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  1. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  2. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (1989). Instrumental Intentionality. Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.
    Many physicalists are committed to an austere dichotomy: either beliefs, desires and intentions are scientifically respectable or attributions of such attitudes are all false. One physicalist, Daniel Dennett, offers a third alternative, which seems to permit a kind of instrumentalism concerning attitudes. I argue that Dennett's attempt to reconcile an instrumentalistic account of attributions of attitudes with a thoroughgoing physicalism founders on unresolvable conflicts between his official theory and his actual treatment of key concepts. As a result, instrumentalism concerning attitudes (...)
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  4. Lynne Rudder Baker (1987). Instrumentalism: Back From the Brink? In , Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.
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  5. William P. Bechtel (1985). Realism, Instrumentalism, and the Intentional Stance. Cognitive Science 9 (4):265-92.
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  6. David Beisecker (2002). Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a Myth. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
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  7. Jonathan Bennett (1993). Comments on Dennett From a Cautious Ally. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):381-385.
    In these notes, unadorned page numbers under 350 refer to Dennett (1987) - The Intentional Stance, hereafter referred to as Stance - and ones over 495 refer to Dennett (1988) - mostly to material by him but occasionally to remarks of his critics. Since the notes will focus on disagreements, I should say now that I am in Dennett’s camp and am deeply in debt to his work in the philosophy of mind, which I think is wider, deeper, more various (...)
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  8. Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
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  9. Denny E. Bradshaw (1998). Patterns and Descriptions. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.
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  10. Philip Cam (1984). Dennett on Intelligent Storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):247-62.
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  11. David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.) (1992). Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields, including moral and mental philosophy, psychology, organic biology, and the social sciences.
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  12. Andy Clark (1990). Belief, Opinion and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.
    Abstract The paper considers two recent accounts of the difference between human and animal thought. One deflationary account, due to Daniel Dennett, insists that the only real difference lies in our ability to use words and sentences to give artificial precision and determinacy to our mental contents. The other, due to Paul Smolensky, conjectures that we at times deploy a special purpose device (the Conscious Rule Interpreter) whose task is to deal with public, symbolically coded data and commands. Both these (...)
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  13. B. Cohen (1995). Patterns Lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's Realism About Beliefs. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):17-31.
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  14. Robert C. Cummins (1981). What Can Be Learned From Brainstorms? Philosophical Topics 12 (1):83-92.
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  15. David Davies (1995). Dennett's Stance on Intentional Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.
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  16. Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
    Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the (...)
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  17. Daniel C. Dennett (1990). The Interpretation of Texts, People and Other Artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50:177-194.
    I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism.
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  18. Daniel C. Dennett (1988). Precis of the Intentional Stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25.
    The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited (and is virtually unavoidable) in artificial (...)
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  19. Daniel C. Dennett (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  20. Daniel C. Dennett (1981). Making Sense of Ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.
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  21. Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
    This collection of 17 essays by the author offers a comprehensive theory of mind, encompassing traditional issues of consciousness and free will.
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  22. Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  23. William Dibrell (1988). Persons and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Critical Analysis 9 (1):13-25.
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  24. Zoe Drayson (2012). The Uses and Abuses of the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  25. Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra (2010). Propositional Attitudes, Intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors. Principia 7 (1-2):93-114.
    This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective (...)
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  26. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Mit Press.
  27. Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes. In , Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. Mit Press.
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  28. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
    In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...)
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  29. Jeffrey E. Foss (1994). On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance. Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.
    Like everyone with a scientific bent of mind, Dennett thinks our capacity for meaningful language and states of mind is the product of evolution (Dennett [1987, ch. VIII]). But unlike many of this bent, he sees virtue in viewing evolution itself from the intentional stance. From this stance, ?Mother Nature?, or the process of evolution by natural selection, bestows intentionality upon us, hence we are not Unmeant Meaners. Thus, our intentionality is extrinsic, and Dennett dismisses the theories of meaning of (...)
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  30. Gordon R. Foxall (1999). The Contextual Stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an (...)
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  31. Richard Griffin (2002). The Intentional Stance: Developmental and Neurocognitive Perspectives. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press.
    Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often (...)
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  32. Lars Hall, Petter Johansson & Thomas Strandberg (2012). Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey. PLoS ONE 7 (9):e45457. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.
    Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This (...)
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  33. John Haugeland (1993). Pattern and Being. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  34. Reese M. Heitner (2000). Is Design Relative or Real? Dennett on Intentional Relativism and Physical Realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.
    Dennett's intended rapprochement between physical realism and intentional relativism fails because it is premised upon conflicting arguments governing the status of design. Indeed, Dennett's remarks on design serve to highlight tensions buried deep within his theory. For inasmuch as Dennett succeeds in objectifying attributions of design, attributions of intentionality readily follow suit, leading to a form of intentional realism. But inasmuch as Dennett is successful in relativizing attributions of design, scientific realism at large is subject to renewed anti-realistic criticism. Dennettian-inspired (...)
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  35. Jennifer Hornsby (1992). Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.
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  36. Bryce Huebner (2014). Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality. OUP USA.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.
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  37. David Joslin (2006). Real Realization: Dennett's Real Patterns Versus Putnam's Ubiquitous Automata. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 16 (1):29-41.
    Both Putnam and Searle have argued that that every abstract automaton is realized by every physical system, a claim that leads to a reductio argument against Cognitivism or Strong AI: if it is possible for a computer to be conscious by virtue of realizing some abstract automaton, then by Putnam’s theorem every physical system also realizes that automaton, and so every physical system is conscious—a conclusion few supporters of Strong AI would be willing to accept. Dennett has suggested a criterion (...)
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  38. Timothy A. Kenyon (2000). Indeterminacy and Realism. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. 77--94.
    This article considers a Quine-Dennett style of argument from the indeterminacy of intentional content against the reducibility of mental states to neurological states. The most compelling version of such an argument, I suggest, is one that exploits a semantic anti-realist notion of truth; this holds out the promise of a relatively sophisticated story about the respects in which mental state attributions may be true or false of physical systems, without those states themselves being physical states.
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  39. Robert Kirk (1993). Indeterminacy of Interpretation, Idealization, and Norms. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):213-223.
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  40. William E. Lyons (1990). Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology I: The Modern Reduction of Intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):247-69.
    In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, (...)
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  41. Gregory McCulloch (1990). Dennett's Little Grains of Salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.
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  42. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.
  43. Brian P. McLaughlin & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1995). Dennett's Logical Behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22 (1-2):189-258.
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  44. Angus Menuge (2003). A Critique of Dennett's Evolutionary Account of Intentionality. Pcid 2.
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  45. Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.) (1996). Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.
    This is the first of two volumes of essays in commemoration of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in the theory of artificial intelligence and computer science ...
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  46. Ruth G. Millikan (2000). Reading Mother Nature's Mind. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.
    I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a (...)
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  47. Marco Mirolli (2002). A Naturalistic Perspective on Intentionality: Interview with Daniel Dennett. Mind and Society 3 (6):1-12.
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  48. Bruno Mölder (2010). Mind Ascribed. An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. John Benjamins.
    This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed (...)
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  49. Ajit Narayanan (1996). The Intentional Stance and the Imitation Game. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.
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  50. Norton Nelkin (1994). Patterns. Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.
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