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The Given

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Bruce Aune (1967). Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation? In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House.
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  2. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  3. Andrew R. Bailey (2004). The Myth of the Myth of the Given. Manuscrito 27 (2):321-60.
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  4. Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  5. Laurence Bonjour (2004). C. I. Lewis on the Given and its Interpretation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):195–208.
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  6. Robert B. Brandom, The Centrality of Sellars' Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.
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  7. Derek H. Brown (2008). Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):180–185.
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  8. Matthew Burstein (2010). Epistemological Behaviorism, Nonconceptual Content, and the Given. Contemporary Pragmatism 7 (1):168-89.
  9. Matthew Burstein (2006). Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition. In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Rodopi. 197-216.
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  10. Alex Byrne (1996). Spin Control. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. 261--74.
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  11. Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.) (1976). Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill.
  12. Tim Crane (2013). The Given. In Joseph Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate. Routledge. 229-249.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...)
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  13. Susan Cunnew (1970). The Appeal to the Given: A Study in Epistemology, By Jacob Joshua Ross. (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1970. Pp. 224. Price 42s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 45 (174):346-.
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  14. Willem A. deVries & Paul Coates (2009). Brandom's Two-Ply Error. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
    Robert Brandom makes several mistakes in his discussion of Sellars's "Two-Ply" account of observation. Brandom does not recognize the difference in "level" between observation reports concerning physical objects and 'looks'-statements. He also denies that 'looks'-statements are reports or even make claims. They then demonstrate a more correct reading of Sellars on 'looks'-statements.
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  15. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  16. William Eastman (1972). The Appeal to the Given: A Study in Epistemology. By Jacob Joshua Ross. London: George Allen and Unwin; Toronto: Methuen. 1970. Pp. 224. $6.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 11 (04):649-651.
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  17. C. G. Echelbarger (1981). An Alleged Legend. Philosophical Studies 39 (April):227-46.
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  18. Charles Echelbarger (1974). Sellars on Thinking and the Myth of the Given. Philosophical Studies 25 (May):231-246.
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  19. Terence Rajivan Edward (forthcoming). From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity. Organon F.
    This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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  20. Evan Fales (1996). A Defense of the Given. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    The Doctrine of the Given The Myth of the Given A Methodological Problem To a convinced foundationalist, the project of establishing the existence of the ...
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  21. Jerry A. Fodor (2007). The Revenge of the Given. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. 105--116.
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  22. Bruce V. Foltz (2004). Nature's Other Side: The Demise of Nature and the Phenomenology of Givenness. In Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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  23. Christopher Frey (2011). On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):721-732.
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  24. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (forthcoming). Knowledge and Justification of the First Principles. In Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms.
    The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a (...)
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  25. Jay L. Garfield (1989). The Myth of Jones and the Mirror of Nature: Reflections on Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):1-26.
  26. Christopher W. Gowans (1989). Two Concepts of the Given in C. I. Lewis: Realism and Foundationalism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):573-590.
    It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in (...)
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  27. Robert H. Grimm (1959). A Note on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 10 (3):45-48.
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  28. A. Gupta (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Harvard University Press.
    This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...)
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  29. Charles Hartshorne (2002). The Structure of Givenness. In Personalism Revisited: Its Proponents and Critics. New York: Rodopi NY.
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  30. Charles Hartshorne (1958). The Logical Structure of Givenness. Philosophical Quarterly 8 (October):307-316.
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  31. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma – phenomenal (...)
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  32. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  33. Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  34. Benj Hellie (2013). It's Still There! In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer.
    The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies surrounding (...)
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  35. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There are (...)
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  36. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73.
    In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.
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  37. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  38. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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  39. Daniel Howard-Snyder & E. J. Coffman (2007). Three Arguments Against Foundationalism: Arbitrariness, Epistemic Regress, and Existential Support. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):535-564.
    Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist withoutother (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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  40. Ronald C. Hoy (1985). The Given of the Self-Presenting. Noûs 19 (September):347-364.
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  41. Michael Huemer (1999). A Defense of the Given. Philosophical Review 108 (1):128-130.
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  42. Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
    Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in sometime later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.”—Franz Kafka..
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  43. Jeremy R. Koons (2002). How to Avoid the Twin Perils of Anti-Empiricism and the Given. In Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
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  44. Jeremy R. Koons (2002). Perspectives on Coherentism. Aylmer, Québec: Éditions Du Scribe.
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  45. Jeremy Randel Koons (2006). Sellars, Givenness, and Epistemic Priority. In Michael P. Wolf (ed.), The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. 147-172.
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  46. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2005). On Denying a Presupposition of Sellars' Problem:A Defense of Propositionalism. Veritas 50 (4):173-190.
    There is a great divide between two approaches to epistemology over the past thirty to forty years. Some label the divide that between internalists and externalists, and that characterization may be accurate on some account of the distinction. I will pursue the divide from a different direction, in part because the literature on the distinction between internalism and externalism has become a mess, and I don’t want to clean up the mess here.
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  47. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1986). The Confusion Over Foundationalism. Philosophia 16 (3-4):345-354.
    Foundationalism came under attack in two areas in the first half of this century. First, some doubted whether the foundations were adequate to support the entire structure of knowledge, and second, the doctrine of the Agiven@ came under serious attack. = However, many epistemologists were not convinced that foundationalism was to be abandoned even if the criticisms were granted. According to these epistemologist, far from having shown that foundationalism itself was at fault, the critics of foundationalism had only been attacking (...)
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  48. Ramon M. Lemos (1964). Sensation, Perception, and the Given. Ratio 6 (June):63-80.
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  49. Caleb Liang (2006). Phenomenal Character and the Myth of the Given. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:21-36.
    In “Sellars and the ‘Myth of the Given,’” Alston argues against Sellars’s position in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” (EPM) that there is no nonconceptual cognition. According to him, Sellars ignores phenomenal look-concepts that capture the phenomenal character of experience. I contend that the Sellarsian can agree that the phenomenal aspect of looks should be accommodated, but he is not thereby forced to concede a form of the nonconceptual Given. I examine some of Alston’s arguments, especially the Fineness of (...)
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  50. Jack Lyons (2008). Evidence, Experience, and Externalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):461 – 479.
    The Sellarsian dilemma is a famous argument that attempts to show that nondoxastic experiential states cannot confer justification on basic beliefs. The usual conclusion of the Sellarsian dilemma is a coherentist epistemology, and the usual response to the dilemma is to find it quite unconvincing. By distinguishing between two importantly different justification relations (evidential and nonevidential), I hope to show that the Sellarsian dilemma, or something like it, does offer a powerful argument against standard nondoxastic foundationalist theories. But this reconceived (...)
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