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- Torin Alter, Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument (Revised).
- Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
- Torin Alter, Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Torin Alter (2001). Know-How, Ability, and the Ability Hypothesis. Theoria 67 (3):229-39.
- Torin Alter, The Knowledge Argument. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
- Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
- Torin Alter (1995). Mary's New Perspective. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):585-84.
- Torin Alter & Sven Walter (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
- James T. Anderson, A Simple Refutation of the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism.
- István Aranyosi (2008). Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter (Eds.) Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. Mind 117 (467):665-669.
- Derek Ball (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind 118 (472):935-962.
- Katalin Balog (2008). Review of Torin Alter, Sven Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
- Michael Beaton (2005). What RoboDennett Still Doesn't Know. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):3-25.
- J. Berntsen (2004). Why Physicalists Needn't Bother with Perry's Recent Response to the Knowledge Argument. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):135-148.
- John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (2006). Re-Acquaintance with Qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
- John C. Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1990). Acquaintance with Qualia. Theoria 61 (3):129-147.
- Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 21.
- Alex Byrne (2002). Something About Mary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
- Neil Campbell (2003). An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.
- Yuri Cath (2009). The Ability Hypothesis and the New Knowledge-How. Noûs 43 (1):137-156.
- David J. Chalmers (2004). Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
- Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
- Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
- Earl Conee (1994). Phenomenal Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
- Earl Conee (1985). Physicalism and Phenomenal Properties. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July):296-302.
- Earl Conee (1985). Physicalism and Phenomenal Qualities. Philosophical Quarterly 35 (140):296-302.
- Tim Crane (2003). Subjective Facts. In Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
- Robert C. Cummins (1984). The Mind of the Matter: Comments on Paul Churchland. Philosophy of Science Association 1984:791 - 798.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). "Epiphenomenal" Qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.
- Ronald P. Endicott (1995). The Refutation by Analogous Ectoqualia. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):19-30.
- Martina Fürst (2011). What Mary's Aboutness Is About. Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.
- Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.
- Brie Gertler (2005). The Knowledge Argument. In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan.
- Brie Gertler (1999). A Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 93 (3):317-336.
- Andres Gleeson (1999). Deducing the Mind. Inquiry 42 (3-4):385-410.
- Philip Goff (forthcoming). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies.
- George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2005). Mary Mary au Contraire: Reply to Raffman. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-12.
- George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
- Gilbert Harman (1993). Can Science Understand the Mind? In Gilbert Harman (ed.), Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays on Honor of George A. Miller. Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Benj Hellie (2004). Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument. In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The Mit Press.
- Jeffrey Hershfield (1998). Lycan on the Subjectivity of the Mental. Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38.
- David Hodgson (2008). The Knowledge Argument: A Response to Elizabeth Schier. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):112-115.
- Emmett L. Holman (2006). Dualism and Secondary Quality Eliminativism: Putting a New Spin on the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):229-56.
- Amir Horowitz & Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz (2005). The Knowledge Argument and Higher-Order Properties. Ratio 18 (1):48-64.
- Robert J. Howell (2007). The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145 - 177.
- Frank Jackson (2006). The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
- Frank Jackson (2003). Mind and Illusion. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.
- Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
- Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
- Dale Jacquette (1995). The Blue Banana Trick: Dennett on Jackson's Color Scientist. Theoria 61 (3):217-30.
- Dunja Jutronić (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):193-197.
- Dunja Jutronic (2004). The Knowledge Argument--Some Comments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):193-197.
- Guy Kahane (2010). Feeling Pain for the Very First Time: The Normative Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):20-49.
- Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
- Janet Levin (1986). Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience. Philosophical Studies 49 (March):245-61.
- Brian Loar (1990). Phenomenal States. Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
- Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (2004). There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
- William G. Lycan (2003). Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
- William G. Lycan (1998). Phenomenal Information Again: It is Both Real and Intrinsically Perspectival. Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):239-42.
- Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
- Luca Malatesti (2004). Knowing What It is Like and Knowing How. In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins.
- Luca Malatesti (2004). The Knowledge Argument. Dissertation, University of Stirling
- Pete Mandik (2010). Swamp Mary's Revenge: Deviant Phenomenal Knowledge and Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 148 (2).
- J. McConnell (1995). In Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Topics 22 (3):157-187.
- Victoria McGeer (2003). The Trouble with Mary. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):384-393.
- Uwe Meyer (2001). The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, and Metalinguistic Beliefs. Erkenntnis 55 (3):325-347.
- Barbara Montero (2007). Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189.
- James P. Moreland (2003). The Knowledge Argument Revisited. International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):218-228.
- Yujin Nagasawa, Knowledge Argument.
- Yujin Nagasawa (2010). The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism. Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.
- Yujin Nagasawa (2008). God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments. Cambridge University Press.
- Yujin Nagasawa (2002). The Knowledge Argument Against Dualism. Theoria 68 (3):205-223.
- Bence Nanay (2009). Imagining, Recognizing and Discriminating: Reconsidering the Ability Hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):699-717.
- Laurence Nemirow (1995). Understanding Rules. Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):28-43.
- Natika Newton (1986). Churchland on Direct Introspection of Brain States. Analysis 46 (March):97-102.
- Martine Nida-Rumelin, The Knowledge Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Martine Nida-Rumelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
- Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
- Paul Noordhof (2003). Something Like Ability. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
- Knut Nordby (1990). Vision in a Complete Achromat: A Personal Account. In R. F. Hess, L. T. Sharpe & K. Nordby (eds.), Night Vision: Basic, Clinical and Applied Aspects. Cambridge University Press.
- Christian Onof (2008). Property Dualism, Epistemic Normativity, and the Limits of Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):60-85.
- David Papineau, Lecture 3 The Knowledge Argument for Dualism.
- David Papineau (1993). Physicalism, Consciousness, and the Antipathetic Fallacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.
- Michael Pelczar (2009). The Knowledge Argument, the Open Question Argument, and the Moral Problem. Synthese 171 (1).
- Michael W. Pelczar (2005). Enlightening the Fully Informed. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):29-56.
- Derk Pereboom (1994). Bats, Brain Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):315-29.
- John Perry (2004). Pr�Cis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.
- John Perry (2001). Time, Consciousness and the Knowledge Argument. In The Importance of Time: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.
- Philip Pettit (2004). Motion Blindness and the Knowledge Argument. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press.
- Jesse J. Prinz, Mental Maintenance: A Response to the Knowledge Argument.
- Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
- Diana Raffman (2005). Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan. Philosophical Studies 122 (2):189-202.
- Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
- Paul Raymont (1995). Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument. Dialogue 34 (4):713-26.
- Denis Robinson (1993). Epiphenomenalism, Laws, and Properties. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):1-34.
- Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 53 (3):174-7.
- William S. Robinson (2002). Jackson's Apostasy. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.
- Elizabeth Schier (2008). The Knowledge Argument and the Inadequacy of Scientific Knowledge. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):39-62.
- Sydney Shoemaker (1984). Churchland on Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 1984:799 - 809.
- Robert Stalnaker, Knowing Where We Are, and What It is Like.
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