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The Nature of Perceptual Experience

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Ignacio Ávila (forthcoming). Perceiving the Intrinsic Properties of Objects. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.
    In this paper, I discuss Noë’s enactive account of our perceptual encounter with the intrinsic properties of the surrounding objects. First, I argue that this view falls into a dilemma in which either we are left without a satisfactory explanation of this encounter or, in order to keep Noë’s view, we must abandon our ordinary intuitions about the ontological status of the intrinsic properties of objects. Then, I show that, strikingly, there is a suggestive unofficial strand running in Noë that (...)
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  2. M. Beaton (2013). Phenomenology and Embodied Action. Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):298-313.
    Context: The enactivist tradition, out of which neurophenomenology arose, rejects various internalisms – including the representationalist and information-processing metaphors – but remains wedded to one further internalism: the claim that the structure of perceptual experience is directly, constitutively linked only to internal, brain-based dynamics. Problem: I aim to reject this internalism and defend an alternative analysis. Method: The paper presents a direct-realist, externalist, sensorimotor account of perceptual experience. It uses the concept of counterfactual meaningful action to defend this view against (...)
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  3. Richard Brown, Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.
    The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ (...)
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  4. Raffaella De Rosa (2010). Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation. OUP Oxford.
    While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Misrepresentation is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of their representationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other (...)
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  5. Christoph Hoerl (2013). 'A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession'. Mind 122 (486):373-417.
    Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences (in and of itself) does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. I distinguish three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against (...)
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  6. Carolyn Dicey Jennings (forthcoming). Attention and Perceptual Organization. Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    How does attention contribute to perceptual experience? Within cognitive science, attention is known to contribute to the organization of sensory features into perceptual objects, or “object-based organization.” The current paper tackles a different type of organization and thus suggests a different role for attention in conscious perception. Within every perceptual experience we find that more subjectively interesting percepts stand out in the foreground, whereas less subjectively interesting percepts are relegated to the background. The sight of a sycamore often gains the (...)
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  7. T. J. Mawson (2005). How Can I Know I've Perceived God? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (2):105 - 121.
    In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of ones perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one directly enough by God and – bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort – discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not directly enough caused any such experience.
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  8. Jennifer Nagel (2000). The Empiricist Conception of Experience. Philosophy 75 (293):345 - 376.
    One might think that a healthy respect for the deliverances of experience would require us to give up any claim to nontrivial a priori knowledge. One way it might not would be if the very admission of something as an episode of experience required the use of substantive a priori knowledge -- if there were certain a priori standards that a representation had to meet in order to count as an experience, rather than as, say, a memory or daydream. This (...)
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  9. Bence Nanay (2009). How Speckled is the Hen? Analysis 69 (3):499-502.
    We can see a number of entities without seeing a determinate number of entities. For example, when we see the speckled hen, we do not see it as having a determinate number of speckles, although we do see it as having a lot of speckles. How is this possible? I suggest a contextualist answer that differs both from Michael Tye's and from Fred Dretske's.
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  10. Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
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  11. Pierre Pica, Stuart Jackson, Randolph Blake & Nikolaus Troje (2011). Comparing Biological Motion in Two Distinct Human Societies. PLoS ONE 6 (12):e28391.
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  12. Dustin Stokes (2006). Review of Mohan Matthen-Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (3):323-325.
  13. Charles Travis (2007). Reason's Reach. European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):225–248.
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Sense-Datum Theories
  1. R. I. Aaron (1958). The Common Sense View of Sense-Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.
  2. E. M. Adams (1958). The Nature of the Sense-Datum Theory. Mind 67 (April):216-226.
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  3. V. C. Aldrich & Herbert Feigl (1935). Spatial Location and the Psycho-Physical Problem. Philosophy of Science 2 (2):256-261.
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  4. Virgil C. Aldrich (1979). Objective Sense-Data. Personalist 60 (January):36-42.
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  5. Virgil C. Aldrich (1955). Is an After-Image a Sense-Datum? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):369-376.
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  6. Virgil C. Aldrich (1934). Are There Vague Sense-Data? Mind 43 (172):477-482.
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  7. R. E. Allinson (1978). A Non-Dualistic Reply to Moore's Refutation of Idealism. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):661-668.
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  8. William P. Alston (1957). Is a Sense-Datum Language Necessary? Philosophy of Science 24 (1):41-45.
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  9. D. Z. Andriopoulos (1979). Did Aristotle Assume a Sense-Data Theory? Philosophical Inquiry 1 (2):125-128.
  10. David Malet Armstrong (1979). Perception, Sense-Data, and Causality. In Graham Macdonald (ed.), Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.~J. Ayer with His Replies. Macmillan.
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  11. J. L. Austin (1964). Sense And Sensibilia; Reconstructed From The Manuscript Notes By G J Warnock. Oxford University Press.
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  12. J. L. Austin (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford University Press.
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  13. A. J. Ayer (1970). Metaphysics and Common Sense. San Francisco,Freeman, Cooper.
    On making philosophy intelligible.--What is communication?--Meaning and intentionality.--What must there be?--Metaphysics and common sense.--Philosophy and science.--Chance.--Knowledge, belief, and evidence.--Has Austin refuted the sense-datum theory?--Professor Malcolm on dreams.--An appraisal of Bertrand Russell's philosophy.--G. E. Moore on propositions and facts.--Reflections on existentialism.--Man as a subject for science.--Philosophy and politics.
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  14. A. J. Ayer (1967). Has Austin Refuted the Sense-Datum Theory? Synthese 17 (June):117-140.
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  15. A. J. Ayer (1945). The Terminology of Sense-Data. Mind 54 (October):289-312.
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  16. A. J. Ayer (1940). The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge. Macmillan.
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  17. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  18. Ba (2004). On the Ontological Issue of Sense Data. Philosophia 33 (2):125-154.
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  19. Winston H. F. Barnes (1945). The Myth of Sense-Data. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45:89-118.
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  20. H. C. Becroft (1925). Professor Norman Kemp Smith's Theory of the Sensa. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):179 – 189.
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  21. Gustav Bergmann (1947). Sense Data, Linguistic Conventions, and Existence. Philosophy of Science 14 (2):152-163.
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  22. Jose Luis Bermudez (2000). Naturalized Sense Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):353-374.
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  23. Stephen H. Bickham (1975). What is at Issue in the Ayer-Austin Dispute About Sense-Data. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 1:1-8.
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  24. Shokti Charan Biswas (1967). The Nature and Status of Sensa. [Allahabad]Dept. Of Philosophy, University of Allahabad.
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  25. Max Black (1971/1963). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  26. John W. Blyth (1935). A Discussion of Mr. Price's Perception. Mind 44 (173):58-67.
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  27. W. Russell Brain (1960). Space and Sense-Data. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (November):177-191.
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  28. Walter R. Brain (1959). The Nature Of Experience. London,: Oxford University Press,.
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  29. Philip Bretzevonl (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.
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  30. Robert Briscoe (2008). Vision, Action, and Make‐Perceive. Mind and Language 23 (4):457-497.
    In this paper, I critically assess the enactive account of visual perception recently defended by Alva Noë (2004). I argue inter alia that the enactive account falsely identifies an object’s apparent shape with its 2D perspectival shape; that it mistakenly assimilates visual shape perception and volumetric object recognition; and that it seriously misrepresents the constitutive role of bodily action in visual awareness. I argue further that noticing an object’s perspectival shape involves a hybrid experience combining both perceptual and imaginative elements (...)
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  31. Audre Jean Brokes (2000). The Argument From Illusion Reconsidered. Disputatio 9 (1):1-7.
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  32. Richard N. Bronaugh (1964). The Argument From the Elliptical Penny. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (April):151-157.
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  33. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  34. Norman O. Brown (1957). Sense-Data and Material Objects. Mind 66 (April):173-194.
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  35. Charles A. Campbell (1947). Sense Data and Judgment in Sensory Cognition. Mind 56 (October):289-316.
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  36. James D. Carney (1962). Was Moore Talking Nonsense in 1918? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 22 (June):521-527.
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  37. Gregg Caruso (1999). A Defence of the Adverbial Theory. Philosophical Writings 10:51-65.
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