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  1. Louise Anthony (1993). Conceptual Connection and the Observation/ Theory Distinction. In Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 135-161.
    Fodor and LePore's reconstruction of the semantic holism debate in terms of "atomism" and "anatomism" is inadequate: it fails to highlight the important issue of how intentional contents are individuated, and excludes or obscures several possible positions on the metaphysics of content. One such position, "weak sociabilism" is important because it addresses concerns of Fodor and LePore's molecularist critics about conditions for possession of concepts, without abandoning atomism about content individuation. Properties like DEMOCRACY may be "theoretical" in the following sense: (...)
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  2. Louise Anthony (1993). Holism: A Consumer Update. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
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  3. Jody Azzouni (2004). Theory, Observation and Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):371-392.
    A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored: such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of. Epistemic views in which observation (and generalizations of it) play a central role, and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories, are contrasted in the light of this constraint. It's argued that global-style epistemic virtues can't meet the constraint, although (certain) epistemic views within which (...)
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  4. Anjan Chakravartty (2003). The Reality of the Unobservable: Observability, Unobservability and Their Impact on the Issue of Scientific Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):359-363.
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  5. Jerry A. Fodor (1984). Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (March):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  6. Daniel Gilman (1992). What's a Theory to Do... With Seeing? Or Some Empirical Considerations for Observation and Theory. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (3):287-309.
    it to be an empirical fact that even the most basic human perception is heavily theory–laden. I offer critical examination of experimental evidence cited by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Churchland on behalf of this supposition. I argue that the empirical evidence cited is inadequate support for the claims in question. I further argue that we have empirical grounds for claiming that the Kuhnian discussion of perception is developed within an inadequate conceptual framework and that a version of the observation/theory distinction (...)
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  7. Milena Ivanova (2013). Did Perrin's Experiments Convert Poincare to Scientific Realism. Hopos 3 (1):1-19.
    In this paper I argue that Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom does not indicate a shift from instrumentalism to scientific realism. I examine the implications of Poincaré’s acceptance of the existence of the atom for our current understanding of his philosophy of science. Specifically, how can we understand Poincaré’s acceptance of the atom in structural realist terms? I examine his 1912 paper carefully and suggest that it does not entail scientific realism in the sense of acceptance of the fundamental existence (...)
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  8. Matthias Kaiser (1991). From Rocks to Graphs — the Shaping of Phenomena. Synthese 89 (1):111 - 133.
    Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and the use of (...)
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  9. William H. Krieger & Brian L. Keeley (2006). The Unexpected Realist. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press.
    There are two ways to do the unexpected. The banal way—let's call it the expectedly unexpected—is simply to chart the waters of what is and is not done, and then set out to do something different. For a philosopher, this can be done by embracing a method of non sequitor or by perhaps inverting some strongly held assumption of the field. The more interesting way— the unexpectedly unexpected—is to transform the expectations themselves; to do something new and contextualize it in (...)
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  10. Farzad Mahootian & Timothy E. Eastman (2009). Complementary Frameworks of Scientific Inquiry: Hypothetico-Deductive, Hypothetico-Inductive, and Observational-Inductive. World Futures 65 (1):61 – 75.
    The 20th century philosophy of science began on a positivistic note. Its focal point was scientific explanation and the hypothetico-deductive (HD) framework of explanation was proposed as the standard of what is meant by “science.” HD framework, its inductive and statistical variants, and other logic-based approaches to modeling scientific explanation were developed long before the dawn of the information age. Since that time, the volume of observational data and power of high performance computing have increased by several orders of magnitude (...)
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  11. J. Christopher Maloney (1986). Sensation and Scientific Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3):471-482.
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  12. Ernest Nagel (ed.) (1971). Observation and Theory in Science. Baltimore,Johns Hopkins Press.
  13. S. Okasha (2011). Experiment, Observation and the Confirmation of Laws. Analysis 71 (2):222-232.
  14. Observation Reconsidered (1984). Philosophy of Science Association Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51 (1):23-43.
    Several arguments are considered which purport to demonstrate the impossibility of theory-neutral observation. The most important of these infers the continuity of observation with theory from the presumed continuity of perception with cognition, a doctrine widely espoused in recent cognitive psychology. An alternative psychological account of the relation between cognition and perception is proposed and its epistemological consequences for the observation/theory distinction are then explored.
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  15. Raimo Tuomela (1978). Scientific Realism and Perception. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):87-104.
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  16. Ioannis Votsis (forthcoming). Perception and Observation Unladened. Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    Let us call ‘veridicalism’ the view that perceptual beliefs and observational reports are largely truthful. This paper aims to make a case for veridicalism by, among other things, examining in detail and ultimately deflating in import what many consider to be the view’s greatest threat, the so-called ‘theory-ladenness’ of perception and/or observation. In what follows, it is argued that to the extent that theoretical factors influence the formation of perceptual beliefs and observational reports, as theory-ladenness demands, that influence is typically (...)
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  17. Ioannis Votsis (2011). Data Meet Theory: Up Close and Inferentially Personal. Synthese 182 (1):89 - 100.
    In a recent paper James Bogen and James Woodward denounce a set of views on confirmation that they collectively brand 'IRS'. The supporters of these views cast confirmation in terms of Inferential Relations between observational and theoretical Sentences. Against 1RS accounts of confirmation, Bogen and Woodward unveil two main objections: (a) inferential relations are not necessary to model confirmation relations since many data are neither in sentential form nor can they be put in such a form and (b) inferential relations (...)
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  18. Ioannis Votsis (2010). Making Contact with Observations. In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Springer. 267--277.
  19. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2009). Character Analysis in Cladistics: Abstraction, Reification, and the Search for Objectivity. Acta Biotheoretica 57:129-162.
    The dangers of character reification for cladistic inference are explored. The identification and analysis of characters always involves theory-laden abstraction—there is no theory-free “view from nowhere.” Given theory-ladenness, and given a real world with actual objects and processes, how can we separate robustly real biological characters from uncritically reified characters? One way to avoid reification is through the employment of objectivity criteria that give us good methods for identifying robust primary homology statements. I identify six such criteria and explore each (...)
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  20. Crispin Wright (1993). Scientific Realism and Observation Statements. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):231 – 254.