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  1. Edison Barrios (2013). Meaning Shift and the Purity of 'I'. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):263-288.
    In this paper I defend the “Standard View” of the semantics of ‘I’—according to which ‘I’ is a pure, automatic indexical—from a challenge posed by “deferred reference” cases, in which occurrences of ‘I’ are (allegedly) not speaker-referential, and thus non-automatic. In reply, I offer an alternative account of the cases in question, which I call the “Description Analysis” (DA). According to DA, seemingly deferred-referential occurrences of the first person pronoun are interpreted as constituents of a definite description, whose operator scopes (...)
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  2. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2002). Who is I?(Indexical Reference, Answering Machine Paradox). Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1 - 21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
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  3. Charles B. Daniels (1968). 'I' as a Definite Description. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):200 – 209.
  4. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). We and the Plural Subject. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):235-259.
    Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory defines social collectives in terms of common knowledge of expressed willingness to participate in some joint action. The author critically examines Gilbert's application of this theory to linguistic phenomena involving "we," arguing that recent work in linguistics provides the tools to develop a superior account. The author indicates that, apart from its own relevance, one should care about this critique because Gilbert's claims about the first person plural pronoun play a role in the argument in (...)
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  5. Dylan Dodd & Paula Sweeney (2010). Indexicals and Utterance Production. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):331-348.
    We distinguish, among other things, between the agent of the context, the speaker of the agent's utterance, the mechanism the agent uses to produce her utterance, and the tokening of the sentence uttered. Armed with these distinctions, we tackle the the ‘answer-machine’, ‘post-it note’ and other allegedly problematic cases, arguing that they can be handled without departing significantly from Kaplan's semantical framework for indexicals. In particular, we argue that these cases don't require adopting Stefano Predelli's intentionalism.
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  6. Geert Keil (2000). Indexikalität und Infallibilität. In Audun Ofsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis.
    Some, if not all statements containing the word “I” seem to be “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun” (Shoemaker). This immunity, however, is due to the fact that the pronoun “I” plays no identifying role in the first place. Since no identification takes place here, the alleged immunity to misidentification should come as no surprise. But there is a second immunity thesis, which captures the peculiarity of “I” better: The first-person pronoun is immune to reference-failure. Some (...)
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  7. Hiroshi Kojima (1998). On the Semantic Duplicity of the First Person Pronoun “I”. Continental Philosophy Review 31 (3):307-320.
  8. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
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  9. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'. Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.
    In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO.
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  10. Friederike Moltmann (2006). Generic 'One', Arbitrary PRO, and the First Person. Natural Language Semantics 14 (3):257–281.
    The generic pronoun 'one' (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). The paper argues that generic 'one' involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity ‘as if’ to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy of mind (...)
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  11. Daniel Morgan (2009). Can You Think My 'I'-Thoughts? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):68-85.
    If tokens of 'I' have a sense as well as a reference the question immediately arises of what account to give of their sense. One influential kind of account, of which Gareth Evans provides the best developed instance, attempts to elucidate the sense of 'I' partly in terms of the distinctive functional role possessed by thoughts containing this sense ('I'-thoughts). Accounts of this kind seem to entail that my 'I'-thoughts cannot be entertained by anyone other than me, a consequence generally (...)
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  12. Carlo Penco (2013). Sense and Linguistic Meaning: A Solution to the Kirkpe-Burge Conflict. Paradigmi 23 (3).
    In this paper I apply a well known tension between cognitive and semantic aspects in Frege’s notion of sense to his treatment of indexicals. I first discusses Burge’s attack against the identification of sense and meaning, and Kripke’s answer supporting such identification. After showing different problems for both interpreters, the author claims that the tension in Frege’s conception of sense (semantic and cognitive) accounts for some shortcomings of both views, and that considering the tension helps in understanding apparently contradictory Fregean (...)
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  13. John Perry, Self-Notions.
    ”Self-beliefs” are beliefs of the sort one ordinarily has about oneself, and expresses with the first person. These contrast with the beliefs one has in ”Casta˜neda cases,” in which one has a belief about oneself without knowing it. This paper advances an account of the nature of self-belief. According to this account, self-belief is a special case of interacting with things via notions that serve as repositories for information about objects with certain important relations to the knower, and as motivators (...)
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  14. Pierre Pica (1995). Condition C and Epistemic Contexts : A Case Study of Epithets and Anti-Logophoricity Pronouns in French. In Young-Sun Kim, Byung-Choon Lee, Kyoung-Jae Lee, Kyun-Kwon Yang & Jong-Kuri Yoon (eds.), A Festchrift for Dong-Whee Yang. Hankuk Publishing.
    Epithets and pronominals 'en' and 'y' in French have a variety of Binding properties that are unexpected on conventional approach to Binding Theory. We argue that the linguistic variety observed cross-linguistically (and perhaps, more surprinsingly, within a single language) - derives from the morphological properties of the anaphoric element - which we claim lack number features. Epithets and pronominal like 'en' and 'y' are predicates modifying null but semantically active nouns, and must theefore refer to the Speaker. These properties, we (...)
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  15. Huw Price, The Effective Indexcial.
    In a famous paper in Noûs in 1979, John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to “third-person” information about her environment, an agent need “first-person” information about where, when and who she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not as a reason for realism about tensed facts. In another famous paper in the same volume of Noûs, Nancy Cartwright (...)
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  16. A. N. Prior (1968). Egocentric Logic. Noûs 2 (3):191-207.
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  17. Erich Rast (2008). A Remark About Essential Indexicals. The Reasoner 2 (10):5-6.
    There are two ways of interpreting the argument for the existence of essential indexicals; one of them is too strong, the other one is compatible with reductionist positions.
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  18. K. Romdenh-Romluc (2006). I. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):257 - 283.
    It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is (...)
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  19. Avrum Stroll (1963). The Paradox of the First Person Singular Pronoun. Inquiry 6 (1-4):217 – 233.
    The author attempts to provide a characterization of statements which will avoid the twin perils of identifying them with sentences per se or with such non?observable entities as ?propositions?, ?meanings? etc. In providing a positive account of the sorts of things statements are, he distinguishes between the utterances of sentences, and. sentences per se, and maintains that statements are to be identified with those utterances made in certain kinds of circumstances. In the light of this analysis, it is then argued (...)
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