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  1. B. A. (1962). Thought and Language. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):400-400.
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  2. Barbara Abbott (1995). Thinking Without English. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):49 - 55.
    Abbott replies to each of Hauser's arguments. Problem solving by chimpanzees and evidence of recursion in the thought of a feral human being suggest that natural language is not necessary for productive thought. Communication would be trivial if the inner language were the outer language, but it is not. The decryption analogy Hauser uses is flawed, and it is not clear which way Occam's razor cuts.
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  3. Frederick R. Adams, Robert A. Stecker & Gary Fuller (1992). The Semantics of Thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):375-389.
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  4. Laird Addis (1990). The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language. Review of Metaphysics 44 (2):426-427.
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  5. Fernando Martínez‐Manrique Agustín Vicente (2008). Thought, Language, and the Argument From Explicitness. Metaphilosophy 39 (3):381-401.
    : This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe they (...)
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  6. H. Austin Aikins (1909). Macleane's Reason, Thought, and Language, or The Many and The One. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 6 (23):640.
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  7. Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
  8. Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio (2012). The Visual Language of Thought: Fodor Vs. Pylyshyn. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):59-74.
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  9. Noga Arikha (2005). Deafness, Ideas and the Language of Thought in the Late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.
  10. Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.
    The arguments that Fodor (1987: 150-52) gives in support of a Language of Thought are apparently straightforward. (1) Linguistic capacities are "systematic", in the sense that if one understands the words 'John loves Mary' one also understands the form of words 'Mary loves John'. In other words, sentences have a combinatorial semantics, because they have constituent structure. (2) If cognitive capacities are systematic in the same way, they must have constituent structure also. Thus there is a Language of Thought. The (...)
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  11. Murat Aydede, Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art.
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments (...)
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  12. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    b > 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes /b > b > 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? /b > b > 3 Status of LOTH /b > b > 4 Scope of LOTH /b > b > 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? /b > b > 6 *Nativism and LOTH /b > b > 7 Naturalism and LOTH /b >.
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  13. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its apparent consequences. The (...)
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  14. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In Gurol Irzik & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), Boston Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer
    I argue that Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind (STM) and a naturalistic narrow content functionalism run on a Language of Though story have the same exact structure. I elaborate on the argument that narrow content functionalism is either irremediably holistic in a rather destructive sense, or else doesn't have the resources for individuating contents interpersonally. So I show that, contrary to his own advertisement, Stich's STM has exactly the same problems (like holism, vagueness, observer-relativity, etc.) that he claims plague content-based (...)
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  15. Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
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  16. Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical.
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  17. Murat Mustafa Aydede (1993). Syntax, Functionalism, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. Dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Explain such cognitive regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a LOT architecture. Some connectionists took the challenge seriously. They developed some models that purport to show that they can explain the regularities without becoming classical. The key to their claim is that their models can and do provide non-concatenatively realized syntactically complex representations that can also be processed in a structure sensitive way. Surprisingly, Fodor and McLaughlin seem (...)
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  18. A. B. (1962). Thought and Language. Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):400-400.
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  19. A. B. (1962). Thought and Language. Review of Metaphysics 16 (2):400-400.
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). Seeming to See Red. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):121-128.
    In "Understanding the Language of Thought," John Pollock offers a semantics for Mentalese. Along the way, he raises many deep issues concerning, among other things, the indexicality of thought, the relations between thought and communication, the function of 'that'-clauses and the nature of introspection. Regrettably, I must pass over these issues here. Instead, I shall focus on Pollock's views on the nature of appearance and its role in interpreting the language of thought.' I shall examine two aspects of Pollock's views: (...)
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  21. David Bakhurst (1992). J.M. Moravcsik, Thought And Language. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 12:409-412.
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  22. J. Mark Baldwin (1907). Thought and Language. Philosophical Review 16:565.
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  23. Abbott Barbara (2000). Gilles Fauconnier, Mappings in Thought and Language. Minds and Machines 10 (1).
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  24. Christian Barth (2011). Objectivity and the Language-Dependence of Thought: A Transcendental Defence of Universal Lingualism. Routledge.
    Does thought depend on language? Primarily as a consequence of the cognitive turn in empirical disciplines like psychology and ethology, many current empirical researchers and empirically minded philosophers tend to answer this question in the negative. This book rejects this mainstream view and develops a philosophical argument in favor of a universal dependence of language on thought. In doing so, it comprises insights of two primary representatives of 20 th century and contemporary philosophy, namely Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom. Barth (...)
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  25. T. H. Bartolomei (1957). Thought and Language. Philosophy Today 1 (1):48.
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  26. T. M. Bartolomei (1957). Thought and Language. Philosophy Today 1 (1):48-53.
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  27. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
  28. Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology.
    Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor, Margolis and Laurence defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that Mentalese symbols are not. This paper shows how Fregeans can withstand this objection. Along the way, a clearer (...)
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  29. Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can There Be a Language of Thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky
    1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows: " Cognitive scientists (...)
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  30. Antoni Gomila Benejam (2011). The Language of Thought: Still a Game in Town? Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):145-155.
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  31. Jonathan Berg (2015). When Fodor Met Frege. Erkenntnis 80 (2):467-476.
    In the third chapter of LOT 2—"LOT Meets Frege's Problem "—Jerry Fodor argues that LOT provides a solution to "Frege's Problem," as well as to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle . I argue that most of what Fodor says in his discussion of Frege's problem is mistaken.
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  32. Benjamin Bergen, Nathan Medeiros-Ward, Kathryn Wheeler, Frank Drews & David Strayer (2013). The Crosstalk Hypothesis: Why Language Interferes with Driving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):119.
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  33. Jose Luis Bermudez (2010). Two Arguments for the Language-Dependence of Thought. Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):37-54.
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  34. José Luis Bermúdez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
    Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.
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  35. Raj Nath Bhat (2012). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. By Jerry A. Fodor. The European Legacy 17 (3):400 - 401.
    The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 3, Page 400-401, June 2012.
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  36. Derek Bickerton (2005). Language First, Then Shared Intentionality, Then a Beneficent Spiral. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):691-692.
    Tomasello et al. give a good account of how shared intentionality develops in children, but a much weaker one of how it might have evolved. They are unduly hasty in dismissing the emergence of language as a triggering factor. An alternative account is suggested in which language provided the spark, but thereafter language and shared intentionality coevolved.
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  37. Ben Blumson (2012). Mental Maps. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):413-434.
    It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.
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  38. L. Pearl Boggs (1907). Aldwin on Thought and Language. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 4 (20):555.
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  39. Laurence BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  40. David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick (1990). Explanation and the Language of Thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
    In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT. We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that (...)
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  41. Robert Briscoe (2014). Review of Christopher Gauker, Words and Images: An Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. [REVIEW] Mind 123 (491):902-096.
  42. Susan Joy Brison (1987). Do We Think in Mentalese? A Critique of the "Language of Thought" Hypothesis. Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
    Arguments for the claim that we think in a distinct language of thought are common in the philosophical literature from Plato to the present. In this dissertation, I examine the philosophical foundations of this currently popular "Language of Thought" Hypothesis , evaluating both the empirical results and the a priori grounds that have been presented in support of it. After presenting an historical survey of philosophical motivations for LOT, I discuss a number of psychological experiments in the area of bilingualism (...)
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  43. Robert W. Brown, Irving M. Copi, Don E. Dulaney, William K. Frankena, Paul Henle & Charles L. Stevenson (1962). Language, Thought, and Culture. Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):137-140.
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  44. A. Burri (1994). The Social Characters of Language and Thought. Dialectica 48 (3-4):337-352.
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  45. J. D. C. (1972). Poetry. Language, Thought. Review of Metaphysics 25 (4):755-755.
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  46. Elisabeth Camp (2009). A Language of Baboon Thought? In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press 108--127.
    Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...)
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  47. Susan Carey (2001). Language of Thought: A Case Study of the Evolution and Development of Representational Resources. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 23.
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  48. Susan Carey (2001). The Representation of Number in Natural Language Syntax and in Language of Thought: A Case Study of the Evolution and Development of Representational Resources. In João Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press 23--53.
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  49. James Cargile (2010). The Language of Thought Revisited. Analysis 70 (2):359-367.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  50. P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.) (1998). Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This distinguished collection of essays explores the place of natural language in human cognition.
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