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  1. R. I. Aaron (1958). The Common Sense View of Sense-Perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-14.
  2. Gavin Ardley (1959). The Nature of Perception. Philosophy Today 3 (3):79-86.
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  3. A. J. Ayer & Graham Macdonald (eds.) (1979). Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer, with His Replies. Cornell University Press.
  4. H. Barnard (1957). Quinton's Variety of 'Experience'. Mind 66 (January):88-90.
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  5. Robert N. Beck (1980). The World of Perception. Philosophical Inquiry 2 (2-3):458-465.
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  6. Max Black (1971/1963). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  7. Simon Blackburn (2005). Paradise Regained. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):1-14.
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  8. David C. Blumenfeld (1959). On Not Seeing Double. Philosophical Quarterly 9 (July):264-266.
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  9. Robert Briscoe (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Reach of Phenomenal Content. In Athanassios Raftopoulos & John Zeimbekis (eds.), Cognitive Penetrability.
  10. Robert Briscoe (2004). Single-Mindedness: Language, Thought, and the First Person. Dissertation, Boston University
  11. Karl Britton (1952). Seeming, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 195:195-214.
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  12. Carmelo Calì (2008). Experimental Phenomenology in Contemporary Perception Science. Teorie E Modelli 13 (1/2).
    Some issues heavily debated in perception sciences are presented: the explanatory gap and the experience measurement problem. The experimental phenomenology is said to provide substantive contribution to settle controversy over the phenome- nological adequacy of perception theory and models. An interpretation of experi- mental phenomenology as explanation of the perceptual manifold, and definition of relation varieties to eventually map onto other perception sciences’ domains is sketched.
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  13. Maurice Charlesworth (1979). Sense-Impressions: A New Model. Mind 88 (January):24-44.
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  14. Roderick M. Chisholm (1951). Reichenbach on Observing and Perceiving. Philosophical Studies 2 (April):45-48.
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  15. Roderick M. Chisholm (1950). The Theory of Appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall.
  16. Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception is belief-independent and perception is presentational. Then I argue that intuitions also have both features. The (...)
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  17. Kevin Connolly, Dylan Bianchi, Craig French, Lana Kuhle & Andy MacGregor, Perceptual Learning and Perceptual Phenomenology (Network for Sensory Research/University of York Perceptual Learning Workshop, Question Three).
    This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions that arose from the Network for Sensory Research workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of York in March, 2012. This portion of the report explores the question: How does perceptual learning alter perceptual phenomenology?
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  18. Tim Crane, The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sense-perception—the awareness or apprehension of things by sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste—has long been a preoccupation of philosophers. One pervasive and traditional problem, sometimes called “the problem of perception”, is created by the phenomena of perceptual illusion and hallucination: if these kinds of error are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? The present entry is about how these possibilities of error challenge the intelligibility of the phenomenon of (...)
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  19. Tim Crane (2005). What is the Problem of Perception? Synthesis Philosophica 2 (40):237-264.
    It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling, from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philosophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused (...)
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  20. Thomas Crowther (2010). The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching and looking at (...)
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  21. Adrian Cussins (2012). Environmental Representation of the Body. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):15-32.
    Much recent cognitive neuroscientific work on body knowledge is representationalist: “body schema” and “body images”, for example, are cerebral representations of the body (de Vignemont 2009). A framework assumption is that representation of the body plays an important role in cognition. The question is whether this representationalist assumption is compatible with the variety of broadly situated or embodied approaches recently popular in the cognitive neurosciences: approaches in which cognition is taken to have a ‘direct’ relation to the body and to (...)
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  22. E. E. Dawson (1961). Sense Experience and Physical Objects. Theoria 27 (2):49-57.
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  23. Stanislas Dehaene, Véronique Izard, Pierre Pica & Elizabeth Spelke (2006). Examining Knowledge of Geometry : Response to Wulf and Delson. Science 312 (5778):1309-1310.
    La connaissances noyau de la géométrie euclidienne est liée au raisonnement déductif et non à la reconnaissance de motifs perceptuels.
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  24. John Dewey (1927). An Empirical Account of Appearance. Journal of Philosophy 24 (17):449-463.
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  25. George Djukic & Vladimir B. Popescu (2003). A Critique of Langsam's The Theory of Appearing Defended. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):69-91.
    In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsams defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.
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  26. Durant Drake (1927). The Data of Consciousness as Essences. Journal of Philosophy 24 (21):569-577.
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  27. Santiago Echeverri (2013). Is Perception a Source of Reasons? Theoria 79 (1):22-56.
    It is widely assumed that perception is a source of reasons (SR). There is a weak sense in which this claim is trivially true: even if one characterizes perception in purely causal terms, perceptual beliefs originate from the mind's interaction with the world. When philosophers argue for (SR), however, they have a stronger view in mind: they claim that perception provides pre- or non-doxastic reasons for belief. In this article I examine some ways of developing this view and criticize them. (...)
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  28. Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2008). Are Our Spaces Made of Words? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):63-83.
    It is argued that both neuroscience and physics point towards a similar re-assessment of our concepts of space, time and 'reality', which, by removing some apparent paradoxes, may lead to a view which can provide a natural place for consciousness and language within biophysics. There are reasons to believe that relationships between entities in experiential space and time and in modern physicists' space and time are quite different, neither corresponding to our geometric schooling. The elements of the universe may be (...)
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  29. Andreas Elpidorou (2009). The Upsurge of Spontaneity and the Rise of Undivided Subject: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate. In Lauren Freeman (ed.), In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  30. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
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  31. Brice N. Fleming (1962). The Nature of Perception. Review of Metaphysics 16 (December):259-295.
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  32. Robert J. Fogelin (1981). When I Look at a Tomato There is Much I Cannot See. The Monist 64 (January):109-123.
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  33. Lauren Freeman & Andreas Elpidorou (eds.) (2009). In/Visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.
  34. Jeffrey Galko (2004). Ontology and Perception. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-18.
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  35. Todd Ganson (2013). Are Color Experiences Representational? Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.
    The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. (...)
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  36. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (2014). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):556-573.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  37. Garc (1999). Searle on Perception. Teorema 18 (1):19-41.
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  38. Christopher Gauker (2012). What Do Your Senses Says? On Burge's Theory of Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):311-323.
    This is a critical review of Tyler Burge's book, Origins of Objectivity. Criticism focuses on Burge's claim that perceptions represent particulars as belonging to kinds.
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  39. Quentin Gibson (1966). Is There a Problem About Appearances? Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):319-328.
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  40. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Reasons for Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):286 - 318.
    Davidson claims that nothing can count as a reason for a belief except another belief. This claim is challenged by McDowell, who holds that perceptual experiences can count as reasons for beliefs. I argue that McDowell fails to take account of a distinction between two different senses in which something can count as a reason for belief. While a non-doxastic experience can count as a reason for belief in one of the two senses, this is not the sense which is (...)
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  41. A. R. Gledhill (1970). An Analysis Of Sense Experience. Regency Press.
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  42. Paul Gochet (2005). W.V. Quine\H.G. Callaway, Wissenschaft Und Empfindung, Die Immanuel Kant Lectures. [REVIEW] Dialectica 59 (3):375-378.
    Quine's Immanuel Kant lectures were delivered in English at Stanford University in 1980 under the title Science and Sensibilia. The English version of the text has never been published. An Italian translation by Michele Leonelli, La Scienza e I Dati di Senso appeared in 1987. These translations fill an important gap. Wissenschaft und Empfindung strikes me as the best presentation of Quine's physicalistic program.
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  43. Richard Gray (2004). What Synaesthesia Really Tells Us About Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):64-69.
    J. A. Gray et al. have recently argued that synaesthesia can be used as a counterexample to functionalism. They provide empirical evidence which they hold supports two anti-functionalist claims: disparate functions share the same types of qualia and the effects of synaesthetic qualia are, contrary to what one would expect from evolutionary considerations, adverse to those functions with which those types of qualia are normally linked. I argue that the empirical evidence they cite does not rule out functionalism, rather the (...)
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  44. Denis J. B. Hawkins (1945). The Criticism Of Experience. Sheed & Ward,.
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  45. Benj Hellie, Phenomenal Contact.
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  46. R. J. Hirst (1966). Sentience and Mr Myers. Mind 75 (January):122-124.
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  47. R. J. Hirst (1959). The Problems Of Perception. Macmillan.
    As our chief aim is a comprehensive theory of perception which will cover all the facts, ... JR Smythies' Analysis of Perception I discuss in Ch. VI, § 6. ...
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  48. R. J. Hirst (1954). Sensing and Observing, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 197:197-218.
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  49. C. W. Ingram-Pearson (1955). The Reality of Appearances. Review of Metaphysics 9 (December):200-206.
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  50. Mark Johnston (2007). Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233–268.
1 — 50 / 121