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  1. Andre J. Abath (2008). A Note on McDowell's Response to the Fineness of Grain Argument. Dialogue 47 (3-4):677-.
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  2. Laird Addis (2000). The Simplicity of Content. Metaphysica 1 (2):23-44.
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  3. Kathleen Akins (ed.) (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
  4. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  5. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an account (...)
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  6. C. Anthony Anderson (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.
  7. D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place (1996). In T. Crane. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  8. Moses J. Aronson (1941). BRINTON, CRANE. Nietzsche. Journal of Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence 7:94.
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  9. Thomas Baldwin & David Bell (1988). Phenomenology, Solipsism and Egocentric Thought. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62:27 - 60.
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  10. David Barton (1994). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Review of Metaphysics 47 (4):812-814.
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  11. Samuel Birch (1785). Consilia: Or, Thoughts Upon Several Subjects.
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  12. Simon Blackburn (1988). Attitudes and Contents. Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
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  13. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Explanation. Noûs 35 (s15):253-289.
    Many philosophers think that the Substitution Objection decisively refutes Russellianism. This objection claims that sentences (1) and (2) can differ in truth value. Therefore, it says, the sentences express different propositions, and so Russellianism is false.
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  14. David Braun (2001). Russellianism and Prediction. Philosophical Studies 105 (1):59 - 105.
    Russellianism (also called `neo-Russellianism, `Millianism, and `thenaive theory') entails that substitution of co-referring names inattitude ascriptions preserves truth value and proposition expressed.Thus, on this view, if Lucy wants Twain to autograph her book, thenshe also wants Clemens to autograph her book, even if she says ``I donot want Clemens to autograph my book''. Some philosophers (includingMichael Devitt and Mark Richard) claim that attitude ascriptions canbe used to predict behavior, but argue that if Russellianism weretrue, then this would not be so. (...)
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  15. David M. Braun (2000). Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations. Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  16. Fernando Broncano (1999). Incompatibilidades en las teorías del contenido mental. Teorema 18 (2).
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  17. Tyler Burge (2014). Reply to Rescorla and Peacocke: Perceptual Content in Light of Perceptual Constancies and Biological Constraints. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):485-501.
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  18. Tyler Burge (1980). The Content of Propositional Attitudes. Noûs 14 (1):53-58.
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  19. Alan Caden Burk (1973). Intentional Propositions 'de Dicto' and 'de Re' and Non-Propositional Seeing. Dissertation, Brown University
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  20. Kam-Yuen Cheng (2010). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason that twin cases are (...)
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  21. Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2013). Varieties of Intentional Objects. Semiotica 194 (194):189–206.
    In this paper I propose a certain classification of entities which are introduced in various theories of intentionality under the label ‘intentional objects’. Franz Brentano’s immanent objects, Alexius Meinong’s entities ‘beyond being and non-being’, or Roman Ingarden’s purely intentional objects can serve as examples of such entities. What they all have in common is that they have been introduced in order to extensionalise the so called ‘intentional contexts’ (‘intentional’ with ‘t’). But not all entities which function this way deserve the (...)
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  22. Jonathan Cohen (2013). Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine. Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):5-32.
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  23. Jonathan Cohen (2013). Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine. Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):5-32.
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  24. Eros Corazza (1994). Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations. Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...)
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  25. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian (...)
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  26. Wesley D. Cray (2014). Inconstancy and Content. Dialectica 68 (3):337-353.
    According to David Lewis, many de re modal predications – that is, sentences such as ‘John McCain could have won the 2008 U.S. Presidential election’ and ‘Dwight could receive a promotion’ – are inconstant insofar as their truth values can vary alongside changes in our interests. In this paper, I argue that previous accounts of this inconstancy, such as those offered by Lewis and Harold Noonan, are inadequate. Linguistic data, I claim – specifically, agreement and disagreement data – tell against (...)
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett, Two Black Boxes: A Fable.
    Once upon a time, there were two large black boxes, A and B, connected by a long insulated copper wire. On box A there were two buttons, marked *a* and *b*, and on box B there were three lights, red, green, and amber. Scientists studying the behavior of the boxes had observed that whenever you pushed the *a* button on box A, the red light flashed briefly on box B, and whenever you pushed the *b* button on box A, the (...)
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  28. Patrick K. Dooley (1994). The Pluralistic Philosophy of Stephen Crane. University of Illinois Press.
    Crane's fundamental philosophical view, Dooley finds, is that reality is comprised of changing and interrelated processes.
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  29. S. R. Ellis & U. J. Bucher (1992). Depth-Perception of Stereoscopically Presented Virtual Objects Interacting with Real Background Patterns. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):443-443.
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  30. Michael Neil Fleming (1999). The Linguistic U-Turn in the Philosophy of Thought. Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada)
    A central task of contemporary analytic philosophy is to develop an understanding of how our minds are connected to the external world. Arising from this task is the need to explain how thoughts represent things in the world. Giving such an explanation is the central endeavor of this dissertation---the aim being to contribute to our understanding of what it is for a subject to be thinking of a particular object. The structure of the dissertation is set, in part, by responding (...)
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  31. Illocutionary Force (2007). Content, Mode, and Self-Reference. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), John Searle's Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  32. Hubertus Fremerey (2006). Some Thoughts on What We Call Real. Philosophy Pathways 117.
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  33. Paul Gilbert (1994). The Puzzle of Experience. Philosophical Books 35 (2):124-125.
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  34. Juan-Carlos Gomez (1998). Some Thoughts About the Evolution of LADS, with Special Reference to TOM and SAM. In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press. 76--93.
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  35. Keith Hall (2013). Acquaintance and Mental Files. My Cms.
    Hall-Keith-J_Acquaintance-and-Mental-Files.
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  36. Andrew Hamilton (1984). A. Woodfield "Thought and Object". [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 34 (34):81.
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  37. Richard T. Heine, R. Terry Pivik & Charles P. Thompson (1966). Magnitude of the Doublet Effect as a Function of Location in a Verbal Maze. Journal of Experimental Psychology 72 (6):912.
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  38. James T. Higginbotham (1995). Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
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  39. Harmon R. Holcomb Iii (1993). The Puzzle of Experience. Review of Metaphysics 47 (1):170-171.
  40. Amir Horowitz (2009). Individualism and Narrow Content. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 8:139-153.
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  41. Harmon R. Holcomb Iii (1993). The Puzzle of Experience. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 47 (1):170-171.
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  42. C. A. Anderson J. Owens (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. CSLI.
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  43. Brian Loar (1988). Two Kinds of Content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press. 121--139.
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  44. S. F. MacLennan (1903). Existence and Content. Mind 12 (45):78-82.
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  45. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Introduction: The Admissible Contents of Experience. In The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  46. J. Christopher Maloney (1994). Content: Covariation, Control, and Contingency. Synthese 100 (2):241-90.
    The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically simple mental representation, proposing that the content of such a representation is determined by (...)
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  47. Gianfranco Soldati Manfred Bruns (1994). Object‐Dependent and Property Dependent Contents. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.
    SummaryIn a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth‐value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something , and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra‐ and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We (...)
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  48. Tero Tulenheimo Manuel Rebuschi (2011). Between de Dicto and de Re: De Objecto Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):828-838.
    Hintikka's second generation epistemic logic introduces a syntactic device allowing to express independence relations between certain logical constants. De re knowledge attributions can be reformulated in terms of quantifier independence, but the reformulation does not extend to non‐factive attitudes like belief. There, formulae with independent quantifiers serve to express a new type of attitude, intermediate between de dicto and de re, called ‘de objecto’: in each possible world compatible with the agent's belief, there is an individual with the specified property (...)
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  49. Peter J. Markie (1988). Multiple Propositions and "de Se" Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (4):573-600.
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  50. Jennifer Matey (2012). Review of Perception, Reference and the Problem of Realism. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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