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  1. Yuichi Amitani (2015). Natural Kinds, Species, and Races. Kagaku Tetsugaku 48 (1):35-48.
    In _Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge_ (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Uehara's distinction between real and nominal kinds, his (...)
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  2. Matthew J. Barker (2013). Biological Explanations, Realism, Ontology, and Categories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):617-622.
  3. Matthew J. Barker (2010). Specious intrinsicalism. Philosophy of Science 77 (1):73-91.
    Over the last 2,300 years or so, many philosophers have believed that species are individuated by essences that are at least in part intrinsic. Psychologists tell us most folks also believe this view. But most philosophers of biology have abandoned the view, in light of evolutionary conceptions of species. In defiance, Michael Devitt has attempted in this journal to resurrect a version of the view, which he calls Intrinsic Biological Essentialism. I show that his arguments for the resurrection fail, and (...)
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  4. Matthew J. Barker (2007). The Empirical Inadequacy of Species Cohesion by Gene Flow. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):654-665.
    This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed. ‡I'm grateful to Rob Wilson, Alex Rueger and Lindley Darden for important comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Nagel, Heather Proctor, Ken Bond, members of the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group, and audience (...)
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  5. Matthew J. Barker & Joel D. Velasco (2013). Deep Conventionalism About Evolutionary Groups. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):971-982.
    We argue for a new conventionalism about many kinds of evolutionary groups, including clades, cohesive units, and populations. This rejects a consensus, which says that given any one of the many legitimate grouping concepts, only objective biological facts determine whether a collection is such a group. Surprisingly, being any one kind of evolutionary group typically depends on which of many incompatible values are taken by suppressed variables. This is a novel pluralism underlying most any one group concept, rather than a (...)
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  6. Matthew J. Barker & Robert A. Wilson (2010). Cohesion, Gene Flow, and the Nature of Species. Journal of Philosophy 107 (2):59-77.
    A far-reaching and influential view in evolutionary biology claims that species are cohesive units held together by gene flow. Biologists have recognized empirical problems facing this view; after sharpening the expression of the view, we present novel conceptual problems for it. At the heart of these problems is a distinction between two importantly different concepts of cohesion, what we call integrative and response cohesion. Acknowledging the distinction problematizes both the explanandum of species cohesion and the explanans of gene flow that (...)
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  7. David A. Baum (2009). Species as Ranked Taxa. Systematic Biology 58 (1):74-86.
    -/- Because species names play an important role in scientific communication, it is more important that species be understood to be taxa than that they be equated with functional ecological or evolutionary entities. Although most biologists would agree that taxa are composed of organisms that share a unique common history, 2 major challenges remain in developing a species-as-taxa concept. First, grouping: in the face of genealogical discordance at all levels in the taxonomic hierarchy, how can we understand the nature of (...)
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  8. Peter Beurton (2002). Ernst Mayr Through Time on the Biological Species Concept - a Conceptual Analysis. Theory in Biosciences 121:81-98.
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  9. Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Human Reproductive Cloning: Science, Jewish Law and Metaphysics. ssrn.com.
    Abstract: Under traditional Jewish Law (halacha), assessment of human reproductive cloning (HRC) has been formulated along four lines of inquiry, which I discussed in Part I of this paper. Therein I also analyze five relevant doctrines of Talmudic Law, concluding that under with a risk-benefit analysis HRC fails to fulfill the obligation ‘to be fruitful and multiply’ and should be strictly prohibited. Here, I review of the topic from an exigetical Biblical and Kabbalistic perspective, beginning with exploring comments of the (...)
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  10. Richard Boyd (2010). Homeostasis, Higher Taxa, and Monophyly. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):686-701.
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  11. Richard Boyd (1999). Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa. In R. A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press 141-85.
  12. Richard N. Boyd (1999). Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization: Comments on Millikan's "Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1/2):67-98.
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  13. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1305–1316.
    Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
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  14. Roger C. Buck & David L. Hull (1966). The Logical Structure of the Linnaen Hierarchy. Systematic Zoology 15 (2):97-111.
  15. Arthur J. Cain (1954). Animal Species And Their Evolution. Hutchinson University Library.
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  16. Keith A. Coleman & E. O. Wiley (2001). On Species Individualism: A New Defense of the Species-as-Individuals Hypothesis. Philosophy of Science 68 (4):498-517.
    We attempt to defend the species-as-individuals hypothesis by examining the logical role played by the binomials (e.g., "Homo sapiens," "Pinus ponderosa") in biological discourse about species. Those who contend that the binomials can be properly understood as functioning in biological theory as singular terms opt for an objectual account of species and view species as individuals. Those who contend that the binomials can in principle be eliminated from biological theory in favor of predicate expressions opt for a predicative account of (...)
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  17. Judith K. Crane (2004). On the Metaphysics of Species. Philosophy of Science 71 (2):156-173.
    This paper explains the metaphysical implications of the view that species are individuals (SAI). I first clarify SAI in light of the separate distinctions between individuals and classes, particulars and universals, and abstract and concrete things. I then show why the standard arguments given in defense of SAI are not compelling. Nonetheless, the ontological status of species is linked to the traditional "species problem," in that certain species concepts do entail that species are individuals. I develop the idea that species (...)
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  18. Kevin de Queiroz (2007). Species Concepts and Species Delimitation. Systematic Biology 56 (6):879-886.
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  19. Kevin de Queiroz (2005). A Unified Concept of Species and Its Consequences for the Future of Taxonomy. Proceedings of the California Academy of Sciences 56 (18):196-215.
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  20. Kevin de Queiroz (1998). The General Lineage Concept of Species, Species Criteria, and the Process of Speciation. In D. J. Howard & S. H. Berlocher (eds.), Endless Forms: Species and Speciation. Oxford University Press 57-75.
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  21. Kevin De Queiroz (1995). The Definition of Species and Clade Names: A Reply to Ghiselin. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 10 (2):223-8.
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  22. Kevin De Queiroz & Michael J. Donoghue (1988). Phylogenetic Systematics and the Species Problem. Cladistics 4:317-38.
  23. Th Dobzhansky (1935). A Critique of the Species Concept in Biology. Philosophy of Science 2 (3):344-355.
  24. John Dupré (1999). On the Impossibility of a Monistic Account of Species. In Robert A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. Bradford Books 3-22.
  25. John Dupré (1996). Promiscuous Realism: Reply to Wilson. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):441-444.
    This paper presents a brief response to Robert A. Wilson's critical discussion of Promiscuous Realism [1996]. I argue that, although convergence on a unique conception of species cannot be ruled out, the evidence against such an outcome is stronger than Wilson allows. In addition, given the failure of biological science to come up with a unique and privileged set of biological kinds, the relevance of the various overlapping kinds of ordinary language to the metaphysics of biological kinds is greater than (...)
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  26. Marc Ereshefsky (2014). Consilience, Historicity, and the Species Problem. In R. Paul Thompson & Denis Walsh (eds.), Evolutionary biology: conceptual, ethical, and religious issues. Cambridge 65-86.
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  27. Marc Ereshefsky (2010). Darwin's Solution to the Species Problem. Synthese 175 (3):405 - 425.
    Biologists and philosophers that debate the existence of the species category fall into two camps. Some believe that the species category does not exist and the term 'species' should be eliminated from biology. Others believe that with new biological insights or the application of philosophical ideas, we can be confident that the species category exists. This paper offers a different approach to the species problem. We should be skeptical of the species category, but not skeptical of the existence of those (...)
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  28. Marc Ereshefsky, Species. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  29. Marc Ereshefsky & Mohan Matthen (2005). Taxonomy, Polymorphism, and History: An Introduction to Population Structure Theory. Philosophy of Science 72 (1):1-21.
    Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) theory suggests that species and other biological taxa consist of organisms that share certain similarities. HPC theory acknowledges the existence of Darwinian variation within biological taxa. The claim is that “homeostatic mechanisms” acting on the members of such taxa nonetheless ensure a significant cluster of similarities. The HPC theorist’s focus on individual similarities is inadequate to account for stable polymorphism within taxa, and fails properly to capture their historical nature. A better approach is to treat distributions (...)
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  30. James Franklin (1986). Aristotle on Species Variation. Philosophy 61 (236):245 - 252.
    Explains Aristotle's views on the possibility of continuous variation between biological species.
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  31. Michael Ghiselin (1969). The Triumph of the Darwinian Method. University of California Press.
  32. Michael T. Ghiselin (1966). On Psychologism in the Logic of Taxonomic Controversies. Systematic Zoology 15 (3):207-215.
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  33. M. Goodfellow, G. P. Manfio & J. Chun (1997). Towards A Practical Species Concept for Cultivable Bacteria. In M. F. Claridge, H. A. Dawah & M. R. Wilson (eds.), Species: The Units of Biodiversity. Chapman & Hall 25-59.
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  34. Todd A. Grantham (1999). Explanatory Pluralism in Paleobiology. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):236.
    This paper is a defense of "explanatory pluralism" (i.e., the view that some events can be correctly explained in two distinct ways). To defend pluralism, I identify two distinct (but compatible) styles of explanation in paleobiology. The first approach ("actual sequence explanation") traces out the particular forces that affect each species. The second approach treats the trend as "passive" or "random" diffusion away from a boundary in morphological space. I argue that while these strategies are distinct, some trends are correctly (...)
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  35. Mark Greene (2011). On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations. In Tom L. Beauchamp & R. G. Frey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics. Oxford University Press 577-602.
    I argue that defenders of general duties of species preservation are faced with an impossible task. I distinguish derivative from non-derivative value and argue that the derivative value of species can yield only limited and contingent duties of preservation. There can be no general duty of species preservation unless all species have non-derivative value. Ongoing controversy over the ’species’ notion has not deterred some from claiming settled authority for whatever notion appears most conducive to their favored account of species value. (...)
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  36. P. E. Griffiths (1994). Cladistic Classification and Functional Explanation. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):206-227.
    I adopt a cladistic view of species, and explore the possibility that there exists an equally valuable cladistic view of organismic traits. This suggestion seems to run counter to the stress on functional views of biological traits in recent work in philosophy and psychology. I show how the tension between these two views can be defused with a multilevel view of biological explanation. Despite the attractions of this compromise, I conclude that we must reject it, and adopt an essentially cladistic (...)
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  37. Paul E. Griffiths (1999). Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences. In Robert A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press 209-228.
  38. Melissa Haendel, Fabian Neuhaus, David Osumi-Sutherland, Paula M. Mabee, José L. V. Mejino Jr, Chris J. Mungall & Barry Smith (2008). CARO: The Common Anatomy Reference Ontology. In Anatomy Ontologies for Bioinformatics: Principles and Practice. Springer
    The Common Anatomy Reference Ontology (CARO) is being developed to facilitate interoperability between existing anatomy ontologies for different species, and will provide a template for building new anatomy ontologies. CARO has a structural axis of classification based on the top-level nodes of the Foundational Model of Anatomy. CARO will complement the developmental process sub-ontology of the GO Biological Process ontology, using it to ensure the coherent treatment of developmental stages, and to provide a common framework for the model organism communities (...)
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  39. Vladimir Havlik (2011). SAI Thesis (Biological Species as Individuals). Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18:32-49.
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  40. David Hull (1999). On the Plurality of Species: Questioning the Party Line. In R. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press 23-48.
  41. David L. Hull (1980). Individuality and Selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 11:311-332.
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  42. David L. Hull (1965). The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy--Two Thousand Years of Stasis (II). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (61):1-18.
  43. P. Kämpfer & R. Rosselló-Mora (2004). The Species Concept for Prokaryotic Microorganisms?An Obstacle for Describing Diversity? Poiesis and Praxis 3 (1-2):62-72.
    Species are the basis of the taxonomic scheme. They are the lowest taxonomic category that are used as units for describing biodiversity and evolution. In this contribution we discuss the current species concept for prokaryotes. Such organisms are considered to represent the widest diversity among living organisms. Species is currently circumscribed as follows: A prokaryotic species is a category that circumscribes a (preferably) genomically coherent group of individual isolates/strains sharing a high degree of similarity in (many) independent features, comparatively tested (...)
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  44. Stuart A. Kauffman (1993). The Origins of Order Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution. Oxford University Press.
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  45. Catherine Kendig (2014). Towards a Multidimensional Metaconception of Species. Ratio 27 (2):155-172.
    Species concepts aim to define the species category. Many of these rely on defining species in terms of natural lineages and groupings. A dominant gene-centred metaconception has shaped notions of what constitutes both a natural lineage and a natural grouping. I suggest that relying on this metaconception provides an incomplete understanding of what constitute natural lineages and groupings. If we take seriously the role of epigenetic, behavioural, cultural, and ecological inheritance systems, rather than exclusively genetic inheritance, a broader notion of (...)
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  46. Catherine Kendig (2012). The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):405-408.
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  47. Philip Kitcher (1984). Species. Philosophy of Science 51 (2):308-333.
    I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomings arise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected (...)
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  48. David B. Kitts (1978). Theoretics and Systematics: A Reply to Cracraft, Nelson, and Patterson. Systematic Zoology 27 (2):222-224.
  49. David B. Kitts (1977). Karl Popper, Verifiability, and Systematic Zoology. Systematic Zoology 26 (2):185-194.
  50. David B. Kitts & David J. Kitts (1979). Biological Species as Natural Kinds. Philosophy of Science 46 (4):613-622.
    The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural (...)
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