This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
218 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 218
Material to categorize
  1. Robert J. Ackermann (1966). Confirmatory Models of Theories. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (64):312-326.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Matthias Adam (2004). Why Worry About Theory-Dependence? Circularity, Minimal Empiricality and Reliability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):117 – 132.
    It is a widely shared view among philosophers of science that the theory-dependence (or theory-ladenness) of observations is worrying, because it can bias empirical tests in favour of the tested theories. These doubts are taken to be dispelled if an observation is influenced by a theory independent of the tested theory and thus circularity is avoided, while (partially) circular tests are taken to require special attention. Contrary to this consensus, it is argued that the epistemic value of theory-dependent tests has (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Michael D. Alder (1973). On Theories. Philosophy of Science 40 (2):213-226.
    An axiom set is given which purports to formalize the notion of a "theory involving measurement." The abstract objects satisfying these axioms are examined, and some candidates for measures of complexity are considered. This framework allows us to discuss some forms of a degree of confirmation. Both "complexity" and "degree of confirmation" appear to be intimately bound up with geometrical aspects of these "theories" which derive from measurement considerations, suggesting that the concepts may be inapplicable to more "general theories." The (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Peter Alexander (1958). Theory-Construction and Theory-Testing. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (33):29-38.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Wolfgang Balzer & Carlos Ulises Moulines (eds.) (1996). Structuralist Theory of Science: Focal Issues, New Results. Walter De Gruyter.
  6. Wolfgang Balzer & Joseph D. Sneed (1978). Generalized Net Structures of Empirical Theories. II. Studia Logica 37 (2):167 - 194.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Wolfgang Balzer & Joseph D. Sneed (1977). Generalized Net Structures of Empirical Theories. I. Studia Logica 36 (3):195 - 211.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael Baur (1990). On the Aim of Scientific Theories in Relating to the World: A Defence of the Semantic Account. Dialogue 29 (03):323-.
  9. John Beatty (1987). On Behalf of the Semantic View. Biology and Philosophy 2 (1):17-23.
    responses to Sloep and Van der Steen, Biol. Philos. 1987 (2)33.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David Craig, A Theory of Theories.
    On the basis of examples from mathematical physics, theoretical hypotheses are distinguished from generative theories. An example of the former is Green’s claim that light is the vibrations of a certain type of elastic solid. An example of the later is the wave theory of light. Both hypotheses and theories are characterized in terms of theoretical principles and models, but unique to a theory is a language frame for generating its many models. The aim of theory is defined in terms (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Michael E. Cuffaro (2014). Review Of: Christopher G. Timpson, Quantum Information Theory and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 81 (4):681-684,.
  12. Jan Faye, Models, Theories, and Language.
    The semantic view on theories has been much in vogue over four decades as the successor of the syntactic view. In the present paper, I take issue with this approach by arguing that theories and models must be separated and that a theory should be considered to be a linguistic systems consisting of a vocabulary and a set of rules for the use of that vocabulary.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Robert P. George & Natural Law (1999). Rooks Received. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Hallett (1979). Towards a Theory of Mathematical Research Programmes (I). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (1):1-25.
  15. Michael Hallett (1979). Towards a Theory of Mathematical Research Programmes (II). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (2):135-159.
  16. D. Wade Hands (2003). Reconsidering the Received View of the 'Received View': Kant, Kuhn, and the Demise of Positivist Philosophy of Science. Social Epistemology 17 (2 & 3):169 – 173.
  17. Robin F. Hendry & Stathis Psillos (2007). How to Do Things with Theories: An Interactive View of Language and Models in Science. In Jerzy Brzeziński, Andrzej Klawiter, Theo A. F. Kuipers, Krzysztof Łastowski, Katarzyna Paprzycka & Piotr Przybysz (eds.), The Courage of Doing Philosophy: Essays Dedicated to Leszek Nowak. Rodopi. 123--157.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Noretta Koertge, A Methodological Critique of the Semantic Conception of Theories.
    A new PhD slated to teach a beginning undergraduate course on scientific reasoning recently asked me to recommend topics. I launched into a description of my “baby-Popper-plus-statistics” class – give them enough deductive logic to understand the Duhemian problem, do the Galileo case study, use the notion of severe test to introduce a bit of probability theory, then segue to the problem of testing statistical hypotheses…. My interlocutor was looking impatient. “But I’m a strong adherent of the Semantic Conception of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jean Leroux (2001). "Picture Theories" as Forerunners of the Semantic Approach to Scientific Theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (2):189 – 197.
  20. Michael Lissack, Second Order Science: Putting the Metaphysics Back Into the Practice of Science.
    The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. Through the imposition of “enabling constraints” -- making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus -- science can bracket away ambiguity. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. After rendering explicit the role of uceps in scientific claims, the scientific method is used to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Elisabeth A. Lloyd (1988). The Semantic Approach and Its Application to Evolutionary Theory. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:278 - 285.
    In this talk I do three things. First, I review what I take to be fruitful applications of the semantic view of theory structure to evolutionary theory. Second, I list and correct three common misunderstandings about the semantic view. Third, I evaluate the weaknesses and strengths of Horan's paper in this symposium. Specifically, I argue that the criticisms leveled against the semantic view by Horan are inappropriate because they incorporate some basic misconceptions about the semantic view itself.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. P. D. Magnus, What SPECIES Can Teach Us About THEORY.
    This paper argues against the common, often implicit view that theories are some specific kind of thing. Instead, I argue for theory concept pluralism: There are multiple distinct theory concepts which we legitimately use in different domains and for different purposes, and we should not expect this to change. The argument goes by analogy with species concept pluralism, a familiar position in philosophy of biology. I conclude by considering some consequences for philosophy of science if theory concept pluralism is correct.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Frederik A. Muller (2003). Refutability Revamped: How Quantum Mechanics Saves the Phenomena. Erkenntnis 58 (2):189 - 211.
    On the basis of the Suppes–Sneed structuralview of scientific theories, we take a freshlook at the concept of refutability,which was famously proposed by K.R. Popper in 1934 as a criterion for the demarcation of scientific theories from non-scientific ones, e.g., pseudo-scientificand metaphysical theories. By way of an introduction we argue that a clash between Popper and his critics on whether scientific theories are, in fact, refutablecan be partly explained by the fact Popper and his criticsascribed different meanings to the term (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Mark W. Risjord (2010). Nursing Knowledge: Science, Practice, and Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell Pub..
    The final chapter of the book 'redraws the map', to create a new picture of nursing science based on the following principles: Problems of practice should guide ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Gerhard Schurz (1990). Paradoxical Consequences of Balzer's and Gähde's Criteria of Theoreticity. Results of an Application to ten Scientific Theories. Erkenntnis 32 (2):161 - 214.
    It is shown that the criteria of T-theoreticity proposed by Balzer and Gähde lead to strongly counterintuitive and in this sense paradoxical results: most of the obviously empirical or at least nontheoretical terms come out as theoretical. This is demonstrated for a lot of theories in different areas. On the way, some improved and some new structuralist theory-reconstructions are given. The conclusion is drawn that the T-theoreticity of a term cannot possibly be proved on the basis of the mathematical structure (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Gerhard Schurz & Ioannis Votsis, A Preliminary Application of Frame-Theory to the Philosophy of Science: The Phlogiston-Oxygen Case.
    In the first part of this paper we investigate how scientific theories can be represented by frames. Different kinds of scientific theories can be distinguished in terms of the systematic power of their frames. In the second part we outline the central questions and goals of our research project. In the third and final part of this paper we show that frame-representation is a useful tool in the comparison of the theories of phlogiston and oxygen, despite those theories being traditionally (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Patrick Sibelius (1990). Natural Contradictions and the Concept of Action in Mechanics. Distribution, Tidningsbokhandeln.
  28. Christopher Gordon Timpson (2013). Quantum Information Theory & the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press.
    Quantum Information Theory and the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics is a conceptual analysis of one of the most prominent and exciting new areas of physics, providing the first full-length philosophical treatment of quantum information theory and the questions it raises for our understanding of the quantum world. -/- Beginning from a careful, revisionary, analysis of the concepts of information in the everyday and classical information-theory settings, Christopher G. Timpson argues for an ontologically deflationary account of the nature of quantum information. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Enrico Viola (2009). “Once Upon a Time” Philosophy of Science: Sts, Science Policy and the Semantic View of Scientific Theories. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 19 (4):465-480.
    Is a policy-friendly philosophy of science possible? In order to respond this question, I consider a particular instance of contemporary philosophy of science, the semantic view of scientific theories, by placing it in the broader methodological landscape of the integration of philosophy of science into STS (Science and Technology Studies) as a component of the overall contribution of the latter to science policy. In that context, I defend a multi-disciplinary methodological integration of the special discipline composing STS against a reductionist (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
The Received View of Theories
  1. Massimiliano Badino, Three Dogmas on Scientific Theory.
    Most philosophical accounts on scientific theories are affected by three dogmas or ingrained attitudes. These dogmas have led philosophers to choose between analyzing the internal structure of theories or their historical evolution. In this paper, I turn these three dogmas upside down. I argue (i) that mathematical practices are not epistemically neutral, (ii) that the morphology of theories can be very complex, and (iii) that one should view theoretical knowledge as the combination of internal factors and their intrinsic historicity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Vadim Batitsky (2000). Measurement in Carnap's Late Philosophy of Science. Dialectica 54 (2):87–108.
  3. Gabriele Contessa (2006). Scientific Models, Partial Structures and the New Received View of Theories. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):370-377.
  4. Herbert Feigl (2004). The" Orthodox" View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as Well as Critique. Scientiae Studia 2 (2):265-277.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Hans Halvorson (2013). The Semantic View, If Plausible, Is Syntactic. Philosophy of Science 80 (3):475-478.
  6. Hans Halvorson (2012). What Scientific Theories Could Not Be. Philosophy of Science 79 (2):183-206.
    According to the semantic view of scientific theories, theories are classes of models. I show that this view -- if taken seriously as a formal explication -- leads to absurdities. In particular, this view equates theories that are truly distinct, and it distinguishes theories that are truly equivalent. Furthermore, the semantic view lacks the resources to explicate interesting theoretical relations, such as embeddability of one theory into another. The untenability of the semantic view -- as currently formulated -- threatens to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sebastian Lutz, The Semantics of Scientific Theories.
    Marian Przełęcki’s semantics for the Received View is a good explication of Carnap’s position on the subject, anticipates many discussions and results from both proponents and opponents of the Received View, and can be the basis for a thriving research program.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Sebastian Lutz (forthcoming). Empirical Adequacy in the Received View. .
    I show that the central notion of Constructive Empiricism, empirical adequacy, can be expressed syntactically and specifically in the Received View of the logical empiricists. The formalization shows that the Received View is superior to Constructive Empiricism in the treatment of theories involving constants or functions from observable to unobservable objects. It also suggests a formalization of ‘full empirical informativeness’ in Constructive Empiricism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Sebastian Lutz (2014). What's Right with a Syntactic Approach to Theories and Models? Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Syntactic approaches in the philosophy of science, which are based on formalizations in predicate logic, are often considered in principle inferior to semantic approaches, which are based on formalizations with the help of structures. To compare the two kinds of approach, I identify some ambiguities in common semantic accounts and explicate the concept of a structure in a way that avoids hidden references to a specific vocabulary. From there, I argue that contrary to common opinion (i) unintended models do not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sebastian Lutz (2012). On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View. Hopos 2 (1):77–120.
    I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Philippe Mongin (1988). À la Recherche du Temps Perdu : Réponse a Mm. LaFleur, Rosenberg Et Salmon. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (4):537-549.
    A rejoinder to commentators of the paper Le réalisme des hypothèses et la "Partial Interpretation View", which was published in the same journal.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Philippe Mongin (1988). Le Réalisme Des Hypothèses Et la Partial Interpretation View. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18 (3):281-325.
    The article discusses Friedman's classic claim that economics can be based on irrealistic assumptions. It exploits Samuelson's distinction between two "F-twists" (that is, "it is an advantage for an economic theory to use irrealistic assumptions" vs "the more irrealistic the assumptions, the better the economic theory"), as well as Nagel's distinction between three philosophy-of-science construals of the basic claim. On examination, only one of Nagel's construals seems promising enough. It involves the neo-positivistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical ("observable") terms; so (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Frederick Suppe (ed.) (1974). The Structure of Scientific Theories. Urbana,University of Illinois Press.
    Suppe, F. The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories (p. [1]-241)--Proceedings of the symposium.--Bibliography, compiled by Rew A. Godow, Jr. (p. [615]-646).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Frederick Suppe (1972). What's Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories? Philosophy of Science 39 (1):1-19.
    Achinstein, Putnam, and others have urged the rejection of the received view on theories (which construes theories as axiomatic calculi where theoretical terms are given partial observational interpretations by correspondence rules) because (i) the notion of partial interpretation cannot be given precise formulation, and (ii) the observational-theoretical distinction cannot be drawn satisfactorily. I try to show that these are the wrong reasons for rejecting the received view since (i) is false and it is virtually impossible to demonstrate the truth of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Peter Turney (1990). Embeddability, Syntax, and Semantics in Accounts of Scientific Theories. Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (4):429 - 451.
    Recently several philosophers of science have proposed what has come to be known as the semantic account of scientific theories. It is presented as an improvement on the positivist account, which is now called the syntactic account of scientific theories. Bas van Fraassen claims that the syntactic account does not give a satisfactory definition of "empirical adequacy" and "empirical equivalence". He contends that his own semantic account does define these notations acceptably, through the concept of "embeddability", a concept which he (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2012). Interweaving Categories: Styles, Paradigms, and Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 43 (4):628-639.
    Analytical categories of scientific cultures have typically been used both exclusively and universally. For instance, when /styles of scientific research/ are employed in attempts to understand and narrate science, styles alone are usually employed. This article is a thought experiment in interweaving categories. What would happen if rather than employ a single category, we instead investigated several categories simultaneously? What would we learn about the practices and theories, the agents and materials, and the political-technological impact of science if we analyzed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2012). Mathematical Modeling in Biology: Philosophy and Pragmatics. Frontiers in Plant Evolution and Development 2012:1-3.
    Philosophy can shed light on mathematical modeling and the juxtaposition of modeling and empirical data. This paper explores three philosophical traditions of the structure of scientific theory—Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic—to show that each illuminates mathematical modeling. The Pragmatic View identifies four critical functions of mathematical modeling: (1) unification of both models and data, (2) model fitting to data, (3) mechanism identification accounting for observation, and (4) prediction of future observations. Such facets are explored using a recent exchange between two groups (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Research Programs
  1. Joseph Agassi (1979). The Legacy of Lakatos. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 9 (3):316-326.
  2. Joseph Agassi (1976). The Lakatosian Revolution. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. 9--21.
  3. F. M. Akeroyd (1988). Research Programmes and Empirical Results. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):51-58.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Guy S. Axtell (1993). In the Tracks of the Historicist Movement: Re-Assessing the Carnap-Kuhn Connection. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):119-146.
    Thirty years after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, sharp disagreement persists concerning the implications of Kuhn’s "historicist" challenge to empiricism. I discuss the historicist movement over the past thirty years, and the extent to which the discourse between two branches of the historical school has been influenced by tacit assumptions shared with Rudolf Carnap’s empiricism. I begin with an examination of Carnap’s logicism --his logic of science-- and his 1960 correspondence with Kuhn. I focus on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 218