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  1. R. I. Aaron (1958). The Common Sense View of Sense-Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.
  2. Gavin Ardley (1959). The Nature of Perception. Philosophy Today 3 (3):79-86.
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  3. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  4. H. Barnard (1957). Quinton's Variety of 'Experience'. Mind 66 (January):88-90.
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  5. Robert N. Beck (1980). The World of Perception. Philosophical Inquiry 2 (2-3):458-465.
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  6. Max Black (1971/1963). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  7. Simon Blackburn (2005). Paradise Regained. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):1-14.
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  8. David C. Blumenfeld (1959). On Not Seeing Double. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (July):264-266.
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  9. Robert Briscoe (2004). Single-Mindedness: Language, Thought, and the First Person. Dissertation, Boston University
  10. Karl Britton (1952). Seeming, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 195:195-214.
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  11. Carmelo Calì (2008). Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science. Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
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  12. Maurice Charlesworth (1979). Sense-Impressions: A New Model. Mind 88 (January):24-44.
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  13. Roderick M. Chisholm (1951). Reichenbach on Observing and Perceiving. Philosophical Studies 2 (April):45-48.
  14. Roderick M. Chisholm (1950). The Theory of Appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.
  15. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  16. Tim Crane (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  17. Tim Crane, The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  18. Thomas Crowther (2010). The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at (...)
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  19. Adrian Cussins (2012). Environmental Representation of the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
  20. E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.
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  21. Stanislas Dehaene, Véronique Izard, Pierre Pica & Elizabeth Spelke (2006). Examining Knowledge of Geometry : Response to Wulf and Delson. Science 312 (5778):1309-1310.
    La connaissances noyau de la géométrie euclidienne est liée au raisonnement déductif et non à la reconnaissance de motifs perceptuels.
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  22. John Dewey (1927). An Empirical Account of Appearance. Journal of Philosophy 24 (17):449-463.
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  23. George Djukic & Vladimir B. Popescu (2003). A Critique of Langsam's The Theory of Appearing Defended. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91.
    In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.
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  24. Durant Drake (1927). The Data of Consciousness as Essences. Journal of Philosophy 24 (21):569-577.
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  25. Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  26. Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2008). Are Our Spaces Made of Words? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):63-83.
    It is argued that both neuroscience and physics point towards a similar re-assessment of our concepts of space, time and 'reality', which, by removing some apparent paradoxes, may lead to a view which can provide a natural place for consciousness and language within biophysics. There are reasons to believe that relationships between entities in experiential space and time and in modern physicists' space and time are quite different, neither corresponding to our geometric schooling. The elements of the universe may be (...)
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  27. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  28. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  29. Brice N. Fleming (1962). The Nature of Perception. Review of Metaphysics 16 (December):259-295.
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  30. Robert J. Fogelin (1981). When I Look at a Tomato There is Much I Cannot See. The Monist 64 (January):109-123.
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  31. Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) (2009). In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  32. Jeffrey Galko (2004). Ontology and Perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-18.
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  33. Todd Ganson (forthcoming). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  34. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (forthcoming). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  35. Garc (1999). Searle on Perception. Teorema 18 (1):19-41.
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  36. Christopher Gauker (2012). What Do Your Senses Says? On Burge's Theory of Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85:311-323.
    This is a critical review of Tyler Burge's book, Origins of Objectivity. Criticism focuses on Burge's claim that perceptions represent particulars as belonging to kinds.
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  37. Quentin Gibson (1966). Is There a Problem About Appearances? Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):319-328.
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  38. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286–318.
    Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is (...)
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  39. A. R. Gledhill (1970). An Analysis Of Sense Experience. Regency Press.
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  40. Paul Gochet (2005). W.V. Quine\H.G. Callaway, Wissenschaft Und Empfindung, Die Immanuel Kant Lectures. [REVIEW] Dialectica 59 (3):375-378.
    Quine's Immanuel Kant lectures were delivered in English at Stanford University in 1980 under the title Science and Sensibilia. The English version of the text has never been published. An Italian translation by Michele Leonelli, La Scienza e I Dati di Senso appeared in 1987. These translations fill an important gap. Wissenschaft und Empfindung strikes me as the best presentation of Quine's physicalistic program.
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  41. Richard Gray (2004). What Synaesthesia Really Tells Us About Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):64-69.
    J. A. Gray et al. have recently argued that synaesthesia can be used as a counterexample to functionalism. They provide empirical evidence which they hold supports two anti-functionalist claims: disparate functions share the same types of qualia and the effects of synaesthetic qualia are, contrary to what one would expect from evolutionary considerations, adverse to those functions with which those types of qualia are normally linked. I argue that the empirical evidence they cite does not rule out functionalism, rather the (...)
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  42. Denis J. B. Hawkins (1945). The Criticism Of Experience. Sheed & Ward,.
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  43. Benj Hellie, Phenomenal Contact.
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  44. R. J. Hirst (1966). Sentience and Mr Myers. Mind 75 (January):122-124.
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  45. R. J. Hirst (1959). The Problems Of Perception. Macmillan.
    As our chief aim is a comprehensive theory of perception which will cover all the facts, ... JR Smythies' Analysis of Perception I discuss in Ch. VI, § 6. ...
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  46. R. J. Hirst (1954). Sensing and Observing, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 197:197-218.
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  47. C. W. Ingram-Pearson (1955). The Reality of Appearances. Review of Metaphysics 9 (December):200-206.
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  48. Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
  49. Sean Dorrance Kelly, Perceptual Normativity and Human Freedom.
  50. John Lachs (1965). Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):10-17.
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  51. Sterling P. Lamprecht (1929). Sense Qualities and Material Things. Philosophical Review 38 (1):23-41.
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  52. Sterling P. Lamprecht (1922). The Metaphysical Status of Sensations. Journal of Philosophy 19 (7):169-181.
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  53. Harold Langsam (1997). The Theory of Appearing Defended. Philosophical Studies 87 (1):33-59.
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  54. Joseph A. Leighton (1910). Perception and Physical Reality. Philosophical Review 19 (1):1-21.
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  55. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). The Philosophy and Psychology of Hallucination: An Introduction. In Fiona Macpherson Dimitris Platchias (ed.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press.
    An overview of the philosophy and psychology of hallucination and its relevance to the philosophy of perception.
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  56. Fiona Macpherson (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):429-468.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena.
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  57. Fiona Macpherson (2009). Perception, Philosophical Perspectives. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
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  58. Fiona Macpherson (2004). Review of The Problem of Perception By A.D. Smith. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 45 (3):255-257.
  59. Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
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  60. Stanley Malinovich (1964). Perception: An Experience or an Achievement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (December):161-168.
  61. Riccardo Manzotti (2006). A Process Oriented View of Conscious Perception. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (6):7-41.
    I present a view of conscious perception that supposes a processual unity between the activity in the brain and the perceived event in the external world. I use the rainbow to provide a first example, and subsequently extend the same rationale to more complex examples such as perception of objects, faces and movements. I use a process-based approach as an explanation of ordinary perception and other variants, such as illusions, memory, dreams and mental imagery. This approach provides new insights into (...)
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  62. Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich (1999). Whither Structured Representation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):626-627.
    The perceptual symbol system view assumes that perceptual representations have a role-argument structure. A role-argument structure is often incorporated into amodal symbol systems in order to explain conceptual functions like abstraction and rule use. The power of perceptual symbol systems to support conceptual functions is likewise rooted in its use of structure. On Barsalou's account, this capacity to use structure (in the form of frames) must be innate.
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  63. Michael G. F. Martin (2003). Sensible Appearances. In T. Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    The problems of perception feature centrally in work within what we now think of as different traditions of philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century, most notably in the sense-datum theories of early analytic philosophy together with the vigorous responses to them over the next forty years, but equally in the discussions of pre-reflective consciousness of the world characteristic of German and French phenomenologists. In the English-speaking world one might mark the beginning of the period with Russell’s The (...)
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  64. Michael G. F. Martin (1998). Setting Things Before the Mind. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...)
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  65. Jennifer Matey (2012). Representing the Impossible. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
    A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the sensory receptors. According to the active-externalist theory of perception, amodal perception depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper focuses on amodal visual perception and presents a counter-example to the idea that active-externalism can account for amodal perception. The counterexample involves the experience of (...)
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  66. Mohan Matthen (2010). How Things Look (And What Things Look That Way). In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
    What colour does a white wall look in the pinkish light of the late afternoon? Philosophers disagree: they hold variously that it looks pink, white, both, and no colour at all. A new approach is offered. After reviewing the dispute, a reinterpretation of perceptual constancy is offered. In accordance with this reinterpretation, it is argued that perceptual features such as color must always be predicated of perceptual objects. Thus, it might be that in pinkish light, the wall looks white and (...)
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  67. Mohan Matthen (2010). Two Visual Systems and the Feeling of Presence. In Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary & Finn Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. Oxford University Press.
    Argues for a category of “cognitive feelings”, which are representationally significant, but are not part of the content of the states they accompany. The feeling of pastness in episodic memory, of familiarity (missing in Capgras syndrome), and of motivation (that accompanies desire) are examples. The feeling of presence that accompanies normal visual states is due to such a cognitive feeling; the “two visual systems” are partially responsible for this feeling.
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  68. Mohan Matthen (2006). Review: Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1160-1166.
    This a review of Alva Noë's Action in Perception. It argues that a distinction should be made between the proposition that sensorimotor feedback is used in sensory perception and that perception is of sensorimotor features of the world. Noë fails to make this distinction.
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  69. S. V. Mcdaniel (1963). A Note on the Percept Theory. Mind 72 (July):409-413.
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  70. Michelle Montague (forthcoming). The Phenomenology of Particularity. In T. Bayne M. Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
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  71. Kevin Mulligan, Perception, Particulars and Predicates.
    What sort of an episode is perception? What are the objects of such episodes? What is the grammatical and logical form of perceptual reports, direct and indirect? Each of these questions has been the subject of recent discussion. In what follows I set out one answer to each of them and explore some of the ways these answers support and complement each other. The answers adopted are: to perceive - and I shall normally only have in mind visual perception - (...)
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  72. Clement W. K. Mundle (1960). Common Sense Versus Mr. Hirst's Theory of Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:61-77.
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  73. Charles M. Myers (1962). Perceptual Events, States, and Processes. Philosophy of Science 29 (July):285-291.
    The notion that there is a category mistake or some other conceptual confusion in regarding seeing, hearing, and other forms of perception as events, states, or processes is incorrect. Ryle's analysis of "seeing" as an achievement word does not rule out our regarding seeing as an event, but in fact suggests that we do so when we carry the analysis beyond the point where Ryle leaves it. Furthermore there are uses of "see" not noticed by Ryle which justify our saying (...)
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  74. Gerald E. Myers (1957). Perception and the 'Time-Lag' Argument. Analysis 17 (April):97-102.
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  75. Bence Nanay (ed.) (2010). Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
    'Perceiving the World' offers 11 essays written especially for this book by some of the leading contemporary philosophers of perception: Susanna Siegel, Jesse ...
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  76. Henry Nelson Wieman (1924). Experience, Mind, and the Concept. Journal of Philosophy 21 (21):561-572.
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  77. Gregory Nixon (2007). Jay's *Songs of Experience*. [REVIEW] Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (11):125-7.
    ‘Experience is the best teacher’ goes the cliché without ever making clear just want is meant by that slippery first term. ‘Experience is never remembered unaltered’ goes another. Is experience something to be undergone, like a journey, or is it perhaps the relational immediacy between organism and environment? What do we reference when we use the term experience? -/- Martin Jay, renowned intellectual historian from UC Berkeley, here examines these questions in a grand survey of the term’s use throughout the (...)
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  78. Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.) (2010). Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The views are original, and there is substantive engagement among contributors. This collection will stimulate future research in this area.
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  79. Casey O'Callaghan (2011). Lessons From Beyond Vision (Sounds and Audition). Philosophical Studies 153 (1):143-160.
    Recent work on non-visual modalities aims to translate, extend, revise, or unify claims about perception beyond vision. This paper presents central lessons drawn from attention to hearing, sounds, and multimodality. It focuses on auditory awareness and its objects, and it advances more general lessons for perceptual theorizing that emerge from thinking about sounds and audition. The paper argues that sounds and audition no better support the privacy of perception’s objects than does vision; that perceptual objects are more diverse than an (...)
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  80. Anthony O'Hear (ed.) (1998). Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Key issues in the philosophy of mind, examined by leading figures in the field.
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  81. H. H. Price (1952). Seeming, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 215:215-234.
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  82. Anthony M. Quinton (1955). The Problem of Perception. Mind 64 (January):28-51.
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  83. Anthony M. Quinton (1952). Seeming, Part III. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 235:235-252.
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  84. Hans Reichenbach (1951). On Observing and Perceiving. Philosophical Studies 2 (December):92-93.
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  85. David H. Sanford (1983). Impartial Perception. Philosophy 58 (225):392-.
    Wittgenstein remarks in the "Tractatus" that the eye is not in the visual field. I question the claim of Michael Dummett and P T Geach that reflection on this remark helps one conceive of an observer perceiving objects in space without having any location in that space. The literal meaning of "point of view" is illustrated by the visual field. Reflection on the fact that the point of view is not itself normally an object of sight is no help in (...)
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  86. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Perceptual Content and Relations. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.
  87. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714-750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  88. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1).
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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  89. Sonia Sedivy (2004). Wittgenstein's Diagnosis of Empiricism's Third Dogma: Why Perception is Not an Amalgam of Sensation and Conceptualization. Philosophical Investigations 27 (1):1-33.
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  90. Wilfrid S. Sellars (1982). Sensa or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception. Philosophical Studies 41 (January):83-114.
  91. Joseph Shieber (2010). On the Possibility of Conceptually Structured Experience: Demonstrative Concepts and Fineness of Grain. Inquiry 53 (4):383-397.
    In this paper I consider one of the influential challenges to the notion that perceptual experience might be completely conceptually structured, a challenge that rests on the idea that conceptual structure cannot do justice to the fineness of grain of perceptual experience. In so doing, I canvass John McDowell's attempt to meet this challenge by appeal to the notion of demonstrative concepts and review some criticisms recently leveled at McDowell's deployment of demonstrative concepts for this purpose by Sean D. Kelly. (...)
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  92. Susanna Siegel (2013). Precise of The Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):813-816.
  93. Susanna Siegel (2010). Do Visual Experiences Have Contents? In Bence -Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford.
    This paper defends the Content View: the thesis that all visual experiences have contents.
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  94. Gianfranco Soldati & Fabian Dorsch, Experience & Reason.
    In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experiences. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one's own experience. We shall describe and distinguish a series of errors that can (...)
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  95. Ernest Sosa (1992). Ayer on Perception and Reality. In The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer. Peru: Open Court.
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  96. Ernest Sosa (1992). The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer. Peru: Open Court.
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  97. R. Taylor & Timothy J. Duggan (1958). On Seeing Double. Philosophical Quarterly 8 (April):171-174.
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  98. Mark Textor (2001). Intense Heat Immediately Perceived is Nothing Distinct From a Particular Sort of Pain. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1):43 – 68.
    The paper proposes a novel interpretation of Berkeley's so-called Assimilation Argument in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.
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  99. Irving Thalberg (1973). Ingredients of Perception. Analysis 33 (April):145-155.
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  100. L. E. Thomas (1957). Looking. Philosophical Quarterly 7 (April):109-115.
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