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Summary If you see a frog on the chair, you have a visual experience. But things from your perspective could seem exactly the same, even if you were hallucinating a frog on a chair. So if two experiences are typed the same according to how things are from your perspective, then there's a single type of experience that is instantiated in both cases. Since there is no frog in the hallucination case, it would seem that your experience does not constitutively involve the frog or your perceptual relation to the frog.  On the other hand, when you see the frog on the chair, your experience puts you in contact with the frog. It puts you in a position to succeed in making demonstrative reference to the frog (e.g., by saying something like "that is a frog"). So there is another useful way to type experiences that includes the frog and your perceptual relation to it.  How are these two ways of typing experiences related? If we focus on the phenomenal character of the experience, what is the relationship between the frog and the phenomenal aspects of the experience? What structures of experience best reflect these relationships? By virtue of what features of experience can they tell us about particular objects, as opposed to objects that are distinct but qualitatively identical to the ones we see?  Other issues about objects concern the status of objects as mind-independent. Are objects presented to us in experience as mind-independent, or is experience neutral on this question?
Key works Valberg 1992 sets out a puzzle about experience that highlights different roles for objects in experience. Strawson 1959 and Evans 1982 discuss singular reference in ways that lay the basis for subsequent work in the philosophy of perception on particularity in perception, such as  Martin 2002 and Burge 1991Schellenberg 2011 and Logue 2012 are contemporary discussions of the role of objects in experience. On mind-independence in perceptual experience, Hume 2000 argues that experiences neutral on mind-independence. Siegel 2006 argues that experiences present us with objects as mind-indendendent.
Introductions Valberg 1992
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  1. Jan Almäng (2013). The Causal Self‐Referential Theory of Perception Revisited. Dialectica 67 (1):29-53.
    This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for the (...)
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  2. Kent Bach (2007). Searle Against the World : How Can Experiences Find Their Objects? In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Here's an old question in the philosophy of perception: here I am, looking at this pen [I hold up a pen in my hand]. Presumably I really am seeing this pen. Even so, I could be having an experience just like the one I am having without anything being there. So how can the experience I am having really involve direct awareness of the pen? It seems as though the presence of the pen is inessential to the way the experience (...)
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  3. Antonio M. Battro (1977). Visual Riemannian Space Versus Cognitive Euclidean Space. Synthese 35 (4):423 - 429.
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  4. Clare Batty (2010). A Representational Account of Olfactory Experience. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):511-538.
    Much of the philosophical work on perception has focused on vision, with very little discussion of the chemical senses—olfaction and gustation. In this paper, I consider the challenge that olfactory experience presents to upholding a representational view of the sense modalities. Given the phenomenology of olfactory experience, it is difficult to see what a representational view of it would be like. Olfaction, then, presents an important challenge for representational theories to overcome. In this paper, I take on this challenge and (...)
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  5. Clare Batty (2010). What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.
    We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us. In this paper, I explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead. I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply. Integral to the traditional distinction is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately. I argue that there are no such presented objects in olfactory experience. As a result, olfactory experience (...)
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  6. Sara Bernal (2005). Object Lessons: Spelke Principles and Psychological Explanation. Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to (...)
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  7. João Branquinho (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Given the controversial nature of most issues in the foundations of cognitive science, it could hardly be expected from a description of the territory that ...
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  8. Bill Brewer (1994). Thoughts About Objects, Places and Times. In Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  9. Bill Brewer (1994). Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  10. John Campbell (2006). Does Visual Reference Depend on Sortal Classification? Reply to Clark. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):221-237.
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  11. Austen Clark (2004). Feature-Placing and Proto-Objects. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):443-469.
    This paper contrasts three different schemes of reference relevant to understanding systems of perceptual representation: a location-based system dubbed "feature-placing", a system of "visual indices" referring to things called "proto-objects", and the full sortal-based individuation allowed by a natural language. The first three sections summarize some of the key arguments (in Clark, 2000) to the effect that the early, parallel, and pre-attentive registration of sensory features itself constitutes a simple system of nonconceptual mental representation. In particular, feature integration--perceiving something as (...)
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  12. Jonathan Cohen (2004). Objects, Places, and Perception. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):471-495.
    In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (.
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  13. Karl Duncker (2003). Phenomenology and Epistemology of Consciousness of Objects. International Gestalt Journal 26 (1):79-128.
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  14. Gareth Evans (1980). Philosophical Subjects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  15. Gareth Evans (1980). Things Without the Mind. In Philosophical Subjects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  16. Jos Falguera (ed.) (1999). La Filosof. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..
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  17. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different from (...)
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  18. Fern (2006). Particularity and Reflexivity in the Intentional Content of Perception. Theoria 21 (56):133-145.
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  19. Fern (1999). Perceptual Consciousness and the Reflexive Character of Attention. In Jos Falguera (ed.), La Filosof. Santiago de Compostela: S.I.E.U..
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  20. Robert French (1987). The Geometry of Visual Space. Noûs 21 (June):115-133.
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  21. Stuart N. Hampshire (1961). Perception and Identification, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81:81-96.
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  22. J. Michael Hinton (1967). Perception and Identification. Philosophical Review 76 (October):421-435.
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  23. Ted Honderich (1994). Seeing Things. Synthese 98 (1):51-71.
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  24. Sean Dorrance Kelly, Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom.
  25. John Kulvicki (2007). What is What It's Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation. Synthese 156 (2):205 - 229.
    The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem (...)
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  26. Guido Kung (1984). The Intentional and the Real Object. Dialectica 38 (2‐3):143-156.
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  27. Jason Leddington (2012). Look-Blindness. Analysis 72 (2):244-251.
    In Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts 2009, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael Tye claims that seeing can occur independently of seeing-that. Call this The Independence Claim (TIC). Tye supports this ‘general point’ by appeal to cases of ‘ubiquitous error’ (2009: 95). In this article, I show that this strategy fails: it is guilty of a certain blindness to how things look.
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  28. Jack C. Lyons (2005). Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):185-206.
    I defend a moderate (neither extremely conservative nor extremely liberal) view about the contents of perception. I develop an account of perceptual kinds as perceptual similarity classes, which are convex regions in similarity space. Different perceivers will enjoy different perceptual kinds. I argue that for any property P, a perceptual state of O can represent something as P only if P is coextensive with some perceptual kind for O. 'Dog' and 'chair' will be perceptual kinds for most normal people, 'blackpool (...)
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  29. Michael G. F. Martin (2002). Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language. Cambridge University Press. 173-214.
    Book description: Much contemporary philosophical debate centres on the topics of logic, thought and language, and on the connections between these topics. This collection of articles is based on the Royal Institute of Philosophy’s annual lecture series for 2000–2001. Its contributors include a number of those working at the forefront of the field, and in their papers they reflect their own current pre-occupations. As such, the volume will be of interest to all philosophers, whether their own work is within the (...)
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  30. Olivier Massin (2011). Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence]. Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
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  31. Mohan Matthen (forthcoming). Image Content. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press.
    The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. It is argued that our grasp of the meaning of these images implies that they have propositional content. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that even on an enriched conception, image content has certain expressive (...)
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  32. Mohan Matthen (2012). Visual Demonstratives. In Athanasios Raftopoulos & Peter Machamer (eds.), Perception, Realism, and The Problem of Reference. Cambridge University Press.
    When I act on something, three kinds of idea (or representation) come into play. First, I have a non-visual representation of my goals. Second, I have a visual description of the kind of thing that I must act upon in order to satisfy my goals. Finally, I have an egocentric position locator that enables my body to interact with the object. It is argued here that these ideas are distinct. It is also argued that the egocentric position locator functions in (...)
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  33. Mohan Matthen (2010). On the Diversity of Auditory Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (1):63-89.
    This paper defends two theses about sensory objects. The more general thesis is that directly sensed objects are those delivered by sub-personal processes. It is shown how this thesis runs counter to perceptual atomism, the view that wholes are always sensed indirectly, through their parts. The more specific thesis is that while the direct objects of audition are all composed of sounds, these direct objects are not all sounds—here, a composite auditory object is a temporal sequence of sounds (whereas a (...)
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  34. Mohan Matthen (2010). How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way). In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. 226.
    What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? Philosophers disagree: they hold variously that it looks pink, white, both, and no colour at all. A new approach is offered. After reviewing the dispute, a reinterpretation of perceptual constancy is offered. In accordance with this reinterpretation, it is argued that perceptual features such as color must always be predicated of perceptual objects. Thus, it might be that in pinkish light, the wall looks white and (...)
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  35. Mohan P. Matthen (2006). On Visual Experience of Objects: Comments on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220.
    John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also (...)
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  36. Gregory Mcculloch (1984). Cause in Perception: A Note on Searle's Intentionality. Analysis 44 (October):203-205.
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  37. John McDowell (1986). Singular Thought and the Extent of ``Inner Space''. In John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context. Clarendon Press.
  38. John McDowell & Philip Pettit (eds.) (1986). Subject, Thought, And Context. Clarendon Press.
  39. Colin McLear (2011). Kant on Animal Consciousness. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (15).
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can (...)
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  40. Neil Mehta (forthcoming). The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience. Journal of Philosophy.
    By considering imaginative experiences, radically different experiences of a single object, and other data, I argue that external particulars are sometimes parts of experience but are never parts of phenomenal character.
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  41. Alan Millar (1985). Veridicality: More on Searle. Analysis 45 (March):120-124.
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  42. Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):625-654.
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  43. Boyd Millar (2014). The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
    When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that to perceive is to (...)
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  44. Christopher Mole (2010). The Contents of Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (11-12):173-79.
    Clare Batty has recently argued that the content of human olfactory experience is 'a very weak kind of abstract, or existentially quantified content', and so that 'there is no way things smell'. Her arguments are based on two claims. Firstly, that there is no intuitive distinction between olfactory hallucination and olfactory illusion. Secondly, that olfaction 'does not present smell at particular locations', and 'seems disengaged from any particular object'. The present article shows both of these claims to be false. It (...)
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  45. Thomas Natsoulas (2002). The Experiential Presence of Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: Wilfrid Sellars, Sense Impressions, and Perceptual Takings. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):293-316.
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  46. Thomas Natsoulas (1997). The Presence of Environmental Objects to Perceptual Consciousness: An Integrative, Ecological and Phenomenological Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (4):371-390.
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  47. Thomas Natsoulas (1994). On the Distinction Between the Object and the Content of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):239-64.
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  48. Thomas Natsoulas (1984). On the Causal Self-Referentiality of Perceptual Experiences and the Problem of Concrete Perceptual Reference. Behaviorism 12:61-80.
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  49. Daniel O'Brien, Objects of Perception. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  50. Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Intermodal Binding Awareness. In David Bennett & Christopher Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT.
    It is tempting to hold that perceptual experience amounts to a co-conscious collection of visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory, and olfactory episodes. If so, each aspect of perceptual experience on each occasion is associated with a specific modality. This paper, however, concerns a core variety of multimodal perceptual experience. It argues that there is perceptually apparent intermodal feature binding. I present the case for this claim, explain its consequences for theorizing about perceptual experience, and defend it against objections. I maintain that (...)
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