Traditionally, knowledge has been taken to yield a reductive analysis in terms of (conceptually primitive) necessary and jointly sufficient conditions—most commonly, justified (or warranted) true belief. In 1963, however, Edmund Gettier’s “Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?” challenged the reductive model of knowledge by producing a series of counterexamples where, intuitively, a justified true belief fails to be knowledge. Since Gettier’s original challenge, the philosophical literature has been replete with attempts to defend the reductive analysis against Gettier counterexamples (now generalized well beyond the cases posed in 1963) and those claiming that such defenses fail.
|Key works||Gettier 1963 is the piece that started it all, and should be the first point of contact with the literature. And Shope 1983 provides an excellent summary of the first 20 years following Gettier's landmark paper. While there is certainly a legion of accounts aiming to provide a viable reductive account of knowledge that is not vulnerable to Gettier counterexample, four seminal accounts can be found here: Hetherington 2001, Howard-Snyder 2003, Zagzebski 1999, and Nozick 1981. Other philosophers have tried to defuse Gettier counterexamples by challenging the intuitions that inform and undergird them. See Weatherson 2003 and Weinberg et al 2001. Finally, it is worth noting that some philosophers have argued that Gettier counterexamples are unavoidable within the reductive model of knowledge. See Zagzebski 1994, Floridi 2004, and Church 2013|
|Introductions||Encyclopedia articles include Steup 2008 and Hetherington 2005.|
- Defining Knowledge, Misc (67)
- Knowledge as a Natural Kind (7)
- Primitivism about Knowledge (48)
- The Concept of Knowledge (17)
- Epistemic Luck (117)
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