The cause of contemporary education is a subject-object relation of the society to man. There are two possible types of education constructed on the basis of this relation: cultural-oriented and social-oriented. None of this two types can solve the problem of a man as a subject of own history. Creative type of education based оn a subject-subject relation can solve this problem.

In a recent article, Thomas Nagel argues against the court’s decision to strike down the Dover school district’s requirement that biology teachers in Dover public schools inform their students about Intelligent Design. Nagel contends that this ruling relies on questionable demarcation between science and nonscience and consequently misapplies the Establishment Clause of the constitution. Instead, he argues in favor of making room for an open discussion of these issues rather than an outright prohibition against Intelligent Design. We contend that Nagel’s (...) arguments do not succeed. First, we argue that Nagel’s case trades on an ambiguity regarding the content of non-theological views and fails to engage adequately some of the problems of ID. Then we raise concerns about Nagel’s conclusion; specifically, we will point to three incongruities between Nagel’s argument and his conclusion, and then we will raise a more general worry about the likely impact of Nagel’s view. (shrink)

The nature of educational philosophy.--Democracy as a social philosophy.--Aspects of a reconstructed educational policy.--References (p. [231]-238).

The purpose of this article is to explore the epistemological foundations of narrative research in education. In particular, I seek to explain how one can obtain knowledge, given its origin in teachers' subjective experiences. The problem with rhetorical and aesthetic criteria that narrative researchers use to warrant their knowledge claims is not that they don't meet a correspondence criterion of truth as post-positivists contend, but rather that they fail to connect teachers' ethical views with their practice. Since narrative research is (...) aimed at understanding teachers' actions and not at seeking some kind of mechanism in teachers' behaviour, the link between past experiences and present teaching practice is not causal but teleological. I suggest that although the knowledge claims of narrative researchers may not be justified (because they don't meet the criteria of truth as correspondence theory), we might nonetheless be intellectually entitled to accept them. Entitlement is an epistemic right or warrant that constitutes knowledge as justification, but uses different reasons—teleological not causal explanations. I offer three criteria to establish entitlement to accept narrative researchers' findings: (1) the meeting of rhetorical standards such as plausibility, adequacy, and persuasion; (2) the inclusion of teachers' stories about their pedagogical practice; (3) the meeting of ethical criteria that connects a teacher's actions to an articulate and defensible end-in-view or vision of the good. (shrink)

The deeper meaning of education, says Dewey in his Human Nature and Conduct (1922), which distinguishes the justly honored profession from that of mere trainer, is that a future new society of changed purposes and desires may be created by a deliberately humane treatment of the impulses of youth (p. 69). For Dewey, a truly humane education consists in an intelligent direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and necessities of the social situation (p. 70). Student impulse (...) and interest are not to be suppressed nor continually vented in unrestrained expression. In view of the plasticity of youth, there is little danger that allowing the role of student interest will lead away from important objectives of the curriculum. Education which respects the integrity of the student is a prerequisite of the kind of educated public suited for fuller participation in the democratic processes which properly direct and reconstruct our social life. The citizen appropriate for a democratic society is neither the dull conformist nor the superficial, gushing, non-conformist or sensualist. Individual impulse and initiative is neither to be damned up nor frivolously expressed. Meaningful participation and fuller social reconstruction require that we respect the social conditions for the possibility of knowledge and its growth, and this is more easily achieved, and more broadly appealing, when we speak of plans for the school environment. Respect for the cognitive and developmental needs of our own children and young people is fundamental to the self-respect of any viable society. Education could be philosophical praxis for a better world. (shrink)

The appearance of mass media and a versatile medium of videos can serve the convenience and instructive information for children; on the other hand, it could abet them in implicit image consumption. Now is the time for kids' to be in need of thinking power which enables them to make a choice, applications andcriticism of information within such visual cultures. In spite of these social changes, the realities are that our curriculum still doesn't meet a learner's demand properly. This research, (...) in this context, is aimed at looking out on the currently implemented art appreciation learning process in a critical fashion, and also aimed at suggesting a plan for visual culture learning by applying the philosophy program for kids as a new alternative. The purpose of such education is toenhance the capability to solve a variety of problems they are facing in the course of daily life by reflecting their matter of concern in a curriculum. What we have to pay attention to in visual culture learning is 'visual literacy.' Such an interpretative faculty of a critical reading of images is a must especially when kids should make a judgment of value hidden in images in their daily events, make an analysis of an ideological message and make an information-oriented decision. Therefore, learners have to enrich their higher-order thinking power as well as critical thinking faculty in modern society. If there is no objection to these social surroundings, it is quite natural that philosophy education, which forms a base of a higher-order thinking for children should be handled significantly at school. (shrink)

Consider the following argument for school choice, based on an appeal to the virtues of the market: allowing parents some measure of choice over their particular children's education ultimately serves the interests of all children, because creating a market mechanism in state education will produce improvements through the same pressures that lead to greater efficiency and quality when markets are deployed in more familiar contexts. The argument fails, because it is committed to a principle of equal concern, which (after analysis) (...) implies that a market in education is acceptable only if it is right to hold children disadvantaged by their parents' poor market choices substantively responsible for the fact. Since that claim is untenable, the market-based argument for school choice not only fails, but also turns out to rely on principles which in fact condemn the very policy it was supposed to support. (shrink)

Educational analysts need new ways to engage with policy processes in a networked world of complex transnational connections. In this discussion, Tara Fenwick and Richard Edwards argue for a greater focus on materiality in educational policy as a way to trace the heterogeneous interactions and precarious linkages that enact policy as complex manifestations. In particular, Fenwick and Edwards point to the methodologies of actor-network theory (ANT), at least in its most recent permutations, as a useful approach to materiality in policy (...) analysis. Published examples of educational policy studies drawing from these methodologies are beginning to appear. In reviewing these, we argue that ANT sensibilities help to make visible the sociomaterial assemblages—the “messy objects”—that enact policy, the micro-negotiations that mobilize and stabilize (and destabilize) these assemblages, and the multiple ontologies that often coexist in policy environments. Fenwick and Edwards conclude with a discussion of methodological issues for working with concepts of ontological variance and messy objects in educational policy. (shrink)

The paper explores the links between philosophy and learning with a view to highlight some of the today’s most influential philosophical “paradigms” of education. The concepts of “paradigm” and “philosophical paradigm of education” are discussed – and nuanced - based on some explicit references to them in the current philosophical and pedagogical literature. While taking into account all the different ways in which philosophy may be inquired with regard to its influence on education, the paper focuses merely on philosophical contributions (...) to the understanding of specific issues such as the human potential for learning; the concepts of cognition and learning; epistemological and value assumptions in teaching and learning; and psycho-social aspects exploring the relationshipsbetween the self and the “other” via communication and other forms of social interaction. While assuming that the relationships between philosophy and education are not unidirectional (in the sense that not only philosophy impacts on education, but also vice-versa, education issues may trigger philosophical reflection and debates), the paper analyses how different contemporary influential philosophical orientations (i.e. Pragmatism and Neo-pragmatism; The Critical Theory; Post-modern and Relativistic approaches; Constructivism) paved their way into educational thinking, policy making and teaching and learning practices. Whereas acknowledging that philosophy is not the only strong “foundation” for education, the paper stresses nevertheless the benefits of a reflective attitude ineducation with regard to its main (philosophical) assumptions. Choices in education are not always following a reflective pattern and changes are very often introduced because they are fashionable. Recurrent interrogations on important philosophical assumptions of educational theories, policies and practices may yet bring about a better balance between “innovation” and “tradition” and/or between “change” and “stability” while avoiding the many pitfalls of new andattractive, yet ephemeral, education fashions. (shrink)

Since the 1960s, the influence of economic thought on education has been steadily increasing. Taking Jean-Jacques Rousseau's educational thought as a point of departure, Tal Gilead critically inquires into the philosophical foundations of what can be termed the economic approach to education. Gilead's focus in this essay is on happiness and the role that education should play in promoting it. The first two parts of the essay provide an introduction to Rousseau's conception of happiness, followed by an examination of the (...) economic approach to education and the notion of human capital. In the course of this discussion, Gilead shows that increasing happiness is one of the economic approach's major aims. In the third part of the essay, he uses Rousseau's views to interrogate significant aspects of the economic approach to education. He then continues by highlighting some of the educational implications that stem from Rousseau's critique. Gilead maintains that Rousseau's ideas can provide valuable suggestions regarding how education might contribute to the promotion of happiness. The article concludes by proposing that while Rousseau's ideas on the matter should not necessarily be embraced, contemporary policymakers can learn some important lessons from them. (shrink)

This book upholds the idea of learning and education as a means to individual development and social empowerment. It presents a holistic picture, looking at learning as an integral part of one's social and physical life. Strongly differing from existing classroom perspectives, the book analyses integrated learning at its broadest possible imperative-arguing for a spontaneous learning environment within real-life contexts. -/- The book broadly covers: " Creativity in classroom education with a focus on interdisciplinary approach and positive teacher-student interaction " (...) The essence of good education with a deep concern for the impact on the social order " Teachings of Indian and Western educational thinkers-Gandhi, Confucius, Plato, Freire, and Tagore-and their commitment to individual well-being " Application of learning to real-world situations -/- Accessible and reader-friendly, it will be an indispensible resource to students and teachers of educational studies and to the general reader interested in the true spirit of education. (shrink)

This paper deals with an analysis of philosophy as intellectual therapeutics for educational (pedagogical) activity. Two interrelated issues are examined: (1) philosophy's role in the construction of cognitive attitudes to all systems of education; (2) philosophy's role in the formation of a definite value attitude to education. A great deal of attention is devoted to the problem of educational goals. It is argued that the assumed dichotomy of the social and the individual (which still occurs in our teaching practice and (...) in some philosophical doctrines) in defining educational goals, is itself mistaken. It is shown that pedagogical activity must be based on a general concept of man as a whole substance who organically includes qualities in himself. Our pressing concern with education in the twenty-first century promotes a new subject for pedagogical activity. This presupposes a modern philosophical mind capable of creating an individual with a broad worldview and with pragmatic capabilities. (shrink)

The overall question addressed in this article is, ‘What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The article focuses on the following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by philosophers themselves; the meanings attached to the term philosophy (of education) by policy makers; the difference place and time makes to these meanings; how these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy (of education) influencing policy. The question is addressed using philosophical methods (...) and empirical evidence from conversations and conversational interviews with some philosophers of education and other educational researchers. The argument begins with an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the findings from the conversational evidence. The article is drawn together in the penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the concluding section, some further—thorny—questions are raised by the analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice. (shrink)

I consider if and how far it is possible to live an educational philosophical life, in the fast-changing, globalised world of Higher Education. I begin with Socrates’ account of a philosophical life in the Apology. I examine some tensions within different conceptions of what it is to do philosophy. I then go on to focus more closely on what it might be to live a philosophical, educational life in which educational processes and outcomes are influenced by philosophy, using examples taken (...) from published sources and from conversational interviews with philosophers carried out by myself with Kenneth Wain, Bas Levering and Richard Pring. I then outline the directions of current European policy for Higher Education. Finally I discuss how far current policies and trends leave room for doing philosophy of education, concluding that it is possible, but only for individuals who are very much in sympathy with current policy trends or who are creative in constructing smoke screens. (shrink)

I argue that hopes and claims about the liberating power of liberal education are typically exaggerated, naive and wrong. Reflecting upon and borrowing terms from Jim Shelton's essay on "The Subversive Nature of Liberal Education," I use the work of Ivan Illich, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron to argue that social education—training in efficient and productive consumeristic life—absorbs, muffles and domesticates any radical content liberal arts education may manage to provide. As with virtually all education, liberal education conserves (...) the society from which it emerges. (shrink)

Dewey famously argues that the end of education is growth. This basic idea, widely criticized and often misunderstood, rests on a series of more complex arguments about the nature of education, human experience, and social life. First, Dewey understands education as the reconstruction of experience. As such, there is an intimate and inextricable relation between a person’s life experiences on one side and educational methods, content, and ends on the other. We learn by gaining a better sense of the meaning (...) of present experiences and by increasing our ability to direct future experiences (MW 9: 83). Second, we grow when learning opens up opportunities for future growth and thereby enables us to continue our .. (shrink)

Plato noticed a sizeable problem apropos of establishing his republic—that there was always a ready pool of zealous potential rulers, lying in wait for a suitable opportunity to rule on their own tyrannical terms. He also recognized that those persons best suited to rule, those persons with foursquare and unimpeachable virtue, would be least motivated to govern. Ruling a polis meant that those persons, fully educated and in complete realization that the most complete happiness comprises solitary study of things unchanging, (...) would have to compromise their happiness for the wellbeing of their polis and of the people in it. Plato’s solution, in effect that the aristoi would merely recognize their duty to sacrifice personal happiness for the happiness of the polis, has perplexed and continues today to perplex scholars. Like Plato, Jefferson recognized that there was always a pool of eager sharks, ready to govern. His republicanism, comprising a ward system and general education, was founded on the fullest participation of its citizenry, suitably educated and a governing aristoi. The true aristoi, the “natural aristoi”, are the intelligent and virtuous and that government is best which allows for a “pure selection” of the natural aristoi into the governing offices. Nonetheless, as Jefferson’s own life shows, non-parochial governing meant being rent from domestic tranquility, being forced to leave behind one’s personal affairs to decay, and being tossed willy-nilly into the coliseum of nonstop political wrangling. Why would anyone, particularly one wanting to be happy, wish to govern? Thus, Jefferson faced the same problem that Plato faced. How could a state be structured so that the wisest and most virtuous would be motivated to rule? In this paper, I argue that Jefferson, in full recognition of the problem of encouraging the most intelligent and virtuous to govern, the problem of public service, offers a solution that is remarkably Platonic. (shrink)

In the 1990s P.H. Hirst criticizes his influential forms of knowledge theory, suggesting a new concept of education. In this paper I explain why Hirst suggests the new concept of ‘education as initiation into practices’. Although the latter Hirst’s position had positive implications on education, it is frequently confused with theutilitarian position. In order to provide a more coherent concept of education, I compare basic features of the rationalist (R), the utilitarian (U), and the practices-based (P) approach. Then I discuss (...) the implications of this concept. The main features of R, U, and P are respectively as this: 1) A person is seen as a rational being, a being of wants and desires, and a rational practitioner who is socially constructed. 2) The nature of reason is conceived as ‘rational’,‘instrumental’, and ‘practical’. 3) The aim of education is education for theoretical rationality, education for maximum satisfaction of desires, and education for identity formation by participating in practices. 4) The contents of education are theoretical knowledge, instrumental knowledge with utility, and practical knowledge for various practices. 5) R pursues absolute transcendental values, U pursues extrinsic instrumental values, and P pursues values internal to a practice. 6) R conceives education as ‘seeing’, U as ‘doing’, and I suggest ‘listening’ model for P. Based on this conception of practices-based position, I hope we can provide better education. (shrink)

The increase in violence in South African schools, as elsewhere, has been associated with a general 'decline in moral values'. There have been three different responses that emphasise the decline in religious teaching at schools, the loss of traditional values like ubuntu , communalism and the like; and humankind's increasing alienation from nature. In other words, in terms of teaching and learning initiatives, we should turn to religion, community and the common good and nature (the natural environment and nonhuman animals) (...) in order to feel the force of morality and, consequently, to counteract human violence and cruelty. After critically examining these responses, the present article focusses on the third as the most promising, albeit one that is in need of re-conceptualisation. We need to teach not as if nature mattered but that it matters. Concepts and principles like justice, equality and rights have worked in the past. They have been useful in governing and regulating relations between human individuals. Indeed, it is the recognition of and respect for rights that best exemplifies the transculturality of values. Taking these concepts and principles seriously requires extending and employing them beyond the human realm. This may well be the most reliable way of halting the rapid deterioration of the world. Humane education, insofar as it incorporates guidance in moral reasoning and critical thinking - over and above nurture of appropriate feelings in individuals - and engages both rationality and individual responsibility, consists of transmission as well as in transcendence of our moral and cultural heritage. 'Decline in moral values', then, is counteracted by an approach that combines caring with respect for rights, in order to contribute towards erasing what has been called 'the ultimate evil', namely human violence and abuse. Environmental education and humane education, so re-conceived, arguably have long-term benefits for both humans and nonhumans. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that genuine dialogue is a refined human achievement and probably the most valid criterion on the basis of which we can evaluate educational or social policy and practice. The paper explores the prerequisites of dialogue in the language games, the common certainties, the rules of logic and the variety of common virtues; defends dialogue as a normative concept and interprets the principles of dialogue as extensions of its prerequisite virtues. Finally, it examines (...) the social conditions that are conducive to dialogue and those that frustrate it. (shrink)

There are essential differences between the Eastern and Western models of education. The Eastern model of education aims at the perfecting of an individual to reach his moral purity. Therefore it applies teaching and teacher-student relations on the individual scale, and primarily prefers didactics. The Western model of education considers an individual as a product of the social environment. Therefore it aims at the perfection of the environment itself, of the society, and so it concentrates its attention on socio-economic reforms (...) and considers education as a component of society. It is impossible to find pure Eastern or pure Western models of education. Secular education was formed in the new period. Besides the social structure and peculiarities of relationships with society, educational systems are primarily differentiated on the basis of their purposes. The relationship between the Eastern and Western educational systems is not one that obtains between religious and secular schools. Educational systems depend on the characters of relations between science and practice, science and philosophy, science and religion. Therefore the development of education is closely connected with the nature of the development of science. (shrink)

The lack of attention to the role of emotions generally has led modern learning theories to neglect the importance of emulation as a pedagogical support to students’ learning. One reason could be that the influence of teacher personality is not considered in relation to learning outcome. Another reason may be that the concept of emulation has been used as a psychological conception for one-way transmission. From a pedagogical rhetorical perspective, it is here argued that emulation and its pedagogical function is (...) rooted in three human conditions: the biological, moral and political. The framework for this reasoning is discussed, as well as historical changes in pedagogical focus. Finally, it is concluded that the educative character of the teacher has a crucial impact on how willing students are to interact and share the teachers’ knowledge, skills and values. Therefore, there is a need for a greater awareness of these aspects to be developed among teachers. (shrink)

The article argues that the most important trends in the recent metamorphosis of higher education, especially of university teaching and research, cannot be understood without placing them in the context of general developments in political life. Both processes reveal alarming features and there is a link between them. In recent decades a religion has established its dominance in the public policy field. Its dogmas are called "liberalization", "economic man", "individual preference", "the free market", "competition" and "efficiency". The consequences of the (...) progressive imposition of this doctrine on the universities--including on the relation between teaching and research--are well documented but not always well understood. It is argued that the "commercialization" of higher education and research means in reality their hyper-bureaucratization, via the imposition of so-called evaluation, assessment and accreditation schemes, the latest avatars of the managerialist ideology. Might the final result be the disintegration of the university as an institution? (shrink)

We need a revolution in education, from five year olds onwards, so that exploration of problems is at the heart of the enterprise.

Since educators are always looking for ways to improve their practice, and since empirical science is now accepted in our worldview as the final arbiter of truth, it is no surprise they have been lured toward cognitive neuroscience in hopes that discovering how the brain learns will provide a nutshell explanation for student learning in general. I argue that identifying the person with the brain is scientism (not science), that the brain is not the person, and that it is the (...) person who learns. In fact the brain only responds to the learning of embodied experience within the extra-neural network of intersubjective communications. Learning is a dynamic, cultural activity, not a neural program. Brain-based learning is unnecessary for educators and may be dangerous in that a culturally narrow ontology is taken for granted, thus restricting our creativity and imagination, and narrowing the human community. (shrink)

Starting from a suggestion of Stephen Toulmin and through an interpretation of the criticism to which Neurath, one of the founders of the Vienna Circle, submits Descartes’ views on science, the paper attempts to outline a pattern of modernity opposed to the Cartesian one, that has been obtaining over the last four centuries. In particular, it is argued that a new alliance has to be established between science and education, overcoming Descartes’ banishment against education. In a Neurathian perspective education is (...) a key-moment of the scientific enterprise without which science itself is in danger of going astray and no scientific outlook is promoted in the society at large. Such an anti-Cartesian attitude is a leitmotiv of the whole Neurath’s production and characterizes his fundamental approach to the sense of modernity. For this reasons, despite all its shortcomings, Neurath’s proposal represents a very promising option for a new agenda of the modernity away from Descartes’ spell. By elaborating on Neurath’s (and Dewey’s) insights, the paper puts forward the idea that philosophy of science (such as it was originated by neopositivism in its Reichenbachian version) should give way to an educational philosophy of science which could allow us “to bring the genuine modern into existence”. (shrink)

Beginning with a reconsideration of what the school is and has been, this paper explores the idea of the school to come. Emphasizing the governmental role of education in modernity, I offer a line of thinking that calls into question the assumption of both the school and education as possible conduits for either democracy or social justice. Drawing on Derrida’s spectral ontology I argue that any automatic correlation of education with democracy is misguided: especially within redemptive discourses that seek to (...) liberate education from its present enclosure. This rereading of the field of education in the light of an account of the fundamental ontology of its key institution problematizes all rhetorics of education as social salvation. Education, it proposes, cannot be conceived as the ideal soul of a corrupted or as yet defective body, the school. Education—having taken on the character of an ontotheological principle—has become a governmental instrument as much as its specific institutions. This ontological condition can be understood within various accounts of the nature of contemporaneity. This paper considers the monstrous proposal that education be abandoned as the grounds for social, ethical and cultural redemption. The good news is that this abandonment opens the possibility for thinking beyond education, a beyond that is also beyond the strictures of instrumental rationality. (shrink)

The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education contains surveys of philosophical theories of education and philosophical analyses of educational issues. The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education is a dynamic study space for students, teachers, researchers and professionals in the field of education, philosophy and social sciences offering theoretically concurrent expositions of the topics of theoretical and practical interest in philosophy and education.

Abstract This paper maintains that imaginative philosophical dialogue is essential to what is meant by education. It is a necessary condition. Whether it is a sufficient condition for education depends on what one means by intellectual autonomy, personhood and human rights. The author also contends that if one could show that dialogical education within the context of a community of inquiry was a necessary condition for the formation of autonomous educated persons and, further, that it is appropriate to talk of (...) persons as natural kinds with an essence, then one could argue that one can speak meaningfully of the essence of education as coextensive with the development of an autonomous person who has the ability to think well and to think for him or herself about matters of importance. (shrink)

The present education does riot yield required results mainly because it is divorced from the real social content and social goals. We as the citizens of the republic are constitutionally committed to democracy, social justice, equality of opportunity, secularism and above all to a welfare state. Educational policy and educational programmes should not merely equip an individual to adjust with society to its customs and conventions, but it should enable him to bring desirable changes in the society. Every educational institute (...) from secondary school to University College should be developed to become an agency of change, it is the dream of Dr. B.R .Ambedkar. (shrink)

This book takes as a premise that Derrida is a profound educational thinker, who from the very beginning concerned himself with questions of pedagogy.

This paper argues that moral particularism, defined as the view that moral judgment does not require moral principles, depends upon a constricted and untenable view of rational judgment as simple syllogistic ratiocination. This I demonstrate by re-examining Nussbaum’s (1986/2002) case for particularism based on Sophocles’ Antigone. The central role of principles in moral judgment and in educational theory is supported by explicating ‘mature judgment’, which highlights key features of Thomas Green’s account of norm acquisition and of Kant’s account of the (...) autonomy of rational judgment. (shrink)