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The Given

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Jedediah Wp Allen & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). You Can't Get There From Here: Foundationalism and Development. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):124-125.
    The thesis of our commentary is that the framework used to address what are taken by Carey to be the open issues is highly problematic. The presumed necessity of an innate stock of representational primitives fails to account for the emergence of representation out of a nonrepresentational base. This failure manifests itself in problematic ways throughout Carey's book.
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  2. Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves (2008). Sobre a possibilidade de pensarmos o mundo: o debate entre John McDowell e Donald Davidson. Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    The thesis evaluates a contemporary debate concerning the very possibility of thinking about the world. In the first chapter, McDowell's critique of Davidson is presented, focusing on the coherentism defended by the latter. The critique of the myth of the given (as it appears in Sellars and Wittgenstein), as well as the necessity of a minimal empiricism (which McDowell finds in Quine and Kant), lead to an oscillation in contemporary thinking between two equally unsatisfactory ways of understanding the empirical content (...)
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  3. Bruce Aune (1967). Does Knowledge Have an Indubitable Foundation? In Knowledge, Mind and Nature. Random House
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  4. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  5. Andrew R. Bailey (2004). The Myth of the Myth of the Given. Manuscrito 27 (2):321-60.
    Qualia have historically been thought to stand in a very different epistemological relation to the knower than does the external furniture of the world. The ‘raw feels’ of thought were often said to be ‘given’, while what we might call the content of that thought – for example, claims about the external world – was thought only more or less doubtfully true; and this was often said to be because we are ‘directly’ or ‘non-inferentially’ confronted by qualia or experiences, whereas (...)
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  6. Selim Berker (2011). Gupta's Gambit. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):17-39.
    After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.
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  7. W. P. Blevin (1927). The Theory of Sensa: An Aspect of Current Realism. The Monist 37 (1):50-76.
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  8. Laurence Bonjour (2004). C. I. Lewis on the Given and its Interpretation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):195–208.
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  9. Robert B. Brandom, The Centrality of Sellars' Two-Ply Account of Observation to the Arguments of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.
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  10. Derek H. Brown (2008). Empiricism and Experience – Anil Gupta. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):180–185.
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  11. Matthew Burstein (2010). Epistemological Behaviorism, Nonconceptual Content, and the Given. Contemporary Pragmatism 7 (1):168-89.
    Debates about nonconceptual content impact many philosophical disciplines, including philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of language. However, arguments made by many philosophers from within the pragmatist tradition, including Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Rorty, and Putnam, undercut the very role such content purportedly plays. I explore how specifically Sellarsian arguments against the Given and Rortian defenses of “epistemological behaviorism” undermine standard conceptions of nonconceptual content. Subsequently, I show that the standard objections to epistemological behaviorism inadequately attend to the essentially social and (...)
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  12. Matthew Burstein (2006). Prodigal Epistemology: Coherence, Holism, and the Sellarsian Tradition. In M. P. Wolf & M. N. Lance (eds.), Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. Rodopi 197-216.
    Many philosophers have equated the denial of foundationalism with a call for coherentist approaches to epistemology. I think such equations are spurious, and to show why this is so I contrast the views of a paradigmatic coherentist with an antifoundationalist alternative. This article examines the coherentism of Laurence BonJour with an eye toward the way in which BonJour's views fail to fully adopt the insights of their Sellarsian roots. In particular, I argue that BonJour's view endorses the philosophy of mind (...)
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  13. Alex Byrne (1996). Spin Control. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview 261--74.
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  14. Hector-Neri Castaneda (ed.) (1976). Action, Knowledge, and Reality. Bobbs-Merrill.
  15. Tim Crane (2013). The Given. In Joseph Schear (ed.), Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World: the McDowell-Dreyfus Debate. Routledge 229-249.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...)
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  16. Susan Cunnew (1970). The Appeal to the Given: A Study in Epistemology, By Jacob Joshua Ross. (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1970. Pp. 224. Price 42s.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 45 (174):346-.
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  17. Stefanie Dach (2014). Realismus a jazyk: Recept podle Sellarse. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 5 (19).
  18. Stefanie Dach (2014). Realismus a jazyk: Recept podle Sellarse. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (Suppl. 1):05-19.
    Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophical system joins issues that have often been regarded as incompatible or at least in mutual tension. Two of these are his holistic approach to language and knowledge on the one hand and his realism on the other hand. In my paper I first outline this tension and then present a number of steps, including the rejection of semantic relations, picturing and the defense of realism, which can help us to accommodate it. I highlight the payoff of these (...)
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  19. Michael Davis (2011). A Little Give and Take: Problems in the Empiricism of Sellars and His Followers. Discusiones Filosóficas 11 (17):53-67.
    The starting point of this paper is Sellars’s rejection of foundationalist empiricism as found in his discussion of the Myth of the Given. Sellars attacks the Myth from two main angles, corresponding to the two elements of empiricism: the idea that our beliefs are justified by the world, and the idea that our concepts are derived from experience. In correctly attacking the second, Sellars is also, incorrectly, led to attack the first. Thus, Sellars rejects the commonsensical idea that at least (...)
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  20. Ron C. de Weijze, Constructive Recollection Philosophy Application.
    Constructive recollection is a systematic retake of philosophical Modernism, which is mainly characterized by "duality of origin" (Bergson 1932) as is central to Christianity in the separation of body and mind, which was studied scientifically for the first time in the 17th century (Descartes 1644) and articulated best in the 18th century (Kant 1781-1793). The two sources are presumed to be what-is-sensed (Kant: sensibility) and knowing (Kant: understanding) and both sources are presumed to coordinately reflect themselves, as sensing by what-is-sensed (...)
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  21. Willem A. deVries & Paul Coates (2009). Brandom's Two-Ply Error. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press
    Robert Brandom makes several mistakes in his discussion of Sellars's "Two-Ply" account of observation. Brandom does not recognize the difference in "level" between observation reports concerning physical objects and 'looks'-statements. He also denies that 'looks'-statements are reports or even make claims. They then demonstrate a more correct reading of Sellars on 'looks'-statements.
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  22. Willem A. deVries & Timm Triplett (2000). Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: A Reading of Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”. Hackett.
    This is a careful explication of and commentary on Wilfrid Sellars's classic essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" [EPM]. It is appropriate for upper-level undergraduates and beyond. The full text of EPM is included in the volume.
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  23. William Eastman (1972). The Appeal to the Given: A Study in Epistemology. By Jacob Joshua Ross. London: George Allen and Unwin; Toronto: Methuen. 1970. Pp. 224. $6.00. [REVIEW] Dialogue 11 (4):649-651.
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  24. C. G. Echelbarger (1981). An Alleged Legend. Philosophical Studies 39 (April):227-46.
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  25. Charles Echelbarger (1974). Sellars on Thinking and the Myth of the Given. Philosophical Studies 25 (May):231-246.
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  26. Terence Rajivan Edward (2015). From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1):3-8.
    This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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  27. George Englebretsen (1974). Essentiality. Journal of Critical Analysis 5 (3):112-118.
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  28. Evan Fales (1996). A Defense of the Given. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
    The Doctrine of the Given The Myth of the Given A Methodological Problem To a convinced foundationalist, the project of establishing the existence of the ...
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  29. Jerry A. Fodor (2007). The Revenge of the Given. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell 105--116.
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  30. Bruce V. Foltz (2004). Nature's Other Side: The Demise of Nature and the Phenomenology of Givenness. In Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
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  31. Christopher Frey (2011). On the Rational Contribution of Experiential Transparency1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):721-732.
  32. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (forthcoming). Knowledge and Justification of the First Principles. In Niels Öffenberger & Alejandro Vigo (eds.), Iberoamerikanische Beiträge zur modernen Deutung der Aristotelischen Logik. Olms
    The claim that knowledge is grounded on a basic, non-inferentially grasped set of principles, which seems to be Aristotle’s view, in contemporary epistemology can be seen as part of a wider foundationalist account. Foundationalists assume that there must be some premise-beliefs at the basis of every felicitous reasoning which cannot be themselves in need of justification and may not be challenged. They provide justification for truths based on these premises, which Aristotle unusually call principles (archái). Can Aristotle be considered a (...)
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  33. Jay L. Garfield (1989). The Myth of Jones and the Mirror of Nature: Reflections on Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (September):1-26.
  34. A. C. Genova (2003). Review of Nicholas S. Smith, (Ed), Reading McDowell on Mind and World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (3).
  35. Christopher W. Gowans (1989). Two Concepts of the Given in C. I. Lewis: Realism and Foundationalism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4):573-590.
    It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in (...)
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  36. Robert H. Grimm (1959). A Note on Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Studies 10 (3):45-48.
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  37. Andrea Guardo (2007). Empirismo senza fondamenti - Cinque lezioni su "Empirismo e filosofia della mente". CUEM.
    A study guide to Wilfrid Sellars’ “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”.
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  38. A. Gupta (2006). Empiricism and Experience. Harvard University Press.
    This book offers a novel account of the relationship of experience to knowledge. The account builds on the intuitive idea that our ordinary perceptual judgments are not autonomous, that an interdependence obtains between our view of the world and our perceptual judgments. Anil Gupta shows in this important study that this interdependence is the key to a satisfactory account of experience. He uses tools from logic and the philosophy of language to argue that his account of experience makes available an (...)
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  39. Charles Hartshorne (2002). The Structure of Givenness. In Philosophical Forum. New York: Rodopi NY 22.
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  40. Charles Hartshorne (1958). The Logical Structure of Givenness. Philosophical Quarterly 8 (October):307-316.
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  41. Ali Hasan (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism, Classical Foundationalism, and Internalist Justification. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):119-141.
    In “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism” (2007), “Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition” (2006), and Skepticism and the Veil of Perception (2001), Michael Huemer endorses the principle of phenomenal conservatism, according to which appearances or seemings constitute a fundamental source of (defeasible) justification for belief. He claims that those who deny phenomenal conservatism, including classical foundationalists, are in a self-defeating position, for their views cannot be both true and justified; that classical foundationalists have difficulty accommodating false introspective beliefs; and that phenomenal conservatism (...)
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  42. Ali Hasan (2013). Internalist Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Res Philosophica 90 (2):171-184.
    According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma (...)
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  43. Ali Hasan & Richard Fumerton, Knowledge by Acquaintance Vs. Description. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  44. Gary Hatfield (2013). Psychology, Epistemology, and the Problem of the External World : Russell and Before. In Erich H. Reck (ed.), The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan
    This chapter examines Russell’s appreciation of the relevance of psychology for the theory of knowledge, especially in connection with the problem of the external world, and the background for this appreciation in British philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Russell wrote in 1914 that “the epistemological order of deduction includes both logical and psychological considerations.” Indeed, the notion of what is “psychologically derivative” played a crucial role in his epistemological analysis from this time. His epistemological discussions engage psychological factors (...)
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  45. Gary Hatfield (2013). Russell's Progress: Spatial Dimensions, the From-Which, and the At-Which. In Dina Emundts (ed.), Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel. De Gruyter 321–44.
    The chapter concerns some aspects of Russell’s epistemological turn in the period after 1911. In particular, it focuses on two aspects of his philosophy in this period: his attempt to render material objects as constructions out of sense data, and his attitude toward sense data as “hard data.” It examines closely Russell’s “breakthrough” of early 1914, in which he concluded that, viewed from the standpoint of epistemology and analytic construction, space has six dimensions, not merely three. Russell posits a three-dimensional (...)
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  46. Benj Hellie (2013). It's Still There! In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer
    The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies surrounding (...)
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  47. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2012). Foundationalism. In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum 37.
    Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. Two theses constitute Foundationalism: (a) Minimality: There (...)
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  48. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2004). Lehrer's Case Against Foundationalism. Erkenntnis 60 (1):51-73.
    In this essay, I assess Keith Lehrer's case against Foundationalism, which consists of variations on three objections: The Independent Information or Belief Objection, The Risk of Error Objection, and the Hidden Argument Objection. I conclude that each objection fails for reasons that can be endorsed – indeed, I would say for reasons that should be endorsed – by antifoundationalists and foundationalists alike.
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  49. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2002). On an “Unintelligible” Idea: Donald Davidson's Case Against Experiential Foundationalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):523-555.
    Donald Davidson’s epistemology is predicated on, among other things, the rejection of Experiential Foundationalism, which he calls ‘unintelligible’. In this essay, I assess Davidson’s arguments for this conclusion. I conclude that each of them fails on the basis of reasons that foundationalists and antifoundationalists alike can, and should, accept.
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  50. Daniel Howard-Snyder (1998). BonJour's 'Basic Antifoundationalist Argument' and the Doctrine of the Given. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):163-177.
    Laurence BonJour observes that critics of foundationalism tend to argue against it by objecting to "relatively idiosyncratic" versions of it, a strategy which has "proven in the main to be superficial and ultimately ineffective" since answers immune to the objections emerge quickly (1985: 17). He aims to rectify this deficiency. Specifically, he argues that the very soul of foundationalism, "the concept of a basic empirical belief," is incoherent (1985: 30). This is a bold strategy from which we can learn even (...)
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