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  1. Edison Barrios (2013). Meaning Shift and the Purity of 'I'. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):263-288.
    In this paper I defend the “Standard View” of the semantics of ‘I’—according to which ‘I’ is a pure, automatic indexical—from a challenge posed by “deferred reference” cases, in which occurrences of ‘I’ are (allegedly) not speaker-referential, and thus non-automatic. In reply, I offer an alternative account of the cases in question, which I call the “Description Analysis” (DA). According to DA, seemingly deferred-referential occurrences of the first person pronoun are interpreted as constituents of a definite description, whose operator scopes (...)
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  2. José Luis Bermúdez (2005). Evans and the Sense of "I". In Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press
    This paper focuses on two enduring features of Gareth Evans’s work. The first is his rethinking of standard ways of understanding the Fregean notion of sense and the second his sustained attempt to undercut the standard opposition between Russellian and Fregean approaches to understanding thought and language.I explore the peculiar difficulties that ‘I’ poses for a Fregean theory and show how Evans’s account of the sense of the first person pronoun can be modified to meet those difficulties.
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  3. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2015). The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press Uk.
    When we represent the world in language, in thought, or in perception, we often represent it from a perspective. We say and think that the meeting is happening now, that it is hot here, that I am in danger and not you; that the tree looks larger from my perspective than from yours. This book is an exploration and defence of the view that perspectivality is a philosophically shallow aspect of the world. This book opposes one of the most entrenched (...)
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  4. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2013). The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person. Oxford University Press.
    Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.
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  5. Stéphane Chauvier (2009). Ce que « Je » dit du sujet. Les Etudes Philosophiques 88 (1):117.
    Si l’usage contemporain du concept de sujet s’est introduit en philosophie à la faveur d’une substantivation des mots « je » et « moi », cet usage peut-il résister à une compréhension moins fantastique du sens du mot « je »? Nous montrons en quoi le penseur d’une pensée en première personne peut être littéralement considéré comme un sujet absolu, la subjectivité étant alors moins synonyme d’intériorité que d’inhésion ou de prédication réelle.Ce que « Je » dit du sujetIs the (...)
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  6. Stéphane Chauvier (2001). Dire “Je”: Essai Sur la Subjectivité. Vrin.
    L’aptitude à dire “Je” est une des remarques distinctives de la subjectivité : si un caillou se mettait à nous parler de lui-même, nous pourrions difficilement, l’étonnement dissipé, ne pas le tenir pour une personne. Toutefois, pour beaucoup de philosophes, cette aptitude à dire “je” n’est que l’une des manifestations d’une aptitude plus profonde et plus générale de la conscience de soi. Une créature ne pourrait parler de soi que parce qu’elle serait consciente de soi et c’est cette aptitude à (...)
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  7. Jonathan Cohen & Eliot Michaelson (2013). Indexicality and The Answering Machine Paradox. Philosophy Compass 8 (6):580-592.
    Answering machines and other types of recording devices present prima facie problems for traditional theories of the meaning of indexicals. The present essay explores a range of semantic and pragmatic responses to these issues. Careful attention to the difficulties posed by recordings promises to help enlighten the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics more broadly.
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  8. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2004). Who Is I? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1-21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
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  9. Charles B. Daniels (1968). 'I' as a Definite Description. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):200 – 209.
  10. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). We and the Plural Subject. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (2):235-259.
    Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory defines social collectives in terms of common knowledge of expressed willingness to participate in some joint action. The author critically examines Gilbert's application of this theory to linguistic phenomena involving "we," arguing that recent work in linguistics provides the tools to develop a superior account. The author indicates that, apart from its own relevance, one should care about this critique because Gilbert's claims about the first person plural pronoun play a role in the argument in (...)
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  11. Amy Rose Deal (forthcoming). Nez Perce Embedded Indexicals. In H. Greene (ed.), Semantics of Under-represented Languages in the Americas. GLSA
    The Nez Perce counterparts of `I', `you', and `here' show "shifty" behavior in attitude reports. I argue that this is not the result of mixed quotation or binding, and should be analyzed via Anand and Nevins-style context shift with Kaplanian monsters.
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  12. Dylan Dodd & Paula Sweeney (2010). Indexicals and Utterance Production. Philosophical Studies 150 (3):331-348.
    We distinguish, among other things, between the agent of the context, the speaker of the agent's utterance, the mechanism the agent uses to produce her utterance, and the tokening of the sentence uttered. Armed with these distinctions, we tackle the the ‘answer-machine’, ‘post-it note’ and other allegedly problematic cases, arguing that they can be handled without departing significantly from Kaplan's semantical framework for indexicals. In particular, we argue that these cases don't require adopting Stefano Predelli's intentionalism.
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  13. Joshua Fost (2013). The Extended Self, Functional Constancy, and Personal Identity. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 12:47-66.
    Personal indexicals are often taken to refer to the agent of an expression’s context, but deviant uses (e.g. ‘I’m parked out back’) complicate matters. I argue that personal indexicals refer to the extended self of the agent, where the extended self is a mereological chimera incorporating whatever determines our behavioral capacities. To ascertain the persistence conditions of personal identity, I propose a method for selecting a level of description and a set of functional properties at that level that remain constant (...)
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  14. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...)
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  15. Marie Guillot (2012). Anscombe aurait-elle été relativiste? Repha (6):55-72.
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  16. Artemij Keidan (2008). Deissi, arbitrarietà e disambiguazione. Due approcci a confronto. In Artemij Keidan & Luca Alfieri (eds.), Deissi, riferimento, metafora. Questioni classiche di linguistica e filosofia del linguaggio. Firenze University Press 19-66.
    Two approaches to indexicality are comparatively taken into analysis: John Parry's analytic approach on the one hand, and a sort of Saussure-inspired approach within the domain of Functionalist Linguistics, on the other hand. It is argued that these two approaches do diametrically oppose each other in some important aspects. The notion of Saussurean arbitrariness of reference, opposing the analytic notion of rigid designation, is eventually argued to have a good explanatory power when some ordinary language phenomena are to be explained.
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  17. Geert Keil (2011). Ich bin jetzt hier - aber wo ist das? In Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.), Kant: Here, Now, and How. Mentis 15-34.
    Menschen verfügen über ein komplexes Vermögen der Selbstlokalisierung in Raum und Zeit. Seine eigene Position festzustellen kann in verschiedenen Kontexten Verschiedenes bedeuten. Nicht jedes unsere raumzeitliche Lokalisierung und Orientierung betreffende Problem ist philosophischer Natur. Fragen wie »Wo ist Norden?«, »Wie weit ist es nach Hause?« oder »In welcher Richtung liegt das Ziel?« sind lebensweltliche und gegebenenfalls navigatorische Fragen. Die kognitiven Mechanismen und Fähigkeiten zu untersuchen, die unseren Lokalisierungs- und Orientierungsleistungen zugrunde liegen, ist eine Aufgabe für die Kognitionswissenschaften. Die Untersuchung der (...)
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  18. Geert Keil (2002). Der Nullpunkt der Orientierung. In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis 9-29.
    The indexical sentence “I am here now” can be used any time and anywhere by anyone to say something true. Rather than yielding a special kind of infallible knowledge, this fact indicates that every speaker or thinker has a zero of an egocentric coordinate system at his disposal. Many idealist philosophers assume that this egocentric zero can be further reduced. The ability to make a de se-reference with the first person pronoun, they claim, need not involve spatiotemporal self-localization. The paper (...)
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  19. Geert Keil (2000). Indexikalität und Infallibilität. In Audun Ofsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis
    Some, if not all statements containing the word 'I' seem to be 'immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun' (Shoemaker). This immunity, however, is due to the fact that the pronoun 'I' plays no identifying role in the first place. Since no identification takes place here, the alleged immunity to misidentification should come as no surprise. But there is a second immunity thesis, which captures the peculiarity of 'I' better: The first-person pronoun is immune to reference-failure. Some (...)
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  20. Hiroshi Kojima (1998). On the Semantic Duplicity of the First Person Pronoun “I”. Continental Philosophy Review 31 (3):307-320.
  21. Guy Longworth (2014). You and Me. Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303.
    Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.
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  22. Guy Longworth (2013). Sharing Thoughts About Oneself. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):57-81.
    This paper is about first-person thoughts—thoughts about oneself that are expressible through uses of first-person pronouns (for example, ‘I’). It is widely held that first-person thoughts cannot be shared. My aim is to postpone rejection of the more natural view that such thoughts about oneself can be shared. I sketch an account on which such thoughts can be shared and indicate some ways in which deciding the fate of the account will depend upon further work.
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  23. Aidan McGlynn (2016). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification and the Epistemology of De Se Thought. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 25-55.
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  24. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Relative Truth and the First Person. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
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  25. Friederike Moltmann (2010). Generalizing Detached Self-Reference and the Semantics of Generic 'One'. Mind and Language 25 (4):440-473.
    In this paper I will give an analysis of what I call ‘generalizing detached self-reference’ within a general account of reference to the first person. With generalizing detached self-reference an agent attributes properties to a range of individuals by putting himself into their shoes, or simulating them. I will show that generalizing detached self-reference plays an important role in the semantics of natural language, in particular in the English generic one and in what syntacticians call arbitrary PRO.
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  26. Friederike Moltmann (2006). Generic 'One', Arbitrary PRO, and the First Person. Natural Language Semantics 14 (3):257–281.
    The generic pronoun 'one' (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). The paper argues that generic 'one' involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity ‘as if’ to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy of mind (...)
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  27. Daniel Morgan (2009). Can You Think My 'I'-Thoughts? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):68-85.
    If tokens of 'I' have a sense as well as a reference the question immediately arises of what account to give of their sense. One influential kind of account, of which Gareth Evans provides the best developed instance, attempts to elucidate the sense of 'I' partly in terms of the distinctive functional role possessed by thoughts containing this sense ('I'-thoughts). Accounts of this kind seem to entail that my 'I'-thoughts cannot be entertained by anyone other than me, a consequence generally (...)
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  28. Lucy F. O'Brien (1994). Anscombe and the Self-Reference Rule. Analysis 54 (4):277 - 281.
    This paper argues that Anscombe's arguments against appealing to the self-reference rule that 'I" refers to its producer are ineffective.
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  29. Carlo Penco (2013). Sense and Linguistic Meaning: A Solution to the Kirkpe-Burge Conflict. Paradigmi 23 (3).
    In this paper I apply a well known tension between cognitive and semantic aspects in Frege’s notion of sense to his treatment of indexicals. I first discusses Burge’s attack against the identification of sense and meaning, and Kripke’s answer supporting such identification. After showing different problems for both interpreters, the author claims that the tension in Frege’s conception of sense (semantic and cognitive) accounts for some shortcomings of both views, and that considering the tension helps in understanding apparently contradictory Fregean (...)
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  30. John Perry, Self-Notions.
    ”Self-beliefs” are beliefs of the sort one ordinarily has about oneself, and expresses with the first person. These contrast with the beliefs one has in ”Casta˜neda cases,” in which one has a belief about oneself without knowing it. This paper advances an account of the nature of self-belief. According to this account, self-belief is a special case of interacting with things via notions that serve as repositories for information about objects with certain important relations to the knower, and as motivators (...)
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  31. Pierre Pica (1995). Condition C and Epistemic Contexts : A Case Study of Epithets and Anti-Logophoricity Pronouns in French. In Young-Sun Kim, Byung-Choon Lee, Kyoung-Jae Lee, Kyun-Kwon Yang & Jong-Kuri Yoon (eds.), A Festchrift for Dong-Whee Yang. Hankuk Publishing
    Epithets and pronominals 'en' and 'y' in French have a variety of Binding properties that are unexpected on conventional approach to Binding Theory. We argue that the linguistic variety observed cross-linguistically (and perhaps, more surprinsingly, within a single language) - derives from the morphological properties of the anaphoric element - which we claim lack number features. Epithets and pronominal like 'en' and 'y' are predicates modifying null but semantically active nouns, and must theefore refer to the Speaker. These properties, we (...)
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  32. Huw Price, The Effective Indexcial.
    In a famous paper in Noûs in 1979, John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to “third-person” information about her environment, an agent need “first-person” information about where, when and who she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not as a reason for realism about tensed facts. In another famous paper in the same volume of Noûs, Nancy Cartwright (...)
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  33. A. N. Prior (1968). Egocentric Logic. Noûs 2 (3):191-207.
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  34. Simon Prosser (2015). XII—Why Are Indexicals Essential? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3 pt 3):211-233.
    Despite recent challenges, it is commonly held that certain indexical terms such as ‘I', ‘here’ and ‘now’ have a necessary or ‘essential’ role in certain kinds of action. I argue that this is correct, and I offer an explanation. A use of an indexical term of the kind in question connotes a specific relation between the thinking subject and the reference of the indexical. The mental representation of this relation has an epistemic feature that I call first-person redundancy. I show (...)
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  35. Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.) (2012). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    In this collection of newly commissioned essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it, engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as well as contemporary philosophical work.
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  36. Erich Rast (2008). A Remark About Essential Indexicals. The Reasoner 2 (10):5-6.
    There are two ways of interpreting the argument for the existence of essential indexicals; one of them is too strong, the other one is compatible with reductionist positions.
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  37. François Recanati (2014). First Person Thought. In Julien Dutant, Davide Fassion & Anne Meylan (eds.), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel. 506-511.
    First person thoughts are the sort of thought one may express by using the first person ; they are also thoughts that are about the thinker of the thought. Neither characterization is ultimately satisfactory. A thought can be about the thinker of the thought by accident, without being a first person thought. The alternative characterization of first person thought in terms of first person sentences also fails, because it is circular : we need the notion of a first person thought (...)
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  38. François Recanati, Commentary on Daniel Morgan, 'A Demonstrative Model of First-Person Thought'.
    This response was written for the Vth Online Consciousness Conference.
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  39. François Recanati (2012). Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: What It is and Where It Comes From. In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press 180--201.
    I argue that immunity to error through misidentification primarily characterizes thoughts that are 'implicitly' de se, as opposed to thoughts that involve an explicit self-identification. Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to the self at the level of content: what makes them de se is simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. Or, to put it in familiar terms : the content of the thought is a property (...)
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  40. Francois Recanati (1998). Le Paradoxe de la Première Personne. In Robert Vion (ed.), Les Sujets et leur Discours: Enonciation et Interaction. 7-17.
  41. François Recanati (1995). The Communication of First Person Thoughts. In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later. Kluwer 95-102.
    A discussion of Frege's views concerning the meaning of 'I' and his distinction between the 'I' of soliloquy and the 'I' of conversation.
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  42. Francois Recanati (1995). The Paradox of the First Person. In Daniel Andler, Parthasarati Banerjee, Mahasweta Chaudhury & Oliver Guillaume (eds.), Facets of Rationality. SAGE 300-311.
  43. K. Romdenh-Romluc (2006). I. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):257 - 283.
    It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on any occasion it is (...)
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  44. Isidora Stojanovic (2015). Speaking About Oneself. In Stephan Torre & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (eds.), About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press 200-219.
    It has long been known (cf. Frege 1918, Castañeda 1968, Anscombe 1975 , Perry 1977, 1979, Lewis 1981) that de se attitudes, that is beliefs, desires, hopes etc. that one has about oneself as oneself,1 are interestingly different fromthe attitudes that one holds in a third-personal mode about some individual, who might or might not turn out to be them. Frege suggested that Dr. Lauben’s belief that he has been wounded is a belief that only Dr. Lauben himself can entertain. (...)
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  45. Isidora Stojanovic (2012). The Problem of De Se Assertion. Erkenntnis 76 (1):49-58.
    It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says (...)
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  46. Avrum Stroll (1963). The Paradox of the First Person Singular Pronoun. Inquiry 6 (1-4):217 – 233.
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  47. Sajed Tayebi (2012). Recanati on Communication of First-Person Thoughts. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):210-218.
    In this paper, I will provide a counterexample to Recanati's account of first-person communication (1995, 2010, 2012). In particular, I will show that Recanati's constraints are not sufficient for the success of first-person communication. My argument against Recanati's account is parallel to Recanati's argument against neo-Russellian accounts, and shows that the same problem resurfaces even in the presence of linguistically encoded mode of presentation in a neo-Fregean framework of mental files.
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