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  1. David Bain (2013). What Makes Pains Unpleasant? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  2. S. Benjamin Fink (2012). Knowing Pain. In Esther Cohen, Leona Toker, Manuela Consonni & Otniel E. Dror (eds.), Knowledge and Pain. Rodopi
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  3. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Pain: A Natural State Without a Nature? Dealing with the Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Ethics. In Heather McKenzie, John Quintner & Gillian Bendelow (eds.), At the Edge of Being: The Aporia of Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Press
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  4. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). The Ambiguity of "Pain". In Jane Fernandez-Goldborough (ed.), Making Sense Of: Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Net
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  5. Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson (2010). Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  6. Simonvanrysewyk, An Approach to Understanding Fetal Pain and Consciousness.
  7. Adam Swenson (2006). Pain and Value. Dissertation, Rutgers University, New Brunswick
    All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken conception of what pains are. On this false view, pain is merely a kind of sensation or feeling. The nature of a stubbed toe is exhausted by the way it stings and throbs. However, on the correct view, pains are much richer and much more complex. For example, a pain’s intrinsic properties also include its sufferer’s beliefs about the causes and implications of her (...)
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  8. Simon van Rysewyk, Self and World: The Case of Pain.
  9. Simon van Rysewyk, Towards Raising Awareness of Qualitative Pain Research.
  10. Simon van Rysewyk, Explaining Pain: Comment on Robinson, Staud and Price (2013).