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  1. Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.
    Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument that has come to be called ‘the Consequence Argument’. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the β-rule) that was shown to be invalid. (McKay (...)
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  3. Helen Beebee (2002). Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
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  4. Bernard Berofsky (2010). Free Will and the Mind–Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
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  5. Alex Blum (2003). The Core of the Consequence Argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
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  6. Alex Blum (2000). N. Analysis 60 (3):284-286.
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  7. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Retooling the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):10–13.
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  8. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  9. Joseph Keim Campbell (2011). Free Will. Polity Press.
    Free will -- Moral responsibility -- The problem of free will -- Moral responsibility : incompatibilism and skepticism -- Free will theories.
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  10. Joseph Keim Campbell (2008). Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 68 (299):264–269.
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  11. Joseph Keim Campbell (2007). Free Will and the Necessity of the Past. Analysis 67 (294):105-111.
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  12. Laura W. Ekstrom (1998). Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument. Synthese 115 (3):333-54.
    The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: (...)
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  13. Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis (...)
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  14. Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield (1998). The Mind Argument and Libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
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  15. John Martin Fischer (1988). Freedom and Miracles. Noûs 22 (2):235-252.
    The modal argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise is discussed. It is argued that there is no interpretation of the argument on which it is uncontroversially sound. That is, there are some important gaps in the argument, and it is illuminating to see precisely where these gaps are. The criticism of the modal argument is defended against certain examples offered by Ginet and van Inwagen.
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  16. John Martin Fischer (1986). Power Necessity. Philosophical Topics 14 (2):77-91.
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  17. John Martin Fischer (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):127 - 137.
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  18. John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft (2013). Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question? Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
    The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature (...)
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  19. Thomas P. Flint (1987). Compatibilism and the Argument From Unavoidability. Journal of Philosophy 84 (August):423-40.
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  20. Peter Forrest (1985). Backwards Causation in Defense of Free Will. Mind 94 (April):210-17.
  21. Christopher Evan Franklin (2011). The Problem of Enhanced Control. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.
    A crucial question for libertarians about free will and moral responsibility concerns how their accounts secure more control than compatibilism. This problem is particularly exasperating for event-causal libertarianism, as it seems that the only difference between these accounts and compatibilism is that the former require indeterminism. But how can indeterminism, a mere negative condition, enhance control? This worry has led many to conclude that the only viable form of libertarianism is agent-causal libertarianism. In this paper I show that this conclusion (...)
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  22. André Gallois (1977). Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):99-105.
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  23. Howard Harriott (1984). An Essay on Free Will. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 24 (3):330-332.
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  24. Stephen Hetherington (2006). So-Far Incompatibilism and the so-Far Consequence Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
    The consequence argument is at the core of contemporary incompatibilism about causal determinism and freedom of action. Yet Helen Beebee and Alfred Mele have shown how, on a Humean conception of laws of nature, the consequence argument is unsound. Nonetheless, this paper describés how, by generalising their main idea, we may restore the essential point and force (whatever that might turn out to be) of the consequence argument. A modified incompatibilist argument — which will be called the so-far consequence argument (...)
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  25. Christopher S. Hill (1992). Van Inwagen on the Consequence Argument. Analysis 52 (2):49-55.
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  26. Terence E. Horgan (1985). Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):339-56.
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  27. Michael Huemer (2000). Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544.
    Peter van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that . . . .” I show that, given van Inwagen’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism.
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  28. Peter Van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery: The Eighth Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Noûs 34 (s14):1 - 19.
  29. Peter van Inwagen (1986). An Essay on Free Will. OUP Oxford.
  30. Peter Van Inwagen (1974). A Formal Approach to the Problem of Free Will and Determinism. Theoria 40 (1):9-22.
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  31. Robert H. Kane (ed.) (2002). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    This comprehensive reference provides an exhaustive guide to current scholarship on the perennial problem of Free Will--perhaps the most hotly and voluminously debated of all philosophical problems. While reference is made throughout to the contributions of major thinkers of the past, the emphasis is on recent research. The essays, most of which are previously unpublished, combine the work of established scholars with younger thinkers who are beginning to make significant contributions. Taken as a whole, the Handbook provides an engaging and (...)
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  32. Tomis Kapitan (2002). A Master Argument for Incompatibilism? In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. 127--157.
    The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is (...)
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  33. Tomis Kapitan (1996). Incompatibilism and Ambiguity in the Practical Modalities. Analysis 56 (2):102-110.
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  34. Stephen Kearns (2011). Responsibility for Necessities. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):307-324.
    It is commonly held that no one can be morally responsible for a necessary truth. In this paper, I will provide various examples that cast doubt on this idea. I also show that one popular argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism (van Inwagen’s Direct Argument) fails given my examples.
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  35. Joseph Keim Campbell (2007). Free Will and the Necessity of the Past. Analysis 67 (294):105–111.
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  36. James W. Lamb (1977). On a Proof of Incompatibilism. Philosophical Review 86 (January):20-35.
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  37. David Lewis (1981). Are We Free to Break the Laws? Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
    I insist that I was able to raise my hand, and I acknowledge that a law would have been broken had I done so, but I deny that I am therefore able to break a law. To uphold my instance of soft determinism, I need not claim any incredible powers. To uphold the compatibilism that I actually believe, I need not claim that such powers are even possible. My incompatibilist opponent is a creature of fiction, but he has his prototypes (...)
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  38. Christian List (2014). Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise. Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent (...)
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  39. Kevin Magill (1997). Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions. St. Martin's Press/Palgrave Macmillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  40. Thomas McKay & David Johnson (1996). A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.
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  41. Michael McKenna (2008). Saying Good-Bye to the Direct Argument the Right Way. Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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  42. Eddy Nahmias, The State of the Free Will Debate: From Frankfurt Cases to the Consequence Argument.
    In this paper I tie together the reasoning used in the Consequence Argument with the intuitions that drive Frankfurt cases in a way that illuminates some of the underlying differences between compatibilists and incompatibilists. I begin by explaining the ‘basic mechanism’ at work in Frankfurt cases: the existence of sufficient conditions for an outcome that do not actually bring about that outcome. I suggest that other potential threats to free will, such as God’s foreknowledge, can be understood in terms of (...)
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  43. Jan F. Narveson (1977). Compatibilism Defended. Philosophical Studies 32 (July):83-7.
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  44. Dana K. Nelkin (2001). The Consequence Argument and the "Mind" Argument. Analysis 61 (2):107-115.
  45. Dana K. Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2001). How to Solve Blum's Paradox. Analysis 61 (269):91-94.
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  46. Garrett Pendergraft, Fundamentalist Contextualist Compatibilism: A Response to the Consequence Argument.
    In my dissertation I offer what I take to be a novel and compelling response to the consequence argument: the argument that if causal determinism is true, then the past history of the world and the laws of nature together determine everything that will happen in the future&mdashincluding my actions and in fact every action ever done by anyone. I begin by noting and emphasizing a parallel between the consequence argument and the skeptical argument, which leads us to ask whether (...)
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  47. John Perry (2004). Compatibilist Options. In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT. 231.
    …those who accept that responsibility for a situation implies an ability to bring it about and, perhaps, an ability to prevent it, must explain how agents are able to do other than they are caused to do. Without it, they can give no defense of their counterexamples. With it, they can be confident that.
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  48. Kenneth J. Perszyk (2003). Molinism and the Consequence Argument. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):131-151.
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  49. Scott Sehon (2011). A Flawed Conception of Determinism in the Consequence Argument. Analysis 71 (1):30 - 38.
    According to the Consequence Argument, the truth of determinism plus other plausible principles would yield the conclusion that we have no free will. In this paper I will argue that the conception of determinism typically employed in the various versions of the Consequence Argument is not plausible. In particular, I will argue that, taken most straightforwardly, determinism as defined in the Consequence Argument would imply that the existence of God is logically impossible. This is quite an implausible result. The truth (...)
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  50. Seth Shabo (2011). What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove? Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
    Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what the (...)
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