About this topic
Summary What distinguishes belief from other states of mind? There are, on the one hand, other information-bearing states of mind, such as perceptual experience or sub-personal cognitive states, that seem to fall short of belief. On the other hand, there are other types of propositional attitudes, notably desire, intention, fear and conjecture, that need to be distinguished from belief. Is the ability to have beliefs essentially connected with rationality, having some other propositional attitudes, the ability to act and the possession of language?
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
133 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 133
  1. Jonathan E. Adler (2002). Akratic Believing? Philosophical Studies 110 (1):1 - 27.
    Davidson's account of weakness of will depends upon a parallel that he draws between practical and theoretical reasoning. I argue that the parallel generates a misleading picture of theoretical reasoning. Once the misleading picture is corrected, I conclude that the attempt to model akratic belief on Davidson's account of akratic action cannot work. The arguments that deny the possibility of akratic belief also undermine, more generally, various attempts to assimilate theoretical to practical reasoning.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Jonathan E. Adler (1999). The Ethics of Belief: Off the Wrong Track. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):267–285.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Miri Albahari (2014). Alief or Belief? A Contextual Approach to Belief Ascription. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):701-720.
    There has been a surge of interest over cases where a subject sincerely endorses P while displaying discordant strains of not-P in her behaviour and emotion. Cases like this are telling because they bear directly upon conditions under which belief should be ascribed. Are beliefs to be aligned with what we sincerely endorse or with what we do and feel? If belief doesn’t explain the discordant strains, what does? T.S. Gendler has recently attempted to explain all the discordances by introducing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Facundo M. Alonso (forthcoming). What is Reliance? Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    In this article I attempt to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about reliance in a systematic way. I argue that reliance is a cognitive attitude that has a tighter connection to the guidance of our thought and action than ordinary belief does. My main thesis is that reliance has a ?constitutive aim?: namely, it aims at guiding our thought and action in a way that is sensible from the standpoint of practical or theoretical ends. This helps explain why reliance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Robert Audi (1982). Believing and Affirming. Mind 91 (361):115-120.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert N. Audi (1994). Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe. Noûs 28 (4):419-34.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). Dretske on the Explanatory Role of Belief. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):99-111.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. James Beebe (2013). A Knobe Effect for Belief Ascriptions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):235-258.
    Knobe (Analysis 63:190-193, 2003a, Philosophical Psychology 16:309-324, 2003b, Analysis 64:181-187, 2004b) found that people are more likely to attribute intentionality to agents whose actions resulted in negative side-effects that to agents whose actions resulted in positive ones. Subsequent investigation has extended this result to a variety of other folk psychological attributions. The present article reports experimental findings that demonstrate an analogous effect for belief ascriptions. Participants were found to be more likely to ascribe belief, higher degrees of belief, higher degrees (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Lisa Bortolotti (2011). In Defence of Modest Doxasticism About Delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.
    Here I reply to the main points raised by the commentators on the arguments put forward in my Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (OUP, 2009). My response is aimed at defending a modest doxastic account of clinical delusions, and is articulated in three sections. First, I consider the view that delusions are inbetween perceptual and doxastic states, defended by Jacob Hohwy and Vivek Rajan, and the view that delusions are failed attempts at believing or not-quitebeliefs, proposed by Eric Schwitzgebel and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Lisa Bortolotti (2004). Can We Interpret Irrational Behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):359 - 375.
    According to some theories of interpretation, it is difficult to explain and predict irrational behavior in intentional terms because irrational behavior does not support the ascription of intentional states with determinate content. In this paper I challenge this claim by offering a general diagnosis of those cases in which behavior, rational or not, resists interpretation. I argue that indeterminacy of ascription and paralysis of interpretation ensue when the interpreter lacks relevant information about the system to be interpreted and about the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Curtis Brown (1992). Direct and Indirect Belief. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research 52 (2):289-316.
    The word 'belief' is ambiguous, referring sometimes to what is believed, sometimes to the act or state of believing it. I believe that as I write this it is sunny outside. This belief is true. What is true is what I believe, namely that it is sunny, not my believing it. On the other hand, my belief that it is sunny is rational and unshakeable, and it played a causal role in my deciding not to wear a coat today. What (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Curtis Brown (1990). How to Believe the Impossible. Philosophical Studies 58 (3):271-285.
    Can we believe things that could not possibly be true? The world seems full of examples. Mathematicians have "proven" theorems which in fact turn out to be false. People have believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, that they themselves are essentially incorporeal, that heat is not molecular motion--all propositions which have been claimed to be not just false, but necessarily false. Some have even seemed to pride themselves on believing the impossible; Hegel thought contradictions could be true, and Kierkegaard seems (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Curtis Brown (1986). What is a Belief State? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):357-378.
    What we believe depends on more than the purely intrinsic facts about us: facts about our environment or context also help determine the contents of our beliefs. 1 This observation has led several writers to hope that beliefs can be divided, as it were, into two components: a "core" that depends only on the individual?s intrinsic properties; and a periphery that depends on the individual?s context, including his or her history, environment, and linguistic community. Thus Jaegwon Kim suggests that "within (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Curtis Brown & Steven Luper-Foy (1991). Belief and Rationality. Synthese 89 (3):323 - 329.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Andrei A. Buckareff (2010). Acceptance Does Not Entail Belief. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (2):255-261.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Compatibilism and Doxastic Control. Philosophia 34 (2):143-152.
    Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Doxastic Decisions and Controlling Belief. Acta Analytica 21 (1):102-114.
    I critique Matthias Steup’s account of exercising direct voluntary control over coming to have doxastic attitudes via doxastic decisions. I show that the sort of agency Steup argues is exercised in doxastic decision-making is not sufficient for agents to exercise direct voluntary control over their doxastic attitudes. This counts against such putative decisions being the locus of direct control in doxastic agency. Finally, I briefly consider what, if any, consequences the failure of Steup’s theory of doxastic agency may have for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Andrei A. Buckareff (2005). Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture? Religious Studies 41 (4):435-445.
    In a recent article in this journal, John Bishop argues in defence of conceiving of Christian faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. That is, he defends the claim that, in exercising faith, agents believe beyond ‘what can be established rationally on the basis of evidence and argument’. Careful examination reveals that Bishop fails adequately to show that faith in the face of inadequate epistemic reasons for believing is, or can even be, a uniquely doxastic venture. I argue that faith is best (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Andrei A. Buckareff (2005). An Essay on Doxastic Agency. Dissertation, University of Rochester
    The problem of doxastic agency concerns what sort of agency humans can exercise with regard to forming doxastic attitudes such as belief. In this essay I defend a version of what James Montmarquet calls "The Asymmetry Thesis": Coming to believe and action are asymmetrical with respect to direct voluntary control. I argue that normal adult human agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over the acquisition of any of their doxastic attitudes in the same way that they exercise such control over (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Andrei A. Buckareff (2004). Acceptance and Deciding to Believe. Journal of Philosophical Research 29:173-190.
    ABSTRACT: Defending the distinction between believing and accepting a proposition, I argue that cases where agents allegedly exercise direct voluntary control over their beliefs are instances of agents exercising direct voluntary control over accepting a proposition. The upshot is that any decision to believe a proposition cannot result directly in one’s acquiring the belief. Accepting is an instrumental mental action the agent performs that may trigger belief. A model of the relationship between acceptance and belief is sketched and defended. The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2013). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 47 (3).
    We distinguish between two categories of belief—thin belief and thick belief—and provide evidence that they approximate genuinely distinct categories within folk psychology. We use the distinction to make informative predictions about how laypeople view the relationship between knowledge and belief. More specifically, we show that if the distinction is genuine, then we can make sense of otherwise extremely puzzling recent experimental findings on the entailment thesis (i.e. the widely held philosophical thesis that knowledge entails belief). We also suggest that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri, In the Thick of Moral Motivation.
    We accomplish three things in this paper. First, we expose the motivational internalism/externalism debate in moral psychology as a false dichotomy born of ambiguity. Second, we provide further evidence for a crucial distinction between two different categories of belief in folk psychology: thick belief and thin belief. Third, we demonstrate how careful attention to deep features of folk psychology can help diagnose and defuse seemingly intractable philosophical disagreement in metaethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Andrei Buleandra (2009). Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity. Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.
    Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.) (1998). Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press.
    What is the place of language in human cognition? Do we sometimes think in natural language? Or is language for purposes of interpersonal communication only? Although these questions have been much debated in the past, they have almost dropped from sight in recent decades amongst those interested in the cognitive sciences. Language and Thought is intended to persuade such people to think again. It brings together essays by a distinguished interdisciplinary team of philosophers and psychologists, who discuss various ways in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (forthcoming). Varieties of Cognitive Achievement. Philosophical Studies.
    According to robust virtue epistemology (RVE), knowledge is type-identical with a particular species of cognitive achievement. The identification itself is subject to some criticism on the (alleged) grounds that it fails to account for the anti-luck features of knowledge. Although critics have largely focused on environmental luck, the fundamental philosophical problem facing RVE is that it is not clear why it should be a distinctive feature of cognitive abilities that they ordinarily produce beliefs in a way that is safe. We (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Timothy Chan (2013). Introduction: Aiming at Truth. In , The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. 1-16.
    In this introductory chapter to the volume The Aim of Belief, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies the major theoretical approaches. The main arguments of the ten contributions to the volume are outlined and located in the context of the existing literature.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Timothy Chan (ed.) (2013). The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. A. J. Chien (1985). Demonstratives and Belief States. Philosophical Studies 47 (2):271 - 289.
  31. L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.
    In this incisive new book one of Britain's most eminent philosophers explores the often overlooked tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. He seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied, at its best, in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily believe or what they voluntarily accept? And (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Mark Crimmins (1992). Tacitness and Virtual Beliefs. Mind and Language 7 (3):240-63.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Robert C. Cummins (1991). Methodological Reflections on Belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. 53--70.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Arnold Cusmariu (1983). Translation and Belief Again. Analysis 43 (1):23-25.
    In "Translation and Belief" I presented a two-stage version of Church's translation argument against Carnap's analysis of belief. Here I show that the first stage is sufficient to establish a weaker, though no less significant conclusion, if supplemented with the principle that the same thought or idea can be expressed in different languages.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Arnold Cusmariu (1982). Translation and Belief. Analysis 42 (1):12-16.
    I present a formally explicit statement of Church's celebrated argument against Carnap's analysis of belief and defend it against well-known objections by W.V.O. Quine, R.M. Martin, and Michael Dummett.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Igor Douven (2010). The Pragmatics of Belief. Journal of Pragmatics 42 (1):35-47.
    This paper argues that pragmatic considerations similar to the ones that Grice has shown pertain to assertability pertain to acceptability. It further shows how this should affect some widely held epistemic principles. The idea of a pragmatics of belief is defended against some seemingly obvious objections.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith (2012). Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief. Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Pascal Engel (2013). Doxastic Correctness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
    Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Arthur E. Falk (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.
    This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Kevin Falvey (1999). A Natural History of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345.
    Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by a conception of our propositional attitude concepts as comprising a proto-scientific causal-explanatory theory of behavior. This conception has given rise to a spate of recent worries about the prospects for “naturalizing” the theory. In this paper I return to the roots of the “theory-theory” of the attitudes in Wilfrid Sellars’s classic “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” I present an alternative to the theory-theory’s account of belief in the form of a parody of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Katalin Farkas (forthcoming). Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Rescuing Doxastic Normativism. Theoria 78 (4):293–308.
    According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Keith Frankish (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Keith Frankish (1998). Natural Language and Virtual Belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press. 248.
    This chapter outlines a new argument for the view that language has a cognitive role. I suggest that humans exhibit two distinct kinds of belief state, one passively formed, the other actively formed. I argue that actively formed beliefs (_virtual beliefs_, as I call them) can be identified with _premising policies_, and that forming them typically involves certain linguistic operations. I conclude that natural language has at least a limited cognitive role in the formation and manipulation of virtual beliefs.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Miguel Garcia-Valdecasas (2013). Do Expectations Have Time Span? Axiomathes 23 (4):665-681.
    If it is possible to think that human life is temporal as a whole, and we can make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the psychological phenomena called ‘dispositions’ do not have genuine temporal duration on the basis of a distinction between dispositions and other mental processes, we need a compelling account of how time applies to these dispositions. I undertake this here by examining the concept of expectation, a disposition with a clear nexus to time by the temporal point at (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Christopher Gauker (2005). The Belief-Desire Law. Facta Philosophica 7 (2):121-144.
    Many philosophers hold that for various reasons there must be psychological laws governing beliefs and desires. One of the few serious examples that they offer is the _belief-desire law_, which states, roughly, that _ceteris paribus_ people do what they believe will satisfy their desires. This paper argues that, in fact, there is no such law. In particular, decision theory does not support the contention that there is such a law.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Christopher Gauker (2003). Attitudes Without Psychology. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):239-56.
    Many philosophers hold that beliefs and desires are theoretical entities postulated for the sake of predicting and explaining people's behaviors. This paper offers a very different perspective on the nature of beliefs and desires. According to this, the first step is to understand the nature of assertion and command. Then, to understand the nature of belief and desire, what one must do is extend one's understanding of assertion and commandto assertions and commands on behalf of others; for to attribute a (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
    Forthcoming, Journal of Philosophy [pdf manuscript].
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief in Action (and Reaction). Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2003). On the Relation Between Pretense and Belief. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination Philosophy and the Arts. Routledge. 125--141.
    By the age of two, children are able to engage in highly elaborate games of symbolic pretense, in which objects and actions in the actual world are taken to stand for objects and actions in a realm of make-believe. These games of pretense are marked by the presence of two central features, which I will call quarantining and mirroring (see also Leslie 1987; Perner 1991). Quarantining is manifest to the extent that events within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 133