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  1. Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.) (2008). Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press.
    This interdisciplinary work is a collection of major essays on reasoning: deductive, inductive, abductive, belief revision, defeasible (non-monotonic), cross cultural, conversational, and argumentative. They are each oriented toward contemporary empirical studies. The book focuses on foundational issues, including paradoxes, fallacies, and debates about the nature of rationality, the traditional modes of reasoning, as well as counterfactual and causal reasoning. It also includes chapters on the interface between reasoning and other forms of thought. In general, this last set of essays represents (...)
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  2. Dan Ariely (2010). Perfectly Irrational: The Unexpected Ways We Defy Logic at Work and at Home. Harper.
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  3. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2013). Reasoning as a Source of Justification. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  4. Gordon Barnes, The Problem of Basic Deductive Inference.
    Knowledge can be transmitted by a valid deductive inference. If I know that p, and I know that if p then q, then I can infer that q, and I can thereby come to know that q. What feature of a valid deductive inference enables it to transmit knowledge? In some cases, it is a proof of validity that grounds the transmission of knowledge. If the subject can prove that her inference follows a valid rule, then her inference transmits knowledge. (...)
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  5. Pierre Barrouillet & Jean-Francois Lecas (1999). Mental Models in Conditional Reasoning and Working Memory. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (4):289 – 302.
    Johnson-Laird's mental models theory claims that reasoning is a semantic process of construction and manipulation of models in working memory of limited capacity. Accordingly, both a deduction and a given interpretation of a premise would be all the harder the higher the number of models they require. The purpose of the present experiment was twofold. First, it aimed to demonstrate that the interpretation of if...then conditional sentences in children (third, sixth, and ninth graders) evolves as a function of the number (...)
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  6. John Broome (2012). Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies (1):1-7.
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  7. D. G. Brown (1955). Evaluative Inference. Philosophy 30 (114):214 - 228.
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  8. D. G. Brown (1955). Misconceptions of Inference. Analysis 15 (6):135-144.
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  9. H. G. Callaway (1999). Intelligence, Community and Cartesian Doubt. Humanism Today 13:31-48.
    This paper attempts some integration of two perspectives on questions about rationality and irrationality: the classical conception of irrationality as sophism and themes from the romantic revolt against Enlightenment reason. However, since talk of "reason" and "the irrational" often invites rigid dualities of reason and its opposites (such as feeling, intuition, faith, or tradition), the paper turns to "intelligence" in place of "reason," thinking of human intelligence as something less abstract, less purely theoretical, and more firmly rooted in practice, including (...)
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  10. Sheldon J. Chow (forthcoming). Many Meanings of 'Heuristic'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ``heuristic'' in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ``heuristic'', and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics in order (...)
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  11. Keith Frankish (2010). Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.
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  12. Andre Norman Gallois (2009). The Fixity of Reasons. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):233 - 248.
    I consider backtracking reasoning: that is, reasoning from backtracking counterfactuals such as if Hitler had won the war, he would have invaded Russia six weeks earlier. Backtracking counterfactuals often strike us as true. Despite that, reasoning from them just as often strikes us as illegitimate. A number of diagnoses have been offered of the illegitimacy of such backtracking reasoning which invoke the fixity of the past, or the direction of causation. I argue against such diagnoses, and in favor of one (...)
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  13. Mikkel Gerken (2013). Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental. Palgrave Macmillan (Innovations in Philosophy).
    Epistemic Reasoning and the Mental integrates the epistemology of reasoning and philosophy of mind. The book contains introductions to basic concepts in the epistemology of inference and to important aspects of the philosophy of mind. By examining the fundamental competencies involved in reasoning, Gerken argues that reasoning's epistemic force depends on the external environment in ways that are both surprising and epistemologically important. -/- For example, Gerken argues that purportedly deductive reasoning that exhibits the fallacy of equivocation may nevertheless transmit (...)
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  14. Mikkel Gerken (2012). Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions. Erkenntnis 76 (3):373-394.
    I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a (...)
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  15. Mikkel Gerken (2011). Conceptual Equivocation and Warrant by Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):381-400.
    In this paper, I challenge a widely presupposed principle in the epistemology of inference. The principle, (Validity Requirement), is this: S’s (purportedly deductive) reasoning, R, from warranted premise-beliefs provides (conditional) warrant for S’s belief in its conclusion only if R is valid. I argue against (Validity Requirement) from two prominent assumptions in the philosophy of mind: that the cognitive competencies that constitute reasoning are fallible, and that the attitudes operative in reasoning are anti-individualistically individuated. Indeed, my discussion will amount to (...)
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  16. Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.
    Change in View offers an entirely original approach to the philosophical study of reasoning by identifying principles of reasoning with principles for revising one's beliefs and intentions and not with principles of logic. This crucial observation leads to a number of important and interesting consequences that impinge on psychology and artificial intelligence as well as on various branches of philosophy, from epistemology to ethics and action theory. Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. A Bradford Book.
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  17. Ulf Hlobil (2014). Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on Inference. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.
    I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out (...)
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  18. Peter D. Klein (2011). Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism. In Diego Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
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  19. Adam Leite (2008). Believing One's Reasons Are Good. Synthese 161 (3):419 - 441.
    Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...)
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  20. Eric Mandelbaum, Attitude, Inference, Association: On The Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias.
    The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between understandings of association as a theory of learning, a theory of cognitive structure, a theory of mental processes, and as an implementation base for cognition. I then argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental (...)
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  21. Eric Marcus (2012). Rational Causation. Harvard University Press.
    Introduction -- Rational explanation of belief -- Rational explanation of action -- (Non-human) animals and their reasons -- Rational explanation and rational causation -- Events and states -- Physicalism.
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  22. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Social Value of Reasoning. Episteme.
    When and why does it matter whether we can give an explicit justification for what we believe? This paper examines these questions in the light of recent empirical work on the social functions served by our capacity to reason, in particular, Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.
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  23. Shyam Nair (forthcoming). Consequences of Reasoning with Conflicting Obligations. Mind.
    Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons (...)
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  24. María G. Navarro (2013). On Fuzziness and Ordinary Reasoning. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing 216 (463):468.
    In 1685, in The Art of Discovery, Leibniz set down an extraordinary idea: "The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate [calculemus], without further ado, to see who is right." Calculemus.
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  25. María G. Navarro (2013). El Poder de la Imprecisión Humana. DIAGONAL 189:29.
    La lógica borrosa se ha definido como un sistema preciso de razonamiento, deducción y computación en el que los objetos del discurso se encuentran asociados a información que, por lo general, consideramos imprecisa, incompleta, incierta, poco fiable, parcialmente verdadera o parcialmente posible.
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  26. Richard E. Nisbett (ed.) (1993). Rules for Reasoning. L. Erlbaum Associates.
    This book examines two questions: Do people make use of abstract rules such as logical and statistical rules when making inferences in everyday life? Can such abstract rules be changed by training? Contrary to the spirit of reductionist theories from behaviorism to connectionism, there is ample evidence that people do make use of abstract rules of inference -- including rules of logic, statistics, causal deduction, and cost-benefit analysis. Such rules, moreover, are easily alterable by instruction as it occurs in classrooms (...)
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  27. Joseph Raz (2009). Reasons : Practical and Adaptive. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press.
    The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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  28. Angus Ross (2008). Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):45-58.
    In Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”, the idea of the reactive attitudes is used to provide a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of moral responsibility and of the moral life generally. But Strawson also tells us that in reasoning with someone our attitude towards them must be reactive. Taking up that thought, I argue that Strawson has also provided us with a corrective for an over-intellectualised picture of rationality. Drawing on a Wittgensteinian conception of the relation between thought and its expression, (...)
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  29. Achille C. Varzi, Logic, Ontological Neutrality, and the Law of Non-Contradiction.
    Abstract. As a general theory of reasoning—and as a general theory of what holds true under every possible circumstance—logic is supposed to be ontologically neutral. It ought to have nothing to do with questions concerning what there is, or whether there is anything at all. It is for this reason that traditional Aristotelian logic, with its tacit existential presuppositions, was eventually deemed inadequate as a canon of pure logic. And it is for this reason that modern quantification theory, too, with (...)
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  30. Ralph Wedgwood (2006). The Normative Force of Reasoning. Noûs 40 (4):660–686.
    What exactly is reasoning? Like many other philosophers, I shall endorse a broadly causal conception of reasoning. Reasoning is a causal process, in which one mental event (say, one’s accepting the conclusion of a certain argument) is caused by an antecedent mental event (say, one’s considering the premises of the argument). Just like causal accounts of action and causal accounts of perception, causal accounts of reasoning have to confront a version of what has come to be known as the problem (...)
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  31. Barbara Winters (1983). Inferring. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):201 - 220.
    It has been a commonplace from the beginnings of philosophical thought that what distinguishes humans from other species is the ability to reason; reason- ing is held to be an essential characteristic of the species and one that is unique to it. The essence condition requires that all humans possess at least the capacity for reasoning and that it be exercised in many of the ordinary cases of acquiring beliefs. And uniqueness entails that non-humans cannot reason, no matter how much (...)
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  32. Crispin Wright (2012). Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is Inference”. Philosophical Studies (1):1-11.
    This is a response to Paul Boghossian’s paper: What is inference? (doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9903-x). The paper and the abstract originate from a symposium at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA in San Diego in April 2011. John Broome was a co-commentator.
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