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  1. J. Adam Carter & Philip J. Nickel (2014). On Testimony and Transmission. Episteme 11 (02):145-155.
    Jennifer Lackey’s case “Creationist Teacher,” in which students acquire knowledge of evolutionary theory from a teacher who does not herself believe the theory, has been discussed widely as a counterexample to so-called transmission theories of testimonial knowledge and justification. The case purports to show that a speaker need not herself have knowledge or justification in order to enable listeners to acquire knowledge or justification from her assertion. The original case has been criticized on the ground that it does not really (...)
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  2. Arindam Chakrabarti (1994). Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):965-972.
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  3. C. A. J. Coady (1992). Testimony: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    Our trust in the word of others is often dismissed as unworthy, because the illusory ideal of "autonomous knowledge" has prevailed in the debate about the nature of knowledge. Yet we are profoundly dependent on others for a vast amount of what any of us claim to know. Coady explores the nature of testimony in order to show how it might be justified as a source of knowledge, and uses the insights that he has developed to challenge certain widespread assumptions (...)
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  4. Andrew Cullison (2010). On the Nature of Testimony. Episteme 7 (2):114-127.
    This paper examines several recent positions on the nature of testimony and argues that all are unsatisfactory. The first section argues against narrow, broad, and moderate views. The second section argues against Jennifer Lackey's recent analysis of testimony. Her position is supposed to avoid the problems of the prior accounts, but still suffers from two problems. After discussing those problems, this paper offers and defends an alternative analysis of testimony.
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  5. Jim Davies & David Matheson (2012). The Cognitive Importance of Testimony. Principia 16 (2):297-318.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p297 Os teóricos da mente têm sustentado por longo tempo que o testemunho, como fonte de crença, desempenha um papel fundamentalmente importante na cognição humana. Não está claro, contudo, exatamente por que o testemunho recebeu tal importância cognitiva. Distinguimos três sugestões sobre essa questão: a asserção do número , que considera que a importância cognitiva do testemunho é função do número de crenças que ele geralmente produz relativamente a outras fontes de crença; a afirmação de confiabilidade , que liga a (...)
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  6. Martine Delvaux (2003). Dichtung Und Wahrheit: Jacques Derrida and the Untranslatability of Testimony. Studies in Practical Philosophy 3 (2):40-56.
  7. Kristie Dotson (2011). Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing. Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.
    Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which (...)
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  8. Sanford Goldberg (2007). Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge University Press.
    Sanford Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part 1 he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part 2 he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic characteristics (...)
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  9. Sanford C. Goldberg (2006). Testimony as Evidence. Philosophica 78.
    Regarding testimony as evidence fails to predict the sort of epistemic support testimony provides for testimonial belief. As a result, testimony-based belief should not be assimilated into the category of epistemically inferential, evidence-based belief.
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  10. Peter J. Graham (1997). What is Testimony? Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):227-232.
    C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p. I offer examples to show that Coady’s conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant (...)
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  11. Daniel Groll & Jason Decker (2014). Moral Testimony: One of These Things Is Just Like the Others. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):54-74.
    What, if anything, is wrong with acquiring moral beliefs on the basis of testimony? Most philosophers think that there is something wrong with it, and most point to a special problem that moral testimony is supposed to create for moral agency. Being a good moral agent involves more than bringing about the right outcomes. It also involves acting with "moral understanding" and one cannot have moral understanding of what one is doing via moral testimony. And so, adherents to this view (...)
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  12. Paul L. Harris & Melissa A. Koenig (2007). The Basis of Epistemic Trust: Reliable Testimony or Reliable Sources? Episteme 4 (3):264-284.
    What is the nature of children's trust in testimony? Is it based primarily on evidential correlations between statements and facts, as stated by Hume, or does it derive from an interest in the trustworthiness of particular speakers? In this essay, we explore these questions in an effort to understand the developmental course and cognitive bases of children's extensive reliance on testimony. Recent work shows that, from an early age, children monitor the reliability of particular informants, differentiate between those who make (...)
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  13. John Hawthorne (2012). Some Comments on Fricker's'Stating and Insinuating'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):95-108.
    This discussion piece critically examines some of the key ideology that figures in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Stating and Insinuating’(2012), raises a number of queries about the details of Fricker's argumentation, and develops some ideas about the normative structure of testimony that relate to the themes of that paper.
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  14. Edward Hinchman (2014). Assurance and Warrant. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (17).
    Previous assurance-theoretic treatments of testimony have not adequately explained how the transmission of warrant depends specifically on the speaker’s mode of address – making it natural to suspect that the interpersonal element is not epistemic but merely psychological or action-theoretic. I aim to fill that explanatory gap: to specify exactly how a testifier’s assurance can create genuine epistemic warrant. In doing so I explain (a) how the illocutionary norm governing the speech act proscribes not lies but a species of bullshit, (...)
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  15. Edward Hinchman (2005). Telling as Inviting to Trust. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):562–587.
    How can I give you a reason to believe what I tell you? I can influence the evidence available to you. Or I can simply invite your trust. These two ways of giving reasons work very differently. When a speaker tells her hearer that p, I argue, she intends that he gain access to a prima facie reason to believe that p that derives not from evidence but from his mere understanding of her act. Unlike mere assertions, acts of telling (...)
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  16. Christopher Hookway (2010). Some Varieties of Epistemic Injustice: Reflections on Fricker. Episteme 2010 (7):151-163.
    Miranda Fricker's important study of epistemic injustice is focussed primarily on testimonial injustice and hermeneutic injustice. It explores how agents' capacities to make assertions and provide testimony can be impaired in ways that can involve forms of distinctively epistemic injustice. My paper identifies a wider range of forms of epistemic injustice that do not all involve the ability to make assertions or offer testimony. The paper considers some examples of some other ways in which injustice can prevent someone from participating (...)
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  17. Thomas Kelly (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Gendler (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oup. 167-196.
    Looking back on it, it seems almost incredible that so many equally educated, equally sincere compatriots and contemporaries, all drawing from the same limited stock of evidence, should have reached so many totally different conclusions---and always with complete certainty.
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  18. Arnon Keren (2012). Knowledge on Affective Trust. Abstracta 6 (3):33-46.
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  19. Arnon Keren (2012). On the Alleged Perversity of the Evidential View of Testimony. Analysis 72 (4):700-707.
    According to the evidential view of testimony (EVT), the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence. Richard Moran has argued that because testimony is deliberately produced with the intention of making audiences form a belief, its value as evidence for the attested proposition is diminished; as a result, EVT cannot explain why we regard testimony as such a significant source of knowledge. I argue that this argument against EVT fails, because there is no reason to think that the (...)
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  20. Max Kölbel (2014). Agreement and Communication. Erkenntnis 79 (1):101-120.
    I distinguish two notions of agreement (disagreement) in belief: (a) believing the same (contradictory) content(s) versus (b) having beliefs that necessarily coincide/diverge in normative status. The second notion of agreement (disagreement), (b), is clearly significant for the communication of beliefs amongst thinkers. Thus there would seem to be some prima facie advantage to choosing the conception of content operative in (a) in such a way that the normative status of beliefs supervenes on their content, and this seems to be the (...)
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  21. Martin Kusch (2002). Knowledge by Agreement: The Programme of Communitarian Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Martin Kusch puts forth two controversial ideas: that knowledge is a social status (like money or marriage) and that knowledge is primarily the possession of groups rather than individuals. He defends the radical implications of his views: that knowledge is political, and that it varies with communities. This bold approach to epistemology is a challenge to philosophy and the wider academic world.
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  22. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2009). ``Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries&Quot. In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 140--160.
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  23. Jennifer Lackey (2007). Introduction: Perspectives on Testimony. Episteme 4 (3):233-237.
    Almost everything we know depends in some way on testimony. Without the ability to learn from others, it would be virtually impossible for any individual person to know much beyond what has come within the scope of her immediate perceptual environment. The fruits of science, history, geography – all of these would be beyond our grasp, as would much of what we know about ourselves. We do not, after all, perceive that we belong to one family rather than to another (...)
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  24. Jennifer Lackey (2006). The Nature of Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):177–197.
    I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both (...)
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  25. Jeff Lewis (1991). Attestation and Testimony. Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 3 (1):20-28.
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  26. Christian List, When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. Here I identify the conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and those under which it does not. I also introduce the new concept of ‘consistency of degree k’, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only ‘blatant’ (...)
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  27. Guy Longworth (2009). Some Models of Linguistic Understanding. The Baltic International Yearbook 5 (1):7.
    I discuss the conjecture that understanding what is said in an utterance is to be modelled as knowing what is said in that utterance. My main aim is to present a number of alter- native models, as a prophylactic against premature acceptance of the conjecture as the only game in town. I also offer preliminary assessments of each of the models, including the propositional knowledge model, in part by considering their respective capacities to sub-serve the transmission of knowledge through testimony. (...)
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  28. Benjamin McMyler (2012). Responsibility for Testimonial Belief. Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
    According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the (...)
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  29. Benjamin McMyler (2011). Testimony, Trust, and Authority. Oxford University Press.
    In Testimony, Trust, and Authority, Benjamin McMyler argues that philosophers have failed to appreciate the nature and significance of our epistemic dependence ...
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  30. Lisa McNulty (2013). Lockean Social Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (4):524-536.
    Locke's reputation as a sceptic regarding testimony, and the resultant mockery by epistemologists with social inclinations, is well known. In particular Michael Welbourne, in his article ‘The Community of Knowledge’ (1981), depicts Lockean epistemology as fundamentally opposed to a social conception of knowledge, claiming that he ‘could not even conceive of the possibility of a community of knowledge’. This interpretation of Locke is flawed. Whilst Locke does not grant the honorific ‘knowledge’ to anything short of certainty, he nonetheless held what (...)
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  31. Nicola Mößner (2011). The Concept of Testimony. In Christoph Jäger & Winfried Löffler (eds.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement, Papers of the 34. International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.
    Many contributors of the debate about knowledge by testimony concentrate on the problem of justification. In my paper I will stress a different point – the concept of testimony itself. As a starting point I will use the definitional proposal of Jennifer Lackey. She holds that the concept of testimony should be regarded as entailing two aspects – one corresponding to the speaker, the other one to the hearer. I will adopt the assumption that we need to deal with both (...)
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  32. Nicola Mößner (2010). Wissen Aus Dem Zeugnis Anderer - der Sonderfall Medialer Berichterstattung. mentis Verlag.
    Wendet man sich der Frage nach den Quellen unseres Wissens zu, so muss man feststellen, dass wir zweifelsohne einen großen Teil unseres Wissens über die Welt aus dem Zeugnis anderer gewinnen. In der gegenwärtigen erkenntnistheoretischen Diskussion wird nicht in Frage gestellt, dass das Zeugnis anderer zur Genese unseres Wissens beiträgt. Umstritten ist dagegen,ob die Anführung des Ursprungs solcher Überzeugungen auch zu deren Rechtfertigung in hinreichendem Maße beiträgt. Dieses Buch bietet einen systematischen Einblick in die verschiedenen epistemologischen Positionen dieser Debatte – (...)
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  33. Nicola Mößner (2010). Testimoniale Akte Neu Definiert – Ein Zentrales Problem des Zeugnisses Anderer. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80:151-178.
    In comparison to other epistemic sources (perception, memory and reason) testimony is the only one dealing with the social aspects of gaining and justifying knowledge. One main problem of the current discussion about knowledge by testimony is the concept of testimony itself. It is quite unclear what the correct notion of testimony is supposed to be. In this essay I present a proposal to define the concept of testimony in making a distinction between the conditions which hold in the speaker’s (...)
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  34. Dan O'Brien (2007). Testimony and Lies. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):225–238.
    In certain situations, lies can be used to pass on knowledge. The kinds of cases I focus on are those involving a speaker's devious manipulation of the hearer's irrational or prejudiced thought. These cases show that sometimes a speaker's knowledge of a hearer's mind is necessary for the testimonial transmission of knowledge. They also support a 'seeding' model of knowledge transmission, rather than one that is akin to the postal delivery of complete parcels of information.
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  35. Karen Petroski (2008). The Public Face of Presumptions. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 388-401.
    We commonly think of presumptions as second-best inferential tools allowing us to reach conclusions, if we must, under conditions of limited information. Scholarship on the topic across the disciplines has espoused a common conception of presumptions that defines them according to their function within the decisionmaking process. This focus on the “private” face of presumptions has generated a predominantly critical and grudging view of them, perpetuated certain conceptual ambiguities, and, most important, neglected the fact that what we refer to as (...)
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  36. Steven L. Reynolds (2002). Testimony, Knowledge, and Epistemic Goals. Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.
    Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.
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  37. Angus Ross (1986). Why Do We Believe What We Are Told? Ratio (1):69-88.
    It is argued that reliance on the testimony of others cannot be viewed as reliance on a kind of evidence. Speech being essentially voluntary, the speaker cannot see his own choice of words as evidence of their truth, and so cannot honestly offer them to others as such. Rather, in taking responsibility for the truth of what he says, the speaker offers a guarantee or assurance of its truth, and in believing him the hearer accepts this assurance. I argue that, (...)
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  38. Judith Simon (2010). The Entanglement of Trust and Knowledge on the Web. Ethics and Information Technology 2010 (12):343-355.
    In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet despite this fundamental entanglement, we do not trust blindly. Instead we make use of knowledge to rationally place or withdraw trust. We use knowledge about the sources of epistemic content as well as general background knowledge to assess epistemic claims. Hence, although we may (...)
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  39. Jeremy Wanderer (2013). Anscombe's 'Teachers'. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):204-221.
    This article is an investigation into G. E. M. Anscombe's suggestion that there can be cases where belief takes a personal object, through an examination of the role that the activity of teaching plays in Anscombe's discussion. By contrasting various kinds of ‘teachers’ that feature in her discussion, it is argued that the best way of understanding the idea of believing someone personally is to situate the relevant encounter within the social, conversational framework of ‘engaged reasoning’. Key features of this (...)
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  40. Matthew Weiner, Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.
    Chapter I: Testimony: The Problem word, pdf) Chapter I defines the framework for the discussion of the epistemology of testimony. Testimony is defined, strictly, as utterances that are meant to be believed on the teller’s say-so alone, not because of supporting arguments or any like considerations. A working analysis of this notion of testimony is given, based on Grice’s analysis of “non-natural meaning” in terms of the speaker’s intention to induce belief by means of the hearer’s recognition of that intention (...)
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