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  1. Keith Allen (2010). Locke and the Nature of Ideas. Archiv fur Geschishte der Philosophie 92 (3):236-255.
    According to Locke, what are ideas? I argue that Locke does not give an account of the nature of ideas. In the Essay, the question is simply set to one side, as recommended by the “Historical, plain Method” that Locke employs. This is exemplified by his characterization of ‘ideas’ in E I.i.8, and the discussion of the inverted spectrum hypothesis in E II.xxxii. In this respect, Locke’s attitude towards the nature of ideas in the Essay is reminiscent of Boyle’s diffident (...)
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  2. Torin Alter, Comments on John Kulvicki's “What is What It's Like?” (2003 Eastern Div. Apa).
    Kulvicki’s goal is to give a representationalist account of what it’s like to see a property that is “fully externalist about perceptual representation” (p. 1) and yet accommodates a certain “internalist intuition” (p. 4), which he describes as follows: “something about what it is like to see a property is internally determined, dependent only on the way one is built from the skin in” (p. 3). He illustrates this intuition with an inverted spectrum case and the manifest-image problem. On his (...)
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  3. U. Bangert, R. Barnes, L. S. Hounsome, R. Jones, A. T. Blumenau, P. R. Briddon, M. J. Shaw & S. Oberg (2006). Electron Energy Loss Spectroscopic Studies of Brown Diamonds. Philosophical Magazine 86 (29-31):4757-4779.
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  4. Michael Beaton (2009). Qualia and Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.
    The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that (...)
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  5. Ned Block (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
    (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the "innocuous" inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the "dangerous" kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of (...)
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  6. Ned Block (1990). Inverted Earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
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  7. Justin Broackes (2007). Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.
    To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue dark, yellow (...)
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  8. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  9. Alex Byrne, Gert on the Shifted Spectrum.
    As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows.
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  10. Alex Byrne, Inverted Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  11. Alex Byrne (1999). Subjectivity is No Barrier. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):949-950.
    Palmer's subjectivity barrier seems to be erected on a popular but highly suspect conception of visual experience, and his color room argument is invalid.
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  12. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Hoffman's "Proof" of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
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  13. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
  14. John Campbell, Philosophy of Mind.
    The last fifty years has seen intense and broad development in philosophy of mind, unprecedented in the whole history of the subject. In this essay I will try to convey something of the broad sweep of developments, but I may as well say now that (a) it would have been possible, even for this author, let alone someone with a quite different approach to the subject, to write a review of the period that focused mostly on material I have either (...)
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  15. Neil Campbell (2004). Generalizing Qualia Inversion. Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.
    Philosophers who advocate the possibility of spectrum inversion often conclude that the qualitative content of experiential states pose a serious problem for functionalism. I argue that in order for the inversion hypothesis to support this conclusion one needs to show that it generalizes to all species of qualia. By examining features of touch, taste, and olfactory sensations, I show there is good reason to resist this generalization, in which case appeals to the possibility of spectral inversion are considerably less effective (...)
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  16. Neil Campbell (2000). Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.
    I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely manifest themselves in behaviour, (...)
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  17. John V. Canfield (2009). Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophia 37 (4).
    In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent. Furthermore, (...)
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  18. Roberto Casati (1990). What is Wrong in Inverting Spectra? Teoria 10:183-6.
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  19. Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland (1981). Functionalism, Qualia and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-32.
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  20. Austen Clark, Inversions Spectral and Bright: Comments on Melinda Campbell.
    Spectrum inversion is a thought experiment, and I would wager that there is no better diagnostic test to the disciplinary affiliation of a randomly selected member of the audience than your reaction to a thought experiment. It is a litmus test. If you find that you are paying close attention, subvocalizing objections, and that your heart-rate and metabolism go up, you have turned pink: you are a philosopher. If on the other hand the thought experiment leaves you cold, and you (...)
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  21. Austen Clark, A Subjectivist Reply to Spectrum Inversion.
    Subjectivists hold that you cannot specify color kinds without implicitly or explicitly referring to the dispositions of observers. Even though "yellow" is ascribed to physical items, and presumably there is something physical in each such item causing it to be so characterized, the only physical similarity between all such items is that they all affect an observer in the same way. So the principles organizing the colors are all found within the skin.
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  22. Austen Clark (1985). Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):431-43.
    The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not be functionally defined.
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  23. Jonathan Cohen (2001). Color, Content, and Fred: On a Proposed Reductio of the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.
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  24. David J. Cole, Inverted Spectrum Arguments.
    Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had by other individuals. When he looks (...)
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  25. David J. Cole (1990). Functionalism and Inverted Spectra. Synthese 82 (2):207-22.
    Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical (...)
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  26. Allin Cottrell (1995). Tertium Datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's Consciousness Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103.
    Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the (...)
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  27. Steven Davis (ed.) (2000). Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (1999). Swift and Enormous. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6).
    As a lefthanded person, I can wonder whether I am a left-hemisphere-dominant speaker or a right-hemisphere-dominant speaker or something mixed, and the only way I can learn the truth is by submitting myself to objective, Athird-person@ testing. I don =t Ahave access to @ this intimate fact about how my own mind does its work. It escapes all my attempts at introspective detection, and might, for all I know, shunt back and forth every few seconds without my being any the (...)
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  29. Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Instead of Qualia. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the "external" world by the triumphs of physics: "raw feels", "sensa", "phenomenal qualities" "intrinsic properties of conscious experiences" "the qualitative content of mental states" and, of course, "qualia," the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms (...)
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  30. Jason Ford (2011). Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
    Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum ( 2000 , in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a , in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological approach to (...)
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  31. Bernard Gert (1965). Imagination and Verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16 (3):44-47.
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  32. Carl Ginet (1999). Qualia and Private Language. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):121-38.
  33. C. L. Hardin (1997). Reinverting the Spectrum. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Mit Press.
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  34. C. L. Hardin (1991). Reply to Levine's 'Cool Red'. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.
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  35. C. L. Hardin (1988). Color for Philosophers. Hackett.
    This expanded edition of C L Hardin's ground-breaking work on colour features a new chapter, 'Further Thoughts: 1993', in which the author revisits the dispute ...
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  36. C. L. Hardin (1987). Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
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  37. C. L. Hardin & W. J. Hardin (2006). A Tale of Hoffman. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):46-47.
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  38. Bernard Harrison (1973). Form and Content. Blackwell.
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  39. Bernard Harrison (1967). On Describing Colors. Inquiry 10 (1-4):38-52.
    This paper attempts to refute the familiar sceptical argument based upon the theoretical possibility of systematic transpositions of colours in different observers? colour?vision. The force of this argument lies in its apparent demonstration that cases of transposed colour?vision would be on a quite different cognitive footing from ordinary cases of colour?blindness; since colour transposition, unlike colour?blindness, could not possibly have any effect on the use of language by a person who suffered from it. It is argued (1) that this demonstration (...)
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  40. J. Harvey (1979). Systematic Transposition of Colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (September):211-19.
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  41. Gary Hatfield (1992). Color Perception and Neural Encoding: Does Metameric Matching Entail a Loss of Information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992:492-504.
    It seems intuitively obvious that metameric matching of color samples entails a loss of information, for spectrophotometrically diverse materials appear the same. This intuition implicitly relies on a conception of the function of color vision and on a related conception of how color samples should be individuated. It assumes that the function of color vision is to distinguish among spectral energy distributions, and that color samples should be individuated by their physical properties. I challenge these assumptions by articulating a different (...)
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  42. Benj Hellie (forthcoming). On Which Perceptual Phenomena Have Content and Why They Have It. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford UP.
    (1) A <em>perceptual state</em> is an 'ecological' state of an animal; by contrast, an <em>attentional posture</em> is a 'psychological' state of an animal's stream of consciousness. The latter has content, the former (being nonpsychological) lacks it. The content of the latter is certainty in the existence of the target of attention (a qualitative state of an external object) with the nature it has. (2) I carry forward the view from 'There it is' to rebut hallucination worries about the 'certainty' plank. (...)
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  43. David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon (2000). Color and the Inverted Spectrum. In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.
    If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance).
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  44. Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The Scrambling Theorem: A Simple Proof of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.
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  45. Donald D. Hoffman (2006). The Scrambling Theorem Unscrambled: A Response to Commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):51-53.
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  46. Terence E. Horgan (1984). Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
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  47. Bredo C. Johnsen (1993). The Intelligibility of Spectrum Inversion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-6.
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  48. Bredo C. Johnsen (1986). The Inverted Spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):471-6.
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  49. Mark Kalderon, Color and the Inverted Spectrum.
    If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance).
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  50. Robert Kirk (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Robert Kirk uses the notion of "raw feeling" to bridge the intelligibility gap between our knowledge of ourselves as physical organisms and our knowledge of ...
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  51. Robert Kirk (1982). Goodbye to Transposed Qualia. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44.
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  52. Karel Kranda (1999). The Inverted Colour Space of Vampires. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):959-959.
    Palmer's attempt to dust off Locke's construct of “inverted spectrum” is discussed here to examine its plausibility. Perceptual inversion could be fulfilled by adopting the notion of “inverted trichromacy” rather than by the proposed existence of “red-green reversed trichromats.” Although the former alternative conforms to a hypothetical world of vampires, it fails to conform to the realities of genetics and neuroscience.
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  53. Joseph Levine (1991). Cool Red. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
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  54. Joseph Levine (1988). Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited. Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
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  55. Leonard Linsky (1962). The Incommunicability of Content. Journal of Philosophy 59 (January):21-22.
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  56. Clayton Littlejohn (2009). On the Coherence of Inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2):127-137.
    In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion.
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  57. William G. Lycan (1973). Inverted Spectrum. Ratio 15 (July):315-9.
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  58. Robert E. MacLaury (1999). Asymmetry Among Hering Primaries Thwarts the Inverted Spectrum Argument. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):960-961.
    Purest points of Hering's six primary colors reside at different levels of lightness such that inversion of each hue pair would be detectable in subjects' choice of foci on the Munsell array. An inverted spectrum would not impose the isomorphism constraint on a contrast of red-green or yellow-blue, whatever we conclude about inference in functionalism.
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  59. Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
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  60. Raamy Majeed (forthcoming). Pleading Ignorance in Response to Experiential Primitivism. Philosophical Studies.
    Modal arguments like the Knowledge Argument, the Conceivability Argument and the Inverted Spectrum Argument could be used to argue for experiential primitivism; the view that experiential truths aren’t entailed from nonexperiential truths. A way to resist these arguments is to follow Stoljar (Ignorance and imagination. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) and plead ignorance of a type of experience-relevant nonexperiential truth. If we are ignorant of such a truth, we can’t imagine or conceive of the various sorts of scenarios that are (...)
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  61. Eric Marcus (2006). Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which (...)
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  62. Barry Maund (2006). Comments. Dialectica 60 (3):347-353.
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  63. B. J. McKeon & J. F. Morrison (2007). Asymptotic Scaling in Turbulent Pipe Flow. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society a-Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences 365 (1852):771-787.
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  64. Ulrich Meyer (2000). Do Pseudonormal Persons Have Inverted Qualia? Facta Philosophica 2:309-25.
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  65. Vivian Mizrahi & Martine Nida-Rumelin (2006). Introduction. Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.
  66. Erik Myin (2001). Color and the Duplication Assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  67. Erik Myin (2001). Constrained Inversions of Sensations. Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.
    Inverted sensation arguments such as the inverted spectrum thought experiment are often criticized for relying on an unconstrained notion of 'qualia'. In reply to this criticism, 'qualia-free' arguments for inversion have been proposed, in which only physical changes happen: inversions in the world, such as the replacement of surface colors by their complements, and a rewiring of peripheral input cables to more central areas in the nervous system. I show why such constrained inversion arguments won't work. The first problem is (...)
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  68. Erik Myin (1999). Beyond Intrinsicness and Dazzling Blacks. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):964-965.
    Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic.
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  69. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1999). Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Science: A Reply to Peter Ross. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
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  70. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1999). Pseudonormal Vision and Color Qualia. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.
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  71. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1996). Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145-57.
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  72. Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Finding a Place for Experience in the Physical-Relational Structure of the Brain. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):966-967.
    In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism.
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  73. D. J. O'Connor (1955). Awareness and Communication. Journal of Philosophy 52 (September):505-514.
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  74. Stephen Palmer (1999). Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.
    The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke.
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  75. M. Peirce (2001). Inverted Intuitions: Occupants and Roles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-298.
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  76. Michael Pelczar (2008). On an Argument for Functional Invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3).
    The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of (...)
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  77. Diana I. Perez (2002). Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts. Theoria 17 (2):359-379.
    In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism (in terms of the supervenience relation), there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: (...)
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  78. Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.) (1994). Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" (...)
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  79. Georges Rey (1992). Sensational Sentences Reversed. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289-319.
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  80. Peter W. Ross (1999). Color Science and Spectrum Inversion: A Reply to Nida-Rumelin. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...)
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  81. Peter W. Ross (1999). Color Science and Spectrum Inversion: Further Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):575-6.
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...)
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  82. Barbara Saunders (1999). One Machine Among Many. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):969-970.
    In this commentary I point out that Palmer mislocates the source of the inverted spectrum, misrepresents the nature of colour science, and offers no reason for prefering one colour machine over another. I conclude nonetheless that talk about “colour machines” is a step in the right direction.
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  83. Timothy Schoettle (2009). How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Inverted Spectrum. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):98-115.
    It is possible for a person and their environment to be physically identical each day and yet the representational content of their beliefs about color are inverted. Each day they utter the same words, ‘Wow! The colors of everything have switched again today.’ In uttering these words, they express a different proposition each day. This supports the view held by Reichenbach and Carnap that when it comes to representations of colored objects, relations of similarity and difference are fundamental. There are (...)
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  84. William Seager (2010). Concessionary Dualism and Physicalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):217-237.
    The doctrine of physicalism can be roughly spelled out simply as the claim that the physical state of the world determines the total state of the world. However, since there are many forms of determination, a somewhat more precise characterization is needed. One obvious problem with the simple formulation is that the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism holds that the mental is determined by the physical (and epiphenomenalists need not assert that there are any properties except mental and physical ones, so (...)
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  85. William E. Seager (1988). Weak Supervenience and Materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.
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  86. George Seli (2009). Fine-Grained Functionalism: Prospects for Defining Qualitative States. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):765 – 783.
    Inverted spectrum and absent-qualia arguments have at least shown that giving the functional role of a qualitative state is challenging, as it is arguable that the same functional organization among one's inputs, outputs, and mental states can be preserved despite having one's qualia radically altered or eliminated. Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a promising strategy for the functionalist: defining a given qualitative state as being disposed to cause a belief that one is in such a state. Such beliefs would be different (...)
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  87. Sydney Shoemaker (2006). The Frege-Schlick View. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  88. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
    Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced (...)
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  89. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). Intersubjective/Intrasubjective. In Sydney Shoemaker (ed.), The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
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  90. Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  91. Sydney Shoemaker (1982). The Inverted Spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
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  92. Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Phenomenal Similarity. Critica 7 (October):3-37.
  93. Jeff Speaks (2011). Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible. Philosophical Studies 156 (3):339-361.
    Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one’s views about the possibility (...)
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  94. Robert Stalnaker (1999). Comparing Qualia Across Persons. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):385-406.
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  95. David G. Stern (2010). Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum. In Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl & Joseph Wang (eds.), Language and World Part Two: Signs, Minds, and Actions. Proceedings of the 32nd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium. Ontos Verlag.
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  96. David G. Stern (2010). Wittgenstein, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum. In Arley Moreno (ed.), Wittgenstein: Certeza? UNICAMP, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência.
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  97. Pär Sundström (2002). An Argument Against Spectrum Inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.
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  98. R. Takenaga (2002). Inverting Intentional Content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If the argument is sound, not (...)
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  99. Daniel M. Taylor (1966). The Incommunicability of Content. Mind 75 (October):527-41.
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  100. Michael Thau (2002). Spectrum Inversion. In Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.
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