death can be a bad thing for the individual who dies, even if it is an experiential blank. But there is a pressing objection to this view, for if the view is correct, then it seems that it should also be the case (...)
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  32. Mikel Burley (2010). Epicurus, Death, and the Wrongness of Killing. Inquiry 53 (1):68-86.
    This article questions the assumption, held by several philosophers, that the Epicurean argument for death's being ?nothing to us? must be fallacious since its acceptance would undermine the principle that killing is (in general) wrong. Two possible strategies are considered, which the Epicurean-sympathizer might deploy in order to show that the non-badness of death (for the person who dies) is compatible with killing's being wrong. One of these is unsuccessful; the other is more promising. It involves arguing that the wrongness (...)
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  33. Mikel Burley (2008). Harry Silverstein's Four-Dimensionalism and the Purported Evil of Death. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (4):559 – 568.
    In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I (...)
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  34. Mikel Burley (2008). Is Death a Bad Thing? Think 6 (16):59.
    After examining arguments for and against the view that death is a bad thing, Mikel Burley tentatively endorses the Epicurean claim that death cannot rationally be judged bad. For moral reasons, however, this conclusion is acceptable only with regard to one's own death.
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  35. Mikel Burley (2007). Lucretius' Symmetry Argument and the Determinacy of Death. Philosophical Forum 38 (4):327–341.
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  36. Mikel Burley (2006). Anticipating Annihilation. Inquiry 49 (2):170 – 185.
    According to Epicureans, anticipating one's own annihilation ought not to be a frightening experience. Non-existence precludes the possibility of sensation, and hence annihilation can be neither pleasant nor unpleasant. And that which cannot be felt is unworthy of fear. Certain objectors to this claim have asserted that one's own annihilation really is a terrifying prospect. Against this assertion, I argue that those who make it are guilty of precisely the kind of confusion that Epicurus and his disciples alert us to, (...)
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  37. Susanne Burri, A Rights-Based Perspective on Permissible Harm.
    This thesis takes up a rights-based perspective to discuss a number of issues related to the problem of permissible harm. It appeals to a person’s capacity to shape her life in accordance with her own ideas of the good to explain why her death can be bad for her, and why each of us should have primary say over what may be done to her. The thesis begins with an investigation of the badness of death for the person who dies. (...)
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  38. Stephen M. Campbell (2015). When the Shape of a Life Matters. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3): 565-75.
    It seems better to have a life that begins poorly and ends well than a life that begins well and ends poorly. One possible explanation is that the very shape of a life can be good or bad for us. If so, this raises a tough question: when can the shape of our lives be good or bad for us? In this essay, I present and critique an argument that the shape of a life is a non-synchronic prudential value—that is, (...)
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  39. Justin A. Capes (2014). James Stacey Taylor, Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):181-182.
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  40. Michael Cholbi (2015). Immortality and the Exhaustibility of Value. In Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman and Littlefield 221-236.
    Much of the literature on the desirability of immortality (inspired by B. Williams) has considered whether the goods of mortal life would be exhausted in an immortal life (whether, i.e., immortality would necessarily end in tedium). However, there has been very little discussion of whether the bads of mortal life would also be exhausted in an immortal life, and more generally, how good immortal life would be on balance, particularly in comparison to a mortal life. Here I argue that there (...)
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  41. Michael Cholbi (2015). Review, Bradatan, "Dying for Ideas: The Dangerous Lives of the Philosophers". [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2015.
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  42. Jacques Choron (1963). Death and Western Thought. New York, Collier Books.
  43. Thomas W. Clark (1995). Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), The Experience of Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing 15-20.
    The words quoted above distill the common secular conception of death. If we decline the traditional religious reassurances of an afterlife, or their fuzzy new age equivalents, and instead take the hard-boiled and thoroughly modern materialist view of death, then we likely end up with Gonzalez-Cruzzi. Rejecting visions of reunions with loved ones or of crossing over into the light, we anticipate the opposite: darkness, silence, an engulfing emptiness. But we would be wrong.
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  44. Daphne Cloke* (1983). Deprivation and Communication. Educational Studies 9 (3):199-209.
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  45. John M. Collins (2005). Feldman's Account of Death's Badness, and Life-Death Comparatives. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (2):83-99.
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  46. Taylor W. Cyr (forthcoming). Death’s Badness and Time-Relativity: A Reply to Purves. Journal of Ethics:1-10.
    According to John Martin Fischer and Anthony Brueckner’s unique version of the deprivation approach to accounting for death’s badness, it is rational for us to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous nonexistence. In previous work, I have defended this approach against a criticism raised by Jens Johansson by attempting to show that Johansson’s criticism relies on an example that is incoherent. Recently, Duncan Purves has argued that my defense reveals an incoherence not only in Johansson’s example but also in (...)
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  47. Taylor W. Cyr (2014). Rationally Not Caring About Torture: A Reply to Johansson. Journal of Ethics 18 (4):331-339.
    Death can be bad for an individual who has died, according to the “deprivation approach,” by depriving that individual of goods. One worry for this account of death’s badness is the Lucretian symmetry argument: since we do not regret having been born later than we could have been born, and since posthumous nonexistence is the mirror image of prenatal nonexistence, we should not regret dying earlier than we could have died. Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer have developed a response (...)
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  48. Françoise Dastur (2012). How Are We to Confront Death?: An Introduction to Philosophy. Fordham University Press.
    Overcoming death -- Neutralizing death -- Accepting death.
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  49. R. Disilvestro (2012). The Ghost in the Machine Is the Elephant in the Room: Souls, Death, and Harm at the End of Life. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):480-502.
    The idea that we human beings have souls that can continue to have conscious experiences after the deaths of our bodies is controversial in contemporary academic bioethics; this idea is obviously present whenever questions about harm at the end of life are discussed, but this idea is often ignored or avoided because it is more comfortable to do so. After briefly discussing certain types of experiences that lead some people to believe in souls that can survive the deaths of their (...)
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  50. John Donnelly (ed.) (1994). Language, Metaphysics, and Death. Fordham University Press.
    This standard work in thanatology is updated with ten essays new to the second edition, and features a new introduction by Donnelly. The collection addresses certain basic issues inherent in a philosophy of death.
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