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  1. Barbara Abbott (1995). Thinking Without English. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):49 - 55.
    Abbott replies to each of Hauser's arguments. Problem solving by chimpanzees and evidence of recursion in the thought of a feral human being suggest that natural language is not necessary for productive thought. Communication would be trivial if the inner language were the outer language, but it is not. The decryption analogy Hauser uses is flawed, and it is not clear which way Occam's razor cuts.
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  2. Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
  3. Noga Arikha (2005). Deafness, Ideas and the Language of Thought in the Late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.
  4. Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.
    The arguments that Fodor (1987: 150-52) gives in support of a Language of Thought are apparently straightforward. (1) Linguistic capacities are "systematic", in the sense that if one understands the words 'John loves Mary' one also understands the form of words 'Mary loves John'. In other words, sentences have a combinatorial semantics, because they have constituent structure. (2) If cognitive capacities are systematic in the same way, they must have constituent structure also. Thus there is a Language of Thought. The (...)
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  5. Murat Aydede, Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art.
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments (...)
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  6. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its apparent consequences. The (...)
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  7. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH.
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  8. Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
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  9. Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical.
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  10. Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). Seeming to See Red. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):121-128.
    In "Understanding the Language of Thought," John Pollock offers a semantics for Mentalese. Along the way, he raises many deep issues concerning, among other things, the indexicality of thought, the relations between thought and communication, the function of 'that'-clauses and the nature of introspection. Regrettably, I must pass over these issues here. Instead, I shall focus on Pollock's views on the nature of appearance and its role in interpreting the language of thought.' I shall examine two aspects of Pollock's views: (...)
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  11. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
  12. Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology, 30 (Special Issue: Concepts.
    Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor, Margolis and Laurence defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that Mentalese symbols are not. This paper shows how Fregeans can withstand this objection. Along the way, a clearer (...)
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  13. Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can There Be a Language of Thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
    1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows:
    Cognitive scientists (...)
    The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows. (shrink)
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  14. José Luis Bermúdez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
    Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.
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  15. Derek Bickerton (2005). Language First, Then Shared Intentionality, Then a Beneficent Spiral. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):691-692.
    Tomasello et al. give a good account of how shared intentionality develops in children, but a much weaker one of how it might have evolved. They are unduly hasty in dismissing the emergence of language as a triggering factor. An alternative account is suggested in which language provided the spark, but thereafter language and shared intentionality coevolved.
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  16. Ben Blumson (2012). Mental Maps. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):413-434.
    It's often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.
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  17. Laurence BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  18. David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick (1990). Explanation and the Language of Thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
    In this paper we argue that the insistence by Fodor et. al. that the Language of Thought hypothesis must be true rests on mistakes about the kinds of explanations that must be provided of cognitive phenomena. After examining the canonical arguments for the LOT, we identify a weak version of the LOT hypothesis which we think accounts for some of the intuitions that there must be a LOT. We then consider what kinds of explanation cognitive phenomena require, and conclude that (...)
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  19. Elisabeth Camp (2009). A Language of Baboon Thought? In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 108--127.
    Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...)
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  20. James Cargile (2010). The Language of Thought Revisited. Analysis 70 (2):359-367.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  21. P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.) (1998). Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
    This distinguished collection of essays explores the place of natural language in human cognition.
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  22. David J. Chalmers (1999). Is There Synonymy in Ockham's Mental Language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge. 76.
    William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification (...)
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  23. Hugh Clapin (1997). Problems with Principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):261-77.
    In Psychosemantics Fodor presents three arguments for preferring the language of thought over mere intentional realism - arguments for the conclusion that intentional causes of behavior have constituent structure. The first of these, relying on the methodological 'Principle P', is considered in detail here and is found wanting. This principle does not prefer the language of thought to those very connectionist systems which Fodor criticizes; and it rests on dubious theoretical and empirical assumptions.
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  24. David Cole (2009). Jerry Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, Isbn 978-0-119-954877-. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 19 (3):439-443.
    Jerry Fodor, LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, x+228, $37.95, ISBN 978-0-119-954877-4 Content Type Journal Article Pages 439-443 DOI 10.1007/s11023-009-9164-4 Authors David Cole, University of Minnesota-Duluth Department of Philosophy 369 A B Anderson Hall Duluth MN 55812 USA Journal Minds and Machines Online ISSN 1572-8641 Print ISSN 0924-6495 Journal Volume Volume 19 Journal Issue Volume 19, Number 3.
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  25. David J. Cole, Pinker on the Thinker: Against Mentalese Monopoly.
    thought and problem solving in persons lacking natural language altogether would be a decisive challenge, but there is no clear evidence of any abstract thinking capabilities similar to those evinced by the scientists. Pinker cites languageless persons rebuilding broken locks - this is evidence of perhaps visual imagery, but not mentalese (at least not without quite a bit more detail and argument than we are given). Spiders, e.g., build marvelous things, but no inference to spiderese appears to be warranted. There (...)
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  26. Josep E. Corbí (1993). Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description. Synthese 95 (2):141 - 168.
    To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on this issue.With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, which is essential to the (...)
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  27. Tim Crane (1990). The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.
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  28. Martin Davies (1998). Language, Thought, and the Language of Thought (Aunty's Own Argument Revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press. 226.
    In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis.
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  29. Martin Davies (1992). Aunty's Own Argument for the Language of Thought. In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer. 235--271.
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  30. Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum:229--57.
  31. Martin Davies (1991). Concepts, Connectionism, and the Language of Thought. In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 485-503.
    The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the (...)
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  32. Daniel C. Dennett (1990). Granny's Campaign for Safe Science. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
    What do these various heresies have in common? From Fodor's point of view, two things, obviously: (1) they are all wrong, wrong, wrong! and (2) they are endorsed by people who are otherwise quite decent company. That would be thread enough to tie Fodor's targets together if he were right, but as one who finds more than a morsel of truth in each of the derided doctrines, I must seek elsewhere for a uniting principle, and I think I have found (...)
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  33. Richard DeWitt (1995). Vagueness, Semantics, and the Language of Thought. Psyche 1 (1).
  34. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1990). Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.
    Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties (...)
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  35. M. F. Egan (1991). Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.
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  36. Jes Ezquerro (ed.) (1992). Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer.
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  37. James H. Fetzer (ed.) (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
  38. Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
  39. J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
  40. Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
    Jerry Fodor presents a new development of his famous Language of Thought hypothesis, which has since the 1970s been at the centre of interdisciplinary debate about how the mind works. Fodor defends and extends the groundbreaking idea that thinking is couched in a symbolic system realized in the brain. This idea is central to the representational theory of mind which Fodor has established as a key reference point in modern philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The foundation stone of our present (...)
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  41. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Why There Still has to Be a Language of Thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
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  42. Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
    INTRODUCTION: TWO KINDS OF RLDUCTIONISM The man who laughs is the one who has not yet heard the terrible news. BERTHOLD BRECHT I propose, in this book, ...
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  43. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1996). Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality. Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-72.
    The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one given by Van Gelder (but one suggested by some of his (...)
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  44. Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
    Classical computational modellers of mind urge that the mind is something like a von Neumann computer operating over a system of symbols constituting a language of thought. Such an architecture, they argue, presents us with the best explanation of the compositionality, systematicity and productivity of thought. The language of thought hypothesis is supported by additional independent arguments made popular by Jerry Fodor. Paul Smolensky has developed a connectionist architecture he claims adequately explains compositionality, systematicity and productivity without positing any language (...)
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  45. Jay L. Garfield (1991). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind, by J. Fodor. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.
  46. James W. Garson (2002). Evolution, Consciousness, and the Language of Thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
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  47. James W. Garson (1998). Chaotic Emergence and the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.
    The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should (...)
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  48. Christopher Gauker (forthcoming). Inexplicit Thoughts. In Laurence Goldstein (ed.), Brevity. Oxford University Press.
    It is often assumed that, though we may speak in sentences that express propositions only inexplicitly, our thoughts must express their propositional contents explicitly. This paper argues that, on the contrary, thoughts too may be inexplicit. Inexplicit thoughts may effectively drive behavior inasmuch as they rest on a foundation of imagistic cognition. The paper also sketches an approach to semantic theory that accommodates inexplicitness in mental representations as well as in spoken sentences.
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  49. Christopher Gauker (1998). Are There Wordlike Concepts Too? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-71.
    Millikan proposes that there are mapping functions through which spoken sentences represent reality. Such mappings seem to depend on thoughts that words express and on concepts as components of such thoughts, but such concepts would conflict with Millikan's other claims about concepts and language.
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  50. Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Reviews Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited by Jerry A. Fodor Oxford University Press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.
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