This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
46 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Patrick Anselme & Robert M. French (1999). Interactively Converging on Context-Sensitive Representations: A Solution to the Frame Problem. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 53 (209):365-385.
    While we agree that the frame problem, as initially stated by McCarthy and Hayes (1969), is a problem that arises because of the use of representations, we do not accept the anti-representationalist position that the way around the problem is to eliminate representations. We believe that internal representations of the external world are a necessary, perhaps even a defining feature, of higher cognition. We explore the notion of dynamically created context-dependent representations that emerge from a continual interaction between working memory, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Theodore Bach (2012). Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Philosophy Compass 7 (5):348-360.
    Analogical cognition refers to the ability to detect, process, and learn from relational similarities. The study of analogical and similarity cognition is widely considered one of the ‘success stories’ of cognitive science, exhibiting convergence across many disciplines on foundational questions. Given the centrality of analogy to mind and knowledge, it would benefit philosophers investigating topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language to become familiar with empirical models of analogical cognition. The goal of this essay is to describe (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Sheldon J. Chow (2013). What's the Problem with the Frame Problem? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):309-331.
    The frame problem was originally a problem for Artificial Intelligence, but philosophers have interpreted it as an epistemological problem for human cognition. As a result of this reinterpretation, however, specifying the frame problem has become a difficult task. To get a better idea of what the frame problem is, how it gives rise to more general problems of relevance, and how deep these problems run, I expound six guises of the frame problem. I then assess some proposed heuristic solutions to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Andy Clark, Local Associations and Global Reason: Fodor's Frame Problem and Second-Order Search.
    Kleinberg (1999) describes a novel procedure for efficient search in a dense hyper-linked environment, such as the world wide web. The procedure exploits information implicit in the links between pages so as to identify patterns of connectivity indicative of “authorative sources”. At a more general level, the trick is to use this second-order link-structure information to rapidly and cheaply identify the knowledge-structures most likely to be relevant given a specific input. I shall argue that Kleinberg’s procedure is suggestive of a (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andy Clark (2002). Global Abductive Inference and Authoritative Sources, or, How Search Engines Can Save Cognitive Science. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2 (2):115-140.
    Kleinberg (1999) describes a novel procedure for efficient search in a dense hyper-linked environment, such as the world wide web. The procedure exploits information implicit in the links between pages so as to identify patterns of connectivity indicative of “authorative sources”. At a more general level, the trick is to use this second-order link-structure information to rapidly and cheaply identify the knowledge- structures most likely to be relevant given a specific input. I shall argue that Kleinberg’s procedure is suggestive of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. L. Crockett (1994). The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI's Mistaken Understanding of Intelligence. Ablex.
    I have discussed the frame problem and the Turing test at length, but I have not attempted to spell out what I think the implications of the frame problem ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Daniel C. Dennett (1984). Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of AI. In C. Hookway (ed.), Minds, Machines and Evolution. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Hubert L. Dreyfus & Stuart E. Dreyfus (1987). How to Stop Worrying About the Frame Problem Even Though It's Computationally Insoluble. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. 95--112.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James H. Fetzer (1990). The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume. International Journal of Expert Systems 3:219-232.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (1988). Aspects of AI. D.
  11. Jerry A. Fodor (1989). Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs. In Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Modules, Frames, Fridgeons, Sleeping Dogs, and the Music of the Spheres. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. 139--49.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Modules, Frames, Fridgeons. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation And Natural-Language Understanding. Cambridge: Mit Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Kenneth M. Ford & Z. Pylylshyn (eds.) (1994). The Robot's Dilemma Revisited. Ablex.
    The chapters in this book have evolved from talks originally presented at The First International Workshop on Human and Machine Cognition.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lieto (2012). Representing Concepts in Formal Ontologies: Compositionality Vs. Typicality Effects&Quot;,. Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 ( Logic, Reasoning and Rationalit):391-414.
    The problem of concept representation is relevant for many sub-fields of cognitive research, including psychology and philosophy, as well as artificial intelligence. In particular, in recent years it has received a great deal of attention within the field of knowledge representation, due to its relevance for both knowledge engineering as well as ontology-based technologies. However, the notion of a concept itself turns out to be highly disputed and problematic. In our opinion, one of the causes of this state of affairs (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. W. F. G. Haselager & J. F. H. Van Rappard (1998). Connectionism, Systematicity, and the Frame Problem. Minds and Machines 8 (2):161-179.
    This paper investigates connectionism's potential to solve the frame problem. The frame problem arises in the context of modelling the human ability to see the relevant consequences of events in a situation. It has been claimed to be unsolvable for classical cognitive science, but easily manageable for connectionism. We will focus on a representational approach to the frame problem which advocates the use of intrinsic representations. We argue that although connectionism's distributed representations may look promising from this perspective, doubts can (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. John Haugeland (1987). An Overview of the Frame Problem. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Patrick Hayes (1987). What the Frame Problem is and Isn't. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Scott Hendricks (2006). The Frame Problem and Theories of Belief. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
    The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Christopher Hookway (ed.) (1984). Minds, Machines And Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This is a volume of original essays written by philosophers and scientists and dealing with philosophical questions arising from work in evolutionary biology and artificial intelligence. In recent years both of these areas have been the focus for attempts to provide a scientific, model of a wide range of human capacities - most prominently perhaps in sociobiology and cognitive psychology. The book therefore examines a number of issues related to the search for a 'naturalistic' or scientific account of human experience (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Lars-Erik Janlert (1987). Modeling Change: The Frame Problem. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex. 156.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.) (2012). Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
  24. Kevin B. Korb (1998). The Frame Problem: An AI Fairy Tale. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):317-351.
    I analyze the frame problem and its relation to other epistemological problems for artificial intelligence, such as the problem of induction, the qualification problem and the "general" AI problem. I dispute the claim that extensions to logic (default logic and circumscriptive logic) will ever offer a viable way out of the problem. In the discussion it will become clear that the original frame problem is really a fairy tale: as originally presented, and as tools for its solution are circumscribed by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (18 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Eric Lormand (1998). The Frame Problem. In Robert A. Wilson & Frank F. Keil (eds.), Mit Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences (Mitecs). Mit Press.
    From its humble origins labeling a technical annoyance for a particular AI formalism, the term "frame problem" has grown to cover issues confronting broader research programs in AI. In philosophy, the term has come to encompass allegedly fundamental, but merely superficially related, objections to computational models of mind in AI and beyond.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Eric Lormand (1994). The Holorobophobe's Dilemma. In Kenneth M. Ford & Z. Pylylshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited. Ablex. 61--88.
    Much research in AI (and cognitive science, more broadly) proceeds on the assumption that there is a difference between being well-informed and being smart. Being well-informed has to do, roughly, with the content of one’s representations--with their truth and the range of subjects they cover. Being smart, on the other hand, has to do with one’s ability to process these representations and with packaging them in a form that allows them to be processed efficiently. The main theoretical concern of artificial (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Eric Lormand (1990). Framing the Frame Problem. Synthese 82 (3):353-74.
    The frame problem is widely reputed among philosophers to be one of the deepest and most difficult problems of cognitive science. This paper discusses three recent attempts to display this problem: Dennett's problem of ignoring obviously irrelevant knowledge, Haugeland's problem of efficiently keeping track of salient side effects, and Fodor's problem of avoiding the use of kooky concepts. In a negative vein, it is argued that these problems bear nothing but a superficial similarity to the frame problem of AI, so (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. L. Magnani & R. Dossena (eds.) (2005). Computing, Philosophy and Cognition.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. J. Christopher Maloney (1988). In Praise of Narrow Minds. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Aspects of AI. D.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. John McCarthy & Patrick Hayes (1969). Some Philosophical Problems From the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence. In B. Meltzer & Donald Michie (eds.), Machine Intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press. 463--502.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Ron McClamrock (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.
    While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Drew McDermott (1987). We've Been Framed: Or, Why AI is Innocent of the Frame Problem. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. B. Meltzer & Donald Michie (eds.) (1969). Machine Intelligence 4. Edinburgh University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. D. Murphy (2001). Folk Psychology Meets the Frame Problem - W. F. G. Haselager, Cognitive Science and Folk Psychology (London: Sage Publications, 1997), X + 165 Pp. ISBN 0-761-95425-2 Hardback £55.00; ISBN 0-761-95426-0 Paperback £17.99. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 32 (3):565-573.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Dominic Murphy (2001). Folk Psychology Meets the Frame Problem. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 32 (3):565-573.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. John L. Pollock (1997). Reasoning About Change and Persistence: A Solution to the Frame Problem. Noûs 31 (2):143-169.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Zenon Pylyshyn (1996). The Frame Problem Blues. Once More, with Feeling. In K. M. Ford & Z. W. Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited: The Frame Problem in Artificial Intelligence. Ablex.
    For many of the authors in this volume, this is the second attempt to explore what McCarthy and Hayes (1969) first called the “Frame Problem”. Since the first compendium (Pylyshyn, 1987), nicely summarized here by Ronald Loui, there have been several conferences and books on the topic. Their goals range from providing a clarification of the problem by breaking it down into subproblems (and sometimes declaring the hard subproblems to not be the_ real_ Frame Problem), to providing formal “solutions” to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.) (1987). The Robot's Dilemma. Ablex.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Erik Rietveld (2012). Context-Switching and Responsiveness to Real Relevance. In Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan.
  40. Murray Shanahan, The Frame Problem. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Murray Shanahan & Bernard J. Baars (2005). Applying Global Workspace Theory to the Frame Problem. Cognition 98 (2):157-176.
  42. Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1996). Fodor's Frame Problem and Relevance Theory (Reply to Chiappe & Kukla). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):530-532.
    Chiappe and Kukla argue that relevance theory fails to solve the frame problem as defined by Fodor. They are right. They are wrong, however, to take Fodor’s frame problem too seriously. Fodor’s concerns, on the other hand, even though they are wrongly framed, are worth addressing. We argue that Relevance thoery helps address them.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Mark Sprevak (2005). The Frame Problem and the Treatment of Prediction. In L. Magnani & R. Dossena (eds.), Computing, Philosophy and Cognition. 4--349.
    The frame problem is a problem in artificial intelligence that a number of philosophers have claimed has philosophical relevance. The structure of this paper is as follows: (1) An account of the frame problem is given; (2) The frame problem is distinguished from related problems; (3) The main strategies for dealing with the frame problem are outlined; (4) A difference between commonsense reasoning and prediction using a scientific theory is argued for; (5) Some implications for the..
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Jonathan A. Waskan (forthcoming). A Virtual Solution to the Frame Problem. Proceedings of the First Ieee-Ras International Conference on Humanoid Robots.
    We humans often respond effectively when faced with novel circumstances. This is because we are able to predict how particular alterations to the world will play out. Philosophers, psychologists, and computational modelers have long favored an account of this process that takes its inspiration from the truth-preserving powers of formal deduction techniques. There is, however, an alternative hypothesis that is better able to account for the human capacity to predict the consequences worldly alterations. This alternative takes its inspiration from the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Michael Wheeler (2008). Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):323 – 349.
    The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, in part, a consequence of the assumption (made by mainstream cognitive science and artificial intelligence) that intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. Dreyfus' Heideggerian analysis suggests that the frame problem dissolves if we reject representationalism about intelligence and recognize that human agents realize the property (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. William S. Wilkerson (2001). Simulation, Theory, and the Frame Problem: The Interpretive Moment. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153.
    The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation