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  1. Bernard J. Baars (1988). A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
    Conscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as (...)
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  2. Bernard J. Baars (1988). The Functions of Consciousness. In , A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
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  3. William P. Banks (1996). How Much Work Can a Quale Do? Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):368-80.
  4. James Barham (2003). Thoughts on Thinking Matter. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3).
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  5. William P. Bechtel & Robert C. Richardson (1983). Consciousness and Complexity: Evolutionary Perspectives on the Mind-Body Problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):378-95.
    (1983). Consciousness and complexity: Evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 378-395.
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  6. Jesse M. Bering (2004). Consciousness Was a 'Trouble-Maker': On the General Maladaptiveness of Unsupported Mental Representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):33-56.
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  7. Mark H. Bickhard (2001). The Emergence of Contentful Experience. In T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific.
    There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled.
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  8. David M. Black (2001). Psychoanalysis and the Function of Consciousness. In Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.), Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts. Wesleyan University Press. 47-57.
  9. Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  10. Joseph E. Bogen (2001). An Experimental Disconnection Approach to a Function of Consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 111 (3):135-136.
  11. Thaddeus L. Bolton (1909). On the Efficacy of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (16):421-432.
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  12. John E. Boodin (1908). Consciousness and Reality. . Consciousness and its Implications. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (9):225-234.
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  13. Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel (1998). Why Did Evolution Engineer Consciousness? In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
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  14. Richard Brown (2009). Review of 'Consciousness and its Function' by David Rosenthal. [REVIEW] Philosopher's Digest.
    David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it seems (...)
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  15. Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem (2005). Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison. Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness-brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both (...)
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  16. A. Carsetti (ed.) (2001). Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.
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  17. David J. Cole (2002). The Function of Consciousness. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins. 287-305.
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  18. Craig DeLancey (1996). Emotion and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.
  19. John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
    The naturalistic voluntary control (VC) theory explains free will and consciousness in terms of each other. It is central to free voluntary control of action that one can control both what one is conscious of, and also what one is not conscious of. Furthermore, the specific cognitive ability or skill involved in voluntarily controlling whether information is processed consciously or unconsciously can itself be used to explain consciousness. In functional terms, it is whatever kind of cognitive processing occurs when a (...)
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  20. John Dilworth (2007). Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively (...)
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  21. Fred Dretske (1997). What Good is Consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.
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  22. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
  23. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1998). Consciousness, Adaptation, and Epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  24. Owen J. Flanagan & Thomas W. Polger (1995). Zombies and the Function of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.
    Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies.
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  25. Philippe Gagnon (2010). “What We Have Learnt From Systems Theory About the Things That Nature’s Understanding Achieves”. In Dirk Evers, Antje Jackelén & Taede Smedes (eds.), How do we Know? Understanding in Science and Theology. Forum Scientiarum.
    The problem of knowledge has been centred around the study of the content of our consciousness, seeing the world through internal representation, without any satisfactory account of the operations of nature that would be a pre-condition for our own performances in terms of concept efficiency in organizing action externally. If we want to better understand where and how meaning fits in nature, we have to find the proper way to decipher its organization, and account for the fact that we have (...)
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  26. Gilberto Gomes (2005). Is Consciousness Epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan Pockett. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):77-79.
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  27. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1994). Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.
  28. Richard L. Gregory (1996). What Do Qualia Do? Perception 25:377-79.
  29. Guven Guzeldere, Owen J. Flanagan & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). The Nature and Function of Consciousness: Lessons From Blindsight. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. Mit Press.
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  30. David R. Hilbert, Why Have Experiences?
    In _An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision_ George Berkeley made the claim that,.
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  31. Kenneth E. Himma (2004). Moral Biocentrism and the Adaptive Value of Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):25-44.
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  32. David Hodgson (2002). Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.
    DAVID HODGSON Abstract: This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to (...)
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  33. Nicholas Humphrey (2000). The Privatization of Sensation. In Celia Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.), The Evolution of Cognition. Mit Press. 241--252.
    It is the ambition of evolutionary psychology to explain how the basic features of human mental life came to be selected because of their contribution to biological survival. Counted among the most basic must be the subjective qualities of conscious sensory experience: the felt redness we experience on looking at a ripe tomato, the felt saltiness on tasting an anchovy, the felt pain on being pricked by a thorn. But, as many theorists acknowledge, with these qualia, the ambition of evolutionary (...)
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  34. Nicholas Humphrey, The Uses of Consciousness.
    Reflexive consciousness evolved in the context of early human social life, as a means by which 'natural psychologists' could develop working models of their own and others' minds.
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  35. Helen Huss Parkhurst (1920). The Obsolescence of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (22):596-606.
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  36. William James (1885). On the Function of Cognition. Mind 10 (37):27-44.
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  37. Mark Johnston (2006). Better Than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 260--290.
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  38. Jaegwon Kim (2007). The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
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  39. E. A. Kirkpatrick (1908). The Part Played by Consciousness in Mental Operations. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (16):421-429.
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  40. T. Kitamura (ed.) (2001). What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific.
    This volume is a guide to two types of transcendence of academic borders which seem necessary for understanding and modelling brain function.
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  41. Eric Russert Kraemer (1984). Consciousness and the Exclusivity of Function. Mind 93 (April):271-5.
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  42. Uriah Kriegel (2004). The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  43. Hakwan Lau (2009). Volition and the Function of Consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not (...)
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  44. Hakwan Lau (2009). Volition and the Function of Consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 26 (5):537-552.
    People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence behavior and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, and this makes us think that consciousness has the function of sending such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could produce strong signals but not (...)
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  45. Steven Lehar (forthcoming). The Function of Conscious Experience: An Analogical Paradigm of Perception and Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition.
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  46. Neil Levy (2008). Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher. [REVIEW] Philosophia 36 (2):213-221.
    In a recent article, George Sher argues that a realistic conception of human agency, which recognizes the limited extent to which we are conscious of what we do, makes the task of specifying a conception of the kind of control that underwrites ascriptions of moral responsibility much more difficult than is commonly appreciated. Sher suggests that an adequate account of control will not require that agents be conscious of their actions; we are responsible for what we do, in the absence (...)
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  47. Benjamin W. Libet (2003). Can Conscious Experience Affect Brain Activity? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.
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  48. J. L. Mackie (1981). The Efficacy of Consciousness: Comments on Honderich's Paper. Inquiry 24 (October):343-352.
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  49. Colin McGinn (1981). A Note on Functionalism and Function. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):169-70.
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  50. Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.) (2001). Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts. Wesleyan University Press.
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