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  1. Hartley Burr Alexander (1904). The Concept of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (5):118-124.
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  2. Sophie Allen (2009). The Definition of Consciousness: Is Triviality or Falsehood Inevitable? Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):127-138.
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  3. A. Allport (1988). What Concept of Consciousness? In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
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  4. David Leech Anderson (2007). Consciousness and Realism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):1-17.
    There is a long and storied history of debates over 'realism' that has touched literally every academic discipline. Yet realism- antirealism debates play a relatively minor role in the contemporary study of consciousness. In this paper four basic varieties of realism and antirealism are explored and their potential impact on the study of consciousness is considered. Reasons are offered to explain why there is not more debate over these issues, including a discussion of the powerful influence of externalist versions of (...)
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  5. Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239-263.
    Intuitively it has seemed to many that our concepts "conscious state" and "conscious creature" are sharp rather than vague, that they can have no borderline cases. On the other hand, many who take conscious states to be identical to, or realized by, complex physical states are committed to the vagueness of those concepts. In the paper I argue that "conscious state" and "conscious creature" are sharp by presenting four necessary conditions for conceiving borderline cases in general, and showing that some (...)
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  6. Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
    An argument is offered for this conditional: If our current concept conscious state is sharp rather than vague, and also correct , then common versions of familiar metaphysical theories of consciousness are false--?namely versions of the identity theory, functionalism, and dualism that appeal to complex physical or functional properties in identification, realization, or correlation. Reasons are also given for taking seriously the claim that our current concept conscious state is sharp. The paper ends by surveying the theoretical options left open (...)
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  7. Michael V. Antony (2004). Sidestepping the Semantics of “Consciousness”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):289-290.
    Block explains the conflation of phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness by appeal to the ambiguity of the term “consciousness.” However, the nature of ambiguity is not at all clear, and the thesis that “consciousness” is ambiguous between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness is far from obvious. Moreover, the conflation can be explained without supposing that the term is ambiguous. Block's argument can thus be strengthened by avoiding controversial issues in the semantics of “consciousness.”.
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  8. Michael V. Antony (2002). Concepts of Consciousness, Kinds of Consciousness, Meanings of 'Consciousness'. Philosophical Studies 109 (1):1-16.
    The use of expressions like ‘concepts of consciousness’, ‘kinds of consciousness’, and ‘meanings of ‘consciousness’’ interchangeably is ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is argued that this practice can be made sense of in only two ways. The first involves interpreting ‘concepts of consciousness’ and ‘kinds of consciousness’ metalinguistically to mean concepts expressed by ‘consciousness’ and kinds expressed by ‘consciousness’; and the second involves certain literal, though semantically deviant, interpretations of those expressions. The trouble is that researchers typically use the (...)
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  9. Michael V. Antony (2001). Is 'Consciousness' Ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):19-44.
    It is widely assumed that ‘ consciousness ’ is multiply ambiguous within the consciousness literature. Some alleged senses of the term are access consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, state consciousness, creature consciousness, introspective consciousness, self consciousness, to name a few. In the paper I argue for two points. First, there are few if any good reasons for thinking that such alleged senses are genuine: ‘ consciousness ’ is best viewed as univocal within the literature. The second point is that researchers would do (...)
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  10. Michael V. Antony (2001). Conceiving Simple Experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-86.
    That consciousness is composed of simple or basic elements that combine to form complex experiences is an idea with a long history. This idea is approached through an examination of our “picture” or conception of consciousness . It is argued that CC commits us to a certain abstract notion of simple experiential events, or simples, and that traditional critiques of simple elements of experience do not threaten simples. To the extent that CC is taken to conform to how consciousness really (...)
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  11. Michael V. Antony (1999). Outline of a General Methodology for Consciousness Research. Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2):43-56.
    In spite of the enormous interdisciplinary interest in consciousness these days, sorely lacking are general methodologies in terms of which individual research efforts across disciplines can be seen as contributing to a common end. In the paper I outline such a methodology. The central idea is that empirically studying our conception of consciousness—what we have in mind when we think about consciousness—can lead to progress on consciousness itself. The paper clarifies and motivates that idea.
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  12. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
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  13. David M. Armstrong (1979). Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69).
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  14. David M. Armstrong (1979). Three Types of Consciousness. In Brain and Mind. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 69) 235.
  15. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan
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  16. Werner Backhaus (ed.) (2001). Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific.
  17. Alexander Bain (1894). Definition and Problems of Consciousness. Mind 3 (11):348-361.
  18. Kati Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  19. Imants Baruss (1986). Meta-Analysis of Definitions of Consciousness. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality 6:321-29.
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  20. Rodrigo Becerra (2004). Homonymous Mistakes with Ontological Aspirations: The Persisting Problem with the Word 'Consciousness'. Sorites 15 (December):11-23.
    In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...)
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  21. Mark H. Bickhard (2005). Consciousness and Reflective Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):205-218.
    An interactive process model of the nature of representation intrinsically accounts for multiple emergent properties of consciousness, such as being a contentful experiential flow, from a situated and embodied point of view. A crucial characteristic of this model is that content is an internally related property of interactive process, rather than an externally related property as in all other contemporary models. Externally related content requires an interpreter, yielding the familiar regress of interpreters, along with a host of additional fatal problems. (...)
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  22. Alexander Bird, Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness.
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  23. E. Bisiach (1988). The Brain and Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press 101--120.
  24. Ned Block (2002). Some Concepts of Consciousness. In D. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. 206-219.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state.
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  25. Ned Block (1997). Author's Response. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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  26. Boyd H. Bode (1913). The Definition of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (9):232-239.
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  27. Joseph E. Bogen (1997). An Example of Access-Consciousness Without Phenomenal Consciousness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):144-144.
    Both Block and the commentators who accepted his P versus A distinction readily recognize examples of P without A but not vice versa. As an example of A without P, Block hypothesized a computationally like a human but without subjectivity. This would appear to describe the disconnected right hemisphere of the split-brain subject, unless one alternatively opts for two parallel mechanisms for P?
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  28. John E. Boodin (1908). Consciousness and Reality: I. Negative Definition of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (7):169-179.
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  29. Clive V. Borst (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  30. Francis H. Bradley (1893). Consciousness and Experience. Mind 2 (6):211-216.
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  31. Joao Branquinho (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Foundations of Cognitive Science is a set of thirteen new essays on key topics in this lively interdisciplinary field, by a stellar international line-up of authors. Philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists here come together to investigate such fascinating subjects as consciousness; vision; rationality; artificial life; the neural basis of language, cognition, and emotion; and the relations between mind and world, for instance our representation of numbers and space. The contributors are Ned Block, Margaret Boden, Susan Carey, Patricia Churchland, Paul Churchland, (...)
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  32. Derek Browne (1997). Two Conceptions of Access-Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):147-147.
    Block's (1995) cognitive conception of consciousness might be introduced in the service of two different projects. In one, the explanatory gap between science and folklore remains. In the other, a reductive claim is advanced, but the intuitive idea of consciousness is abandoned.
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  33. Wesley Buckwalter & Mark Phelan (2013). Function and Feeling Machines: A Defense of the Philosophical Conception of Subjective Experience. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):349-361.
    Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity (...)
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  34. Tyler Burge (1997). Two Kinds of Consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. The MIT Press
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  35. Hartley Burr Alexander (1904). The Concept of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (5):118-124.
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  36. Cyril Burt (1962). The Concept of Consciousness. British Journal of Psychology 53:229-42.
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  37. Philip Cam (1985). Phenomenology and Speech Dispositions. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):357-68.
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  38. Gregg Caruso (2005). Sensory States, Consciousness, and the Cartesian Assumption. In Nathan Smith and Jason Taylor (ed.), Descartes and Cartesianism. Cambridge Scholars Press
    One of the central assumptions made in much of contemporary philosophy of mind is that there is no appearance-reality distinction when it comes to sensory states. On this assumption, sensory states simply are as they seem: consciousness is an intrinsic property of sensory states—that is, all sensory states are conscious—and the consciousness of one’s own sensory states is never inaccurate. For a sensation to be felt as pain, for example, is for it to be pain. This assumption, which I call (...)
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  39. David J. Chalmers (1997). Availability: The Cognitive Basis of Experience? In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press 148-149.
    [[This was written as a commentary on Ned Block 's paper "On A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness" . It appeared in _Behavioral_ _and Brain Sciences_ 20:148-9, 1997, and also in the collection _The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates_ edited by Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere. ]].
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  40. Jennifer Church (1998). Two Sorts of Consciousness? Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 31 (1):51-71.
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  41. Austen Clark (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness so-Called. In Werner Backhaus (ed.), Neuronal Coding of Perceptual Systems. World Scientific
    "Consciousness" is a multiply ambiguous word, and if our goal is to explain perceptual consciousness we had better be clear about which of the many senses of the word we are endorsing when we sign on to the project. I describe some of the relatively standard distinctions made in the philosophical literature about different meanings of the word "conscious". Then I consider some of the arguments of David Chalmers and of Ned Block that states of "phenomenal consciousness" pose special and (...)
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  42. Mark L. Conkling (1977). Ryle's Mistake About Consciousness. Philosophy Today 21 (4):376-388.
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  43. Frederick J. Crosson (1966). The Concept of Mind and the Concept of Consciousness. Journal of Existentialism 6:449-458.
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  44. William L. Davidson (1881). Definition of Consciousness. Mind 6 (23):406-412.
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  45. F. de Brigard (2010). Consciousness, Attention and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):189-201.
    In a recent paper, Christopher Mole (2008) argued in favour of the view that, according to our commonsense psychology, while consciousness is necessary for attention, attention isn’t necessary for consciousness. In this paper I offer an argument against this view. More precisely, I offer an argument against the claim that, according to our commonsense psychology, consciousness is necessary for attention. However, I don’t claim it follows from this argument that commonsense has it the other way around, viz. that consciousness isn’t (...)
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  46. Ronald B. de Sousa (2002). Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity. In M. Larrazabal & P. Miranda (eds.), Twelve Varieties of Subjectivity: Dividing in Hopes of Conquest. Kluwer
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  47. Daniel C. Dennett (2001). Consciousness: How Much is That in Real Money? In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press
  48. John Dewey (1906). The Terms 'Conscious' and `Consciousness'. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (2):39-41.
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  49. Bernard Elevitch (ed.) (2000). Theoria. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr.
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  50. Simon J. Evnine (2008). Kinds and Conscious Experience: Is There Anything That It is Like to Be Something? Metaphilosophy 39 (2):185–202.
    In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even (...)
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