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Traditionally, knowledge has been taken to yield a reductive analysis in terms of (conceptually primitive) necessary and jointly sufficient conditions—most commonly, justified (or warranted) true belief. In 1963, however, Edmund Gettier’s “Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?” challenged the reductive model of knowledge by producing a series of counterexamples where, intuitively, a justified true belief fails to be knowledge. Since Gettier’s original challenge, the philosophical literature has been replete with attempts to defend the reductive analysis against Gettier counterexamples (now generalized well beyond the cases posed in 1963) and those claiming that such defenses fail. 

Key works Gettier 1963 is the piece that started it all, and should be the first point of contact with the literature. And Shope 1983 provides an excellent summary of the first 20 years following Gettier's landmark paper. While there is certainly a legion of accounts aiming to provide a viable reductive account of knowledge that is not vulnerable to Gettier counterexample, four seminal accounts can be found here: Hetherington 2001Howard-Snyder 2003, Zagzebski 1999, and Nozick 1981. Other philosophers have tried to defuse Gettier counterexamples by challenging the intuitions that inform and undergird them. See Weatherson 2003 and Weinberg et al 2001. Finally, it is worth noting that some philosophers have argued that Gettier counterexamples are unavoidable within the reductive model of knowledge. See Zagzebski 1994, Floridi 2004, and Church 2013
Introductions Encyclopedia articles include Steup 2008 and Hetherington 2005
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  1. Robert Almeder (1983). The Invalidity of Gettier-Type Counterexamples. Philosophia 13 (1-2):67-74.
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  2. Robert Almeder (1975). Defending Gettier Counter-Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):58 – 60.
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  3. Nathan Ballantyne (2014). Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology? Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.
    Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.
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  4. Guillaume Beaulac & Pierre Poirier (2009). Va Savoir! De la Connaissance En Général -- Pascal Engel. [REVIEW] Dialogue 48 (01):217-221.
  5. James Beebe & Joseph Shea (2013). Gettierized Knobe Effects. Episteme 10 (3):219-240.
    We report experimental results showing that participants are more likely to attribute knowledge in familiar Gettier cases when the would-be knowers are performing actions that are negative in some way (e.g. harmful, blameworthy, norm-violating) than when they are performing positive or neutral actions. Our experiments bring together important elements from the Gettier case literature in epistemology and the Knobe effect literature in experimental philosophy and reveal new insights into folk patterns of knowledge attribution.
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  6. Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
    This paper argues that for someone to know proposition p inferentially it is not enough that his belief in p and his justification for believing p covary with the truth of p through a sphere of possibilities. A further condition on inferential knowledge is that p's truth-maker is identical with, or causally related to, the state of affairs the justification is grounded in. This position is dubbed ‘identificationism.’.
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  7. Corine Besson (2009). Logical Knowledge and Gettier Cases. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):1-19.
    Knowledge of the basic rules of logic is often thought to be distinctive, for it seems to be a case of non-inferential a priori knowledge. Many philosophers take its source to be different from those of other types of knowledge, such as knowledge of empirical facts. The most prominent account of knowledge of the basic rules of logic takes this source to be the understanding of logical expressions or concepts. On this account, what explains why such knowledge is distinctive is (...)
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  8. John Bigelow (2006). Gettier's Theorem. In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier. 203--218.
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  9. Anthony Robert Booth (2014). The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis. Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
    Stephen Hetherington has defended the tripartite analysis of knowledge (Hetherington in Philos Q 48:453–469, 1998; J Philos 96:565–587, 1999; J Philos Res 26:307–324, 2001a; Good knowledge, bad knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001b). His defence has recently come under attack (Madison in Australas J Philos 89(1):47–58, 2011; Turri in Synthese 183(3):247–259, 2012). I critically evaluate those attacks as well as Hetherington’s newest formulation of his defence (Hetherington in Philosophia 40(3):539–547, 2012b; How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge, Wiley, Oxford, (...)
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  10. Kenneth Boyd & Jennifer Nagel (2014). The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions. In Edouard Machery & O'Neill Elizabeth (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge. 109-127.
  11. B. Brogaard (2004). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.
    The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of (...)
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  12. Jianbo Cao (2006). A Critique to the Significance of Gettier Counter-Examples. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 1 (4):675-687.
    Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.
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  13. J. Adam Carter (2014). Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2).
    Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a (...)
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  14. Andrew Chignell (2003). Accidentally True Belief and Warrant. Synthese 137 (3):445 - 458.
    The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by (...)
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  15. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2000). Ist das Gettier-Problem wirklich ein Problem? Conceptus 33 (82):45-56.
    Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...)
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  16. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do? Dialectica 65 (4):561-579.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I (...)
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  17. Ian M. Church (2013). Getting 'Lucky' with Gettier. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):37-49.
    : In this paper I add credence to Linda Zagzebski's (1994) diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the current trend to abandon the standard analysis) by analyzing the nature of luck. It is widely accepted that the lesson to be learned from Gettier problems is that knowledge is incompatible with luck or at least a certain species thereof. As such, understanding the nature of luck is central to understanding the Gettier problem. Thanks by and large to Duncan Pritchard's seminal work, Epistemic (...)
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  18. Ian M. Church (2013). Manifest Failure Failure: The Gettier Problem Revived. Philosophia 41 (1):171-177.
    If the history of the Gettier Problem has taught us anything, it is to be skeptical regarding purported solutions. Nevertheless, in “Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved” (2011), that is precisely what John Turri offers us. For nearly fifty years, epistemologists have been chasing a solution for the Gettier Problem but with little to no success. If Turri is right, if he has actually solved the Gettier Problem, then he has done something that is absolutely groundbreaking and really quite remarkable. (...)
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  19. David Coder (1974). Naturalizing the Gettier Argument. Philosophical Studies 26 (2):111 - 118.
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  20. Stewart Cohen (1998). Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):289 – 306.
    (1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411.
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  21. John Corcoran (2006). An Essay on Knowledge and Belief. International Journal of Decision Ethics (2):125-144.
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  22. Richard Creath (1992). Induction and the Gettier Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):401-404.
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  23. Thomas M. Crisp (2000). Gettier and Plantinga's Revised Account of Warrant. Analysis 60 (265):42–50.
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  24. Daniel & Frances Howard-Snyder Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304–327.
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  25. John M. DePoe (2011). Gettier's Argument Against the Traditional Account of Knowledge. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  26. Igor Douven (2005). A Contextualist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):207-228.
    According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, pace virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic (...)
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  27. Julien Dutant (2007). The Case for Infallibilism. In C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: University of Genoa. 59-84.
    Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. I spell out three distinct such conditions: epistemic, evidential and modal infallibility. Epistemic infallibility turns out to be simply a consequence of epistemic closure, and is not infallibilist in any relevant sense. Evidential infallibilism i s unwarranted but it is not an satisfactory characterization of the infallibilist intuition. Modal infallibility, by contrast, captures the core infallibilist intuition, and I argue that it is required to solve the Gettier (...)
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  28. Neil Feit & Andrew Cullison (2011). When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):283-304.
    Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a truth, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a truth. This paper provides a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence when it does not. We present the paper as an approach to the Gettier problem (...)
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  29. Richard Feldman (1974). An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
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  30. L. Floridi (2004). On the Logical Unsolvability of the Gettier Problem. Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.
    The tripartite account of propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p as justified true belief can become adequate only if it can solve the Gettier Problem. However, the latter can be solved only if the problem of a successful coordination of the resources (at least truth and justification) necessary and sufficient to deliver propositional, fallibilist knowledge that p can be solved. In this paper, the coordination problem is proved to be insolvable by showing that it is equivalent to the ''''coordinated attack'''' problem, (...)
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  31. Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  32. Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer. 105--117.
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  33. Carl Ginet (1988). The Fourth Condition. In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Kluwer. 105--117.
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  34. Alessandro Giordani (2013). A Logic of Justification and Truthmaking. Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):323-342.
    In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning about justification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic of justification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied both for (...)
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  35. Richard Greene & N. A. Balmert (1997). Two Notions of Warrant and Plantinga’s Solution to the Gettier Problem. Analysis 57 (2):132–139.
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  36. Thomas Grundmann & Joachim Horvath (2013). Thought Experiments and the Problem of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies (3):1-9.
    Descriptions of Gettier cases can be interpreted in ways that are incompatible with the standard judgment that they are cases of justified true belief without knowledge. Timothy Williamson claims that this problem cannot be avoided by adding further stipulations to the case descriptions. To the contrary, we argue that there is a fairly simple way to amend the Ford case, a standard description of a Gettier case, in such a manner that all deviant interpretations are ruled out. This removes one (...)
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  37. Oswald Hanfling (2003). A Gettier Drama. Analysis 63 (3):262–263.
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  38. Michael Hannon, The Universal Core of Knowledge.
    Many epistemologists think we can derive important theoretical insights by investigating the English word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses. However, fewer than six percent of the world’s population are native English speakers, and some empirical evidence suggests that the concept of knowledge is culturally relative. So why should we think that facts about the word ‘know’ or the concept it expresses have important ramifications for epistemology? In this paper, I argue that the concept of knowledge is universal (expressed by (...)
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  39. Michael Hannon (2013). Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? Erkenntnis:1-8.
    In When is True Belief Knowledge? (2012) Richard Foley proposes an original and strikingly simple theory of knowledge: a subject S knows some proposition p if and only if S truly believes that p and does not lack any important information. If this view is correct, Foley allegedly solves a wide variety of epistemological problems, such as the Gettier problem, the lottery paradox, the so-called ‘value problem’, and the problem of skepticism. However, a central component of his view is that (...)
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  40. Allan Hazlett, A Gricean Approach to the Gettier Problem.
    David Lewis maintained that epistemological contextualism (on which the truth-conditions for utterances of “S knows p” change in different contexts depending on the salient “alternative possibilities”) could solve the problem of skepticism as well as the Gettier problem. Contextualist approaches to skepticism have become commonplace, if not orthodox, in epistemology. But not so for contextualist approaches to the Gettier problem: the standard approach to this has been to add an “anti-luck” condition to the analysis of knowledge.
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  41. A. Heathcote (2012). Gettier and the Stopped Clock. Analysis 72 (2):309-314.
    The purpose of this article is to show that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier counter-examples can solve the Russell case of the stopped clock (other standard cases have already been analysed). The solution amounts to this: the truthmaker for the claim that it is, say, 2.00 pm, is a combination of natural and non-natural determinants. The latter are created by stipulation, but having been so made make it is a perfectly objective matter as to whether it is 2.00 o'clock. (...)
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  42. Adrian Heathcote (2006). Truthmaking and the Gettier Problem. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. 152--67.
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  43. Stephen Hetherington (2012). The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study. Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
    Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of (...)
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  44. Stephen Hetherington (2011). Abnormality and Gettier Situations: An Explanatory Proposal. Ratio 24 (2):176-191.
    Analytic epistemologists reach regularly for favoured ‘intuitions’. And the anti-luck intuition (as Duncan Pritchard calls it) is possibly one of the best-entrenched epistemological intuitions at present, seemingly guiding standard reactions to Gettier situations. But why is that intuition true (if it is)? This paper argues that the anti-luck intuition (like the ability intuition) rests upon something even more deeply explanatory – the normality intuition. And to recognise this is to understand better what most epistemologists want from a concept of knowledge. (...)
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  45. Stephen Hetherington (ed.) (2006). Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science.
    AcknowledgementsContributors1. Introduction: The art of precise epistemology Stephen HetheringtonPart A. Epistemology as scientific?2.
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  46. Stephen Hetherington, Gettier Problems. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Gettier problems or cases are named in honor of the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who discovered them in 1963. They function as challenges to the philosophical tradition of defining knowledge of a proposition as justified true belief in that proposition. The problems are actual or possible situations in which someone has a belief that is both true and well supported by evidence, yet which — according to almost all epistemologists — fails to be knowledge. Gettier’s original article had a dramatic (...)
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  47. Stephen Hetherington (2001). A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
    How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).
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  48. Stephen Hetherington (1998). Actually Knowing. Philosophical Quarterly 48 (193):453-469.
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  49. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1996). Gettieristic Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):83 – 97.
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  50. Stephen Cade Hetherington (1992). Gettier and Scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):277 – 285.
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