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  1. Marcia Baron (1984). The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty. Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):197-220.
    Friends as well as foes of Kant have long been uneasy over his emphasis on duty, but lately the view that there is something morally repugnant about acting from duty seems to be gaining in popularity. More and more philosophers indicate their readiness to jettison duty and the moral 'ought' and to conceive of the perfectly moral person as someone who has all the right desires and acts accordingly without any notion that (s)he ought to act in this way. Elsewhere' (...)
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  2. Anne Margaret Baxley (2007). Kantian Virtue. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):396–410.
  3. Anne Margaret Baxley (2003). Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More Than Continence? Review of Metaphysics 56 (3):559 - 586.
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  4. Paul Benson (1987). Moral Worth. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):365 - 382.
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  5. Richard A. Blanke (1985). The Motivation to Be Moral in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. Philosophy Research Archives 11:335-345.
    Kant maintained that in order for an act to have moral worth it is necessary that it be done from the motive of duty. On the traditional view of Kant, the motive of duty is constituted solely by one’s belief or cognition that some act is one’s duty. Desire must be ruled out as forming partof the moral motive. On this view, if an agent’s act is to have moral worth, then it must be the ease that his belief that (...)
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  6. Talbot Brewer (2002). The Character of Temptation: Towards a More Plausible Kantian Moral Psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):103–130.
    Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one’s circumstances as reasons to perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate (...)
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  7. David O. Brink (1999). Review: Engstrom & Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Philosophical Review 108 (4):576-582.
  8. Samuel V. Bruton (2003). Review: Stratton-Lake, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth. Utilitas 15 (02):248-.
  9. Gregory Lewis Bynum (2011). Kant's Conception of Respect and African American Education Rights. Educational Theory 61 (1):17-40.
    Immanuel Kant envisioned a kind of respect in which one recognizes each human (1) as being not fully comprehensible by any human understanding, (2) as being an end in him- or herself, and (3) as being a potential source of moral law. In this essay, Gregory Lewis Bynum uses this conception of respect as a lens with which to examine African American education rights on three levels: the individual level (the level of individual persons' moral experience and moral significance), the (...)
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  10. Claudia Card (2010). Kant's Moral Excluded Middle. In Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Kant's Anatomy of Evil. Cambridge University Press.
  11. Bernard Carnois (1987). The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom. University of Chicago Press.
    The term freedom appears in many contexts in Kant's work, ranging from the cosmological to the moral to the theological. Can the diverse meanings Kant gave to the term be ordered systematically? To ask that question is to test the consistency and coherence of Kant's thought in its entirety. Widely praised when first published in France, The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom articulates and interrelates the disparate senses of freedom in Kant's work. Bernard Carnois organizes all Kant's usages into (...)
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  12. Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). A Direct Kantian Duty to Animals. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant’s view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals, and in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare, without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its claims concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised (...)
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  13. Sr Mary Bernard Curran (2009). What is Pure, What is Good? Disinterestedness in Fénelon and Kant. Heythrop Journal 50 (2):195-205.
  14. Stephen Darwall (2008). Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.
  15. Darian C. DeBolt (2002). Review: Pasternack, Intrinslc Value and Overridingness in Kant's Groundwork. [REVIEW] Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):121-125.
  16. Lara Denis (2011). Humanity, Obligation, and the Good Will: An Argument Against Dean's Interpretation of Humanity. Kantian Review 15 (1):118-141.
  17. Julio Esteves (2014). The Primacy of the Good Will. Kant-Studien 105 (1):83-112.
  18. Robert Hanna (2006). Review: Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):237-240.
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  19. Warren G. Harbison (1980). The Good Will. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):47-59.
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  20. John Hardwig (1983). Action From Duty but Not in Accord with Duty. Ethics 93 (2):283-290.
    In thc Foundations, Kant draws a distinction bctwccn action which is in accord with duty and action which is done from the motive of duty. This is 21 famous distinction, of course, and thcrc arc many interesting issues concerning it and its implications for ethical thcory. In this paper, I wish t0 focus on just 0nc noteworthy feature of K2mt’s usc of this distinction. Likc any distinction bctwccn logical compatiblcs, this 0nc yields four logically possible classes of action: (1) actions (...)
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  21. Richard G. Henson (1979). What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action. Philosophical Review 88 (1):39-54.
    My purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about "moral worth," and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which I hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he (...)
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  22. Barbara Herman (1981). On the Value of Acting From the Motive of Duty. Philosophical Review 90 (3):359-382.
    Richard Henson attempts to take the sting out of this view of Kant on moral worth by arguing (i) that attending to the phenomenon of the overdetermination of actions leads one to see that Kant might have had two distinct views of moral worth, only one of which requires the absence of cooperating inclinations, and (ii) that when Kant insists that there is moral worth only when an action is done from the motive of duty alone, he need not also (...)
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  23. Jill Hernandez (2010). Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):403 - 419.
    Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from accepting a category of acts that are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act performed from the motive of duty should be considered as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action's maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the correct moral motivation of an act, rather than on the moral lightness of an act. I argue that Kant (...)
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  24. Thomas E. Hill (1998). Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):51-71.
  25. Diane Jeske (1998). A Defense of Acting From Duty. Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (1):61–74.
    Philosophers who, in the light of these attacks, have attempted to vindicate the motive of duty have done so in a half-hearted way, by stressing the motive of duty’s function as a secondary or limiting motivation, or by denying “that acting from duty primarily concerns isolated actions.” I will defend duty as a primary motive with respect to isolated actions. Critics of acting from duty and philosophers who have attempted to respond to them have done little work spelling out exactly (...)
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  26. Robert Johnson, Kantian Irrealism.
    Kantian ethics can at times appear to defend the position that there is a unique sort of value that plays a foundational role in morality. For instance, Kant's most well known work in ethics, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, begins by trying to establish that a good will is good without qualification' and then ends with a first statement of the fundamental principle that divides right from wrong, the Categorical Imperative.1 This presentation can make it seems as if (...)
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  27. Robert Johnson, Merit.
    A few pages into the Groundwork Kant claims that only actions from duty have moral worth.ii Even though as an aside he also says that a dutiful action from sympathy or honor, though lacking in moral worth, "deserves praise and encouragement", it is tempting not to take him very seriously. One suspects that he regards this praise as only a poor and morally insignificant cousin of the esteem reserved for actions from duty. In the end, it seems hard to avoid (...)
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  28. Robert Johnson (2009). Good Will and the Moral Worth of Acting From Duty. In Thomas E. Hill (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    The first section of the Groundwork begins “It is impossible to imagine anything at all in the world, or even beyond it, that can be called good without qualification— except a good will.”1 Kant’s explanation and defense of this claim is followed by an explanation and defense of another related claim, that only actions performed out of duty have moral worth. He explains that actions performed out of duty are those done from respect for the moral law, and then culminates (...)
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  29. Robert N. Johnson (1997). Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology. Philosophical Review 106 (4):594-595.
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  30. Robert N. Johnson (1996). Expressing a Good Will: Kant on the Motive of Duty. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):147-168.
    If any action is to be morally good it is not enough that it should conform to the moral law-it must also be done for the sake of the moral law: where this is not so, the conformity is only too contingent and precarious, since the nonmoral ground at work will now and then produce actions which accord with the law, but very often actions which transgress it.
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  31. Robert N. Johnson, Kantian Irrealism.
    Kantian ethics can at times appear to defend the position that there is a unique sort of value that plays a foundational role in morality. For instance, Kant’s most well known work in ethics, the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, begins by trying to establish that a good will is good ‘without qualification’ and then ends with a first statement of the fundamental principle that divides right from wrong, the Categorical Imperative.1 This presentation can make it seems as if (...)
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  32. Samuel J. Kerstein (2004). Review: Hill, Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Ethics 114 (2):350-353.
  33. Samuel J. Kerstein (2003). Review: Stratton-Lake, Duty and Moral Worth. Ethics 113 (3):721-724.
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  34. Samuel J. Kerstein (1999). The Kantian Moral Worth of Actions Contrary to Duty. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 53 (4):530 - 552.
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  35. Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action. In Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Cambridge University Press.
    Aristotle believes that an agent lacks virtue unless she enjoys the performance of virtuous actions, while Kant claims that the person who does her duty despite contrary inclinations exhibits a moral worth that the person who acts from inclination lacks. Despite these differences, this chapter argues that Aristotle and Kant share a distinctive view of the object of human choice and locus of moral value: that what we choose, and what has moral value, are not mere acts, but actions: acts (...)
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  36. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986). Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value. Ethics 96 (3):486-505.
    Kant holds that the good will is a source of value, In the sense that other things acquire their values from standing in an appropriate relation to it. I argue that aristotle holds a similar view about contemplation, And that this explains his preference for the contemplative life. They differ about what the source of value is because they differ about which kind of activity, ethical or contemplative, discovers meaning and purpose in the world.
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  37. Manfred Kuehn (2012). Hamann and Kant on the Good Will. In Lisa Marie Anderson (ed.), Hamann and the Tradition. Northwestern University Press.
  38. Noa Latham (1994). Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely From the Motive of Duty. Journal of Philosophy 91 (11):599-618.
    My concern in part I of this paper is with how to make sense of the position that one can have reasons both of duty and inclination for an action one performs but be motivated solely by duty, and more generally that one can have several reasons for an action one performs but be motivated only by some of them. I examine a number of ways of attempting to do this, most of them independent of the Kantian context, and argue (...)
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  39. Silviya Lechner (2011). Review: Wood, Kantian Ethics: The Hermeneutics of Freedom. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 16 (1):141-150.
  40. Silviya Lechner (2011). Review: Wood, Kantian Ethics: A Hermeneutics of Freedom. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 16 (1):141-150.
  41. Noah M. Lemos (1991). Moral Goodness, Esteem, and Acting From Duty. Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2):103-117.
    There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions (...)
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  42. Rudolf A. Makkreel (2002). Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):205-220.
  43. Julia Markovits (2010). Acting for the Right Reasons. Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.
    This essay examines the thought that our right actions have moral worth only if we perform them for the right reasons. It argues against the view, often ascribed to Kant, that morally worthy actions must be performed because they are right and argues that Kantians and others ought instead to accept the view that morally worthy actions are those performed for the reasons why they are right. In other words, morally worthy actions are those for which the reasons why they (...)
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  44. Cecil H. Miller (1969). Kant's Good Will and the Scholar. Ethics 80 (1):62-65.
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  45. Lawrence Pasternack (2002). Intrinslc Value and Overridingness in Kant's Groundwork. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):113-121.
  46. Nelson Potter (1996). Kant and the Moral Worth of Actions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):225-241.
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  47. Walter E. Schaller (1992). The Relation of Moral Worth to the Good Will in Kant's Ethics. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:351-382.
    I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons (...)
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  48. Walter E. Schaller (1987). Kant on Virtue and Moral Worth. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):559-573.
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  49. Keith Simmons (1989). Kant on Moral Worth. History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1):85 - 100.
  50. T. Sorell (1987). Kant Good Will and Our Good Nature--2nd Thoughts About Henson and Herman. Kant-Studien 78 (1):87-101.
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